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ABSTRACT 
 
The UK governance codes have developed over the last few decades. This thesis 
predominantly discusses key aspects of those recommendations in relation to 
evidence of board effectiveness, firm performance, and firm outcomes. 
Chapter 3 discusses the effects of chairman characteristics on board effectiveness. By 
using a large CEO turnover dataset between 2005 and 2013, the title, independence, 
and age of the chairman play an important role in removing poor performing CEOs. 
This chapter also indicates that the impact of chairman characteristics may be 
dependent on board size and board independence. 
Chapter 4 examines the impact of female directors on firm performance. Previous 
studies indicate that there are mixed results in the relationship between female 
directors and firm performance. There is a tendency for the presence of females on 
the boards to encounter tokenism problems. Moreover, this chapter reports that the 
relationship between female directors and firm performance may depend on a certain 
characteristic such as firm size. 
Finally, Chapter 5 examines the effect of board diversity, particularly the diversity of 
non-executive directors, on firm survival. This chapter argues that by focusing only 
on non-executive directors and financially distressed firms, firm survival can be 
approached via the agency theory and the resource dependence theory. This chapter 
finds that the competency of non-executive directors, which is proxied by six 
diversity dimensions, tends to outperform the independence of non-executive 
directors in enhancing firm survival during the period of distress. 
Overall, this thesis contributes to governance studies in several ways. Firstly, it has 
opened the opportunity for further quantitative examinations on the chairman’s roles. 
Secondly, it contributes to a fast growing body of literature on board diversity. 
Thirdly, this thesis, particularly Chapter 5, contributes to studies on bankruptcy by 
linking corporate governance and financial distress via the agency theory and the 
resource dependence based theory.  
 
 
 
v 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Cover ..................................................................................................................... i 
Statements ............................................................................................................ ii 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................. iii 
Abstract ............................................................................................................... iv 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................ v 
List of Tables ...................................................................................................... ix  
List of Figures ..................................................................................................... xi 
List of Equations ............................................................................................... xii 
List of Abbreviations ....................................................................................... xiii 
 
1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................... 1 
 1.1 Introduction .......................................................................................... 1 
 1.2 Motivations, Objectives, and Contributions ......................................... 4 
  1.2.1 Chairman Characteristics and CEO turnover ........................... 4 
  1.2.2 Female Director and Firm Performance ................................... 6 
  1.2.3 Board Diversity and Firm Survival ........................................... 8 
 1.3 Thesis Structure .................................................................................. 10 
 
2. CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................. 11 
 2.1 Corporate Governance ........................................................................ 11 
 2.2 The Development of Governance Codes in the UK ........................... 16 
  2.2.1 The Cadbury Report ............................................................... 17 
  2.2.2 The Greenbury Report ............................................................ 19 
  2.2.3 The Hampel Report ................................................................. 19 
  2.2.4 The Turnbull Report ............................................................... 20 
  2.2.5 The Higgs Report .................................................................... 21 
  2.2.6 The Turner Review and the Walker Review .......................... 22 
  2.2.7 The Davies Report .................................................................. 23 
  2.2.8 Summarize of Governance Codes UK .................................... 24 
 2.3 The Theories of Corporate Governance ............................................. 25 
  2.3.1 The Agency Theory ................................................................ 25 
  2.3.2 The Resource Dependence Theory ......................................... 27 
  2.3.3 The Stakeholder Theory ......................................................... 29 
 2.4 The Board of Directors ....................................................................... 32 
  2.4.1 The Chairman ......................................................................... 35 
   2.4.1.1 The Roles of Chairman ............................................. 35 
   2.4.1.2 The Separation of CEO-chairman role ..................... 37 
  2.4.2 The Non-Executive Directors ................................................. 40 
  
   
 
vi 
 
 
 
3. CHAPTER 3: CHAIRMAN CHARACTERISTICS AND  
 CEO TURNOVER…… ............................................................................. 43 
 3.1. Introduction.................... .................................................................... 43 
 3.2 Literature Review ............................................................................... 47 
  3.2.1 CEO Turnover ........................................................................ 47 
  3.2.2 CEO Turnover in the UK ........................................................ 49 
  3.2.3 The Roles of Chairman ........................................................... 51 
 3.3 Hypothesis Development .................................................................... 51 
  3.3.1 The Chairman Independence .................................................. 52 
  3.3.2 The Chairman Title (Function) ............................................... 53 
  3.3.3 The Chairman Tenure ............................................................. 55 
  3.3.4 The Chairman Age .................................................................. 56 
  3.3.5 The Chairman Involvement .................................................... 57 
 3.4 Research Methodology ....................................................................... 57 
  3.4.1 Sample Selection .................................................................... 57 
  3.4.2 Regression Analysis ................................................................ 58 
  3.4.3 Research Variables ................................................................. 59 
   3.4.3.1 Dependent Variable .................................................. 59 
   3.4.3.2 Financial Measures ................................................... 60 
   3.4.3.3 Chairman Characteristics .......................................... 61 
   3.4.3.4 Board Characteristics ................................................ 61 
   3.4.3.5 CEO Characteristics ................................................. 62 
   3.4.3.6 Control Variables ...................................................... 62 
 3.5 Empirical Results ................................................................................ 63 
  3.5.1 Sample Selection Process ....................................................... 63 
  3.5.2 CEO Turnover Reasons .......................................................... 67 
  3.5.3 CEO Turnovers and Chairman Turnovers .............................. 69 
  3.5.4 Descriptive Analysis ............................................................... 71 
  3.5.5 Logit Regression Analysis – No Interaction Effects .............. 75 
  3.5.6 Logit Regression Analysis – with Interaction Effects ............ 81 
   3.5.6.1 Non-Executive Chairman ......................................... 82 
   3.5.6.2 Independent Chairman .............................................. 83 
   3.5.6.3 Chairman Age ........................................................... 87 
   3.5.6.4  Chairman Tenure ...................................................... 88 
   3.5.6.5 Chairman Involvement ............................................. 89 
  3.5.7 Research Discussion ............................................................... 89 
 3.6 Conclusion….......... ............................................................................ 92 
 
 
4 CHAPTER 4: FEMALE DIRECTOR AND  
 FIRM PERFORMANCE .......................................................................... 94 
 4.1 Introduction….. …… .......................................................................... 94 
 4.2 Gender Bias and Quota Policy ........................................................... 99 
 4.3 Literature Review ............................................................................. 102 
vii 
 
 
 
 
  4.3.1 Theories of Gender Diversity on the Boards ........................ 102 
  4.3.2 The Impacts of Female Directors on Board  
   Effectiveness ......................................................................... 105 
  4.3.3 The Impacts of Female Directors on Firm Performance ...... 106 
 4.4 Hypothesis Development .................................................................. 109 
  4.4.1 Gender Diversity and Firm Performance .............................. 109 
  4.4.2 Female Executive Director Vs Female Non-Executive 
   Director……… ..................................................................... 111 
  4.4.3 Tokenism and Critical Mass ................................................. 111 
  4.4.4 Firm Governance Level ........................................................ 113 
 4.5. Research Methodology ..................................................................... 114 
  4.5.1 Sample and Data ................................................................... 114 
  4.5.2 Regression Analysis and Variables ...................................... 115 
  4.5.3 Instrumental Variables .......................................................... 117 
 4.6. Empirical Results .............................................................................. 118 
  4.6.1 Sample Selection .................................................................. 118 
  4.6.2 Descriptive Analysis ............................................................. 119 
  4.6.3 Instrumental Variable Analysis. ........................................... 126 
  4.6.4 The Regression Analysis ...................................................... 128 
   4.6.4.1 Analysis of Female Directors on Firm  
    Performance ............................................................ 129 
   4.6.4.2 Analysis of Female Executive Directors and  
    Female Non-Executive Directors ........................... 134 
   4.6.4.3 Analysis of Critical Mass ....................................... 138 
  4.6.5 The Effects of Female Director on Firm Performance  
   with respect to Firm Governance Level ................................ 142 
   4.6.5.1 CEO Power ............................................................. 142 
   4.6.5.2 Firm Size Effect ...................................................... 149 
  4.6.6 Research Discussion. ............................................................ 156 
 4.7 Conclusion………… ........................................................................ 159 
 
 
5 CHAPTER 5: BOARD DIVERSITY AND FIRM SURVIVAL .......... 160 
 5.1 Introduction…… .............................................................................. 160 
 5.2 Literature Review ............................................................................. 163 
  5.2.1 Non-Executive Directors ...................................................... 165 
  5.2.2 Empirical Evidence on Board Diversity. .............................. 223 
  5.2.3 Financial Distress (Bankruptcy) ........................................... 166 
  5.2.4 Corporate Governance and Financial Distress...................... 168 
 5.3 Research Methodology. .................................................................... 171 
  5.3.1 Sample Selection .................................................................. 171 
  5.3.2 Board Diversity Dimensions ................................................. 172 
   5.3.2.1 Gender Diversity..................................................... 172 
viii 
 
 
 
   5.3.2.2 Nationality Diversity .............................................. 173 
   5.3.2.3 Occupation (Expertise) Diversity ........................... 174 
   5.3.2.4 Educational Diversity. ............................................ 175 
   5.3.2.5 Age Diversity .......................................................... 176 
   5.3.2.6 Tenure (Experience) Diversity. .............................. 176 
  5.3.3 Diversity Measures and Diversity Measures ........................ 176 
  5.3.4 Regression Model and Control Variables ............................. 178 
 5.4 Empirical Results .............................................................................. 181 
  5.4.1 Failed Firms. ......................................................................... 181 
  5.4.2 The Diversity of Non-Executive Directors in Financially 
   Distressed Firms....... ............................................................ 184 
  5.4.3 Regression Analysis .............................................................. 190 
   5.4.3.1 Regression Analysis for All Observations.............. 190 
   5.4.3.2 Regression Analysis for Small and Large Firms .... 194 
   5.4.3.3 Regression Analysis for Firms with Powerful  
    CEOs and Non-Powerful CEOs ............................. 197 
  5.4.4 Research Discussion ............................................................. 199 
 5.5 Conclusion…………. ....................................................................... 202 
 
6 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION ................................................................ 203 
 6.1 Introduction…………. ..................................................................... 203 
 6.2 Key Findings on the Empirical Chapters .......................................... 205 
  6.2.1 Chairman Characteristics and CEO Turnover ...................... 205 
  6.2.2 Female Directors and Firm Performance .............................. 206 
  6.2.3 Board Diversity and Firm Survival ....................................... 208 
 6.3 Research Limitations and Future Research ...................................... 209 
 6.4 Summary…………. .......................................................................... 210 
 
References……………………………………………………………………. 211 
 
Appendix A:  The Estimations and Graphs of Interaction Effects ............. 235 
Appendix B: The Stata Output of 2SLS Model ........................................... 283 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 3.1  Variable Types and Sources ............................................................. 63 
Table 3.2  Sample Selection .............................................................................. 66 
Table 3.3  CEO turnover Reasons and Firm Performance between 
   2005 and 2013 .................................................................................. 68 
Table 3.4  New CEO Turnover Classifications and Firm Performance  
   between 2005 and 2013 .................................................................... 70 
Table 3.5  The Occurrences of Chairman turnover 180 days before  
   or after CEO turnovers between 2005 and 2013 .............................. 71 
Table 3.6  CEO Turnover Classification between 2005 and 2013 .................... 72 
Table 3.7  Summary Descriptive Statistics ....................................................... 74 
Table 3.8  The Correlation Matrix of Explanatory Variables ........................... 77 
Table 3.9  Forced CEO Turnover and Financial Performance – Logit  
   Regression……………….. .............................................................. 78 
Table 3.10 CEO Turnover and Chairman Characteristics .................................. 80 
Table 3.11 Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman  
   Function for All Observations .......................................................... 85 
Table 4.1  Variable Descriptions ..................................................................... 117 
Table 4.2  The Percentage of Female Director in the UK Listed Firms  
   Between 2004 and 2012 ................................................................. 122 
Table 4.3  Descriptive Statistics ...................................................................... 123 
Table 4.4  Correlation Analysis ....................................................................... 125 
Table 4.5  Comparison between firms with and without female director ....... 125 
Table 4.6  The Regression Estimations: ROA and Fraction of Female 
   Directors……….. ........................................................................... 132 
Table 4.7  The Regression Estimations: Profit Margin 
   and Fraction of Female Directors ................................................... 133 
Table 4.8  Female Executive Directors and Non-Executive  
   Directors on ROA........................................................................... 136 
Table 4.9  Female Executive Director and Non-Executive  
   Director on Profit Margin ............................................................... 137 
Table 4.10 Critical Mass Analysis with ROA .................................................. 140 
Table 4.11 Critical Mass Analysis with Profit Margin .................................... 141 
Table 4.12 Female Directors and ROA for Owner CEOs ................................ 145 
Table 4.13 Female Directors and Profit Margin for Owner CEOs .................. 146 
Table 4.14 Female Directors and ROA for Outsider CEOs ............................. 147 
Table 4.15 Female Directors and Profit Margin for Outsider CEOs................ 148 
Table 4.16 Female Directors and ROA for Small Firms .................................. 152 
Table 4.17 Female Directors and Profit Margin for Small Firms .................... 153 
Table 4.18 Female Directors and ROA for Large Firms .................................. 154  
Table 4.19 Female Directors and Profit Margin for Large Firms .................... 155 
Table 5.1  The Research Variables .................................................................. 180 
x 
 
 
 
Table 5.2  The Insolvency Classification ........................................................ 181 
Table 5.3  Distressed and Failure Firms based on the Industry ...................... 182 
Table 5.4  Delisting and Failure Firms between 2005 and 2015 ..................... 183 
Table 5.5  The Non-Executive Characteristics in the Sample Research 
   Between 2004 and 2012 ................................................................. 185 
Table 5.6  Descriptive Statistics of the Herfindahl Concentration Index ........ 186 
Table 5.7  Descriptive Statistics ...................................................................... 188 
Table 5.8  The Descriptive Statistics between Failure and Non-Failure  
   Firms………………....................................................................... 189 
Table 5.9  Correlation Matrix .......................................................................... 192 
Table 5.10 Estimation Results of the Cox Proportional Hazard Model of  
   the Entire Sample ........................................................................... 193 
Table 5.11 The estimations of Failure Hazard Rates between Small Firms 
   (Panel A) and Large Firms (Panel B) ............................................. 196 
Table 5.12 The estimations of Failure Hazard Rates between Less  
   Powerful CEOs (Panel A) and Powerful CEOs (Panel B) ............. 198 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 3.1  Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman  
   Function for All Observations ....................................................... 86 
Figure 4.1  Mean of Fraction of Female Director based on the Industry ....... 127 
Figure 5.1  Sample Selection Process ............................................................ 172 
Figure 5.2  Difference between Delisting Year and Failure Year .................. 184 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
 
 
LIST OF EQUATIONS 
 
3.1  The CEO Turnover General Model .................................................... 58 
3.2  The CEO Turnover Logistic Model.................................................... 58  
3.3  Logit Regression for Financial Measures  –  
  without interaction effect .................................................................... 75 
3.4  Logit Regression for Chairman Characteristics –  
  without interaction effect .................................................................... 76 
4.1  The General form of Regression Models ......................................... 115 
4.2  The 1st Stage Regression Model ....................................................... 115 
4.3  The Arellano-Bond Model................................................................ 116 
5.1  The Herfindahl Concentration Index ................................................ 177 
5.2  The Cox Proportional Hazard Regression Model ............................ 178 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiii 
 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Abbreviations   Full Term 
2SLS  Two Stage Least Square 
AIM  Alternative Investment Market 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
COO  Chief Operating Officer  
CSP  Corporate Social Performance 
FRC  Financial Reporting Council 
GMM  General Moment of Methods 
ICB   Industry Classification Benchmark 
IPO     Initial Public Offering 
IV     Instrumental Variable 
ICAEW    Institute of Chartered Accountant in England and Wales 
LBO  Leverage Buy-Out 
LSE  London Stock Exchange 
M&A  Merger and Acquisition 
MBO  Management Buy-Out  
MD   Managing Director 
MFI  Micro-Finance Institution 
NED  Non-Executive Director 
NPV  Net Present Value 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLS  Ordinary Least Square 
PLC  Public Limited Company 
R&D  Research and Development 
ROA  Return on Asset 
ROE  Return on Equity 
ROI  Return on Investment 
SOX  Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
UK   United Kingdom  
US   United States of America 
1 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Introduction 
Corporate governance has attracted huge attention from academics, practitioners and 
policymakers often as a result of large corporate scandals, such as in the US (e.g. Enron, 
WorldCom, Lehman Brothers), in the UK (e.g. Maxwell Communication, Mirror 
Groups, Polly Peck International and Bank of Credit and Commerce International), and 
in Italy (e.g. Parmalat). Moreover, the Asian financial crises in the 1990s and other 
recent financial crises have created massive implications for broader stakeholders 
namely government and taxpayers. 
Consequently, governments around the world have attempted to improve their own 
domestic governance guidelines. The UK government and the regulators of the UK 
capital market have been continuously examining and improving the governance codes 
for listed firms by releasing reform proposals, guidelines, and discussion papers.   
A key starting point was the Cadbury Report (1992), which primarily recommended the 
separation of the CEO-chairman role, the appointment of more independent directors 
and the establishment of audit, nomination, and remuneration committees. About 10 
years on, the Higgs Report was published to scrutinise and to improve the roles of non-
executive directors in terms of duties, composition, appointment, and remuneration. A 
more recent recommendation is outlined in the Davies Report (2012) which emphasised 
the importance of having female directors in the boardroom, and it, therefore, 
recommended a 25 per cent representation of females on the boards for FTSE100 firms 
by 2015.  
Given these recommendations, there are two important inferences. (1) The board of 
directors plays a significant role in the success or failure of a firm. The board is an 
important element in creating effective governance at board level, as well as on firm 
performance and firm outcomes. (2) UK listed firms encounter certain external 
pressures in structuring their boards, which may affect the effectiveness of the boards. 
Even though the UK has adopted the term ‘comply and explain’, some UK listed firms 
may experience inflexibility in creating effective boards for instance in large listed firms.  
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This thesis specifically examines two aspects of the board of directors for UK listed 
firms: the board chairman and board diversity. There are two reasons for choosing these 
themes. Firstly, both aspects have been the targets of the UK governance codes: the 
board chairman in the Cadbury Report (1992) and board diversity in the Higgs Report 
(2002) and the Davies Report (2012). In other words, both aspects can influence board 
effectiveness.  
Secondly, the selected themes follow the development of the UK governance codes, 
from the agency theory to through the lens of the resource dependence theory of the 
organization. The Cadbury Report (1992) put the emphasis on board independence by 
preventing the persistence of dominant individuals (i.e. dual-role CEO) in the 
boardroom which is underpinned by the agency theory. Even though the Higgs Report 
(2002) focused on improving board oversight via non-executive directors, it called for 
more diversity in the UK boardroom. Finally, the latest governance code, the Davies 
Report (2012), only focuses on gender diversity in the UK boardroom, which is 
underpinned by the resource dependence theory. 
The previous examinations on the board chairman have devoted attention only to the 
effect of separating the roles of CEO and chairman on CEO turnovers, which is usually 
a proxy of board effectiveness at the board level. Moreover, some studies tried to 
examine the effects of board diversity on firm performance and firm survival. However, 
they did not properly address several issues that are associated with board diversity 
studies, particularly in the UK-based studies, such as the use of sample selection, 
econometric analysis, and the involved theories.  
There are three main research questions in this thesis. Firstly, do other chairman 
characteristics influence board effectiveness? The recommendation on separating CEO-
chairman roles was introduced more than 20 years ago. Previous empirical studies 
(Brickley et al., 1997; Dahya et al., 2002; Dey et al., 2011) focussed on the implications 
of separating both roles from various aspects. Recent figures show that almost all (90 
per cent) of the UK listed firms have followed the Cadbury Report recommendation by 
separating the CEO-chairman roles (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; Owen and 
Kirchmaier, 2008). Chapter 3 will try to analyse the influence of chairman 
characteristics on CEO turnover, which is deemed to be the chairman’s fundamental 
responsibility. 
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Secondly, does gender diversity have any influence on firm performance? The decision 
to appoint more female directors has been a topical issue. The impacts of appointing 
female directors seem to have had mixed results in the extant literature: positive 
association (Erhardt et al., 2003; Carter et al. 2003; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2007; 
Luckerath-Rovers, 2013; Liu et al., 2013; Strom et al., 2014) and negative or no 
association (Smith et al, 2006; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2010; Galbreath, 
2011; Jurkus et al., 2011; Ahern and Dittmar; 2012). There are serious concerns that 
mixed results may be influenced by uncontrolled characteristics of firms and the use of 
different econometric techniques to address the problems of endogeneity and tokenism 
(Simpson et al, 2010; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013). Chapter 4 will examine the influence of 
gender diversity on firm performance by trying to address those concerns.  
Thirdly, does board diversity, particularly the diversity of non-executive directors, 
improve firm survival in the period of distress? According to the Higgs report (2002), 
the roles of non-executive directors are more complex than the roles of executive 
directors because non-executive directors have to perform both monitoring and advising 
roles simultaneously. Most previous bankruptcy studies (Daily and Dalton, 1994; 
Simpson and Gleason, 1999; Fich and Slevak, 2008) focus on board independence or 
leadership structure. More recently, diversity studies have developed from a single 
diversity dimension to multiple diversity dimensions and they show that diversity can 
improve firm value (Anderson et al 2011), quality of disclosure (Upadhyay and Zeng, 
2014), firm cost of capital (Upadhyay, 2014), and corporate social performance (Hafsi 
and Turgut, 2013). Therefore, Chapter 5 will discuss the impact of board diversity, 
particularly diversity for non-executive directors, on firm survival in the period of 
distress. 
To address all of these questions, this thesis will use data on all the UK listed firms, 
excluding firms in the financial sector, between 2004 and 2012. By using a large sample, 
the empirical analyses are less biased in the estimations, as several recommendations 
are aimed at large firms (FTSE100). In addition, this thesis will employ a range of 
different econometric techniques such as logit analysis in Chapter 3; fixed-effect 
estimations, two-stage least square (2SLS) estimations, and general moment method 
(GMM) estimations in Chapter 4; and survival analysis regression in Chapter 5. 
In general, the contributions of this thesis can be divided into three. Firstly, this thesis 
will add a new perspective on the role of the chairman in relation to CEO turnovers. 
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Secondly, it will show the importance of board diversity concerning firm performance 
and firm survival. Thirdly, this thesis will try to approach firm survival via the agency 
theory and the resource dependence theory at the same time 
The remaining structure of this section is as follows. Section 1.2 will discuss briefly the 
motivation, objectives, research questions, findings and contributions of all the 
empirical chapters. Section 1.3 will discuss the structure of the thesis.  
 
1.2  Motivations, Objectives, and Contributions 
This section will summarize the motivations, objectives, and contributions of the 
empirical chapters.  
 
1.2.1 Chairman Characteristics and CEO Turnover 
The objective of Chapter 3 is to investigate whether chairman characteristics influence 
CEO turnovers. Ever since the publication of the Cadbury Report, most UK listed firms 
have separated the roles of CEO and chairman. The discussions on the role of the 
chairman have been predominantly whether the separation of CEO-chairman roles can 
bring positive consequences on firm value (Brickley et al, 1997; Ferris and Yan, 2007; 
Dey et al, 2011), rather than investigating the effects of chairman characteristics (e.g. 
age, independence, tenure) on board effectiveness or firm performance.  
Gabrielsson et al (2007) argue that the roles of the chairman can be explained from two 
views which are the shareholder model and the team production model. The shareholder 
supremacy model focuses on monitoring roles, which is underpinned by the agency 
theory. According to this model, the chairman should protect the shareholders’ interests 
by monitoring and evaluating the CEO or other executives. The team production model 
argues that the chairman should add value to the firm by providing unique skills, 
information, and expertise together with the executives and other board members. This 
model focuses on stakeholder interests. In other words, the chairman is more involved 
in investment, financing, or even operating decisions in the team production model. 
However, several studies (Florou, 2005; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; McNulty et 
al, 2011) report that the UK chairmen tend to be  more involved in monitoring roles (i.e. 
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hiring and firing CEO) rather than other roles. Therefore, this chapter will try to link 
certain characteristics of the chairman on the effectiveness of monitoring role, which is 
proxied by CEO turnover incidents. 
This chapter offers four contributions. Firstly, the study extends the studies on CEO 
turnover (Weisbach, 1988; Dahya et al 2002; Huson et al., 2001; Hillier et al., 2005; 
Lau et al., 2009) by adding chairman characteristics to the CEO turnover models. 
Previous studies have discussed CEO characteristics, board characteristics, and 
ownership structure as explanatory variables in CEO turnovers models, but none of 
them discussed chairman characteristics even though evaluating CEO performance is 
one of the chairman’ fundamental responsibilities.  
Secondly, the study extends previous quantitative studies on the chairman that 
predominantly discuss only one feature of chairman characteristics, which is the 
separation of the CEO-chairman roles (dual roles). For instance the relation of dual roles 
on CEO turnover (Goyal and Park, 2002; Dahya et al., 2002) or firm performance 
(Brickley et al., 1997; Dey et al., 2011). This chapter examines several other features of 
chairman characteristic such as title (non-executive chairman vs executive chairman), 
independence, age, tenure, and involvement in the CEO selection. The closest study that 
quantitatively discussed these characteristics is Florou (2005), in which chairman title, 
chairman involvement in the CEO selection, and chairman career path (former CEO) 
are linked with chairman dismissal for 300 listed UK firms. Therefore, this study also 
extends Florou (2005) by adding more investigation of chairman characteristics, 
expanding the number of sample firms, and targeting CEO dismissal rather than 
chairman dismissal.  
Thirdly, the study extends studies (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; Owen and 
Kirchmaier, 2008; Kakabadse et al., 2010; McNulty et al., 2011) that focus on the 
effectiveness of the chairman which were mostly conducted by qualitative analyses. 
Those studies focused on a small group of firms and simple analysis, while this chapter 
uses rigorous methods and a much larger sample in analysing the relationship between 
the chairmen and CEOs. 
Fourthly, this study shows not only show the relation between chairman characteristics 
and CEO turnover, but also the interaction of chairman characteristics with certain 
governance structures (board independence and board size). This analysis will therefore 
add new perspectives for shareholders in creating an effective board structure.  
6 
 
 
 
Five chairman characteristics will be investigated: function (non-executive vs executive 
chairman), independence, age, tenure, and involvement in the CEO selection. The 
analysis employs a large sample of observations and logit regression to examine the 
relationship. Several restrictions are employed in the sample selection, such as 
excluding CEO turnover as a result of board restructuring or CEOs who are promoted to 
become the chairman, because the chairmen in such cases are less likely to be involved 
in these types of turnovers.  
The findings indicate that most chairman characteristics tend not to directly influence 
CEO turnover. The effectiveness of chairman characteristics may depend on certain 
governance aspects such as board independence and board size. This chapter argues that 
the lack of significance in the relationship is because of the development of chairman 
roles, from monitoring to more active ones. 
 
1.2.2 Female Directors and Firm Performance 
In a similar way to the previous empirical chapter, Chapter 4 tries to examine the recent 
policy on gender diversity on the boards. The relationship between female directors and 
firm performance can be approached by reference to several theoretical perspectives, 
such as the agency theory, the resource dependence theory, the stakeholder theory, and 
the human capital theory (Carter et al., 2003; Terjesen et al., 2009).  
Terjesen et al. (2009) argue that there is a complex relationship between female 
directors and firm performance because it involves individual characteristics, firm 
characteristics and external environment characteristics. The impacts of gender diversity 
can be seen on different levels such as board level (e.g. board processes, board 
behaviours, board selection, and board culture), firm performance, and firm outcomes. 
Thus, the effects of female directors on firm performance may be mixed.  
The recent studies have shown that the appointment of female directors can have 
positive consequences for board effectiveness such as CEO turnover – firm performance 
sensitivity (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), agency cost (Jurkus et al., 2011), and financial 
restatement (Abbot et al., 2012). However, the effects of female directors on firm 
performance are relatively mixed, which may be due either to certain uncontrolled 
governance or firm characteristics, the econometric techniques employed, or the 
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tokenism problem (Simpson et al., 2010). This chapter will try to address those aspects 
in analysing the relationship between female directors and firm performance 
This chapter contributes in several ways. Firstly, it distinguishes the function of female 
directors. Even though executive and non-executive directors have the same 
responsibilities from a legal point of view, executive directors tend to be more 
influential in many strategic decisions (such as investment, operating, or financing 
decisions). As most UK listed firms appoint females as non-executive directors 
(Gregory-Smith et al., 2013), the impacts of females on the boards may not be fully 
identified on firm performance. This examination is relatively similar to that of Liu et al. 
(2013) which was conducted in China. This analysis extends their study in terms of the 
use of different country.  
Secondly, the chapter extends previous studies (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Jurkus et al., 
2011). These studies argue that the relation between firm performance and female 
directors is subject to firm current governance level. Firms with strong (internal and 
external) governance mechanisms may suffer from over-monitoring problems when 
they appoint female directors. This study uses the same approach in explaining the 
relation between female directors and firm performance but employs different proxies 
for firm governance, which are CEO power and firm size.  
Thirdly, the study addresses the tokenism problem in the analysis. Such problems occur 
when a minority group, such as female directors, are being marginalised, as their 
number in the boardroom is modest (Elstad and Ladegar, 2012). There is a lack of 
discussion about this problem even though previous UK-based studies (Haslam et al., 
2010; Gregory-Smith et al., 2013) found no evidence of a positive relationship between 
female directors and firm performance.  
Fourthly, this study extends similar previous studies in the UK in terms of observations, 
such as private firms (Wilson and Altanlar, 2009) and FTSE350 firms (Gregory-Smith 
et al., 2013). This chapter will use all possible non-financial UK listed firms. Given that 
the UK large listed firms are prone to government interventions in structuring their 
boards, the chapter can give a clear comparison between female directors’ effect on 
large small UK listed firms and on small ones. 
This chapter uses all UK listed firms, excluding the financial sector, between 2004 and 
2012. The study uses ROA and profit margin to proxy firm performance. To address the 
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endogeneity problem, 2SLS and GMM estimations are employed. In the case of 2SLS 
regression, the instrumental variables are the fraction of male directors that have a 
connection to female directors (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Levi et al., 2013) and the 
fraction of female directors in the same industry (Liu et al., 2013). In addition, the 
analysis also controls for the type of female directors (non-executive and executive 
directors) and the critical mass factors. 
There are several important findings in this chapter. (1) There is a little evidence that the 
fraction of female directors can significantly, positively, and directly influence firm 
performance. (2) After addressing the endogeneity problem, both female executive 
directors and female non-executive directors are not significantly influencing firm 
performance. (3) Appointing more than three female directors is better than hiring one 
female director. (4) Certain characteristic of a firm, such as firm size, may influence the 
relation between gender diversity and firm performance.  
 
1.2.3  Board Diversity and Firm Survival 
Chapter 5 discusses the impact of board diversity, particularly in relation to non-
executive directors, on firm survival. Most of the discussions and studies on non-
executive directors have been focusing on their independence, which is a key feature in 
board effectiveness (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Similarly, in the financial 
distress studies, the use of governance variables tends to be approached via the agency 
theory, which is largely related to independent directors and the separation of the CEO-
chairman roles (Daily and Dalton, 1994; Simpson and Gleason, 1999; Fich and Slevak, 
2008).  
The Higgs Report (2002) indicates that the roles of non-executives are not only 
associated with monitoring roles (independence), but also related to advising roles 
(competency). One way to proxy non-executive directors’ competency is via their 
diversity. By appointing non-homogeneous directors, the boards will have a greater pool 
of talents in terms of skills, experience, expertise, and connections (the Davies Report, 
2012). The studies on board diversity have shown that multiple diversity dimensions 
can improve firm value (Anderson et al., 2011), quality of disclosure (Upadhyay and 
Zeng, 2014), firm cost of capital (Upadhyay, 2014), and corporate social performance 
(Hafsi and Turgut, 2013).  
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This chapter contributes from three different angles. Firstly, from the bankruptcy 
studies point of view, the study extends previous studies, in terms of approaching the 
problems, by combining the agency theory and the resource dependence theory and 
adding a new perspective, which is board diversity. Previous studies approach 
bankruptcy studies from either the agency theory alone (Daily and Dalton, 1994; Fich 
and Slevak, 2008; Robinson et al., 2012) or the resource dependence theory alone 
(Wilson and Altanlar, 2009; Wilson et al., 2014) 
Secondly, from the diversity point of view, this empirical chapter can extend previous 
studies (Anderson et al., 2011; Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; Upadhyay and Zeng, 2014; 
Upadhyay, 2014) by adding the new benefit of board diversity which can improve firm 
survival during the period of distress.  
 Thirdly, from the governance studies point of view, this chapter will add a new 
important feature of the non-executive directors. There is tendency to view the 
independence of the non-executive as the only important feature (Roberts et al., 2005; 
Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010). This chapter, however, will show the importance of non-
executive directors’ competency that can be proxied by directors’ occupation and social 
heterogeneity.   
This chapter is slightly different from the previous chapters in terms of sample research. 
This study follows Fich and Slevak (2008), in which the focus is only on financially 
distressed firms. Two measures to distinguish between financially distressed firms and 
healthy firms are debt ratio and qui-score. This chapter employs the Cox proportional 
hazard model. The dependent variable is time (year) in distress. The focus variable is 
the diversity score which is composed of non-executive directors’ gender, nationality, 
experience, expertise, education, and age.  
The results indicate that board diversity can improve firm survival during the period of 
distress. However, the impact of occupation diversity (i.e. education, tenure, and 
expertise) and social diversity (i.e. gender, nationality, and age) may be moderated by 
firm size and CEO power. Social diversity tends to be more significant in small firms 
and firms with powerful CEOs, while occupation diversity is more significant in large 
firms. In addition, the significance of board diversity tends to outperform board 
independence. 
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1.3  Thesis Structure 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. The literature review will be discussed in 
Chapter 2, which covers the corporate governance definitions, the development of the 
UK governance codes, the theories of corporate governance, and the board of directors. 
Chapter 3 will discuss the relation between chairman characteristics and CEO turnover. 
The second empirical chapter, Chapter 4, will discuss female directors and firm 
performance. The final empirical chapter, Chapter 5, is on board diversity and firm 
survival. Finally, Chapter 6 will discuss the conclusions, its research limitations, and 
possible future areas for research.   
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance has drawn considerable attention from scholars, activists, and 
policymakers in the last few decades, predominantly due to large corporate scandals and 
recent financial crises. There are numerous definitions and dimensions of corporate 
governance. One of the most quoted definitions is in the Cadbury Report (1992): 
“Corporate governance is the system by which businesses are directed and controlled.” 
The definition is simple, broad, open-ended and shareholders value oriented, but this 
definition is the least meaningful according to institutional investors (Salomon, 2004). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as “the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investments”. This definition focuses on maximizing capital provider returns, which are 
the shareholders and debt holders, through corporate governance mechanisms, 
particularly board structure, equity ownership, and executive remuneration. This 
definition should be approached with caution, however, as it does not include wider 
stakeholders, which may have a greater role in the firms business operations and 
performance (Goergen, 2012). 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has on several 
occasions released guidelines for corporate governance practice. The report in 2004 
provides a functional definition of governance:  
“Corporate governance is one key element in improving economic efficiency and 
growth as well as enhancing investor confidence. Corporate governance involves 
a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. Good 
corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board and 
management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its 
shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring.” (OECD Principles, 2004, 
Preamble, Cited in IoD Factsheet, Online) 
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The OECD definition is more comprehensive than previous definitions in the Cadbury 
Report (1992) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) in several ways. Firstly, it states the 
importance of good governance not only in micro dimensions (e.g. firm survival) but 
also in macro dimensions (e.g. economic growth, social well-being). Secondly, 
shareholders are not the only beneficiaries of good corporate governance. It is necessary 
to build a good relationship with the stakeholders. Traditionalist views, including those 
expressed in the Cadbury Report (1992), tend to put shareholders’ interests at the centre 
of governance processes, while undermining other stakeholders’ interests. Corporate 
governance should recognize stakeholders’ rights to achieve sustainable firms and 
create prosperity in the broader community. Thirdly, this definition indicates the 
importance of incentives for the boards to embrace effective monitoring roles. 
Since the publication of this report, the definitions of corporate governance have 
developed from the maximization of shareholders’ value oriented to stakeholders’ value 
oriented. Banks (2004) defines corporate governance as “the structure and function of 
corporation to stakeholders generally, and its shareholders specifically”.  
Salomon (2004) defines corporate governance as:  
“The system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, 
which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their 
stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business 
activity.” 
Huse (2007) defines corporate governance as “the interaction between various internal 
and external actors and the board members in directing a firm for value creation”. 
Nordberg (2011) defines corporate governance as the mechanism that is put in place to 
control the board of directors’ actions and the boards’ relationship with management, 
shareholders, and broader society.  
Given the definitions, corporate governance involves two important aspects: the 
participants and the effectiveness of governance.  According to Huse (2007), these 
participants may have a legitimate stake in the firm (narrow definition), or may 
contribute something that is at risk with the firm (narrow definition), or may influence 
the firm or be influenced by the firm (wide definition). Corporate governance involves 
many parties, namely shareholders, management, board of directors, employees, 
customers, creditors, suppliers, and governments.  
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Arguably, the board of directors is the central figure in corporate governance. As the 
agents of shareholders, the success and failure of firms depend on the effectiveness of 
their boards. “A governance failure occurs when neither the board of directors nor the 
top management team is sufficiently qualified to conduct the firm's business” (Walsh 
and Seward, 1990).  
Corporate governance covers not only the relation between the firm’s constituents and 
the firm itself, but also the relations among the firm’s constituents, for instance between 
capital providers and the managers, between shareholders (owners) and stakeholders, or 
among the shareholders (e.g. majority and minority shareholders). Initially, firm 
shareholders are the predominant party, whose interests must be taken care of beyond 
those of the other stakeholders, and the accountability - the product of governance - is 
towards the shareholders only. In recent years, policymakers, practitioners, and 
researchers have called for changes in the way firms create good relations with other 
stakeholders. In this broader view, the future and prosperity of the stakeholders are 
often related to firm’s long-term prospects (Salomon, 2004). Bloomfield (2013) argues 
that the failure of management in observing the interest of firm stakeholders’ interests 
can damage firm survival, which eventually will damage shareholders’ interests. Further 
discussion on the relationship between the firm and its stakeholders will be discussed 
more thoroughly later in the stakeholder theory section. 
The effectiveness of corporate governance is another important aspect in the definitions 
of governance. It involves many aspects such as administration, management, 
accounting, and law. It should fulfil both micro and macro aspects (Keasey et al., 2005). 
The micro aspect objective is to enhance firm productivity and shareholder value. When 
firms become larger and more complex, the objective can be modified, which is to fulfil 
stakeholders’ interests. The macro aspect objective is related to national prosperity, e.g. 
to improve investor confidence and to avoid large corporate scandals. 
Bloomfield (2013) divides effectiveness of corporate governance into inward-facing 
aspects and outward-facing aspects. The inward-facing aspects are related to the 
effectiveness of the relationship between shareholders and managers. As the owner of 
the firms, governance must ensure that the shareholders are provided with proper and 
accurate information about firm financial position and performance and shareholders 
can exercise control over the firm, which includes power to elect and to dismiss 
directors, to prohibit, and to pass resolutions for certain outcomes. On the other hand, 
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the outward-facing aspects are related to the process of balancing competing claims of 
the stakeholders. Governance should ensure that the allocation of firm resources can 
satisfy the stakeholders and balance risks, so that all parties are rewarded. When the 
management can resolve the pressure of competing short-term and long-term 
shareholders and stakeholders needs, then it can be categorised as effective governance. 
Nevertheless, there is an element of risk in corporate governance (Monks and Minow, 
2004): risks for shareholders, employees, creditors, whose interests are not protected, 
because of corrupt or incompetent directors. Such governance problems could create 
different types of damage from mild effects to severe ones. Banks (2004) classifies them 
into four stages. (1) Reputational damage. Financial restatements may create bad press 
coverage and push a temporary stock decline. (2)  Early financial problems. When the 
board cannot resolve reputational damage, it will affect firm financial position and 
performance. Following the inability of the boards to address these issues properly, 
equity analysts will report a negative opinion and rating agencies may put the firm onto 
‘watch list’ status for a possible rating downgrade. (3) Growing financial distress. The 
survival of the firms hangs in the balance at this stage. The stock price is depressed 
because of continuous sell-off. The rating agency is likely to downgrade firm 
creditworthiness. (4) Bankruptcy. Whether the firms encounter re-organization or 
liquidation, the shareholders and stakeholders will face significant consequences. On a 
broader level, the failure of a corporation will create job losses, affect government tax 
revenue, and damage the regulator’s reputation.  
Consequently, it is necessary to strengthen governance processes. Banks (2004) 
suggests that the processes can be done from inside the firms (micro reforms) or outside 
the firms (macro reforms).  Micro reforms include strengthening the board of directors, 
refocusing corporate policies (e.g. setting appropriate compensation standards, 
establishing effective public disclosure for long-term perspective and its implementation) 
and enhancing internal control (e.g. enhancing internal audit controls, promoting a 
culture of risk management, and creating management crisis programs).  
The boards are always the main target of governance reforms, in terms of addressing 
disclosure policy, conflict of interests, and proper compensation. Strengthening the 
boards can be conducted by appointing outside directors. Enhancing board 
independence is an important key to minimize conflict of interest and to increase the 
likelihood of poor performing executives’ dismissal. Outside directors are willing to 
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challenge the executives’ views and they may provide useful skills and expertise in the 
boardroom. Establishing board committees will help directors in specific issues such as 
audit, remuneration, nomination, and risk management. Separating CEO and chairman 
roles can avoid having individuals who are too dominant particularly in countries that 
adopt the unitary board system (Banks, 2004).  
The macro reforms are usually promoted by the capital market regulators, government, 
or activist investors. They include the following: (1) Promoting changes in regulatory 
oversight. Governments have continuously been changing regulatory oversight either 
through formal legislations (e.g. the Companies Act 2006 in the UK, or the quota on 
female directors in Norway), or listing rules for listed companies (e.g. prospectus rules, 
or disclosure and transparency rules), or creating ‘best practice’ recommendations (e.g. 
the Cadbury Report, the Greenbury Report).  
(2) Strengthening legal and bankruptcy systems. Governments must create fair systems 
in terms of creditor rights, seniority, insolvency, and so on. Strong bankruptcy systems 
should enable financially distressed firms to protect the value of the firm assets through 
early access to court protection, respecting the claimant’s priority, and providing 
financing and administration for re-organization.  
(3)  Deepening the capital market and promoting corporate control activity. The market 
regulators could improve the transparency and efficiency rules in the capital markets. 
The regulators could change non-favour rules e.g. on unfavourable tax treatment. 
Efficient capital markets would enhance corporate control activity such as initial public 
offering (IPO), management buy-out (MBO). 
The involvement of external parties in establishing governance codes is inevitable in 
order to minimize the risks of another corporate scandal. Every country has different 
characteristics, which suggests that there is no one governance model that is superior to 
the other. The OECD Report (2004) indicates several principles that should be fulfilled 
by any governments that want to produce effective governance codes. (1) Governance 
framework should embrace transparency and efficiency in the capital market, which 
covers timely and accurate reports on firm financial position, firm performance, and 
firm governance. (2) Governance codes thus protect and accommodate the shareholders’ 
rights, including the rights of the minority and foreign shareholders. (3) The governance 
framework should give guidance on board responsibilities in terms of the effectiveness 
of its monitoring role and its relationship with shareholders. 
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Given the third OECD principle, the boards have a pivotal role in achieving effective 
governance. The credibility and legitimacy of corporate management (the board) is 
related to its independence and competency (Monks and Minow, 2004). 
However, Banks (2004) identifies some common sources of the governance problems, 
which are mainly related to the board of directors such as, poor judgement and 
behaviour of the directors as a result of unethical conduct; powerful CEOs in the 
boardroom and directors failing to challenge the CEOs; directors tending to focus on 
personal gain from connection with the executives; and poor internal and external 
controls. Poor internal control includes lack of technically independent control, liberal 
accounting policies, excessive risk-taking, and inadequate internal audits, while poor 
external control includes inadequate regulatory laws in the capital market or in general, 
insufficient legal bankruptcy regimes, lack of monitoring from block holders or activist 
investors, and poor external audit practices.  
This thesis will ultimately focus on the effectiveness of the board of directors in terms 
of conducting its duties in conjunction with the UK governance codes. Maasen (2002) 
argues that the corporations have been intervened by the introduction of governance 
principles and guidelines in the Anglo-Saxon countries particularly with respect to the 
organization of the board of directors. Section 2.2, Section 2.3, and Section 2.4 will 
discuss the UK governance codes, all relevant theories, and the responsibilities of 
directors (the chairmen and non-executive directors) respectively. 
 
2.2 The Development of Governance Codes in the UK 
According to Ezzamel and Watson in Keasey et al. (2005), the unitary boards have two 
roles in the UK. (1) They are legally responsible for the planning and execution of the 
firm strategic decisions on behalf of shareholders and for ensuring that all aspects of the 
firm operations meet the relevant legal requirements. (2) The board is appointed by the 
shareholders to manage the shareholders’ assets in a way that will embrace 
accountability principles.  
Both roles depend on the system of ‘accountability through disclosure’. They indicate 
two important features of accountability: shareholder rights and information. 
Shareholder rights relate to the privilege to vote at the annual general meeting, appoint 
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and remove directors, and determine the remuneration of the directors and management. 
In order to facilitate shareholder voting rights, the shareholders have to receive 
sufficient information regarding firm financial position and performance.  
However, they argue that the development of ‘creative accounting’ tends to be used by 
executives to mislead rather than enlighten shareholders on firm financial condition. 
The prevalent domination by insider directors in the UK listed firms means a lack of 
independent control on financial disclosures and executive activities. The corporate 
scandals are the concrete proof that “accountability through disclosure” does not work 
properly in UK listed firms.  
The regulators therefore have a crucial role in determining the practice of corporate 
governance in the big corporations, and numerous guidelines and recommendations 
have been proposed to improve board independence, transparency, and accountability in 
publicly held corporations. The following section will discuss the UK governance 
guidelines. 
 
2.2.1 The Cadbury Report  
The Cadbury Report (1992) is the first governance code for modern corporations. 
Following the corporate scandals in the late 1980s and early 1990s (such as Maxwell 
Communication, Mirror Groups, Polly Peck International and the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International), the Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange, 
and the accounting profession created the Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance to improve accountability and board oversight, and the 
Committee was chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury. Keasey et al. (2005) argue that the 
Cadbury Report is the response to recent phenomena in the early 1990s: (1) ‘creative 
accounting’, which can obscure shareholder value; (2) recent corporate scandals as a 
result of highly concentrated power on the board; (3) highly entrenched boards; (4) 
public discontent over directors’ remuneration. 
The report made three important recommendations to the boards of directors in UK 
listed firms: (1) stressing the need to split the positions of the CEO and chairman in 
order to achieve a clear division of power and to avoid highly concentrated power in the 
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boardroom; (2) appointing at least three independent directors; and (3) the formation of 
board committees.  
In addition, this report was the first governance code to introduce the term ‘comply and 
explain’, which would later be used in UK corporate governance codes. The board must 
state how they approach the recommendation and failure to do so may cause the firm to 
lose its listing status.  
The Cadbury Report recommends that no director should dominate in the boardroom. 
Assigning the chairman and CEO positions to different individuals is the heart of the 
recommendation. As the agency theorists point out, there is a tendency for agents 
(CEOs) not to act in the shareholders’ best interest when organization management and 
ownership are separated and so combining the roles of CEO and chairman could 
exacerbate the agency problem. Brickley et al. (1997) argue that combining them means 
that CEOs evaluate their own performance. This condition may be detrimental to 
shareholder value.  
The recommendation argues that non-executive directors can improve the accountability 
of executive directors. The establishment of committees gives non-executive directors 
more influence on certain aspects of the board affairs. However, as non-executive 
directors have two distinctive duties (advising and monitoring), they may have a 
conflict of duties.  The report does not explain how to resolve this, and tends to focus 
only on the independence of non-executive directors as the proxy of board effectiveness. 
Moreover, Keasey et al. (2005) argue that the Cadbury Report does not address every 
issue and tends to lead to ‘box-ticking’. They point out that an over-emphasis on 
accountability can undermine the spirit of enterprise, which is to become economically 
and commercially successful.   
The Cadbury Report is viewed as the foundation for corporate governance codes around 
the world because most developed countries sought to introduce the recommendations 
in the years that followed. France, Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Japan, and 
Australia introduced their codes about 5 years after the Cadbury Report. The US 
officially introduced the codes 10 years after the Cadbury Report through the enactment 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, shortly after the collapse of WorldCom and Enron 
(Nordberg, 2011). Following the introduction of the Cadbury Report, by 2000 there 
were about 60 governance codes in 30 markets (Monks and Minow, 2004). 
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2.2.2 The Greenbury Report  
The committee was led by Sir Richard Greenbury, who was the chairman of Marks & 
Spencer. The Greenbury Report (1995) focussed on the directors’ remuneration, 
following concern from public and shareholders on the size of such remuneration. The 
report makes three important recommendations in terms of directors’ remunerations:   
(1) It sought to link senior managers’ and directors’ remuneration with their 
performance rather than to reduce director salaries, which might have affected in 
attracting high calibre individuals. (2) The report recommended full disclosure of 
information on director remuneration (e.g. basic pay, performance related pay, bonuses) 
and explanations of the reasons of it in the financial statements, as well as 
recommending that external auditors should check the detailed disclosure. (3) It pointed 
out the need to establish a remuneration committee, which would consist of only non-
executive directors, to assess and to determine the remuneration of executive directors. 
However, even though the report recommended the convergence between remuneration 
and performance, it did not provide any guidelines on how to measure performance, 
such as incentives for long-term performance and incentives for short-term performance 
(ICSA, 2009). Nevertheless, after the publication of this report, the disclosure of 
director remuneration has been a topical issue in corporate governance.  
 
 2.2.3 The Hampel Report  
A committee was set up to review the implementation of the Cadbury Report and the 
Greenbury Report. It was led by Sir Ronald Hampel, who was the chairman of Imperial 
Chemical Industries. The Hampel Report (1998) explained the importance of the 
voluntary aspect in the UK governance codes rather than formal regulation, and that 
firms should avoid the ‘box-ticking’ approach of the Cadbury and the Greenbury 
recommendations.  
The report also stressed the importance of stakeholders. Directors are responsible for 
relations with stakeholders, but they are accountable to shareholders. This means 
shareholders’ interest is the main priority in terms of accountability.  But the report 
suggests that the long-term sustainability of a firm depends on its relationship with the 
stakeholders.   
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The report targeted shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders, requiring them 
to be more responsible and proactive in the governance activities, particularly pension 
fund trusts. The report encouraged institutional investors to avoid short-term pressure 
on investee firms and they should be active and careful to approve resolutions in the 
shareholders’ general meeting (Salomon, 2004).  
The set of governance codes from the Cadbury Report, the Greenbury Report, and the 
Hampel Report is known as the Combined Code. This Code has 18 principles and 48 
code provisions, which target the companies (e.g. directors, directors’ remuneration, 
relations with shareholders, accountability and audit) and institutional investors (e.g. 
shareholder voting, dialogue with companies, and evaluation of governance disclosure). 
The Combined Code is used as the governance codes and guidelines for listed firms in 
the London Stock Exchange. The Combined Code (1998) tries to put more balance 
between accountability aspects and enterprise goals to flourish.   
 
2.2.4 The Turnbull Report  
The Institute of Chartered Accountant in England and Wales (ICAEW) created the 
Turnbull Committee, which was chaired by Nigel Turnbull. The purpose of the Turnbull 
Report (1999) was to review internal control in the boardroom, including financial, 
operational, and compliance control, and risk management. The board has to identify all 
risks of the business such as supplier failure, changes in consumer behaviour, or out-
dated products. The report pointed out that management should manage the risks rather 
than eliminate them. “Profits are, in part, the rewards for successful risk taking in 
business”. The boards therefore have to understand the firms’ long-term strategic 
objectives and conduct a proper risk management to prevent a ‘disaster’ (Salomon, 
2004). 
The Turnbull Report provides pivotal guidelines because (1) it requires the boards not 
only to consider past performance in decision-making, (2) it encourages firms to 
disclose to shareholders on the potential risks, (3) it requires the firms to appoint 
directors with a good experience and skills with respect to the changing environments, 
and (4) it recommends that risks should be assessed regularly (ICSA, 2009). In addition, 
this recommendation is a good guideline for small and medium-sized firms because the 
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report suggests that the risks are not entirely related to financial risk and the 
recommendations can be implemented to different firm circumstances (Kendrick, 2000). 
 
2.2.5 The Higgs Report  
The committee, which was chaired by Derek Higgs, was set up as a consequence of the 
collapse of Enron and WorldCom in the US and Parmalat in Italy. In both cases, 
particularly the Enron case, the non-executive directors were high calibre individuals 
including an accounting professor and a former dean. Yet the non-executive directors 
failed to prevent the collapse. The Higgs Report (2003) is therefore an anticipation 
measure by UK policymakers to address the effectiveness of non-executive directors.  
The report describes the main roles of non-executive directors as being: (1) to challenge 
and to contribute to firm strategic decisions; (2) to measure and to monitor management 
performance; (3) to ensure the accountability of the firm financial reporting system; (4) 
to set appropriate levels of management remuneration.   
Several important recommendations to improve the effectiveness of non-executive 
directors were also made. For instance, half of the board members should be 
independent non-executive directors, the boards should identify a senior independent 
non-executive director whose main task is to build a proper and strong relationship with 
major shareholders through regular meetings, non-executive directors cannot serve on 
three board committees at the same time, the nomination and remuneration committees 
should be composed of independent non-executive directors, and non-executive 
directors should have regular meetings without the presence of the chairman and 
executive directors at least once a year. 
In terms of independence, the report introduced new definitions of independent directors: 
(1) directors must not have been employed by the firm (or group) for the last five years; 
(2) there must have been no relationship with the firm for the last three years; (3) 
directors do not receive any other remuneration besides a director’ fee; (4) there is no 
family tie to the firm advisors, or its employees; (5) directors do not represent a 
substantial shareholder; (6) directors do not serve on the board for more than ten years.  
In addition to these recommendations, the Committee for the Higgs Report (2003) 
conducted research into the board characteristics in UK listed firms. It found that the 
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posts of non-executive directors are dominated by white British males. Only 7 per cent 
were non-British and only 1 per cent was from black and minority groups. Only 6 per 
cent of non-executive directors were females although 30 per cent of managers were 
female. Consequently, the report called for a greater diversity in appointing non-
executive directors. 
The publication of the Higgs Report has slightly changed the role and responsibility of 
the chairmen. Even though the chairmen cannot be as the chair committee and the CEO 
should not be elected as the chairman of the same firm, the Higgs Report implicitly 
suggests that the chairman is no longer classified as an independent director (Keasey et 
al., 2005). The boards should appoint senior non-executive directors whose main role is 
to help the interaction between non-executive directors and shareholders. Bloomfield 
(2013) argues that the existence of senior non-executive directors and the chairman will 
cause a problem in the boardroom because both parties will be responsible to the 
shareholders.  
 
2.2.6 The Turner Review and the Walker Review  
Following the financial crisis in 2008, several areas are still causing problems in the UK 
governance, such as concentrated power on the board, directors’ tendency to take risky 
decisions without careful considerations of the nature of firm business, independent 
directors’ lack of experience and expertise in dealing with complex financial 
instruments, and excessive remuneration for executive directors.  
The Turner Review (2009) and the Walker Review (2009) both focus on the UK 
banking sector. The Turner Review was released six months after the fall of Lehman 
Brothers in 2008. The target of its recommendations is mainly in the financial sector, in 
which directors tend to take excessive risks. The review recommends several regulatory 
and supervisory changes in the banking system, particularly the integration of 
remuneration policy and risk management.  
The recommendations of the Walker Review are: (1) to create certain incentives in 
directors remuneration so that they can manage risk effectively; (2) to ensure the 
balance of expertise and independence in the boardroom; (3) to improve the 
effectiveness of audit, risk, remuneration and nomination committees; (4) to increase 
23 
 
 
 
the involvement of institutional shareholders in monitoring roles; and (5) to assess the 
adoption of international best practice in the UK banking sector (Bloomfield, 2013). 
The Walker Review argues that the financial crisis is a result of behavioural problems in 
the boardroom. 
Shortly after the Walker Review, the Combined Code was published to discuss the 
guidelines for the board of directors, and covers seven aspects: the boards, the chairman 
and CEO, board balance and independence, director appointment, information and 
professional development, and performance evaluation.  
 
2.2.7 The Davies Report 
The Davies Report (2012) is relatively different from the previous governance codes 
because it focuses on gender diversity on the boards. It recommends a 25 per cent 
representation of females on the boards for FTSE100 firms by 2015.  
According to the Davies Report (2012), there are several reasons why firms should 
appoint female directors. Firstly, to improve performance. Female directors can 
improve board independence, promote better decision-making, and enhance firm 
survival. Secondly, to bring a larger pool of talents in terms of expertise, experience, and 
connections into the boardroom. More than half of the graduates and labour force are 
females. The firms have to appoint the best quality individuals in order to remain 
competitive. Thirdly, to be more responsive to the market. Female directors tend to be in 
the retail, utility, media, and banking sectors, in which female customers have a 
substantial fraction. Fourthly, to improve firm governance. Female directors are also 
associated with better monitoring in the boardroom and adherence to a code of conduct.  
The recommendation is more relaxed than any of its EU counterparts in terms of the 
percentage and the type of codes. Norwegian firms are required by law to appoint 
female directors to make up at least 40 per cent of firm total number of directors since 
2005 (Smith et al., 2006). Finnish firms have been required by law to have at least one 
female director since 2010. The French government requires firms that have 500 
employees and more than 50 million Euros in sales, to have 20 per cent female directors 
in 2014 and 40 per cent of female directors by 2017 (Nekhili and Gatfaoui, 2013). The 
Italian government has imposed a requirement of 33 per cent of female directors or 
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firms facing a 1 million Euro fine (Chapple and Humphrey, 2014). Similarly, in large 
German corporations, female directors must hold 30 per cent of board seats by 2016 
(Dauer, 2014).  
Several countries outside the EU have followed a similar action. For instance, Japan, 
which is one of the worst among developed countries for gender diversity, has a target 
of 30 per cent female representatives for senior positions by 2020, Malaysia and Brazil 
have set 30 per cent and 40 per cent thresholds respectively for the presence of females 
on the boards (The Economist, 2014). 
The latest figures in FTSE index firms indicate that female directorship increased from 
12 per cent in 2011 to 25 per cent in 2014 (Stern, 2014). However, the significant 
increase of gender diversity in the UK boardroom may be distorted because most of the 
female candidates are appointed as non-executive directors rather than executive 
directors – who are responsible for running the firm business. In fact, the proportion of 
female executive directors remained stagnant at around 6 per cent during that period. 
 
2.2.8 A Summary of Governance Codes in the UK 
The Cadbury Report (1992) focused on improving internal monitoring by separating the 
CEO-chairman roles, appointing at least three independent directors, and establishing 
board committees. This approach continued until the Higgs Report (2002), which aimed 
to empower non-executive directors (Zalewska, 2014). Until this point, the focus of the 
UK governance codes was to increase board independence and to prevent dominance by 
individuals in the boardroom. However, the direction of governance codes altered as the 
financial crisis hit the UK. There was a call for a balance between board independence 
and board competence (the Walker Review, 2009). The call became stronger when the 
Davies Report (2012) focused on board diversity, especially gender diversity. Overall, 
therefore, the UK governance codes have been focusing on the effectiveness of the 
board of directors. 
The term ‘comply and explain’ is used from the Cadbury Report (1992) until the Davies 
Report (2012). This approach suggests that ‘one size may not fit all’. It is a voluntary 
approach which provides flexibility to the UK listed firms to follow the guidelines 
unlike the more legalistic and statutory approach used in some other countries, such as 
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the female director quota for Norwegian listed firms, or SOX in the US. The UK listed 
firms do not have to structure their governance activities around the codes, but they are 
expected to explain how their board has addressed the issues with respect to the codes. 
If a firm decides not to comply, then it has to explain why. Salomon (2004) argues that 
the ‘comply and explain’ approach may encounter a disclosure quality problem, in 
which, particularly large firms, may provide greater detail of governance, while others 
may not explain adequately how they approach the codes. 
Finally, most of the governance codes target large listed firms. For instance, the Davies 
Report (2012) is aimed at FTSE100 firms. In other words, small listed firms experience 
a less rigorous governance regime than large listed firms in the UK. Consequently, the 
effect of governance codes may therefore be different according to firm size.  
 
2.3 The Theories of Corporate Governance 
The discussions on corporate governance encompass many disciplines including finance, 
economics, accounting, law, management, and organization behaviour. Clarke (2004) 
points out six theories that underpin corporate governance: the agency theory, the 
managerial hegemony, the stewardship theory, the stakeholder theory, the theory of 
convergence, and the external pressure theory. Mallin (2010) and Bloomfield (2014) 
add the theory of transaction. In addition, Nordberg (2011) refers to the external 
pressure theory as the resource dependence theory. However, this literature review does 
not discuss all the theories. Those theories that are favoured as the foundation of the 
empirical chapters will be discussed. 
 
2.3.1 The Agency Theory 
The agency theory is the most influential one in governance studies, as most of the 
governance codes are underpinned by it. Fundamentally, the theory involves two parties 
(managers and shareholders), and the nature of humans, who are opportunist, self-
interested, and co-operate with others only when it is in their interests to do so (Daily et 
al., 2003).  
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Clarke (2004) argues that corporate governance can be approached by the agency theory 
via two studies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Firstly, the 
separation between management and finance is the essence of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). In this case, managers have substantial residual control rights and power to 
allocate investors’ funds. Corporate governance is concerned with how to minimize 
misallocation of the shareholders’ funds. This problem is associated with adverse 
selection, in which directors claim to have sufficient knowledge and expertise at the 
time of appointment but the shareholders are not able to verify this.  
Secondly, the separation between decision-making and risk-bearing functions is the 
basis of the Fama and Jensen (1983) approach. Shareholders delegate decision-making 
to managers on particular issues. As managers may attempt to maximize their own 
utility, corporate governance is to ensure whether monitoring and controlling of 
managers can be effective. This problem is related to moral hazard, in which the 
managers show lack of effort and may be shirking.  In other words, the agency problem 
occurs when (a) shareholders and managers have different goals, or (b) shareholders 
cannot assess the behaviour of managers properly.  
Corporate governance is to ensure that managers’ decisions are consistent with 
shareholders’ interests via external and internal control (monitoring) mechanisms. 
External mechanisms are the capital markets and the managerial labour markets.  The 
capital markets can discipline poor performance or opportunistic managers by reducing 
the value of firm’s share. Merger and acquisition activities can minimize managerial 
opportunism (Walsh and Seward, 1990).  Similarly, if the markets can efficiently make 
a valuation of human capital, misconduct and opportunistic behaviours by managers 
will mean they have a lower valuation in the job market (Fama, 1980). The consequence 
of external discipline may therefore lead to losing their job and acquiring a bad 
reputation. Thus, external controls are an effective way to reduce the agency problems.  
Internal control mechanisms are related to effective board structure, concentrated 
ownership holding that result in active monitoring of the executives, appropriate 
remuneration contracts, and performance-based incentives. The board of directors is 
responsible for internal control mechanisms (Walsh and Seward, 1990), but Jensen 
(1993) indicates that the boards are the predominant source of internal control failure as 
a result of the board culture, lack of information and expertise compared to that of CEO, 
lack of independence, oversized board, etc.  
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Many initiatives from the regulators, activist investors and other boardroom reformers 
recommend changes, which are centralized in the board of directors. Nordberg (2011) 
argues that the governance debates and the governance codes are mainly related to: (1) 
board composition: appointing independent directors who can challenge the view of the 
executives; (2) board structure: establishing board committees (i.e. audit, nomination, 
remuneration) to help monitoring; (3) board leadership: separating CEO and chairman 
roles to reduce concentrated power in the boardroom.   
The agency theory has been a dominant theory in the development of the UK 
governance codes, and particularly in relation to the effectiveness of internal monitoring 
mechanisms. The Cadbury Report (1992) was the first report that recommended 
separation between CEO and chairman positions, the inclusion of non-executive 
(independent) directors on the boards, and the establishment of board committees. The 
Greenbury Report (1995) stressed the importance of board remuneration transparency, 
while the Hampel Report (1998) focused on the role of institutional shareholders. The 
Higgs Report (2002) scrutinised the role of non-executive directors, such as the 
guidelines in appointing them and assigning them to board committees. These reports 
highlighted the importance of board oversight and how to make it work effectively.  
 
2.3.2 The Resource Dependence Theory 
The resource dependence theory is an alternative theory, which focuses on external 
challenges by securing resources and creating connections (Clarke, 2004). The resource 
dependence theory, introduced by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), is one in which the 
board role is principally to find access to resources and to try to secure them so that they 
can enhance shareholders’ wealth.   
Hillman et al. (2000) claim that the agency-based approach is less valuable in 
understanding the resource dependence role. As firms may encounter external 
uncertainties, directors serve not only to link the firm with its external environment, but 
also to bring in resources (e.g. expertise, information, skills) to reduce uncertainty and 
increase firm survival. Diverse boards will provide more unique resources and 
information, which may benefit decision-making. Within a diverse board, there exist a 
range of perspectives and non-traditional alternatives to certain problems. This theory 
usually underpins the studies on board diversity.  
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Based on this theory, Hillman et al. (2000) divide board roles into four categories. (1) 
Insiders. They are the current officers (executives) on the board (e.g. CEO, finance 
director, operating director). They have skills and expertise in general and specific areas 
in the firm, such as finance, marketing, and human resources. (2) Business experts. 
They have a significant experience in other large firms in terms of decision-making and 
problem-solving in the boardroom. They are expected to provide ideas, alternative 
viewpoints, and to channel communication on the boards. (3) Support specialists. These 
are lawyers, investment bankers, or public relation experts. They provide specialized 
expertise on specific aspects in the boardroom, such as access to financial capital and 
legal support or channelling communication to government agencies. (4) Community 
influence. They can be former MPs, academics, or members of the clergy. They can 
provide legitimacy, a non-business perspective, and insight information from the 
community.  
Moreover, the boards have four important roles: (1) to provide advice and counsel to 
management with respect to directors’ expertise and background, for instance: 
appointing directors with regulatory expertise can reduce uncertainty and transaction 
costs associated with the regulatory agency. Directors may help the bidding process for 
government contracts; (2) to communicate to the outside world (e.g. customers, 
suppliers, regulatory bodies) about the firm. Hillman et al. (2007) argue that diversity 
on the boards shows the firms’ commitment to minorities; (3) to facilitate access to 
tangible and intangible resources. Appointing directors with a significant experience in 
the industry could lead to positive sales growth (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009), while 
directors with financial expertise can help firms in terms of debt strategies (Stearns and 
Mizruchi, 1993); (4) to provide legitimacy and credibility to the firm when appointing 
prominent individuals e.g. former MPs or former minister (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, 
cited in Nordberg, 2011). This theory implies that board duties include not only 
monitoring and controlling but also advising duties.  
It is necessary for firms to create governance structures (e.g. board size and board 
composition) that can meet the external demands.  While the agency theory tends to 
focus on the internal monitoring, the resource dependence theory is related to securing 
resources and building relationships. 
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2.3.3 The Stakeholder Theory 
The stakeholders play an important role in corporate governance. The OECD report 
states that: 
“The corporate governance framework should recognize the right of stakeholders 
established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-
operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the 
sustainability of financially sound enterprises” (OECD, 1994).  
The firm’s stakeholders can be defined as all individuals (parties) that might be 
involved or come into any sort of commercial contact with a firm on a temporary or 
permanent basis (Bloomfield, 2013).  
The shareholder is deemed to be the most important stakeholder (Jensen, 1986). 
Shareholders tend to have the privilege of being prioritized over the other stakeholders 
because they are capital providers and the residual claimant of free cash flow once other 
stakeholders have been paid.  The role of governance is to protect and ensure the rents 
and rights of shareholders (e.g. voting right, appointment and dismissal of directors). 
Shareholders are the main beneficiaries of the firm’s accountability and responsibility 
(Banks, 2004). 
However, a corporation cannot be regarded as a set of assets that belongs to the 
shareholders only. It should be considered as institutional arrangements for building and 
maintaining relationships with all parties that contributing to firm-specific assets (Blair, 
1995 in Clarke, 2004). Yoshimori (1995) reports that more than 75 per cent of the 
managers of French, German, and Japanese listed firms believe that the firms belong to 
the stakeholders rather than to the shareholders. Yet less than 30 per cent of the 
managers of UK and US listed firms share the same view.  
According to the stakeholder theory, firms must consider wider group interests, namely 
employees, suppliers, creditors, customers, government, and local community, as the 
proxy of effective corporate governance rather than only maximizing shareholders’ 
wealth. The stakeholder theory is closely related to corporate social responsibility 
(Bloomfield, 2013) in response to legitimating the expectation of stakeholders. 
Managers who fail to observe the stakeholders’ interest can damage firm performance 
and even its survival, and so eventually will damage the shareholders’ interest too. The 
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future and prosperity of the stakeholders are thus often related to the firm long-term 
prospects.  
Clarke (2004) categorises firms’ stakeholders into two: contractual stakeholders (e.g. 
shareholders, employees, customers, distributors, suppliers, and lenders) and 
community stakeholders (e.g. regulators, government, pressure groups, media, and local 
communities). Banks (2004) also classifies stakeholders into two: direct stakeholders 
and indirect stakeholders. Direct stakeholders are parties that are directly influenced by 
the firm activities, actions, or prospects such as shareholders, customers, service 
providers, creditors, and communities, while indirect stakeholders are parties that are 
influenced less obviously or less directly as a result of firm success or failure, such as 
regulators, competitors, and taxpayers.  
According to Clarke (1998) and Mallin (2010), each of the stakeholders has different 
expectations from the firms. Shareholders expect returns through dividends or share 
price appreciation. Employees, who are the value generators, expect the basic level of 
support and respect, remuneration, pension benefits, security and a safe working 
environment, training, and equal opportunities. Customers want good quality products 
and services from the firms, while banks (creditors) expect a high liquidity and solvency 
in the firm cash flow, transparent and accountable financial reports. Suppliers expect 
payment on time and a certain continuity of business, government expects firms to 
follow the regulations and laws in terms of jobs, competitiveness, and accurate 
disclosure, and the public (community) expects firms to take care of operational safety 
and to contribute to the community.  
Bloomfield (2013) identifies customers and government as the most powerful 
stakeholders. If the quality of firms’ products or services disappoints customers, it will 
certainly destroy the shareholder value. Where necessary, governments can exercise a 
powerful influence such as fines, or enacting new legislations, whenever firms fail to 
meet government interests. One example is the case of Payment Protection Insurance 
(PPI), which has involved major UK banks. The government has imposed fines totalling 
billions of pounds to compensate customer for the mis-selling of PPI (Treanor, 2015).  
In terms of the board of directors, stakeholders may have a strong influence in 
determining the board structure. The involvement of stakeholders can be seen in 
Germany. Unlike their counterparts in the UK and the US, German listed firms that 
have 2000 employees or more are required by law to appoint 50 per cent employee 
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representatives to the supervisory board (Goergen, 2012). Moreover, the proponents of 
the stakeholder theory argue that corporations should reflect their external environment, 
for instance, a society that is composed of different genders, races, and ethnicity. As a 
result, gender diversity on the boards might be a rational consequence or even an 
obligatory implication for some countries.  
It is difficult to satisfy all stakeholders’ demands because this could cause conflict and 
also inefficiency (Banks, 2004).  Shareholders’ interests are more identifiable and easier 
to deal with than other stakeholders’ interests. The shareholders’ interests are 
predominantly related to returns. The management can increase returns by increasing 
revenues or reducing costs.  On the other hand, management has to identify the interests 
of each of the firm stakeholders and decide the nature and extent of the directors’ 
responsibility to each one of them. One stakeholder’s interest might compete with those 
of the others. Thus, the shareholders’ interest is ‘consistent and simple’, while the 
stakeholders’ interests tend to be ‘competing and conflicting’ (Bloomfield, 2013). 
There are two main considerations in relation to the stakeholder theory. Firstly, judging 
directors’ effectiveness will be difficult because there are no clear measures to gauge 
their performance (Clarke, 1998). Rezaee (2009) indicates that several measures can be 
used for listed firms such as financial measures (e.g. earnings, market, share, stock 
price), social measures (e.g. employment, customer satisfaction, fair-trade with 
suppliers), ethical measures (e.g. business culture, business code of conduct), and 
environmental measures (e.g. antipollution, preservation of natural resources). Secondly, 
satisfying stakeholders’ interests is not just a moral imperative but also a commercial 
necessity, particularly in an industry where competitive and strategic advantage are 
essential (Clarke, 1998). There is a growing emphasis on creating a good relationship 
with employees, customers, suppliers, and investors. Thus, managers encounter more 
complex constituency in the stakeholder theory than in the agency theory.  
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2.4 The Board of Directors 
The board of directors has been a target of the regulators and corporate governance 
reformers ever since the introduction of the Cadbury Report (1992). In large 
corporations, which are mostly listed firms, it is unlikely that shareholders directly 
oversee the management activities. Consequently, they appoint boards as the 
shareholders’ representatives to protect firm assets from opportunist management 
actions. Boards are thus the middle party between the firm owners (the shareholders) 
and management that can help aligning management actions with shareholders’ interests. 
There is no great detail on how to define a director. Bloomfield (2013) defines a director 
as an individual who manages a firm and can exercise his or her discretionary power for 
any of the firm business purposes. Directors are normally appointed by shareholders at 
the Annual General Meeting in the case of a public limited company (PLC).  Milman 
(2013) adds several important points under English Law. For instance, the minimum 
age is 16, formal education is not a mandatory requirement, nationality is not 
necessarily British, and there is no limitation for the number of directorships. Directors, 
however, must be registered at Companies House.  
Before looking at the board duties and responsibilities, it is crucial to discuss the two 
types of board structure that exist: the unitary board systems and the dual board systems. 
The unitary board systems are characterized by the division between executive and non-
executive directors. Both types of directors have the same responsibilities and duties in 
all aspects of firm activities, which are to lead the employees and to control the 
managers of the firms. Directors are nominated through the nomination committee and 
elected by shareholders. The chairmen are the head of the board, while the CEOs are the 
head of management (executives). CEOs might have a dual-role (CEO and chairman) 
particularly for US firms, while UK firms tend to separate those roles.  
The dual board systems have a clear distinction between the management board, who 
runs the company, and the supervisory board, who has a monitoring role. Both boards 
are equivalent to the non-executive directors and the executive directors respectively in 
the single board systems. The supervisory board is responsible for appointing, 
supervising, and advising the management board. It is required by law that the firm 
employees to have representatives on the supervisory board.  
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The consensus indicates that neither board system is more powerful than the other 
systems, as both systems have advantages and disadvantages. The unitary board systems 
are better than the dual board systems because the directors on the unitary board will 
experience a better flow of information, but non-executive directors may easily 
encounter conflicts of interest because they have a close personal relation to the 
executives or certain remuneration. On the other hand, the dual board systems are more 
independent and exhibit fewer conflicts of interest than the unitary board systems 
(Banks, 2004; Mallin, 2010). Several European countries have adopted the dual board 
system such as Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Denmark, while the UK and the 
US have adopted the unitary board systems. Regardless of the differences, however, 
shareholders have a significant role in appointing directors, and the directors have the 
same goals, which are to produce accountable financial reports and to meet certain 
regulations.   
According to the OECD (2004), the responsibilities of the boards are: (1) to ensure 
strategic guidance of the company, including setting performance objectives, action 
plans, risk policies, monitoring implementation and performance, and acquisition; (2) to 
effectively monitor the management, including managing conflict of interest in terms of 
misuse of company assets and any abuse in related party transactions. The board is also 
expected to appoint, to compensate, and to replace key executives; (3) to ensure 
accountability to the company and the shareholders, such as compliance with 
accounting (financial) disclosure regulations.  
Banks (2004) lists 14 duties of directors, including: to represent and to protect 
shareholders’ and stakeholders’ interests; to ensure the effectiveness of internal 
monitoring with respect to commercial affairs, strategic and business performance, 
financial targets and financial disclosure; to conduct management succession; and to 
provide an appropriate management response to a crisis.  
According to Monks and Minow (2004), the board of directors can be involved in five 
main activities. (1) Strategic planning: approve the corporate philosophy and annually 
review and approve the corporation strategy. (2) Capital allocation: review and approve 
the corporation capital allocation. (3)  Long range goals: review and approve the 
corporation long-term policies, plans, and financial standards. (4) Performance 
appraisal: appraise management performance, review, and compare the results with 
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corporate philosophy, goals, and competition. (5) Manpower planning: elect top 
management and ensure that management succession is properly conducted. 
In the UK, the duties of boards can be found in the Companies Act. (2006). Bloomfield 
(2013) summarizes directors’ four obligations in performing their roles: (1) they have to 
act within the power that is given by the company and any statutory authority; (2) they 
have to act on the basis of promoting the success of the firm, which includes the firm 
sustainability and reputation, employee interests, business relations with suppliers and 
creditors, community and the environment; (3) they have to act on independent 
judgement basis; and (4) they have to exercise sensible care, skill, and diligence in 
performing their tasks. In addition, the Companies Act. (2006) states that directors 
should avoid any conflict of interest and not accept benefits from third parties.  
Yet, the boards are often associated with governance failures, such as the following (1) 
ineffective boards due to the lack of board independence; either certain through ties 
with the firm or because of directors interlocking. When the boards lack an element of 
independence, directors are easily influenced by the CEO or senior executives. They 
also tend not to challenge the executives, which can lead to excessive risk taking, poorly 
planned M&A strategy, and unhealthy financial structures.  Knowledge gaps are another 
characteristic of ineffective boards, whereby directors fail to understand certain aspects 
of the firms’ business e.g. accounting policies, environmental and product liability, 
financial risk, or derivatives. The directors’ over-commitment could lead to board 
infectiveness, as busy directors tend not to be focussed on substantive issues of the firm. 
(2) Conflicted boards, which mainly occur when the CEO has dual roles, being 
responsible for running not only the firm business but also the board. (3) Entrenched 
management, which can be caused by management-friendly shareholding, an ineffective 
market in controlling the firm (e.g. rare M&A or leveraged buyout threats), or weak 
boards (e.g. lack of independence). (4) Failed corporate policies. For instance, directors’ 
compensation that lacks correlation with performance and tend to focus on short-term 
performance, opaque disclosure or lack of transparency (Banks, 2004). 
Two of the three empirical chapters in this thesis will observe certain parties in the 
boardroom, which are the board chairman and non-executive directors. It is, therefore, 
important to discuss and understand their roles, so both parties will be discussed in the 
next two sub-sections.  
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2.4.1 The Chairman 
The leadership structure, the separation of the roles of CEO-chairman, has been a 
central topic in the UK corporate governance codes. The Cadbury Report recommended 
separation of these roles to prevent dominant individuals on the boards. The Combined 
Code (2008) states that a former CEO should not become the chairman in the same firm 
because a former CEO tends to be involved in running the firm rather than the board. As 
according to the agency theory, the agents tend to embrace opportunist behaviours, 
CEOs with both decision management and decision control can affect board 
effectiveness, such as: CEOs will evaluate their performance by themselves, CEOs may 
cause the non-executive directors’ decision control role to deteriorate, and CEOs will 
control the flow of information in the boardroom. This section will discuss the roles of 
the chairman and the arguments on the decision to separate the roles of CEO and the 
board chairman. 
 
2.4.1.1 The Roles of the Chairman 
The chairmen position could be the most important one on the board of directors. Sir 
Adrian Cadbury once said “Although board chairmen have no statutory position, the 
choice of who is to fill that post is crucial to board effectiveness” (Cadbury, 2002, cited 
in Leblanc, 2005). Leblanc (2005) adds that board effectiveness goes hand-in-hand with 
strong chairmen. The implication of the separation does not only affect the chairman 
roles in particular, but also affects firm performance in general.   
Cadbury (1990) indicated that the chairmen have internal and external responsibilities. 
‘Internal responsibilities’ refers to the boards, for which the chairmen should provide 
leadership and vision, to set firm aims and strategies, to monitor achievement of those 
aims, and to evaluate resources of people in the firms. On the other hand, they also have 
responsibilities to the shareholders and wider stakeholders, such as responsibility in 
financial reporting and for being the firms’ representative. 
The roles of the chairman can be viewed from two theoretical perspectives (Gabrielsson 
et al., 2007). Firstly, the shareholder supremacy model, which is based on the agency 
theory. This model argues that the chairman’s main roles are to monitor, to control, and 
to evaluate top executives’ performance so that shareholders’ best interests can be 
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enhanced and protected. Secondly, the team production model, in which the chairmen 
must take active roles, emphasising the importance of strategic knowledge and 
competency about the firm operation. Instead of only being the shareholders’ 
representatives, the chairmen must represent the broader stakeholders. Gabrielsson et al. 
(2007) argue that the chairman roles may evolve from the shareholder model to the team 
production model. 
Owen and Kirchmaier (2008) and Bezemer et al. (2012) find the current roles of the 
chairmen are more complex now than in previous decades. Owen and Kirchmaier (2008) 
argue that the chairman should make contributions not only to the board but also to firm 
performance, for instance by appointing directors (non-executive and executive) who 
have the capacity to add value for the firm business. In Netherlands, Bezemer et al. 
(2012) indicate the chairmen may work in a ‘grey area’. The chairman is to conduct 
controlling duties, at the same time he or she may be involved in the firm business 
activities.  
Overall, the chairmen roles can be divided into three categories. (1) Strategy roles are 
related to the chairmen roles in determining firm strategy, for instance merger and 
acquisition issues, decisions on entering or exiting the market, marketing strategy, 
financing decisions, and the appointment of executive directors. These roles have a 
direct implication on firm performance. (2) Control roles, which are deemed to be the 
chairmen primary roles, are related to keeping the executives actions on track. For 
instance, conducting board meetings, establishing board committees, assigning non-
executive directors to the appropriate board committees, appointing and replacing CEO, 
and selecting non-executive directors. (3)  Resource dependence roles, in which the 
chairmen must provide crucial information (i.e. material, financial) to shareholders and 
stakeholders. In other words, the chairmen should maintain a good relationship with 
investors, government, and industry regulators (McNulty et al., 2011). 
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2.4.1.2 The Separation of CEO-Chairman Roles 
The recommendation of splitting the CEO-chairman roles may or may not have 
significant impacts for firm accountability and firm performance. There are numerous 
arguments regarding the benefits and costs of the separation. The proponents of 
separation (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993) use the agency theory in explaining 
the benefits of non-dual CEO roles. They argue that separation between decision 
management (resource allocation) and decision control (monitoring) can reduce the 
agency cost within the firm. Through this separation, the power and monitoring of top 
executives will be decentralized and improved in the firm (Keasey et al., 2005). This 
will allow the chairmen to monitor the top executives (CEO) performance effectively 
(Goyal and Park, 2002; Dahya et al., 2002) and minimize corporate scandal in the future. 
Owen and Kirchmaier (2008) find that the separation will make the CEO focuses on 
running the business, prevent dominant CEOs from making bad strategic decisions, and 
enable the boards to evaluate CEO performance effectively.  
According to Russell Reynolds Associates, an US consultant, the numbers of S&P 500 
companies that separated the CEO and chairman roles jumped from 21 per cent to 44 
per cent between 2001 and 2012. Similarly, 62 per cent of Nasdaq 100 companies 
followed the trend to separate the roles (Tribbet, 2012). Despite these figures, most of 
US practitioners and academics are still questioning the benefits of the separation.   
From the practitioners’ perspective, Condit and Hess (2003) argue that the separation 
may bring both benefits and costs to firms. The effectiveness of the chairmen, 
particularly non-executive chairmen, depends on the circumstances of the firms. For 
example, CEOs who encounter decisive conditions (e.g. restructuring or being a target 
of acquisition, or are involved in a major acquisition) may diverge from shareholders’ 
best interests. The non-executive chairmen may bring benefits in those special 
circumstances. Similarly, employing non-executive chairmen for firms that are 
controlled and managed by a family will bring balance to the boards. On the other hand, 
the creation of (non-executive) chairman position would imply a new power base in the 
corporations and on the boards, which may lead to ‘turf battles’ between CEOs and the 
chairmen.  
Dahya et al. (1996) explain several benefits of separating the CEO-chairman roles. (1) 
The independent chairmen can effectively monitor and check any over-ambitious CEOs’ 
plans that could put the firm at risk. (2) Appointing the chairmen will benefit the 
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efficacy of the board because the chairmen will bring skills, connection, and experience 
in the boardroom. (3) The market tends to react positively when firms decide to separate 
the CEO-chairman roles.   
Tribbet (2012) argues that the decision to split or combine these roles should consider 
firm size and firm circumstances rather than the pressure from outside. Given the 
effectiveness of the splitting in terms of maintaining an independent and objective 
oversight, he recommends that it can be done by the appointment of lead non-executive 
independent director.  
Empirically, Dahya and Travlos (2000) summarize that the benefits of the separation 
CEO-chairman roles on firm performance are mixed because of three factors. Firstly, 
firm performance is more related to the optimum board composition rather than the 
optimum leadership structure. Secondly, changes in leadership structure might need a 
transition to reach the optimum one. Thirdly, only comparing the separated and non-
separated roles is not sufficient in order to examine the optimum leadership structure 
because the optimum leadership may depend on industry characteristics and incentives.   
Similarly, previous empirical studies (Brickley et al., 1997; Dey et al., 2011) indicate 
that the separation does not necessarily lead to an improvement of firm performance. 
Both studies agree that the decision on board leadership structure must be based on firm 
specific economic environment rather than outside pressures (e.g. regulators and activist 
investors).  
Several studies focus on the separation of CEO-chairman roles in financial institutions. 
Ferris and Yan (2007) report that the existence of an independent chairman cannot 
prevent scandals in family-based mutual funds in the US. Byrd et al. (2012) find that the 
separation could exacerbate moral hazard problems because CEOs tend to take riskier 
investment in the US deposit insurance industry. Both studies appear to challenge the 
proposed Sarbanes-Oxley Act and SEC regulation in terms of the separation of CEO-
chairman roles. 
Krause and Semadani (2013) investigate board leadership structure from different 
angles. In terms of the timing, they believe that separation will have positive 
consequences on firm performance when the firm performs poorly, and vice versa. 
Furthermore, the separation is more effective when it is conducted through demotion 
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separation (incumbent CEO and new chairman) rather than apprentice separation (new 
CEO and incumbent chairman) or departure separation (new CEO and new chairman).  
In the UK, listed firms are more receptive than their counterparts in the US in 
implementing the recommendations for splitting the CEO-chairman roles. Almost all 
(about 90 per cent) of UK listed companies have split the roles of CEO and chairman 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; Owen and Kirchmaier, 2008).  
Most of the previous studies used a qualitative approach and focused on the relations 
among the directors after the separation.  Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2007) show that 
the US chairmen are likely still to be involved in running the firm, while the UK 
chairmen focus on the board affairs. The UK chairmen are more passive than their 
counterparts in the US and Australian companies in determining the vision of the firm. 
This implies that the UK chairmen tend to focus on monitoring and controlling roles 
rather than advisory roles, as expected in the Cadbury Report (1992). 
Meanwhile, there is no significant difference between the executive chairmen and the 
non-executive chairmen apart from the fact that they work as full-time or part-time 
chairman respectively. The executive chairmen are more likely to be involved in the 
firm day-on-day business than the non-executive chairmen are. In terms of power, both 
types (titles) have equal power to remove a poor performing CEO. In conclusion, 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2007) point out that the chairmen’ influences are more 
crucial than that of board members (i.e. non-executive directors) in the dismissal of the 
CEOs. 
McNulty et al. (2011) explore quantitatively the power sources of the chairmen in the 
UK. Developing Finkelstein’s (1992) power type, the paper suggests that there are four 
types of power sources for chairmen: structural power, ownership power, prestige 
power, or expertise power. They examine three characteristics of a chairman, such as: 
chair nomenclature (executive chairmen and non-executive chairmen), chair origin 
(inside chairmen and outside chairmen), and chair time (part-time chairmen or full-time 
chairmen). In general, the executive chairmen (full-time chairmen) who are from inside 
the firm are more influential in determining the firm strategy than the non-executive 
chairmen (part-time chairmen) who are brought from outside the firm, whereas the non-
executive chairmen will be more influential in monitoring and control duties.  
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Given the previous arguments and recent studies, it is necessary to examine the effects 
of chairmen characteristics in disciplining poor performing CEOs, which is regarded as 
a fundamental duty of the chairmen in UK listed firms. 
 
2.4.2 The Non-Executive Directors 
The UK listed firms adopt the unitary board system, in which the board of directors can 
be classified into executive directors and non-executive directors.  From a legal point of 
view, 
 “There is no legal distinction between executive and non-executive directors. As a 
consequence, in the UK unitary board structure, non-executive directors have the 
same legal duties, responsibilities and potential liabilities as their executive 
counterparts” (Companies Act 2006, cited in the Institute of Directors website, 
2015).  
According to Monk and Minow (2004), both executive and non-executive directors 
have the same duties which are the duty of loyalty (acting on behalf of the shareholders’ 
best interests) and the duty of care (conducting due diligence in the decision-making 
process). However, non-executive directors are not obliged to report to the CEOs, nor 
are involved in the daily firm business of the firm, which makes them more effective in 
monitoring. Non-executive directors are not full-time employees of the firms. They are 
deemed to be independent directors and are expected to make independent judgement in 
board decision-making (Mallin, 2010). Independent directors do not depend on the 
CEOs in terms of promotion or remuneration, so this makes them effective in 
safeguarding shareholders’ interests.  
The board independence is perceived as the most important aspect in the governance 
process because the more independence the board has, the better it can serve and act in 
the interest of shareholders. The independence of corporate boards is conceptualized by 
Fama and Jensen’s (1983) distinction between the ‘decision management’ and the 
‘decision control’ activities of corporate boards. The decision management (service 
roles) is underpinned by the resource dependence theory and the stakeholder theory, 
while the decision control (control roles) is underpinned by the agency theory (Maasen, 
2002). The service roles of the boards focus on the initiation and the implementation of 
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strategic decisions. The boards control roles are mainly associated with the approval and 
monitoring of the strategic decision-making processes (decision control).  In practice, 
executive directors tend to be more involved in the service roles while non-executives 
focus on the monitoring roles.  
The discussions of non-executive directors are predominantly related to independence. 
The Cadbury Report (1992) aimed to give more emphasis to board independence. Based 
on this report, three ways to enhance the board independence, which are to separate the 
role of the chairman and CEO positions, to appoint non-executive directors who do not 
have ties with the firms, and to form board committees which consist of non-executive 
directors. It is important to appoint non-executive directors with the same impartiality 
and care as executive directors. Firms should appoint non-executive directors that can 
exercise independent judgement in order to avoid any conflict of interest.   
In practice, the scope of the independence of directors is much wider than that. 
Someone can be called independent directors when they have no connection at all with 
the firm (i.e. with its full-time employees, or family members, or the firm’s lawyer, 
banker, or auditor) except for their seat on the board. The Combined Code (2008) 
indicates specifically the criteria for an independent director, such as: not having been a 
former employee for the last five years; having no other incentives than the directorship 
fee; not having a substantial shareholding or any relationship with the substantial 
shareholders, not a member of family; having no business ties with the firm for the last 
three years and, not serving on the board more than ten years.  
Ezzamel and Watson (2005) in Keasey et al. (2005) classify non-executive directors 
into two types: non-executive directors who have ties with firm (affiliated outsiders), 
such as former executives, affiliation with shareholders, supplier or customer; and non-
executive directors with no connection with the firm except for their directorship fees or 
a certain stake in the ownership of the firm (non-affiliated or independent non-executive 
directors).  
The importance of board independence can be seen in accounting, business and finance 
studies. Weisbach (1988) shows that outside directors are the shareholders’ first line of 
defence against incompetent CEOs. Beasley (1994) finds that board composition (non-
executive and executive directors) can reduce the likelihood of financial report fraud. 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) argue that one key to minimize or avoid the agency problem 
is by appointing independent directors because they are perceived as a party that can 
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ensure the executive directors act in the shareholders’ best interests with respect to 
evaluating CEOs performance, planning CEO succession, and monitoring firms 
strategic decisions. 
However, Keasey and Hudson (2002) argue that the effectiveness of non-executive 
directors is not entirely based on their independence. Their influence on firm 
performance depends on (1) their combined skills, knowledge, and expertise; (2) the 
condition of internal governance mechanisms; and (3) the incentives to non-executive 
directors for bringing skills, knowledge, and expertise. Moreover, non-executive 
directors should be familiar with accounting practice, corporate law, information 
technology, and industry of the firms. Personal attributes (such as interpersonal skills) 
can be useful in the boardroom. The composition of non-executive directors should not 
be homogeneous in terms of expertise, experience, and skills.  
The UK Corporate Governance Codes, particularly the Higgs Report (2002), have been 
continuously elaborating on non-executive directors either in the monitoring roles or 
other strategic roles. The Higgs Report (2002) describes the main roles of non-executive 
directors: (1) to challenge and to contribute on firm strategic decisions; (2) to measure 
and to monitor management performance; (3) to ensure the accountability of the firm 
financial reporting system; (4) to set up appropriate management remuneration.   
Given these multiple roles and duties, non-executive directors may encounter the 
paradox of board involvement, which refers to the tendency of non-executive directors 
to be more involved in monitoring roles and distance themselves from the initiation and 
implementation strategic decisions (Maasen, 2002). This makes the role of outside (non-
executive) directors more difficult than inside (executive) directors because their jobs 
are not only to monitor and to oversee the management but also to contribute on firm 
performance.  
Non-executive directors are expected to conduct two distinct and relatively 
contradictory roles. Firstly, they are members of boards that are the leaders of 
management. They have to make a contribution to the overall leadership and 
development of the firm by working together with executive directors, with respect to 
non-executive directors’ experience or expertise. Secondly, they have ultimately, at the 
same time, to be independent and distance themselves from the executives.  Non-
executive directors have to control (discipline) executive directors. Thus, the roles of 
non-executive directors are more complex than those of executive directors. 
43 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
CHAIRMAN CHARACTERISTICS AND CEO TURNOVER 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The proposal for change in the board leadership structure, particularly splitting the 
chairman and CEO roles, is the key recommendation of the Cadbury Report (1992).  
Given this recommendation, there is a clear boundary between these roles. Put simply, 
the chairman has responsibility for running the board, while the CEO is responsible for 
running the firm. 
While the roles of chairmen are slightly trivial in the US (Brickley et al., 1997; Ferris 
and Yan, 2007; Dey et al., 2011), the chairmen have important roles in the UK 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; Owen and Kirchmaier, 2008). Almost all listed UK 
firms (90 per cent) have separated the two positions and most of them assign the 
chairmen as a non-executive. The chairmen may intervene in removing CEO following 
a decline in firm performance (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007). This argument is 
consistent that of with Florou (2005) and McNulty et al. (2011), in which the UK 
chairmen are found to be more responsible for appointing and dismissing the CEO 
rather than for firm performance. 
Moreover, recent studies indicate two important findings about the development of the 
board chairmen in the UK. Firstly, there is a tendency for the chairman to be as an 
independent party, without affiliation with the company, in the boardroom. Secondly, 
most UK listed firms appoint non-executive (part-time) chairmen (Owen and 
Kirchmaier, 2008; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007). 
Those previous studies and arguments indicate that the roles and duties of the chairman 
may not be as crucial as those of the CEOs with respect to firm performance, but the 
chairmen roles are closely associated with the CEO performance. In other words, the 
chairmen have the power to remove the CEOs where it is appropriate.  As one of its 
strategic decisions, the boards have responsibility to remove a poor performing CEO. 
The chairmen, as head of the board, may influence this decision directly or indirectly. 
This study, therefore, will try to examine the role of the chairmen in disciplining poor 
performing CEOs.  
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This study will contribute in a number of ways to the literature on CEO turnovers and 
corporate governance. Firstly, it will extend previous studies on CEO turnovers 
(Weisbach, 1988; Dahya et al., 2002; Huson et al., 2001; Hillier et al., 2005; Lau et al., 
2009).  Previous studies have discussed the impacts governance characteristics such as 
board structure, board independence, CEO characteristics, and ownership structure have 
on the likelihood of CEO turnovers. However, none of them have discussed the relation 
between chairman characteristics and CEO turnover even though the chairmen are 
responsible for the appointment and dismissal of the CEOs. This study will therefore try 
to extend the studies on CEO turnover by adding the characteristics of the chairmen in 
the CEO turnover model. 
Secondly, previous studies (Brickley et al., 1997; Dey et al., 2011) appear sceptical 
regarding the consequences of the governance codes, which require splitting the CEO-
chairman position, on firm performance. However, those studies only focus on one type 
of chairman characteristics which is board leadership structure (separation of CEO-
chairman roles), without examining the other characteristics. Likewise, Goyal and Park 
(2002) use the same approach to examine the effect of chairman and CEO separation on 
CEO turnovers. Yet, the latest figures indicate that most UK listed firms have separated 
chairman and CEO roles (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; Owen and Kirchmaier, 
2008). Given the arguments, this study will try to extend Goyal and Park (2002) by 
examining empirically the characteristics of the chairmen besides the type of board 
leadership structure. 
Thirdly, this study will extend that of Florou (2005), which discussed quantitatively 
chairman characteristics in relation to the chairman dismissal. Florou (2005) only uses 
three such characteristics in the analysis: the chairman’s title, career path, and 
involvement in CEO selection, in 300 UK listed firms. This study will extend Florou 
(2005) by adding more investigated chairman characteristics (including the chairman’s 
independence, age, and tenure) and using all possible UK non-financial listed firms.  
Fourthly, previous studies (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; Owen and Kirchmaier, 
2008; Kakabadse et al., 2010; McNulty et al., 2011) use a qualitative approach in 
examining the roles of the chairman in terms of advising and monitoring roles. This 
study will try to extend those previous studies in terms of the quantitative methodology 
aspect, a larger sample size, and more investigated chairman characteristics. 
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Finally, this study will try to interact chairman characteristics and other governance 
aspects such as board size and board composition. Those aspects have an important role 
in influencing the sensitivity of CEO turnover and firm performance. This could be an 
important aspect in this study because it enables the chairman characteristics in relation 
to large (small) or outsider- (insider-) dominated board to be examined. For instance, 
whether independent chairmen will be more effective in outsider-dominated boards or 
insider-dominated boards.  
There are not many studies that discuss the chairman as the research object. 
Consequently, in developing its hypotheses, this study will use the same terminology as 
previous studies that discuss the impact on CEO (or directors) characteristics on firm 
strategic decisions. This implies that the consequences CEO (or director) characteristics 
and chairman characteristics are equivalent regarding on firm strategic decisions. The 
investigated chairman characteristics are: the chairman’s function (title), independence, 
age, tenure, and involvement in the CEO selection.  
The chairman can be appointed from outside or inside the board (e.g. former CEO, 
former directors). McNulty et al. (2011) argue that outside directors will likely have 
prestige power (e.g. reputation or image) rather than ownership power and structural 
power. Weisbach (1989) explains that independent (outside) directors who work in a 
well-run firm can be deemed to be a signal of directors’ quality. Masulis and Mobbs 
(2014) find that a director’s reputation is a strong incentive to remove poor performing 
CEOs. Given the previous studies, the independent (outside) chairman may be effective 
in disciplining poor performing CEOs. 
Owen and Kirchmaier (2008) report that 79 per cent of FTSE350 firms use the non-
executive title of chairmen. Florou (2005) argues that the executive chairmen can be 
deemed to be part of top executive management. This makes them prone to board 
restructuring. McNulty et al. (2011) found that the non-executive chairmen are more 
influential in their monitoring duties – which include electing and replacing the CEOs – 
than advising duties. The inclusion of ‘non-executive’ in the chairmen’s title is also to 
preserve their independence. Thus non-executive chairmen are more effective in 
removing poor performing CEOs.  
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There is a tendency for chairman tenure to decrease from 10.4 years to 9.4 years 
between 2000 and 2004 (Owen and Kirchmaier, 2008). The chairmen with long tenure 
may not be effective in monitoring roles as they may have a comfortable relationship 
with the board members. Moreover, the chance of the chairmen being involved in the 
CEO selection is higher when they serve on the boards for a long time. Florou (2005) 
points out the involvement of the chairmen in selecting poor performing CEOs may 
jeopardize the chairman position, and that chairmen with a long tenure are not effective 
in removing poor performing CEOs.  
The latest figures (Owen and Kirchmaier, 2008) indicate that 68 per cent of FTSE350 
firms tend to hire older chairmen (61-75 years old), while the average CEO age is 
around 55 (Yim, 2013). There are two opposite views regarding the effects of age on the 
chairmen monitoring roles. On the one hand, Waelchli and Zeller (2013) argue that the 
older chairmen tend to experience deteriorating cognitive abilities which eventually may 
affect their performance. On the other hand, older chairmen tend to have more 
experience than younger ones in the boardroom, and this experience is useful in the 
strategic decision-making process.  
The final chairman characteristic to be investigated in this study is the chairman’s 
involvement in the CEO selection. Florou (2005) argues that sensitivity of chairmen 
turnover is high when the chairmen are involved in the selection of ousted CEOs. 
Therefore, the chairmen who are involved in the CEO selection are less likely to remove 
poor performing CEOs because doing so will jeopardize the chairman’s own position.  
Besides the five chairman characteristics, it is necessary to examine the effects of 
chairman characteristics in disciplining CEOs with different board structures (e.g. board 
size and board composition). McNulty et al. (2011) argue that the chairmen who are 
based on prestige and expertise power will lack structural power. The chairmen can 
improve their structural power by arranging certain board structures such as creating 
sub-committees or hiring more non-executive directors.  
The effectiveness of the board of directors, in general, and chairman, in particular, can 
be seen in removing poor performing CEOs. As CEO turnovers occur for many reasons, 
such as merger and acquisition, scandals, illness, or death, this study will focus on CEO 
turnovers as the result of poor firm performance. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a literature 
review on CEO turnovers and the roles of the chairman. Section 3.3 discusses the 
development of the hypothesis, while Section 3.4 explains research methodology. 
Section 3.5 considers the empirical evidence, and finally, Section 3.6 provides the 
conclusion.  
 
3.2 Literature Review 
This section is divided into several sub-sections: CEO turnover, CEO turnover in the 
UK, and the roles of the chairman.  
 
3.2.1 CEO Turnover 
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has become a focus of research in economics, 
finance, accounting, and management studies for many years. According to Bertrand 
(2009), CEOs are perceived having a key role in decision-making, and therefore they 
are more scrutinised than any other individuals on the boards.  
One particular topic that has attracted significant attention is CEO turnover events. The 
scope and the depth of this topic are wide and deep. The discussions surround not only 
the CEO reasons, e.g. poor performance or high credit risk, but also the impacts of the 
CEO turnover itself with respect to shareholder wealth (Huson et al., 2004; Clayton et 
al., 2005) and bondholder wealth (Adams and Mansi, 2009). 
CEO turnover is regarded as an aspect of strategic decisions because it affects firm 
competitiveness and firm survival. For instance, in a high-level competitive industry, 
firms that are led by poor performing managers will ultimately lose their market share. 
Similarly, during restructuring, removing poor performing CEOs is necessary in order 
to avoid further decline (Ofek, 1993; Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001; Jostarndt and Sautner, 
2008). 
There are two views on the CEO turnover decision. Firstly, it can be viewed as a ‘last 
resort’ because other measures have failed to address certain issues within the firm 
(Goergen, 2012). Secondly, it is a proxy of good corporate governance practice such as 
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board effectiveness (Dahya et al, 2002; Adams and Ferreira, 2009). This thesis uses the 
second view in analysing CEO turnover events.  
CEO turnovers are unique and infrequent events, mostly 10-15 per cent each year, 
(Huson et al., 2001; Hillier et al., 2005; Lau et al., 2009). However, not every turnover 
event has drawn academic attention equally because some of them are easy to 
understand, such as retirement and normal succession. There are various reasons for 
CEO turnover, namely poor performance, retirement, merger and acquisition, illness or 
death, personal or family issues, or normal (planned) succession. Most studies focus on 
firm performance because CEOs are responsible for running the firms.  
In the theoretical perspective, the turnover decisions depend on the board evaluation 
regarding firm performance and/or other signals that may indicate the quality of the 
CEOs. When the board evaluation is below a certain threshold, or equal to the expected 
quality of his or her replacement, the turnover decision will be taken (Jenter and Kanaan, 
2008). Firm performance may be the best indicator to predict the likelihood of CEO 
turnovers, such as accounting ratios and stock return (Weisbach, 1988; Huson et al., 
2001; Dahya et al., 2002; Engel et al., 2003; Kaplan and Minton, 2012).  
The CEOs, who have more power than other party in the boardroom, will be less likely 
to be removed despite poor firm performance. According to Boeker (1992) and Brickley 
(2003), the sources of power (sensitivity) on CEO dismissal can be categorised into 
three aspects: the board characteristics, the ownership characteristics, and the CEO’s 
characteristics. The board characteristics are related to board size, composition, 
structure (e.g. staggered, classified), and the existence of the board committee. The 
ownership ones are related to ownership concentration, management ownership, or 
fraction that is owned by financial institutions in financially distressed firms. The 
CEO’s characteristics include CEO duality, tenure, and origins.  
The principal role of the boards is to monitor the managers so they can act in the best 
shareholders’ interest (Monks and Minow, 2004). Weisbach (1988) and Huson et al. 
(2001) report that outside directors tend to be more effective in removing poor 
performing CEOs than inside directors because of two possible reasons. Firstly, the 
inside directors tend to have a strong connection with the CEOs. Secondly, the outside 
directors try to give signals to the market with respect to their expertise and competence.  
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There are other aspects that also have a significant influence over CEO turnovers, such 
as board size (Lau et al., 2009), involvement of directors in board committees (Faleye et 
al., 2011), a classified (staggered) board (Ahn and Shrestha, 2013), CEO ownership 
(Denis et al., 1997), the proportion of institutional shareholders (Parrino et al., 2003; 
Helwege et al., 2012). Some studies have discussed CEO characteristics, such as the 
CEO with dual roles (Huson et al., 2001; Goyal and Park, 2002; Dahya et al., 2002), 
and CEO tenure (Allgood and Ferrel, 2000; Brookman and Thistle, 2009) 
To sum up, previous studies have discussed many aspects of firm governance, such as 
board structure, CEO characteristics and ownership structure, in relation to their impact 
on CEO turnover. However, none of them discusses the characteristics of the chairman 
as potential variables that can explain CEO turnover, even though the chairmen have a 
responsibility for appointing and dismissing the CEOs. Therefore, this study will extend 
previous studies on CEO turnovers by adding the chairman’s characteristics to the CEO 
turnover model.  
 
3.2.2 CEO Turnover in the UK 
As this study is conducted in the UK, it is essential to look at some of the UK-based 
studies that discussed CEO turnover. Similar to the US-based studies, most of UK-
based studies focus on the boards and ownership aspects in analysing CEO turnover.  
Dahya et al. (1998) found that top management in UK firms are easily entrenched as a 
result of management shareholding. Dahya et al. (2002) report that the relationship 
between firm performance and top management turnover has become stronger after the 
Cadbury Report (1992). Several other relevant factors are CEO ownership (Dedman, 
2003; Hillier and McColgan, 2008) and corporate actions, such as rights issues (Franks 
et al., 2001; Hillier et al., 2005) 
Florou (2005) examines the other party that may be involved directly (or indirectly) in 
CEO turnover events, which is the board chairman. Florou (2005) found that the 
chairmen is likely to be removed from his or her position following firm performance 
decline. This removal will be stronger when the chairmen are involved in the ousted-
CEO selection. 
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Overall, there are some differences and similarities between the US and the UK studies. 
Firstly, in both countries, there is a tendency for more outside (non-executive) directors 
to be involved on the boards. The impact, however, is not necessarily the same. For 
instance, between the US and the UK, Franks et al. (2001) argue that non-executive 
directors in the UK are more involved in advisory roles rather than in monitoring 
(disciplining) roles.  
Secondly, management shareholding plays a substantial role in the sensitivity between 
CEO turnover and firm performance. The CEOs of UK listed firms, however, become 
entrenched more easily than their counterparts in the US. Dahya et al. (1998) report that 
CEOs who own a 1 per cent shareholding can affect the sensitivity between CEO 
dismissal and firm performance. 
Thirdly, even though the numbers of CEO-chairman roles separations in the US are not 
as many as in the UK, previous studies from both countries indicate that separation 
significantly affects forced CEO turnovers. The separation can lead to a high sensitivity 
CEO dismissal and firm performance relation. 
As most UK listed firms have already followed the Cadbury Report (1992), particularly 
on the separation of the CEO-chairman roles, it is necessary to investigate another 
aspect of governance that can predict CEO turnover for UK listed firms, namely 
chairman characteristics.  
Among previous UK-based empirical studies, Florou (2005) is the closest one to this 
study, in which the author examines the chairman’s title, career paths and involvement 
in CEO selection for 300 listed UK firms between 1990 and 1998. This study expands 
Florou (2005) in several ways. Firstly, it will add more investigated variables which are, 
chairman age, tenure, and independence. Secondly, this study will use all UK non-
financial listed firms. Thirdly, it will analyse the characteristics of the chairman with 
CEO turnover rather than on chairman turnover. 
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3.2.3 The Roles of Chairman  
Gabrielsson et al. (2007) explain the chairman roles from two views. Firstly, the 
shareholder supremacy model which is based on the agency theory. The chairman roles 
are to monitor and to evaluate top executives actions and performance so shareholders’ 
best interest can be enhanced and protected. Secondly, the team production model, in 
which the chairmen must take active roles in strategic decisions and firm operation.  
Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2007) report that the US chairmen are likely still involved 
in running the firm, while the UK chairmen focus on the board affairs. The UK 
chairmen are more passive than their counterparts in the US and Australia in 
determining the vision of firm. The UK chairmen tend to focus on monitoring and 
controlling roles rather than advising roles, as expected in the Cadbury Report. 
Overall, the chairmen roles can be divided into three categories. (1) Strategy roles are 
related the chairman roles in determining firm strategy, for instance merger and 
acquisition issues, decisions on entry or exit the market, etc. (2) Control roles, which 
are deemed as the chairmen primary roles, are related to keep top executive actions on 
the track. For instance, conducting board meetings, hiring and replacing CEOs, 
selecting non-executive directors, etc. (3) Resources dependence roles, in which the 
chairmen must provide crucial information to shareholder and stakeholders. The 
chairmen should maintain a good relationship to institutional and non-institutional 
investors, government, and the regulators. The executive chairmen who are from the 
inside of the firms are more influential in determining firm strategy. In contrast, the 
non-executive chairmen who are brought from outside the firms are more influential in 
monitoring and controlling duties (McNulty et al., 2011).  
 
3.3 Hypothesis Development 
This study tries to use the same terminology with previous studies that have already 
empirically discussed CEOs (or directors) characteristics in establishing the hypotheses 
because there are not many studies that have discussed empirically the characteristics of 
the chairman. 
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3.3.1 The Chairman Independence 
In the US, the chairmen are most likely occupied by insiders, who are either former 
CEOs (63 per cent) or former executive directors (14 per cent), while the independent 
chairmen are about 22 per cent (Benz and Frey, 2007). In the UK, the boards for listed 
firms are led either by former non-executive directors of the firm (Roberts, 2002) or by 
truly independent chairmen (Owen and Kirchmaier, 2008). The chairman position can 
also be held by the founder (Villalonga and Amit, 2009; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Li and 
Srinivasan, 2011). 
These chairmen origins have drawbacks and benefits. The addition of the founder in the 
boardroom will bring an extra value through unique and specialized knowledge. 
Villalonga and Amit (2009) indicate that the involvement of the founders either as CEO 
or chairman will provide valuable skills. Brickley et al. (1997) call this process as 
“passing the baton”, in which a former CEO, who holds a chairman position, can 
monitor the new CEO particularly in the probation period. Fahlenbrach et al. (2011) 
argue that a former CEO has a unique and specific knowledge of the business that may 
be useful in grooming his or her successor. A former CEO can help in assessing CEO 
successor performance. 
However, Owen and Kirchmaier (2008) found that former CEO may interfere too much 
in firm operations and it may be difficult to create a good relationship with the 
successor.  McNulty et al. (2011) argue that the benefits of the appointment of a former 
CEO can be seen in their advising roles rather than monitoring roles.  
McNulty et al. (2011) divide the chairman of board as an outsider or insider chairman. 
An insider chairman will be based on ownership (e.g. the substantial shareholders or 
family members or founders of firm) or structural power (e.g. former CEO or executive 
directors of the firm) while the outsider chairman will be based on expertise and 
prestige power. Expertise power is characterised by his or her broad experience in a 
certain business, expertise in crucial areas relevant to the firm (e.g. accountant, solicitor), 
whereas prestige power can be characterised by reputation and image. Ownership power 
and structural power have more influence on the boards than expertise power and 
prestige power.  
In addition, they find that the average influence score of the insider chairmen is higher 
than the average influence score of the outsider chairmen. But, when they decompose 
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that average, the outsider chairmen are more influential in terms of monitoring roles 
than the insider chairmen. This finding implies two things. Firstly, employing former 
CEO (executive directors) of the firm as chairman is likely to benefit the firm from 
advising roles perspectives. Secondly, the outsider chairman is more likely to remove 
poor performing CEOs than the insider chairmen. 
This study will use the same terminology with Weisbach (1988) in explaining the 
incentive for independent directors in removing poor performing CEO. Weisbach (1988) 
argue that the independent director who works in well-run firms will be deemed as a 
signal of director’s quality. McNulty et al. (2011) indicate that the independent 
chairmen are elected because of his or her reputation (prestige power). According to 
Masulis and Mobbs (2014), director’s reputation is a strong incentive to remove poor 
performing CEOs. Given those arguments, the independent chairman should have the 
same incentive to perform well in running the board and making effective strategic 
decisions, particularly disciplining poor performing CEOs.  
Therefore, the first hypothesis is:  
H1:  The outsider (independent) chairmen are more effective than the insider chairmen 
in disciplining poor performing CEOs.  
 
3.3.2 The Chairman Title (Function) 
There are two types of chairman title, which are executive and non-executive. Owen 
and Kirchmaier (2008) indicate that most of FTSE 350 companies (79 per cent) use 
non-executive title in 2005, which has increased from 47 per cent since 1995. The 
Cadbury Report (1992) and the Higgs Report (2002) recommended that the chairmen 
should be as the non-executive chairmen.  
There are three important findings from previous studies that discuss chairman title. 
Firstly, Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2007) argue that there is no special difference 
between the executive chairmen and the non-executive chairmen apart the titles indicate 
full-time and part-time chairman respectively. Similarly, Owen and Kirchmaier (2008) 
argue that the distinction between full-time chairmen or part-time chairmen are more 
useful and meaningful rather than the distinction of chairman title. They found that, in 
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average, the chairmen work 2.3 days per week and ranging between 4 days per week to 
1 day per fortnight.  
Secondly, Florou (2005) and McNulty et al. (2011) argue that the executive chairmen 
may be more involved in day-to-day operations, whereas the non-executive chairmen in 
monitoring and controlling duties. Florou (2005) argues that the executive chairmen can 
be deemed as part of the executive team. Consequently, the executive chairmen are 
more likely to experience board restructuring than the non-executive chairmen. The 
inclusion of ‘non-executive’ title can be implied that the chairman ultimate 
responsibility is to monitor the CEOs and executive directors (Roberts, 2002). The 
inclusion of ‘non-executive’ in chairman title is to preserve the independence of the 
board chairman.   
Thirdly, McNulty et al. (2011) argue that the executive chairmen are more powerful and 
influential on the board than the non-executive chairmen regardless the origin of the 
chairmen. The executive chairmen are likely to have either ownership or structural 
power. This means that the family member, the founder, or the former CEO of the firm 
will likely fill the executive chairmen. They categorise the executive chairmen with 
medium to high power. Although McNulty et al. (2011) report, on average, the 
executive chairmen are more influential than the non-executive chairmen, the non-
executive chairmen are more effective to monitor the CEOs than the executive chairmen. 
The establishment of the board committees and the involvement of the chairman on the 
appointment of non-executive directors could lift up the structural power of the non-
executive chairmen. 
Previous studies and arguments indicate that the executive chairmen are more involved 
in daily firm business decisions, which implies the CEOs or top executives are not the 
only party who have a responsibility on firm performance. The executive chairmen may 
be also responsible for bad strategic decisions. On the other hand, assigning the 
chairmen as the non-executive chairmen means that the primary role is to undertake 
monitoring roles, which one of them is to replace the CEOs where it is appropriate.  
Therefore, the second hypothesis is:  
H2:  The non-executive chairmen are more effective than the executive chairmen in 
removing poor performing CEOs. 
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3.3.3 The Chairman Tenure 
There are at least two mechanisms that may affect director tenure, which are director 
performance or the other mechanisms (e.g. ownership, founder). However, in most 
cases, director tenure depends on their performance. Directors will be retained when 
they perform well, vice versa. 
The impact of chairman tenure can be approached from two ways. Firstly, it can be 
approached via the chairman power.  The chairman tenure can be associated with two 
power sources: ownership power (Udueni, 1999) and expertise power (McNulty, 2011). 
According to Udueni (1999), a director who has been serving on the board for a long 
period of time may acquire shares of the firm. Moreover, chairman tenure can be 
associated with chairman experience. According to McNulty (2011), the chairmen with 
long tenure are likely to have expertise power because they may know specific aspects 
about the firm business and operational. Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2007) indicate that 
the chairmen with long tenure (12 to 15 years) will be effective in doing their duties. 
When the chairmen and board members work together for a long period of time, they 
have more understanding in terms of the firm strengths and weaknesses.  
Secondly, the longer the chairman holds his or her position, the more likely he or she 
involves in the CEO selection. Florou (2005) finds that the likelihood of chairman 
dismissal is higher when the chairman involves on the selection of poor performing 
CEO. It infers that the chairman who is involved in the CEO selection is less likely to 
remove a poor performing CEO because it can jeopardize his or her job as the chairman. 
The chairmen who are involved in appointing CEOs are not effective on removing poor 
performing CEOs. In addition, the chairmen with long tenure tend to have a comfortable 
relationship with the directors particularly the CEOs which lead to ineffectiveness in 
disciplining poor performing CEOs.  
The roles of the chairman are primarily related to advising, resource dependence, and 
control roles (McNulty et al., 2011). Given these roles, the first view is suitable for the 
advising and resource dependence roles while the second view is suitable for the control 
(monitoring) roles. This study will use the second view as the foundation to build the 
hypothesis of chairman tenure on CEO dismissal.  
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Therefore, the third hypothesis is: 
H3: The chairmen with short tenure will be more effective than the chairmen with 
long tenure in removing poor performing CEOs 
 
3.3.4 The Chairman Age  
The latest figures indicate that firms tend to hire older chairman than in 1990s. Owen 
and Kirchmaier (2008) report that about 68 per cent of FTSE350 chairman age are 
between 61 and 75 years old in 2005, while it is only 38 per cent for the same age range 
in 1995. Bezemer et al. (2012) also report that the average chairman age has increased 
from 63.95 years old in 1997 to 65.60 years old in 2005 in Netherlands.  
This study will also use the same terminology to previous empirical studies about 
directors (CEOs) age. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) report that older CEOs are associated 
with lower capital expenditure and lower financial leverage. Consistently, Yim (2013) 
emphasises the importance of appropriate incentives for young CEOs because it may 
lead to overinvestment and value destruction decisions. Older managers tend to avoid 
complexity, e. g. decisions to go public (Yang et al., 2011). Moreover, Huang et al. 
(2012) and Lin et al. (2014) report that older CEOs have a better quality financial 
reporting than younger CEOs. Overall, older CEOs are less risk-averse, less aggressive, 
pro-status quo, and more ethical than younger CEOs. 
In terms of chairman age, Waelchli and Zeller (2013) argue that the consequences of 
chairman age can be approached from two ways, which are related to their cognitive 
abilities and motivations.  They report that firm performance will decline as the 
chairmen become older. The chairmen’ cognitive abilities will deteriorate and it cannot 
be fixed with compensation (incentive) package. In other words, older chairmen are less 
effective than younger chairmen in undertaking their duties. Given this study, the older 
chairmen are less effective in doing his or her primary role, which is monitoring role.  
Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is: 
H4:   Older chairmen are less effective than younger chairmen in removing poor 
performing CEOs 
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3.3.5 Chairman Involvement 
The last investigated variable is chairman involvement in appointing CEO. As the 
chairman main responsibilities are to hire and to dismiss CEO, the chairman may be 
involved in the CEO selection process. The hypothesis argument is built from Florou 
(2005), in which the chairman lost his or her job when the CEO is ousted, particularly 
when the chairman is involved in recruiting the ousted CEO. It implies that the 
chairmen who are involved in the CEO selection may not effectively remove poor 
performing CEOs because it may jeopardize their job.  
Therefore, the fifth hypothesis is: 
H5:  The chairmen who are involved in the CEO selection will be less effective to 
replace poor performing CEOs. 
 
3.4 Research Methodology 
This section will be divided into three sub-sections: sample selection, research variables, 
and regression analysis. 
 
3.4.1 Sample Selection 
This study will observe CEO turnovers for non-financial firms listed in the London 
Stock Exchange during the period 2005 to 2013. Several requirements must be fulfilled 
in selecting the right observations. Firstly, the firms must have CEO and chairman 
positions. Similar to Hillier et al. (2005) and Florou (2005), this study classifies the top 
officer as the CEO. Since not all firms have a CEO title, the role of CEOs may be held 
by the managing director (MD). If the managing director does not exist, this study will 
use one of executive directors that have equivalent duties to CEO (e.g. COO or 
operating director). This information can be seen from directors’ job description, 
responsibility, and salary in the financial report.  
Secondly, although most UK listed firms have separated CEO-chairman roles, the firms 
may change from dual-CEO roles to separation CEO-chairman roles, or vice versa, in 
the observation period. If this state occurs, the firm-years with combined CEO-chairman 
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roles will be excluded from the observation. Finally, CEO turnovers which are due to 
board restructuring, such as removal CEO and chairman about at the same time, will be 
excluded from the observations because the chairmen have no influence in this type of 
forced CEO turnovers.  
 
3.4.2 Regression Analysis 
CEO turnover will be influenced by several factors, such as: financial performance, 
CEO characteristics and board characteristics. This study will control these variables in 
the regression analysis besides the chairman characteristics. The general model is 
formulated as: 
CEO turnover = f(firm performance, chairman characteristics, CEO characteristics, 
Board characteristics, control variables,  
  Interaction variables)      (3.1) 
This study will employ a logit model to estimate the parameters (Denis and Kruse, 2000; 
Hillier et al., 2005; Lau, et al., 2009). The model will be transformed into the binominal 
logistic model as follows: 
 












1,7
1,61,5
1,41,3
1,21,,,
var_int
var__
__
_)1/(ln
ti
titi
titi
titititi
iableseraction
iablesControlsticscharacteriboard
sticscharacteriCEOsticscharacterichairman
eperformancfirmPPturnover
 (3.2) 
Pi,t is the probability of CEO turnover for firm i and year t. For year t, this study will be 
split into two parts, which are year t when turnover occurs and year t without turnover. 
All the explanatory variables are at one-year lag (t-1). All variables will be measured at 
the end of year t. Each factor will be expanded from one to five variables in the further 
analysis. This study will follow Hillier et al. (2005) by adding year dummies and 
industry dummies in order to control time and industry specific effects respectively. 
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3.4.3 Research Variables 
This section will discuss the dependent and independent variables. The independent 
variables will be divided into five categories: financial indicators, chairman 
characteristics, board characteristics, CEO characteristics, and control variables. 
 
3.4.3.1 Dependent Variable 
The primary dependent variable is CEO turnover. CEO turnover is defined as a change 
in CEO identity. CEO turnover equals one if CEO turnover occurs in firm i and time t, 
and CEO turnover equals zero if else.  CEO turnover will be divided into two categories: 
routine turnovers and forced turnovers.  
Previous studies (Huson et al., 2001; Hillier et al., 2005; Hillier and McColgan, 2009) 
classified the CEO turnovers according to the report from the Wall Street Journal. They 
categorise as forced CEO turnovers when the CEOs are fired, depart due to dispute on a 
certain policy, or retiring before the age of 60. Furthermore, CEO retirement without a 
six-month notice is categorised as forced turnovers. On the other hand, CEO turnovers a 
result of death, poor health, and acceptance of other position within the firm or 
elsewhere, personal reason (or business reasons) that unrelated to business activities are 
categorised as routine (voluntary) CEO turnovers.  
As the Bloomberg database provides the news around the CEO turnover event, the 
classification of CEO turnover is based on that news. Any news that is related to profit 
warnings and performance decline around the announcement date will be classified as a 
forced turnover regardless of the official reason from the firms. For instance, the board 
of directors could publish the CEO turnover because of personal reasons, poor health 
reasons, or to pursue other interests. In fact, several analysts report profit warnings.   
CEO retirement is the most frequent reason in CEO turnovers. This study will follow 
previous studies in defining a forced turnover with respect to CEO retirement. Firstly, 
retirement before 60 will be classified as forced-turnover. But, this study will not follow 
entirely on this approach because sometimes the CEO steps down before 60 even 
though the firm is performing well. Secondly, retirement that is followed by a profit 
warning will be classified as a forced turnover. Thirdly, it will be classified as a forced 
turnover if the CEO does not give a six-month notice. 
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Besides retirement reasons, the CEOs can quit the firms to pursue other interests or 
personal reasons. This will be classified as a non-forced turnover if the CEO gives a six-
month notice and there is no bad news about firm performance before the 
announcement. In addition, when the reason of the turnover cannot be found, it can be 
categorised through the successors. If the successor is an acting CEO, the turnover is 
categorised a forced turnover (Lau et al., 2009). CEO change due to CEO death is 
categorised as no turnover event (Kaplan and Minton, 2012).  
In some cases, firm CEO could be stated as interim, acting, joint, and co-CEO. When 
interim or acting CEOs are removed, these events are deemed as no turnover events. 
This study only examines CEO turnovers which are on a permanent basis. Acceptance 
of a higher position in the same firm (e.g. becoming the board chairman) or elsewhere 
(e.g. as CEO) will be classified as routine turnovers.  
 
3.4.3.2 Financial Measures 
This study will use both the market and accounting data in measuring firm performance, 
which are stock returns, return on assets (ROA), profit margin and qui-score. The stock 
return is measured by a 12-month period return of stock a year prior the CEO turnover 
year. ROA is as defined net profit divided by book value of total assets. Profit margin 
equals to net profit divided by total sales. Qui scores are to measure the firm credit risks 
(credit worthiness) which are presented in scale between 1 (worst case) and 100 (best 
case).  These scores, which are developed and maintained by CRIF Decision Solution 
Limited, are estimated by using a certain statistical and modelling techniques and 
various information such as account information  (i.e. profitability, solvency, business 
structure, productivity, trend), director history, County Court Judgements (CCJs), 
shareholder funds and lateness in filing accounts. Both ROA and Qui score data are 
provided by the FAME database, while profit margin and stock return are from the 
Bloomberg database. 
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3.4.3.3 Chairman Characteristics 
The chairman characteristics will be divided into five variables: chairman’s tenure, age, 
title, involvement, and independence. Chairman tenure is the number of years spent as 
chairman, either as the non-executive chairman or the executive chairman. Both 
chairman tenure and chairman age are measured by years. The chairman title is 
measured by a dummy variable. It equals to one if the chairman title is non-executive 
chairman, and it equals to zero if else. Chairman involvement will be measured as a 
dummy variable. It equals to one if chairman involves in the CEO selection or chairman 
appointment dates is earlier than CEO appointment date, and it equals to zero if else.  
The last part is the chairman independence.  In general, the chairman can be a former 
CEO or executive director of the firm, the owner (e.g. a substantial shareholder or a 
family member or the founder) of the firm, a former non-executive director of the firm, 
and an outsider (independent). This study defines outside (independent) chairman 
similar in defining an outsider CEO, who is not working previously (or not more than 
one year) with the firm, not having 3 per cent shareholding or more, and not affiliated 
with any block holders. This variable will be measured as a dummy variable. It equals 
to one if the chairman is an independent chairman and it equals to zero if else.  
 
3.4.3.4 Board Characteristics 
There are two variables in measuring board characteristics: board size and fraction of 
independent non-executive directors. Board size is defined as the total numbers of 
directors, which include CEO, chairman, vice or deputy chairman, executive directors 
and non-executive directors. Fraction of independent non-executive directors is defined 
the numbers of non-executive directors, which includes independent directors and non-
executive deputy or vice chairman, divided by board size.   
In addition, gender diversity on the boards is included to the model. Adam and Ferreira 
(2009) report that female directors can influence the likelihood of CEO turnovers. 
Percentage of female non-executive directors, rather than percentage of females on the 
board of directors, is to measure the gender diversity because female non-executive 
directors are closely associated to monitoring roles (Liu et al., 2013).  
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3.4.3.5 CEO Characteristics 
This study will control CEO tenure and CEO outsider classification which are 
continuous and category variables respectively. CEO tenure is defined as years being in 
the CEO position (or equivalent to CEO position). 
In general, there are two ways to define outsider CEOs. Firstly, it can be classified as 
outsider CEOs when the new CEOs previously worked with the firm less than a year at 
the time of their appointment as CEO (Huson et al., 2001; Hillier et al., 2005; Florou, 
2005). Secondly, Dahya (2005) defined that an outsider succession occurs when the 
successor is not a member board of directors, not related a controlling shareholder and 
never historically employed by the firm.  
This study will classify type of CEO successors into two parts, which are insider CEO 
and outsider CEO. Insider CEO is defined as: (1) he or she has been on the board at 
least 12 months; or (2) he  or she is promoted either from outside the board or other 
business unit which is still in the same parent company; or (3) he or she is the 
representative of the substantial shareholders (> 3 per cent ownership) or affiliated 
shareholders or family; or (4) he or she is one of the founders; or (5) he or she is 
involved in the recent corporate action such as (e.g. M&A, placing, right issue, open 
offer). Any CEOs that are not part of those categories will be categorised as outsider 
CEOs. CEO outsider equals one if the CEO is an outsider, and CEO outsider equals 
zero if else.  
 
3.4.3.6 Control Variables 
This study adds total block holders stake to the model. Dahya et al. (1998) report that 
ownership concentration affects CEO turnover. Furthermore, firm age, firm assets, years 
and industry are controlled in the model.   
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Table 3.1 Variable Types and Sources 
Variables Variables Type Sources 
Dependent Variable   
Turnover Type Category Bloomberg 
   
Financial Performance   
ROA Continuous Fame 
Stock Return Continuous Bloomberg 
Profit Margin Continuous Bloomberg 
Qui Score Continuous Fame 
   
Chairman Characteristics   
Chairman age Continuous Fame 
Chairman origin Category Bloomberg and  Annual Return 
Chairman tenure Continuous Fame 
Chairman title Category Thomson-One Banker and Annual 
Return 
   
CEO characteristics   
CEO origin Category Bloomberg and Annual Return 
CEO Tenure Continuous Fame 
   
Board Characteristics   
Board Size Continuous Fame 
Fraction non-executive directors Continuous Fame and Thomson-One Banker 
Fraction female non-executive 
directors 
Continuous Fame and Bloomberg 
   
Control Variables   
Block holder Continuous Fame and Annual Return 
Firm assets Continuous Fame 
Years Category - 
Industry  Category Bloomberg 
Firm age Continuous Fame 
 
3.5 Empirical Results  
This section will be divided into seven parts: the sample selection process, CEO 
turnover reasons, descriptive analysis, regression analysis – without interaction, 
regression analysis – with interaction, and research discussion. 
 
3.5.1 Sample Selection Process 
There is no database that can provide the exact number of listed firms in the UK. 
Consequently, the process to identify listed firms is started by looking at the LSE Fact 
Books, in which they provide firm names, firm listing year, and firm industry. As UK 
firms are obliged to be registered at Companies House, it is necessary to find the 
64 
 
 
 
registered number for each firm by matching the firm name on the fact books with the 
firm name in the ICC database and the FAME database. Some firms may be excluded 
due to difficulty in determining the correct and appropriate registered numbers. The 
initial sample size reaches 2600 firms. 
This study applies several conditions in selecting the firm observations. Firstly, this 
study excludes financial and real estate firms. Firms with Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) 8000 will be excluded. The Bloomberg database only provides the 
latest ICB codes, without the historical codes. Consequently, some firms that change 
their industry classification from (or to) financial sector are also excluded.  
Secondly, as this study uses several databases, only listed firms that have complete 
identifiers are included, which are the registered number, the ISIN number and the 
SEDOL number. The registered number is an 8-digit number and it indicates firm 
registered number in the UK Companies House. The registered number is used to 
retrieve the characteristics of directors, ownership, and other financial information from 
the FAME database, while the ISIN number and the SEDOL number are used to 
retrieve governance and financial information from the Thomson-One Banker and the 
Bloomberg databases.  
Thirdly, this study will use firms that listed between 2004 and 2012 because the quality 
of governance variables (e.g. directorship and ownership) deteriorates before 2004.  
Lastly, there are also some firms that only listed for a short period, e.g. listing in 2005 
and delisting 2006. This study also excludes this type of firms. There are more than 
1950 firms that fulfil those conditions.  
Moreover, firms must have CEO and the chairman positions, which are held by two 
different individuals. For that reason, this study employs two more requirements in 
selecting the appropriate firm-year for the sample research such as excluding firm-year 
that still using dual CEO and chairman roles and excluding firm-year with joint-CEO.  
For the case of joint-CEO, it is necessary to read the roles of each CEO positions. Firms 
may have a joint-CEO title but his or her roles and responsibilities are mainly related 
the financial aspects of firm. These requirements must be fulfilled to ensure that the 
CEOs and chairmen characteristics do not suffer from missing observation for dual 
roles CEOs or double entry for joint CEOs.  
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In some cases, this study chooses appropriate executive directors as the CEOs, when the 
firms do not explicitly mention CEO or MD positions. This can be addressed by 
assessing of his or her responsibilities and total remuneration from financial report. 
Table 3.2 indicates the number of firm-year observations that have dual-CEO role and 
joint-CEO position. Even though the Cadbury Report (1992) recommended separation 
between the roles of CEO and the chairman, there are few firms that still combine these 
two positions. As a consequence, firms that combine CEO and chairman positions are 
excluded from further analysis.  
There are several firms that assign CEO position to two individuals. This position is 
usually called joint-CEO. This position is also excluded in further analysis due to its 
unique governance structure and its difficulty to determine appropriate CEOs 
characteristics. For instance, if a firm has two CEOs, one is from inside the firm and the 
other from outside the firm, it will be problematic to determine the origin of CEO. 
Table 3.2 also indicates the number of firms with no CEO position or no chairman 
position. Initially, the number of firms with no CEO would be more than 906 firm-year 
observations. Fortunately, about more than one-third of that number can be categorised 
as executive directors who are equivalent to CEOs by looking their job descriptions and 
remuneration. For instance, Eleco PLC has no CEO position during the observation 
period, but the firm has an operation director between 2009 and 2011 which can be a 
proxy of firm CEO. Although there are two or three executive directors on the board, 
they are responsible on firm unit businesses rather than the group. This type of top 
executive is still included in the further analysis.  
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Table 3.2 Sample Selection. Data for UK listed firms excluding financial firms between 2004 and 2012.  
Dual-CEO role is firms that combining CEO-chairman roles. Joint CEO is firms with more than one 
CEOs. Executive director as CEO is firms that do not have a CEO, but this study uses executive director 
(not a financial director) as a proxy for the CEO. No CEO is firms with no CEO or no executive director 
that can be classified as the CEO. No chairman is firms that have no chairman position. MD is managing 
director and MD is equivalent to CEO position. 
Year Firms 
Dual Roles 
CEO 
Joint CEO 
(Joint MD) 
Executive 
Directors 
as CEOs 
No CEO 
(No MD) 
No 
Chairman 
2004 1260 94 9 52 92 30 
2005 1469 106 11 51 111 33 
2006 1513 97 11 49 111 47 
2007 1482 72 9 49 105 34 
2008 1352 58 9 43 104 29 
2009 1216 51 5 35 100 37 
2010 1141 42 3 32 87 26 
2011 1100 47 5 27 97 26 
2012 1055 45 4 20 99 25 
Total 11588 612 66 358 906 287 
 
Meanwhile, some firms with no CEO are still excluded due to several reasons. One of 
the reasons is an appropriate executive director cannot be found due to a certain board 
structure. For instance Pittards PLC did not have a CEO position after John Pittard 
resigned from the firm. There are two executive directors, except financial directors, 
between 2004 and 2007, which might be a proxy of CEO which are either Reginald 
Hankey (CEO Pittards Yeovil) or Stephen Johnson (CEO Pittards Leeds). It is difficult 
to determine the appropriate executive director that is equivalent to CEO position 
because both directors have different responsibilities to different unit businesses.  
The other reason is because there is no executive position except the chairman of board. 
For instance, the Narborough Plantations PLC did not hire a CEO or executive director 
after Stephen Huntsman left his post in 2007 and hold non-executive directors in the 
firm. In this case, the board of directors only consists of the chairman and non-executive 
directors.  
Overall, this study excluded 1,513 firm-year observations because of various problems 
that are related to dual CEO roles, joint-CEOs, and missing CEOs (chairmen). This 
number is likely to be higher due to matching processes between CEO resignation dates 
and the working period of the chairman.   
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3.5.2  CEO Turnover Reasons 
CEO turnover reasons are obtained from the Bloomberg database. This database does 
not only provide the firm official announcement but also the news and analyst 
comments about the turnovers. There are eleven reasons that are usually used as CEO 
turnover reasons: non-forced turnovers (e.g. planned succession, move elsewhere, 
becoming chairman), poor performance, retiring, pursue other opportunities or interests, 
family reason, personal reason, poor health, switching to other positions (e.g. becoming 
non-executive director or deputy or vice chairman), merger and acquisition, corporate 
actions related (e.g. placing, right issue, disposal), and death.  
There are about 1527 CEO turnovers that can be identified. Table 3.3 indicates that the 
CEO turnover reasons and the average of firm performance indicators. Poor 
performance is the most common reason for CEO turnover events, while non-forced 
turnovers and retirement are the second and the third common reasons respectively. 
CEO turnovers that are caused by delisting reason will be excluded from the analysis 
since the reasons of the turnover cannot be properly provided from the Bloomberg 
database.  
Table 3.3 shows that firm performance measures, namely ROA, stock return, and qui 
score, for corporate action reason are the worst.  These firms may not only experience 
poor performance but they also may experience financial distress which may affect firm 
sustainability.  
Furthermore, all CEO turnover reasons are still related to firm performance. In the 
previous studies, family reason, personal reasons, and poor health are categorised as 
non-forced turnovers, but these three reasons have a negative firm performance. The 
same figures also occur for CEOs who said they left their position to pursue other 
business opportunity or interest. This implies CEO turnovers for UK listed firms are 
likely influenced by firm performance regardless of the official announcements. 
Given these findings, this study tries to categorise CEO turnover in a slightly different 
way. Not only looking at firm official announcements, this study also tries to assess 
news, analysts’ comments on firm financial performance (i.e. interim or final results) 
around CEO turnover announcements. Fortunately, the Bloomberg database provides 
the sequence for that information. 
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Table 3.3 CEO turnover Reasons and Firm Performance between 2005 and 2013. Delisted is CEO 
turnover as a result of firm decision to go delisting from the stock market. Non-forced turnovers refer to 
CEOs who are promoted to become the chairman, part of a planned succession, or CEOs who move 
elsewhere. Poor performance is CEOs who resign or are removed as a result of poor performance 
(reported loss or sales decline). Pursue other interests refers CEOs who resign a result of pursue other 
(new or personal) business interests (challenges). M&A is CEO turnover as a result of merger and 
acquisition activities. Corporate actions related to placing or right issue or disposal of unit business. 
Switching to other positions means CEOs who are moved to other position in the boards except as the 
chairman. Family reason, personal reason, poor health means CEOs who resign by stating family reason, 
personal reason, and poor health respectively. Passed away means CEOs are deceased while still seating 
as the CEO. Retiring is when CEOs state that he or she is retiring in the public disclosure. ROA is 
measured net profit divided by total assets. Stock return is measured by a 12-month stock return at the end 
of the calendar year. Profit margin is measured net profit divided by total sales. Qui-Score is a proxy of 
credit risk. 
Code Reasons N ROA Stock Return Profit Margin Qui-Score 
. Delisted 250 -0.19 -36.67 -7.76 78.44 
0 Non-Forced Turnovers 175 -0.08 -16.23 -0.70 83.43 
1 Poor Performance 513 -0.33 -40.75 -4.52 76.44 
2 Pursue other interests 117 -0.27 -45.25 -7.58 79.06 
3 M&A 52 -0.26 -13.63 -3.12 79.16 
4 Corporate actions related 40 -0.34 -53.32 -1.93 71.45 
5 Switching to other position 128 -0.17 -18.53 -24.76 80.50 
6 Family reason 13 -0.25 -14.99 -2.23 76.85 
7 Personal reason 34 -0.13 -26.68 -5.62 79.82 
8 Poor health 20 -0.18 -11.43 -3.65 80.00 
9 Passed Away 14 -0.17 -6.03 -0.13 79.42 
100 Retiring 171 0.07 -1.40 -0.17 87.29 
 
Table 3.4 reports almost half of CEO retirements are categorised as forced turnovers.  It 
means that some CEOs may use retirements to cover up their poor results or older CEOs 
(more than 60s) are more likely to be removed from his or her position. Similarly, it 
seems CEOs who left their position to pursue other interests is also the most common 
reason to quit CEO positions, but two-third of this reason is categorised as forced-
turnovers. One possible reason might be to protect former CEOs reputation (credibility) 
in the job market.  
Moreover, Table 3.4 indicates the components of non-forced turnovers and their 
respective financial performance. Firms that conduct planned successions tend to have 
better performance than firms that promoting CEOs to become the chairman.  It can be 
deemed that the CEOs promotion may not be related to their performance such as 
ownership.  
This classification also indicates that CEO turnovers as the consequences of family 
reason, personal reason, and poor health may be still related to firm performance. 
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Overall, this table indicates that there are a significant difference in performance 
indicators for every reason and classification which suggests that firm official 
announcement on CEO turnover might not be entirely true and the turnovers are still 
subject to firm performance. 
There are four important implications in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4. Firstly, this study will 
use the second approach in classifying forced and non-forced CEO turnovers rather than 
entirely relying on the official announcements. Secondly, following to Kaplan et al. 
(2012), CEO turnovers as a result of death are classified as no turnover event. Thirdly, 
CEO turnovers as a result of M&A activities are categorised as non-forced turnovers 
because this study focuses on firm poor performance. Fourthly, CEOs who are 
promoted to become the board chairman within the same firms will be excluded in the 
further analysis because the chairman is less likely to be involved in this type of 
succession.  
 
3.5.3 CEO Turnovers and Chairman Turnovers 
According to Florou (2005), chairman turnover may highly be related to CEO turnover 
events rather than to firm performance. Table 3.5 reports that 529 chairman turnovers 
occur during the period 180 days before and after the CEO turnovers, of which most 
chairman turnovers occur on the same day of CEO turnovers.  
Table 3.5 indicates that chairman turnovers that occur before CEO turnover may be a 
good indicator to predict CEO turnovers. The new chairman will do better monitoring 
and overseeing roles than the previous chairman. The introduction a new chairman may 
bring new faces in the boardroom by hiring new non-executive directors. The other 
reason is a new chairman may be linked to the appointment a new CEO successor 
(planned succession). The chairmen who are well experienced and connected are hired 
to identify potential CEO candidates.  
Moreover, chairman turnovers that happen after CEO turnover may indicate that 
chairman has responsibility for the CEO turnover that just happened. Florou (2005) 
indicates that the likelihood of chairmen losing their job is high when the chairmen are 
involved in the selection of dismissed CEOs. 
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Table 3.4 New CEO Turnover Classifications and Firm Performance between 2005 and 2013. Poor 
performance is CEOs who resign or are removed as a result of poor performance (reported loss or sales 
decline). M&A is CEO turnover as a result merger and acquisition activities. Passed away means CEOs 
are deceased while still seat as the CEO. Retiring is when CEOs state that he or she is retiring in the 
public disclosure. Becoming chairman is CEO who is promoted to become the chairman in the same firm. 
Move elsewhere is CEO who moves to other firm as CEO. Planned succession is CEO who resigns by 
giving six-month notice, no negative news, and usually less than 60 years old. Pursue other interests 
refers CEOs who resign as a result of pursue other (new or personal) business interests (challenges). 
Corporate actions are to related placing or right issue or disposal of unit business. Switching to other 
positions means CEOs who are moved to other position in the boards besides the chairman. Family 
reason, personal reason, and poor health mean CEOs who resign by stating family reason, personal reason, 
and poor health reasons respectively. Retiring reason, pursue other interest reason, family reason, 
personal reason, poor health reasons with forced classification refer to negative news or analysts’ 
comments around the announcements. ROA is measured net profit divided book value of total assets. 
Stock return is measured by a 12-month stock return at the end of the calendar year. Profit margin is 
measured net profit divided by total sales (revenue). Qui-Score is a proxy of credit risk. 
Reason Code 
Turnover 
Type 
N ROA 
Stock 
Return 
Profit 
Margin 
Qui-Score 
Poor Performance 1 Forced 513 -0.33 -40.75 -4.52 76.44 
M&A 3 Non_forced 52 -0.26 -13.63 -3.12 79.16 
Passed Away 9 Non_forced 14 -0.17 -6.03 -0.13 79.42 
Retiring 
10 Non_forced 122 0.11 9.02 0.06 87.14 
11 Forced 49 -0.04 -28.38 -0.77 87.72 
Becoming Chairman 13 Non_forced 83 -0.17 -17.74 -1.48 81.59 
Move elsewhere 14 Non_forced 49 -0.07 -29.12 -0.05 83.45 
Planned Succession 15 Non_forced 43 0.08 1.99 -0.03 86.81 
Pursue other interests 
20 Non_forced 39 0.00 -11.26 -4.62 83.16 
21 Forced 78 -0.40 -63.70 -9.38 77.01 
Corporate actions related 41 Forced 40 -0.34 -53.32 -1.93 71.45 
Switching to other position 
50 Non_forced 39 0.04 2.25 -64.26 88.33 
51 Forced 89 -0.26 -28.00 -3.22 76.98 
Family reason 
60 Non_forced 4 0.01 -13.53 0.05 83.25 
61 Forced 9 -0.36 -15.73 -3.53 74.00 
Personal reason 
70 Non_forced 8 0.10 29.38 0.09 92.25 
71 Forced 26 -0.21 -41.96 -7.79 75.84 
Poor health 
80 Non_forced 9 0.00 -3.67 0.08 90.89 
81 Forced 11 -0.32 -18.33 -7.01 71.09 
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CEO turnovers in Table 3.5 are excluded in the next analysis because (1) this study 
suggests that it is difficult for the chairman to assess CEO performance in a short period 
of time (less than 6 month). (2) The chairman is less likely to be involved in CEO 
dismissal in the board restructuring, which refers to the dismissal of CEO and the 
chairman dismissal at the same time. (3) As some of the appointment and resignation 
dates are hand-collected, it is likely that some dates are mistyped particularly for dates 
and months. To minimize the chance of this error, CEO turnover dates that are close to 
chairman turnover dates should be excluded in the next analysis. 
 
Table 3.5 The Occurrences of Chairman Turnovers 180 Days before or after CEO Turnovers 
between 2005 and 2013. t is the days (dates) when CEO left his or her position. Panel A is when 
chairman turnovers incidents before CEO turnovers. Panel B is when the turnovers of CEO and chairman 
on the same day. Panel C is when chairman turnovers incidents after CEO turnovers. 
Period Code N Accumulated 
Panel A: Before CEO turnover dates 
   between t-150 and t-180 g 19 177 
between t-120 and t-150 f 18 158 
between t-90 and t-120 e 20 140 
between t-60 and t-90 d 25 120 
between t-30 and t-60 c 38 95 
between 0 and t-30 b 57 57 
    
Panel B 
   On CEO turnover day (t = 0) a 171 171 
    Panel C: After CEO turnover dates  
between 0 and t+30 h 31 31 
between t+30 and t+60 i 32 63 
between t+60 and t+90 j 32 95 
between t+90 and t+120 k 36 131 
between t+120 and t+150 l 21 152 
between t+150 and t+180 m 29 181 
 
 
3.5.4 Descriptive Analysis 
It has been shown that there are more than 1500 CEO turnover events between 2004 and 
2013 for UK listed firms. Due to the sensitivity of CEO and chairman datasets, that 
number reduces to 900 turnovers, such as: excluding promoted CEOs, board 
restructuring, and delisting firms.  
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Unlike UK-based previous studies, in which only used listed big capitalization 
companies (FTSE100 or FTSE350), this study uses a large dataset of listed firms 
between 2004 and 2012. This dataset includes firms that listed in FTSE all share index 
and FTSE AIM index. Table 3.6 indicates the number of firms is 9233 firm-years, 
which involves 900 CEO turnover events. This number is substantially larger than 
Dahya et al. (2002) and Hillier et al. (2005) in which only include 257 and 497 CEO 
turnover events respectively. 
Table 3.6 CEO Turnover Classification between 2005 and 2013. Data is for 9233 CEO turnovers. A 
turnover is classified as a forced turnover if the CEO departs as the results of poor performance which can 
be observed from the news, analysts’ comments, and public disclosures around the announcement date.  
Year Firm Year 
CEO Turnover Forced Turnover 
Observation Rate (%) Observation Rate (%) 
2005 1013 99 9.77 58 5.73 
2006 1154 125 10.83 72 6.24 
2007 1185 140 11.81 74 6.24 
2008 1183 125 10.57 82 6.93 
2009 1089 104 9.55 62 5.69 
2010 975 82 8.41 54 5.54 
2011 930 96 10.32 63 6.77 
2012 882 83 9.41 53 6.01 
2013 822 46 5.60 24 2.92 
TOTAL 9233 900 9.75 542 5.87 
 
Table 3.6 presents the final firm years and the number of CEO turnovers for every year 
during period 2005 to 2013. Some firms could have more than one CEO succession in a 
calendar year. Only the first CEO succession in calendar year will be included in order 
to avoid overlap. The average rate for all turnovers in this study is 9.75 per cent, which 
is lower than previous UK based studies, such as Hillier et al. (2005) and Hillier and 
McColgan (2009) which report around 12 per cent. This is may be the results of 
excluding some CEO turnover events in the previous section. As this study employs 
different ways in classifying the forced and routine CEO turnovers, the rate of forced 
CEO turnovers in this is higher than previous studied (Conyon and Florou, 2002; Hillier 
et al., 2005). The rate of forced CEO turnovers is 5.87 per cent, while the rate in 
previous studies was around 4 per cent.  
Table 3.7 exhibits the descriptive statistics of CEO characteristics, chairman 
characteristics, board characteristics, performance measures, and firm characteristics. 
There is a significant number of missing values for some variables, particularly firm 
performance measures and firm characteristics. Firm profit margin and stock return are 
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the first and the second highest in terms of missing observations. This problem occurs 
mostly due to poor data availability for smaller listed firms particularly when they are 
delisted. Total observations in regression analysis will likely be lower than 9000 
observations. 
ROA, stock return and profit margin will be winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent, 
while qui-score will remain the same as the score range is between 0 and 100. After 
winsorizing, the mean of ROA, stock return, and profit margin are still in the negative 
area but the median values are positive. This implies that there are some firms that 
experience severely poor performance. 
Table 3.7 reports that the chairmen are about 10 years older than the CEO, which is 
consistent with Florou (2005). The mean (median) CEO tenure is slightly higher than 
the mean (median) of chairman tenure, which are 5.08 years (3.59 years) and 5.06 years 
(3.50 years). Furthermore, most of the firms still hire an insider as the chairman such as 
a former CEO (executive director), the owner (i.e. substantial shareholder or family 
member or founder), or a former non-executive director. About 46 per cent of the 
chairmen are the independent chairmen. This figure is larger than the outsider CEO, 
which is about 32 per cent. Most of the chairmen are non-executive and most of them 
are not involved in the CEO selection.  
The board characteristics indicate that the average board size and fraction of non-
executive for UK listed firms are 6.79 and 52 per cent respectively. Board size is lower 
than previous study (Guest, 2008), in which the average board size is 7.41 in the UK. 
The average of fraction of female non-executive directors is only 6 per cent.  
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Table 3.7 Summary Descriptive statistics. outsider_ceo equals to 1 when the CEO (1) has not been on 
the board or other firm unit business for 12 months, (2) is not a founder, substantial shareholder, nor 
member of family, (3) is not involved in any other corporate actions (i.e. M&A, placing, right issue, open 
offer), it equals to 0 if else. ceo_age (year) is the difference between end date of calendar year-t and date 
of birth of the CEO. ceo_tenure (year) is the difference between end date of calendar year-t and date of 
appointment of the CEO. chair_age (year) is the difference between end date of calendar year-t and date 
of birth of the chairman. chair_tenure (year) is the difference between end date of calendar year-t and date 
of appointment of the chairman. chair_func equals to 1 if the chairman is a non-executive, equal to 0 if 
else. Involve equals to 1 if the chairman is appointed prior to the CEO appointment, it equals 0 if else. 
independent_origin equal to 1 if the chairman never works with the firm, is not the founder, shareholder, 
nor family member, it equals 0 if else. board_size is total directors. prop_ned is fraction of non-executive 
directors to total directors. Prop_ined is fraction of independent directors to total directors. women_ned is 
fraction of female non-executive director to total directors. ROA is measured net profit divided book 
value of total assets. Stock return (per cent) is measured by a 12-month stock return at the end of the 
calendar year. Profit margin is measured net profit divided by total sales. Qui-Score is a proxy of credit 
risk. assetf is total assets (‘000). Employ is total employees. firm_age is the difference between end date 
of calendar year-t and firm date establishment. block is the stake is owned by top block holder. * 
winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent. 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 
Lower 
Quartile 
Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
CEO Characteristics 
      outsider_code 9220 0.32 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00
ceo_age 9232 50.49 7.84 45.32 50.24 55.58 
ceo_tenure 9233 5.08 4.95 1.58 3.59 6.91 
       
Chairman Characteristics      
chair_age 9233 60.48 7.73 55.81 61.09 65.49 
chair_func 9207 0.75 0.43 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Involve 9233 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
independent_origin 9197 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
chair_tenure 9233 5.06 5.53 1.59 3.50 6.51 
       
Board Characteristics      
board_size 9233 6.79 2.35 5.00 6.00 8.00 
prop_ned 9233 0.52 0.16 0.40 0.50 0.63 
prop_ined 9233 0.41 0.19 0.29 0.40 0.55 
women_ned 9233 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
       Firm Performance       
ROA* 8825 -0.07 0.35 -0.09 0.03 0.09 
Stock Return * 8366 -11.35 65.03 -41.70 0.00 27.62 
Profit Margin* 8223 -2.02 10.68 -0.08 0.03 0.09 
Qui Score 8528 82.96 14.01 77.00 90.00 93.00 
       
Firm Characteristics       
Asset 8847 1,390,443 9,325,492 11,094 45,742 235,124 
employ 8694 5923.42 28372.64 57.00 267.00 1825.00 
firm_age 9233 23.41 28.53 5.61 11.09 26.22 
block 9035 0.21 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.26 
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Table 3.8 shows the coefficients correlation of all variables that will be possibly used in 
the regression analysis. There is a strong positive association between total assets, total 
employees, and board size. The correlation between total assets and board size is 0.69, 
while the correlation between total employees and board size is 0.60. A multicolinearity 
problem will occur when total assets and board size are used together in the regression 
model. Thus, total employees will be a proxy of firm size. 
Fraction of independent director and board size are the proxies of board monitoring 
power and firm complexity respectively. Fraction of independent director has a positive 
association with chairman function and chairman independence, while it has a negative 
correlation with chairman tenure. Moreover, board size also has a positive correlation 
with chairman age and chairman function. Large boards need more experienced 
chairman and focused on monitoring due to firm complexity. Thus, there is an early 
indication that the effectiveness of the chairmen depends on the board characteristics.  
 
3.5.5 Logit Regression Analysis – No Interaction Effects 
Following to the previous studies previous studies on CEO turnovers (Weisbach, 1988; 
Allgood and Farrel, 2000), this study uses logit regression. In general, logit regression 
will divided into two parts: regression analysis without interaction variables and 
regression analysis with interaction variables. The interaction variables will be between 
chairman characteristics and financial performance. The logit regression analysis only 
uses forced CEO turnover as the dependent variable.  
This section is to investigate the explanatory power of independent variables, 
particularly firm performance and chairman characteristic without interacting both 
variables. There are two type regressions in this section: for financial measures 
(Equation 3.3) and for chairman characteristics (Equation 3.4).  
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Where Pi,t is the probability of CEO turnover for firm i and year t. forced_turnover is a 
dummy variable, which equals to one if CEO is removed as a result of poor 
performance, it equals to zero if else. Firm performance measures are ROA, stock return, 
profit margin and qui score. Chairman characteristics are chairman’s function, 
independence, age, tenure, and involvement in the CEO selection. CEO characteristics 
are outsider CEO and CEO tenure. Board characteristics are board size, fraction of 
independent non-executive directors, and fraction of female non-executive directors. 
Control variables are block holders, firm assets, firm age, dummy industry and dummy 
year. All the explanatory variables are at one-year lag (t-1) 
Table 3.9 reports that the relation between financial measures and the likelihood of 
forced CEO turnovers. Consistently to previous studies (Huson et al., 2001; Hillier et al., 
2005; Lau et al., 2009), all the financial measures are negatively associated with forced 
CEO turnovers, which means the likelihood of forced turnovers is high when firm 
performance is low, and vice versa. The significance of financial performance measures 
is relatively high in Model 1 to Model 4, but profit margin and qui score tend to lose 
their significance in Model 5. ROA and stock return might be the strongest financial 
measures in this CEO turnover model.  
In terms of CEO characteristics, the coefficient estimation of outsider CEO is 
statistically significant at level 1 per cent. The likelihood of outsider CEOs to 
experience forced turnovers is higher than insider CEO. Consistently, CEO tenure tends 
to have a negative influence to the likelihood of forced CEO turnover, but it is only 
statistically significant in Model 3. The coefficient estimations suggest that the CEOs 
tend to be entrenched when they hold their position for a long period.  
Board size statistically influences forced turnovers for all models. Large boards tend to 
dismiss CEO. However, there is no evidence that fraction of independent directors will 
increase forced turnover probability. Finally, fraction of female non-executive director 
estimations tend to be positive and stable as expected, but they are not statistically 
significant. 
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Table 3.8 The Correlation Matrix of Explanatory Variables. Forced turnover equals to 1 if the ceo is removed as a result of poor performance, it equals to 0 if else. outsider_ceo 
equals to 1 when the CEO (1) has not been on the board or other firm unit business for 12 months, (2) is not a founder, substantial shareholder, and member of family, (3) is not 
involved in any other corporate actions (i.e. M&A, placing, right issue, open offer), it equals to 0 if else. ceo_tenure (year) is the difference between end date of calendar year-t and 
date of appointment of the CEO. board_size is total directors. prop_ned is fraction of non-executive directors to total directors.  prop_ined is fraction of independent non-executive 
directors to total directors. women_ned is fraction of female non-executive director to total directors.  chair_age (year) is the difference between end date of calendar year-t and date 
of birth of the chairman. chair_tenure (year) is the difference between end date of calendar year-t and date of appointment of the chairman. chair_function equals to 1 if the chairman 
is a non-executive, equal to 0 if other. Involve equals to 1 if the chairman is appointed prior to the CEO appointment, it equals to 0 if else. Independent chairman equals to 1 if the 
chairman never works with the firm, the chairman is not a founder, shareholder, nor family member, it equals 0 if else. ROA is measured net profit divided book value of total assets. 
Stock return (per cent) is measured by a 12-month stock return at the end of the calendar year. Profit margin is measured net profit divided by total sales (revenue). Qui-Score is a 
proxy of credit risk. ln_asset is natural logarithm of firm total assets. ln_employee is natural logarithm of firm total employees. firm_age is the difference between end date of 
calendar year-t and firm date establishment. Block holder is a stake that is owned by top block holder.  
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Forced Turnover (1) 1.00
outsider_ceo (2) 0.03 1.00
ceo_tenure (3) -0.03 -0.21 1.00
board_size (4) -0.01 0.04 -0.01 1.00
prop_ned (5) -0.01 0.13 -0.09 0.31 1.00
prop_ined (6) -0.03 0.10 -0.03 0.37 0.72 1.00
women_ned (7) -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.23 0.11 0.16 1.00
chair_age (8) -0.06 -0.01 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.07 -0.03 1.00
chair_tenure (9) -0.06 -0.10 0.28 0.02 -0.12 -0.06 -0.02 0.24 1.00
chair_func (10) -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.43 0.23 -0.01 0.07 -0.25 1.00
involve (11) -0.02 0.15 -0.38 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.36 -0.16 1.00
independent chairman (12) 0.01 0.07 -0.06 0.00 0.10 0.38 0.05 0.05 -0.19 0.26 -0.03 1.00
ROA (13) -0.13 -0.05 0.15 0.19 0.11 0.18 0.09 0.07 0.13 0.02 0.02 -0.02 1.00
Stock Return (14) -0.10 -0.04 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.32 1.00
Profit Margin (15) 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.13 0.02 1.00
Qui Score (16) -0.09 -0.05 0.17 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.17 0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.49 0.22 0.09 1.00
ln_asset (17) -0.07 0.08 0.02 0.69 0.40 0.50 0.29 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.43 0.17 0.07 0.18 1.00
ln_employee (18) -0.06 0.07 0.03 0.60 0.35 0.44 0.28 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.39 0.15 0.09 0.20 0.88 1.00
firm_age (19) -0.04 0.07 0.08 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.21 -0.01 0.12 -0.07 0.18 0.10 0.04 0.27 0.26 0.33 1.00
blockholder (20) 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.11 -0.06 -0.13 -0.08 0.01 0.06 -0.10 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.20 -0.19 -0.09 1.00
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Table 3.9 Forced CEO Turnover and Financial Performance – Logit Regression. CEO turnover is 
regressed with financial performance measures and control variables. outsider_ceo equals to 1 when the 
CEO (1) has not been on the board or other firm unit business for 12 months, (2) is not a founder, 
substantial shareholder, and member of family, (3) is not involved in any other corporate actions (i.e. 
M&A, placing, right issue, open offer), it equals to 0 if else. ceo_tenure is the difference between end date 
of calendar year-t and date of appointment of the CEO in year. board_size is total directors. prop_ined is 
fraction of independent non-executive directors to total directors. women_ned is fraction of female non-
executive director to total directors.  roaf2 refers to ROA, which is measured net profit divided book 
value of total assets. ret_bloom2 refers to stock return, which is measured by a 12-month stock return at 
the end of the calendar year. Prof_margin2 refers to profit margin, which is measured net profit divided 
by total sales. Quif refers to qui-score, which is a proxy of credit risk. ln_employf is natural logarithm of 
total employees. firm_age is the difference between end date of calendar year-t and firm date 
establishment. block is stake that is owned by top block holder. Year and industry (2-digit ICB code) are 
controlled for all models. roaf2, ret_bloom2, prof_margin2 are winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent. *, 
**, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of 
significance respectively. ll is log likelihood. r2_p is pseudo–square. Robust standard errors are provided 
in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 B1 B4 B7 B11 B12 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
      
outsider_code 0.283*** 0.188* 0.290*** 0.297*** 0.170 
 (0.099) (0.104) (0.106) (0.101) (0.116) 
ceo_tenure -0.014 -0.015 -0.023** -0.015 -0.007 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
prop_ined -0.198 -0.166 -0.524* -0.250 -0.124 
 (0.287) (0.293) (0.305) (0.289) (0.322) 
board_size 0.042* 0.046* 0.065** 0.044* 0.055* 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) 
women_ned 0.228 0.405 0.454 0.171 0.233 
 (0.381) (0.381) (0.394) (0.402) (0.426) 
ln_employf -0.041 -0.094*** -0.106*** -0.071** -0.056 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.030) (0.036) 
firm_age -0.004* -0.003 -0.004* -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
block -0.501 -0.477 -0.353 -0.489 -0.435 
 (0.344) (0.372) (0.366) (0.352) (0.409) 
roaf2 -0.857***    -0.594*** 
 (0.095)    (0.151) 
ret_bloom2  -0.007***   -0.006*** 
  (0.001)   (0.001) 
prof_margin2   -0.008**  0.002 
   (0.003)  (0.005) 
quif    -0.017*** -0.007 
    (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant -3.349*** -2.931*** -2.949*** -1.559*** -2.952*** 
 (0.313) (0.306) (0.336) (0.373) (0.520) 
      
Observations 8,550 7,940 7,785 8,277 7,145 
ll -1844 -1689 -1641 -1782 -1412 
r2_p 0.0415 0.0520 0.0298 0.0365 0.0613 
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Firm size, which is proxied by firm total employees, tends to have a negative 
consequence on forced turnovers. This result is relatively similar to previous UK based 
studies (Hillier et al., 2005; Hillier and McColgan, 2009) on CEO turnover. This result 
infers most UK large firms either perform so well or avoid CEO dismissal due to 
possibility expensive costs.  
Table 3.10 shows that the impacts of chairman characteristics on forced CEO turnover. 
Several chairman characteristics have important effects in explaining the likelihood of 
forced CEO turnovers.  Chairman function has negative coefficients in model 1 and 
model 6, which is the opposite of expected sign. This means that the non-executive 
chairmen decrease the probability of forced turnovers. This result is statistically 
significant in model 6.  
In terms of chairman age, the estimations are consistent with Waelchli and Zeller (2013) 
in which the older chairmen tend to experience deteriorating cognitive abilities which 
affect their performance. Chairman tenure also shows consistent estimations in terms of 
the sign and significance level. The chairmen with long tenure are less likely to remove 
poor performing CEO. The chairmen can create a comfortable relationship with CEOs, 
which leads to ineffectiveness in disciplining poor performing CEOs.  
Furthermore, chairman independence is not statistically significant although the 
estimations show positive estimations. Chairman involvement is negative and 
significant at level 5 per cent, which means chairman who is involved in the CEO 
selection will decrease the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. But the significance of 
chairman involvement estimation disappears in model 6. Overall, chairman’s function, 
age, and tenure could be the most important chairman characteristics.  
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Table 3.10 CEO Turnover and Chairman Characteristics. CEO turnover is regressed with chairman 
characteristics and control variables. outsider_ceo equals to 1 when the CEO (1) has not been on the 
board or other firm unit business for 12 months, (2) is not a founder, substantial shareholder, and member 
of family, (3) is not involved in any other corporate actions (i.e. M&A, placing, right issue, open offer), it 
equals to 0 if else. ceo_tenure (year) is the difference between end date of calendar year-t and date of 
appointment of the CEO. board_size is total directors. prop_ined is fraction of independent non-executive 
directors to total directors. women_ned is the fraction of female non-executive director to total directors. 
ln_employf is the natural logarithm of total employees. firm_age (year) is the difference between end date 
of calendar year-t and firm date establishment. block is stake that is owned by top block holder. chair_age 
(age) is the difference between end date of calendar year-t and date of birth of the chairman. chair_tenure 
is the difference between end date of calendar year-t and date of appointment of the chairman in year. 
chair_func equals to 1 if the chairman is a non-executive, equals to 0 if else. Involve equals to 1 if the 
chairman is appointed prior to the CEO appointment, it equals to 0 if else. independent_origin equal to 1 
if the chairman never works with the firm, is not the founder, shareholder, nor family member, it equals 0 
if else. Year and industry (2-digit ICB code) are controlled in all models.  *, **, and *** mean 
statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. 
ll is log likelihood. r2_p is pseudo–square.  Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
       
outsider_code 0.292*** 0.300*** 0.291*** 0.295*** 0.323*** 0.282*** 
 (0.098) (0.098) (0.099) (0.098) (0.098) (0.099) 
ceo_tenure -0.024** -0.021** -0.009 -0.025** -0.035*** -0.007 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) 
prop_ined -0.308 -0.379 -0.462 -0.548* -0.436 -0.447 
 (0.288) (0.283) (0.283) (0.311) (0.285) (0.312) 
board_size 0.048** 0.053** 0.051** 0.052** 0.051** 0.055** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
women_ned 0.331 0.250 0.299 0.319 0.355 0.160 
 (0.376) (0.380) (0.385) (0.378) (0.378) (0.388) 
ln_employf -0.107*** -0.099*** -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.104*** -0.094*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
firm_age -0.004** -0.004* -0.003 -0.004** -0.004* -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
block -0.465 -0.479 -0.450 -0.464 -0.494 -0.398 
 (0.339) (0.341) (0.341) (0.340) (0.341) (0.340) 
chair_func -0.115     -0.232** 
 (0.106)     (0.112) 
chair_age  -0.022***    -0.018*** 
  (0.006)    (0.006) 
chair_tenure   -0.055***   -0.050*** 
   (0.016)   (0.017) 
independent_origin    0.108  0.127 
    (0.102)  (0.104) 
involve     -0.263** -0.050 
     (0.105) (0.118) 
Constant -2.599*** -1.446*** -2.502*** -2.691*** -2.522*** -1.389*** 
 (0.308) (0.433) (0.305) (0.301) (0.303) (0.443) 
       
Observations 8,538 8,562 8,562 8,543 8,562 8,519 
ll -1884 -1882 -1878 -1885 -1885 -1863 
r2_p 0.0276 0.0304 0.0326 0.0273 0.0289 0.0361 
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3.5.6 Logit Regression Analysis – with Interaction Effects  
Even though Table 3.10 indicates that several chairman characteristics have important 
role on forced CEO turnovers, this type of regression analysis is not sufficient because 
previous studies (Weisbach, 1988; Dahya et al., 2002; Hillier et al., 2005; Hillier and 
McColgan, 2009; Lau, 2009; Adams and Ferreira, 2009) always use the interaction 
effect between the focused variable and firm performance measure. Therefore, this 
study follows those previous studies by interacting five chairman characteristics with 
ROA, stock return, profit margin and qui-score. 
As firm performance and CEO turnovers have a negative relationship, it is expected that 
negative estimated interaction variable will increase the magnitude (likelihood or 
sensitivity) of forced CEO turnover. In this study, a negative estimation of interaction 
effect will infer certain chairman characteristics will increase the likelihood or 
sensitivity of forced CEO turnovers with respect to firm performance.   
This analysis will be conducted in three ways. Firstly, using estimated coefficient from 
logit regression. Secondly, using the inteff analysis from the STATA software. As this 
study uses non-linear regression model, interpreting the interaction terms in logit 
models cannot be simply evaluated by assessing the magnitude, signs, and significance 
of the estimated coefficients (Ai and Norton, 2003). Fortunately, the STATA can help 
this analysis through a programme called inteff which can provide the graphs of the 
interaction variables. These graphs show the sign and t-value of the interaction variables. 
Thirdly, the analysis of chairman characteristics will be subject to board characteristics. 
Thus, the regression analysis will be conducted with respect to board size and board 
independence.  
In order to save space in this chapter, the full estimation results and the graph of 
interaction effects are presented in Appendix A. Table 3.11 and Figure 3.1 are still 
presented in this chapter to give a brief idea on the interaction effects. 
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3.5.6.1 Non-Executive Chairman 
In the previous section, it is reported that most of the chairmen are assigned as the non-
executive chairmen. Similar to the role of non-executive directors, the non-executive 
chairmen tend to be involved in monitoring duties rather than in firm daily businesses.  
Table 3.11 indicates that the estimation of chairman function is negative in all models, 
which are similar to previous results in Table 3.10. Assigning the chairmen as the non-
executive chairmen has a negative effect on the likelihood of forced turnovers.  The 
focused variable (functionXfirm_performance) which refers to interaction between 
chairman function (= 1 if chairman function is non-executive chairman, and = 0 if else) 
and firm performance. The estimated coefficients of interaction term tend to be negative 
except for functionXroa, but none of them is significant.  
Figure 3.1 reports the interaction terms can be positive or negative with weak 
explanation power. Figure 3.1 also reports that the interaction between chairman 
function and qui-score has positive estimations rather than negative as reported in Table 
3.11. The results indicate the lack of consistency on the interaction term estimations 
between chairman function and firm performance. 
The next analysis is to examine whether certain board characteristics may influence the 
interaction term estimations. Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.3 indicate that the 
interaction estimations for small boards and large boards respectively. Both tables 
indicate that the estimations of interaction term tend to be stable, in which they are 
negative and positive for small boards and large boards respectively. The non-executive 
chairmen on small boards are more effective to increase the sensitivity between CEO 
turnover and firm performance rather than on large boards. More importantly, Appendix 
A.1 and Appendix A.3 show that the interaction effects are significant, which are 
chairman_functionXprofit_margin and chairman_functionXroa respectively.  
Appendix A.6 and Appendix A.8 show the estimations of interaction effect with respect 
to board independence. Again, this analysis shows a clearer direction of interaction 
effect than the estimations in Table 3.11.  Most interaction effects for insider-dominated 
boards are positive (Appendix A.6), whereas they tend to be negative for outsider-
dominated boards (Appendix A.8). In other words, the non-executive chairmen tend to 
be more effective when the boards are outsider-dominated. 
Given those findings, this study suggests that the effectiveness chairman function 
(executive vs non-executive) in removing poor performing CEOs relies on a certain 
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board structure. As the decision of dismissing CEOs is one of firm strategic decisions, 
this decision may be based on the consensus on the board of directors rather than 
chairman decision particularly firms with large board. As a result, the non-executive 
chairmen tend not to be effective in increasing the sensitivity relationship between firm 
performance and CEO turnover in the large boards. Moreover, the non-executive 
chairmen are less likely to work in daily basis. Hiring more outsider directors, whose 
their main task is to do monitoring, will help the non-executive chairmen in removing 
poor performing CEOs. 
 
3.5.6.2 Independent Chairman 
The chairman independence is the heart of separating between chairman and CEO 
positions. The chairman can be held by an insider (e.g.  a former CEO, the founder, a 
former director, or a member of family) or an outsider (independent). Table 3.7 
indicates that most of UK listed firms assign chairman position to the insider.  Similar 
to board independence, appointing outsider chairman should improve the sensitivity of 
firm performance and CEO turnover.  
The board chairman can be an independent chairman when he or she (1) is not an 
employee of the firm for the last five years, (2) does not own substantial on firm stake, 
(3) is not a represent a substantial shareholder, (4) has no business nor family ties with 
advisors, directors, or senior employees, (5) has no other directorship that may link with 
firm businesses, and (6) does not receive other remuneration except director’s 
remuneration. Due to data availability reasons, this study does not consider the last 
requirement as a criterion for an independent chairman.  
Using the same approach with previous analysis, the focused variable is the interaction 
variable between firm performance measures and dummy independent chairman. 
Appendix A.9 indicates inconclusive outcomes on the interaction variables. 
roaXindependent and profit_marginXindependent tend to have negative estimations 
while the others are positive. Yet, stock_returnXindependent is significant at level 10 
per cent. This means there is no a clear evidence that the chairman independence can 
bring a positive consequence particularly in disciplining poor performing CEOs.  
The next step is to analyse the interaction variable estimations with respect to board size 
and board independence. Appendix A.11 shows clearer estimations than Appendix A.9. 
Two interaction variables significantly influence the likelihood of forced CEO turnover 
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when the board is small, which are roaXindependent and profit_mariginXindependent. 
Although qui_scoreXindependent coefficient is positive, its values tend to close to zero 
in Appendix A.12. On the other hand, Appendix A.13 again shows inconclusive results 
when the board is large because two interaction variables show a negative influence 
while others are positive.  Thus, the independent chairmen seem to be more effective 
when the board is small rather than in large board.  
The interaction between independent chairman and firm performance is also subject to 
board independence. Most of interaction variable estimations are positive in Appendix 
A.15 and Appendix A.16, which means the independent chairmen are less effective to 
remove poor performing CEO when the boards are dominated by insiders. In fact, 
stock_returnXindependent chairman is statistically significant at level 5 per cent. In 
contrast, Appendix A.17 and Appendix A.18 report interaction variable tend to increase 
the sensitivity of forced turnovers and firm performance. The strong significance of 
profit_marginXindependent support that independent chairmen can work more 
effectively when the boards are dominated by outsider directors.  
These findings suggest that appointing an independent chairman does not necessarily 
lead to a better monitoring because it is subject to firm current board characteristics. 
There is no evidence that independent chairman could bring an advantage in terms of 
CEO turnover sensitivity when the boards are large and dominated by insiders.  
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Table 3.11 Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Function for All Observations. 
CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial performance measures and control 
variables. functionXroa is interaction variable between chair_func and roaf2. functionXret is interaction 
variable between chair_func and ret_bloom2. functionXpm is interaction variable between chair_func and 
prof_margin2. functionXqui is interaction variable between chair_func and quif. Year and industry (2-
digit ICB code) are controlled for all models.  *, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 
per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. Robust standard errors are provided 
in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 funct_roa funct_ret funct_pm funct_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
chair_func -0.223* -0.316** -0.211* -0.245 
 (0.121) (0.126) (0.124) (0.469) 
outsider_code 0.269*** 0.179* 0.286*** 0.282*** 
 (0.100) (0.105) (0.108) (0.102) 
ceo_tenure 0.002 -0.001 -0.012 -0.000 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
prop_ined -0.232 -0.104 -0.548 -0.270 
 (0.319) (0.328) (0.343) (0.318) 
board_size 0.048* 0.050* 0.071*** 0.048* 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
women_ned 0.032 0.220 0.289 -0.001 
 (0.392) (0.390) (0.409) (0.413) 
ln_employf -0.031 -0.085*** -0.098*** -0.061** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.030) 
block -0.410 -0.424 -0.317 -0.394 
 (0.345) (0.374) (0.372) (0.356) 
firm_age -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
chair_age -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
chair_tenure -0.045*** -0.042** -0.041** -0.043** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
independent_origin 0.138 0.085 0.083 0.103 
 (0.107) (0.111) (0.114) (0.107) 
involve -0.050 -0.089 -0.124 -0.054 
 (0.119) (0.123) (0.127) (0.121) 
roaf2 -0.924***    
 (0.164)    
functionXroa 0.109    
 (0.187)    
ret_bloom2  -0.006***   
  (0.001)   
functionXret  -0.001   
  (0.001)   
prof_margin2   -0.003  
   (0.006)  
functionXpm   -0.006  
   (0.007)  
quif    -0.016*** 
    (0.005) 
functionXqui    -0.000 
    (0.006) 
Constant -2.022*** -1.413*** -1.558*** -0.357 
 (0.458) (0.465) (0.490) (0.583) 
     
Observations 8,507 7,916 7,749 8,237 
ll -1821 -1668 -1622 -1760 
r2_p 0.0497 0.0616 0.0385 0.0443 
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Figure 3.1 Interaction Effect between Chairman Function and Firm Performance 
for All Observations.   
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3.5.6.3 Chairman Age 
The descriptive statistics indicate that the chairmen tend to be 10 years older than the 
CEOs. There are two opposites view in terms of chairmen age. On the one hand, 
Waelchli and Zeller (2013) find that the older chairmen tend to experience deteriorating 
cognitive abilities which may implicate firm performance. On the other hand, the older 
chairmen may have a significant experience. This experience might be useful in 
strategic decision-making e.g. to dismiss poor performing CEO. 
There is a tendency that the estimations interaction variables (firm_performanceXage) 
are negative in Appendix A.19, particularly when using qui-score which has 
significance at level 10 per cent. But, Appendix A.20 analysis reports that roaXage and 
profit_marginXage have positive estimations. The chairman age has mixed effects on 
the sensitivity of CEO turnover and firm performance. 
Again, this analysis examines whether the interaction effects of firm performance and 
chairman age are influenced by board size and board independence. Appendix A.21 
shows that some interaction variables have negative estimations (stock_returnXage and 
profit_marginXage) for firms with small board, but Appendix A.22 report 
stock_returnXage have positive estimations. Appendix A.23 shows that the estimations 
of interaction variables are likely to be negative. Even though profit_marginXage tends 
to be positive, its explanation power is so weak (t-value closes to zero).   
More importantly, Appendix A.23 reports that roaXage and retXage estimations are 
statistically significant at level 10 per cent. In other words, it is likely that the chairman 
cognitive abilities are more important than chairman experience (Table 3.10). But, to 
compensate of appointing older chairman, it is necessary to have more directors on the 
boards in order to help the chairman doing his or her monitoring duties effectively. 
In terms of board independence, Appendix A.25 and Appendix A.26 show that the 
interaction variable estimations lack of consistency. Two interaction variables show 
positive estimations, which are ageXroa and ageXpm, while others are negative. 
Appendix A.27 and Appendix A.28 show consistency on the interaction variable 
estimations, which are mostly negative even though none of them is statistically 
significant.  In other words, there is a possibility that outsider directors help the older 
chairman in terms of monitoring poor performing CEOs.   
Appendix A.26 and Appendix A.28 report that the interaction variable between 
chairman age and Qui score tends to be negative regardless for insider- or outsider- 
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dominated boards, which means the older chairmen more effective to dismiss poor 
performing CEOs. Qui score is slightly different from other performance measures 
because Qui-score measures firm credit worthiness which reflects firm solvency and 
firm profitability. Qui-score also can measure firm sustainability. Firms that experience 
low Qui-score do not only suffer from low performance but also they may encounter 
bankruptcy or liquidation. As older chairmen have more experience than younger 
chairmen, it is likely chairman with more experience more useful in monitoring CEO 
particularly in financially distressed firms.  
 
3.5.6.4 Chairman Tenure 
Previous regressions in Table 3.10 indicate that chairman tenure tends to have a 
negative association with CEO turnovers. The estimations are consistently significant at 
level 1 per cent. This study argues that the chairmen with long tenure may not be 
effective in monitoring roles because of two things. Firstly, the chairmen tend to have a 
comfortable relationship with CEOs, which lead to ineffectiveness in disciplining poor 
performing CEOs. Secondly, the introduction of a new chairman also may lead to the 
appointment of one or two non-executive directors.  
Appendix A.29 reports that there is an early indication that most of the interaction 
variables have negative signs, namely ROA, stock return, qui-score. But Appendix A.30 
shows that the estimations of roaXtenure and profit_marginXtenure are positive. 
Therefore, it is difficult to conclude whether chairman tenure improve the sensitivity of 
CEO turnover – firm performance relationship. 
Unlike the results from previous analyses, the sign and significance of the interaction 
effect estimations are still difficult to interpret after dividing the sample according to 
board size and board independence (Appendix A.32, Appendix A.34, Appendix A.36, 
and Appendix A.38). After controlling board size (large and small boards) and board 
independence (outsider- and insider-dominated boards), there is no clear evidence that 
chairman tenure can influence forced CEO turnovers due to unstable signs. The 
effectiveness of chairman with long-tenure or short-tenure is not subject to board size 
and board independence.  
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3.5.6.5 Chairman Involvement 
The final chairman characteristic is chairman involvement (involve) which is a dummy 
variable (= 1, when chairman involve in the CEO selection, and = 0, if else). Chairman 
involvement in the CEO selection can be identified by comparing the chairman 
appointment date and CEO appointment date. When chairman appointment date is 
lower (earlier) than CEO appointment date, it can be said that the chairman is involved 
in the CEO selection, and vice versa.  
This study hypothesises that the chairmen who are involved in the CEO selection may 
not effectively remove poor performing CEOs because they will jeopardize their 
position (Florou, 2005). The interaction effects of chairman involvement and firm 
performance are the most unstable and inconsistent in this study. Appendix A.39 and 
Appendix A.40 involveXroa and involveXqui report a negative association, whereas 
involveXret and involveXprofit_margin show a positive association. Similarly, after 
controlling board size and board independence (Appendix A.42, Appendix A.44, 
Appendix A.46, and Appendix A.48), there is no evidence that a certain board structure 
will influence the sensitivity of CEO turnover and firm performance relationship. 
 
3.5.7 Research Discussion 
This study has tried to explore the effect of chairman characteristics on CEO turnover 
for UK listed firms. Those chairman characteristics are chairman’s function, 
independence, involvement in appointing CEO, age and tenure.  
This study has conducted two types of regression, which are non-interaction regression 
analysis and interaction regression analysis. The regression analyses use different 
indicators to measures firm performance, such as ROA, stock return, profit margin and 
qui-score. Table 3.9 shows that all indicators of firm performance are statistically 
significant, but ROA and stock return are the strongest measures in explaining CEO 
turnover.  
Table 3.10 (no interaction regression models) showed that most estimations of chairman 
characteristics are as expected but chairman function (title). This study hypothesised 
that the non-executive chairmen will give a positive influence on forced turnovers, but 
the estimation goes to the opposite way. The estimated coefficient is even more 
significant in Model 6 when all chairman characteristics are included.  
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This finding is supported in the estimations in Table 3.11, in which there is no evidence 
that non-executive chairmen can increase the sensitivity of CEO turnover and firm 
performance. As a consequence, this study examined the effectiveness of chairman 
function with respect to board size (Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.3) and board 
independence (Appendix A.5 and Appendix A.7). By separating the analysis, the non-
executive chairmen are more effective to monitor poor performing CEOs when the 
boards are small or outsider-dominated.  
In terms of board size, it is so likely that the decision to remove poor performing CEOs 
based on the consensus in the boardroom. As a leader on the board, the power of the 
chairman to influence may play significant role for CEO dismissal. McNulty et al. 
(2011) argue that the non-executive chairmen are less influential than the executive 
chairmen. They categorise the non-executive chairmen with medium to low power, 
while the executive chairmen with medium to high power. The non-executive chairmen 
may be more influential when the boards are small.  
In terms of board independence, it might be a result of chairman busyness (director 
interlocks). The non-executive chairmen are equivalent to part-time directors. 
Analogizing to non-executive directors, the non-executive chairmen may serve as (non-) 
executive director on other boards. On the other hand, the executive chairmen, which 
may refer to full-time chairmen, are less likely sit on other boards. Previous studies 
(Core et al., 1999; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Jiraporn et al., 2008) indicate that 
multiple directorships may negatively affect their effectiveness. Given that findings and 
arguments, hiring more independent (non-executive) director may help and improve the 
non-executive chairmen in monitoring roles. 
There is evidence that the independent chairmen can contribute to the sensitivity of 
CEO turnover and firm performance. The findings for chairman independence are 
relatively similar to chairman function. It is difficult to interpret and conclude the 
interaction effects without controlling board size and board independence (Appendix 
A.9 and Appendix A.10). The independent chairmen will work effectively when the 
boards are small or outsider-dominated. As independent (outsider) chairmen are not as 
strong as insider chairmen (McNulty et al., 2011), there should be certain corporate 
governance mechanisms to increase their influence such as appointing more 
independent (non-executive) directors.    
This study has developed two views in analysing chairman age. (1) The older chairmen 
may find difficulty to do his or her roles. They tend to experience deteriorating 
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cognitive abilities which implicates board effectiveness (Waelchli and Zeller, 2013). (2) 
The chairmen are the most important party on the boards because they are the leader of 
directors in the boardroom. It is necessary for the chairman candidates to have sufficient 
experience so the chairmen can do their roles properly. It is a common sense that older 
people are likely to have more experience than younger people. Similarly, older 
directors (older chairman candidates) are likely to have more experience than younger 
directors (younger chairman candidates). This is why in descriptive statistics (Table 3.7) 
the chairmen are 10 years older than the CEOs. 
The empirical evidence tends to support the first view. The regressions with no 
interaction term (Table 3.10) indicate the older chairmen are less likely to discipline 
poor performing CEOs. However, this weakness can be avoided by a certain board 
structure. In this case, large boards and outsider-dominated boards will improve the 
cognitive problems that are experienced by the older chairmen.  
Chairman tenure is one of the most significant chairman characteristics in Table 3.10. 
Chairman tenure is expected to have negative estimations because the chairmen with 
long tenure tend to have a comfortable relationship with CEO which leads to 
ineffectiveness to discipline poor performing CEO. Table 3.10 showed that consistent 
results in Model 4 and Model 6. However, the interaction effect analyses do not support 
the hypothesis as the estimations can go to either direction (Appendix A.29). Similarly, 
the estimations tend to be unstable even after conditioning board size (Appendix A.31 
and Appendix A.33) and board independence (Appendix A.35 and Appendix A.37). 
The final chairman characteristic is chairman involvement. Initially, the estimations of 
chairman involvement is significantly negative on CEO turnover in Table 3.10, its 
significance vanishes when all chairman characteristics are added as regressors. This 
finding support Florou (2005), in which the likelihood of the chairmen losing their job 
is high when the chairmen are involved in dismissed CEOs selection. However, the 
interaction regression analysis does not report that the chairman involvement may 
decrease the sensitivity CEO turnover – firm performance (Appendix A.39 and 
Appendix A.41). Moreover, the sensitivity of CEO turnover – firm performance is not 
subject to board size and board independence as the estimations are mix and 
insignificant.  
This study has given evidence that three out of five chairman characteristics may have 
important effects in disciplining poor performing CEOs, which are chairman function, 
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independence, and age. It is noted that the influences depend on the board 
characteristics (i.e. board size and board independence). Meanwhile, this study has not 
found evidence that chairman tenure and chairman involvement can affect CEO 
turnover.  
One of important and interesting results is the lack of significant estimations 
particularly for the estimations of interaction effect. Previous studies on CEO turnover 
show the significance of interaction terms is the most important aspect. The lack of 
significance of interaction effect of chairman characteristics may be related to the 
evolvement of chairman roles in recent years. Appointing and dismissing CEO seems to 
be the main roles of traditional chairman.  
The UK governance code which is released by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
said that an effective board can be reflected by the quality of its chairman. FRC 
indicates that chairman essential roles such as to set out board agenda, to create and 
maintain a good relationship among board members, to ensure effective in the flow of 
information, to evaluate succession planning on the board and the committees, and to 
regularly communicate with shareholders and stakeholders. 
Similarly, several studies (Gabrielsson et al., 2007; Bezemer et al., 2012; Cossin and 
Caballerro, 2013) argue that roles of chairman have shifted from conventional to active 
chairmanship. The conventional roles of chairman are mainly related to setting up board 
agenda and board composition, CEO appointment and dismissal. In contrast, the 
chairmen should be more active on board level, committee level, and management level 
such as influencing board culture, challenging firm strategic plans, supervising firm 
operation, and understanding customers or clients.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This study has tried to investigate the chairman characteristics on CEO turnovers. By 
using most of listed firms in the UK, this study analysed more than 1500 CEO turnover 
events during the period 2005 to 2013, which is larger than previous UK based studies 
that focus on CEO turnover. 
The logit regression analysis indicated that chairman’s function, independence, and age 
are the most important chairman characteristics. Initially, chairman function has 
unexpected result, in which the executive chairmen are more influential on CEO 
turnover decision rather than the non-executive chairmen. But, after controlling board 
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size and board independence, the findings support McNulty et al. (2011), in which they 
report that the non-executive chairmen more effective in monitoring and controlling 
roles.  
The independent chairmen may have an important contribution on forced CEO turnover. 
The effect of independent chairmen could also be subject to board size and fraction of 
independent director because they have less power than insider chairmen (McNulty et 
al., 2011). The independent chairmen can increase their influence level through certain 
governance mechanisms, e.g. hiring more independent directors, creating the board 
committees.  
The older chairmen have a negative effect on the likelihood of forced turnovers. 
However, their poor cognitive abilities can be addressed by hiring more non-executive 
directors, particularly independent directors. This study has not found evidence that 
chairman tenure and chairman involvement can influence CEO turnover. 
One of the crucial points in the relationship between chairman characteristics and firm 
performance is the lack of significance when they are interacted. The evolvement of 
chairman roles, from conventional chairman to active chairmanship, might be the main 
reason of this problem.  
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CHAPTER 4 
FEMALE DIRECTORS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Gender diversity on the boards has been of major interest in corporate governance in 
recent years. Because of the apparent under-representation of females on the boards of 
directors, some countries have introduced the idea of imposing quotas of females on the 
boards of large corporations.  
This movement can be traced back to the Scandinavian countries that tried to regulate 
gender diversity on the boards. Since 2005, Norwegian firms have been required by law 
to appoint females to make up at least 40 per cent of board size (Smith et al., 2006), 
while Finnish firms have been required by law to have at least one female on the board 
since 2010. Spanish, Italian, and French governments also intend to impose certain 
thresholds (quotas) for female directors in the coming years (Nekhili and Gatfaoui, 2013; 
Chapple and Humphrey, 2014). 
In the UK, gender diversity on the board became a prominent issue after the Lord 
Davies Report (2012). The report was concerned with gender imbalance on the boards 
of listed firms. Although there has been no formal regulation or law, the Davies Report 
explicitly recommended a 25 per cent representation of females on the boards for 
FTSE100 firms by 2015. Perhaps as a result, the latest figures indicate that female 
directorships in FTSE index firms have increased from 12 per cent in 2011 to 25 per 
cent in 2014 (Stern , 2014).  
However, the significant increase in gender diversity in the UK boardroom may be 
distorted, because most female candidates are appointed as non-executive directors 
rather than executive directors – who are responsible for running the business. Gregory–
Smith et al. (2013) found that the probability of appointing non-executive female 
directors is high when an incumbent female director leaves her position. The proportion 
of females as executive directors was been stagnant around 3 per cent between 2005 and 
2010 in FTSE 350. 
The issues of a lack of suitably qualified and experienced female directors has been put 
forward as a major reason why male candidates are preferred to female candidates 
(Burke, 1997; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004). For example, females’ lack of experience 
and business connections, particularly in executive positions in relatively similar size 
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firms, could be a factor reducing the likelihood of large corporations hiring female 
directors. As a result, most of the firms that appoint females do not use the business 
case (human capital) reasons as a determinant for appointing female directors. In other 
words, gender diversity on the boards may be subject to a firm’s target for board 
diversity (Farrel and Hersch, 2005) such as pressure from activist investors (Gillan and 
Starks, 2000), industry factors (Bertrand and Hallock, 2001), and the characteristics of 
firm and board (Carter et al., 2003). 
Academics have discussed theoretically and empirically the impacts of gender diversity 
on firm performance. Terjesen et al. (2009) identified about twenty theories that could 
explain the impacts of gender diversity, drawn from management, finance, 
organizational, psychology, and sociology studies. They argue that females on the 
boards can improve firm performance in many ways, but may not directly influence the 
firm’s bottom line.  The impacts of gender diversity can be seen in two aspects: board 
effectiveness (e.g. M&A, CEO turnover, financial report accountability) and firm 
performance (e.g. firm profitability and firm value). 
The positive impact of female directors on board effectiveness can be manifested by 
examining either the board monitoring roles or advising roles. Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) indicate that the presence of a female on the board can bring benefits through 
board meeting attendance, participation on board committees, and the sensitivity CEO 
turnover to performance. Consistently, Jurkus et al. (2011) report that female directors 
can reduce firm agency costs when its external corporate governance (e.g. product 
market competition) is weak. Abbot et al. (2012) and Srinidhi et al. (2011) indicate that 
females on the boards can improve the firms’ financial reporting quality. Thus, gender 
diversity appears to have led to improved board effectiveness, particularly to board 
monitoring roles.  
In contrast, the effects of female directors on firm performance are far from consistent.  
Several studies have found a positive association (Erhardt et al., 2003; Carter et al., 
2003; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2007; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013; Liu et al., 2013; 
Strom et al., 2014). Carter et al. (2003) report that gender diversity on the board can 
improve Tobin’s Q for Fortune 1000 firms. Erhardt et al. (2003) show that board 
diversity can improve performance in large firms in the US. Similarly, Campbell and 
Minguez-Vera (2007) find a positive association between female directors and Tobin’s 
Q for Spanish listed firms. Galbreath (2011) reports that female directors only influence 
not only the firms’ economic growth but also the firms’ social responsiveness. 
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Luckerath-Rovers (2013) shows that firms with females on the board tend to outperform 
those without for listed Dutch firms.   
Recent and comprehensive studies (Liu et al., 2013; Strom et al., 2014) report that 
female directors, specifically female executive directors, significantly influence firm 
performance in developing countries. Liu et al. (2013) show that female executive 
directors tend to be more influential than female independent directors in affecting firm 
performance for Chinese listed firms. Similarly, Strom et al. (2014) indicate that female 
CEOs (chairwomen) tend to outperform in the micro finance institution sectors in 73 
emerging markets.   
On the other hand, some studies fail to indicate the consistency of a positive association 
between firm performance and gender diversity. For instance, Smith et al. (2006) and 
Rose (2007) do not find any positive relationship between gender diversity and firm 
performance in Danish firms, and Adams and Ferreira (2009) find no evidence that the 
proportion of female directors can directly influence firm performance. Carter et al. 
(2010) report a lack of consistency in the contribution of female directors on 
performance measures.  
These inconsistencies occur not only in countries that have taken interest in imposing a 
female quota but also in those countries that have actually implemented it. Ahern and 
Dittmar (2012) find no evidence that the effect of a quota imposition will bring positive 
benefits on firm performance for Norwegian firms. In fact, they report that increasing 
the fraction of female directors by 10 per cent could reduce Tobin’s Q by 0.19. 
Despite the difficulty in finding a direct positive relationship between gender diversity 
and firm performance, those studies provide several conditions (states) in which gender 
diversity may contribute positively on firm performance, such as the characteristics of 
female directors, the level of firm governance, its competition level, and industry. Smith 
et al. (2006) show that female directors that are chosen by staff will make a positive 
contribution on firm performance. Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that female 
directors can bring positive outcomes for firms that have a weak governance mechanism. 
Jurkus et al. (2010) report that the effect of gender diversity on agency costs will be less 
likely in firms with a high level of competition, which is a proxy of an effective external 
governance mechanism.  
Other studies (Dezso and Ross, 2012; Chapple and Humphrey, 2014) show that firm 
industry is a crucial intervening factor in the relationship between female directors and 
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firm performance. Dezso and Ross (2012) suggest that female directors who work in 
high innovation intensity sectors are likely to make a positive contribution. Similarly, 
Chapple and Humphrey (2014) report that firms that hire female directors in the 
consumer goods industry will experience positive outcomes.  
Simpson et al. (2010) explicitly raise a concern about the mixed results in the 
relationship between gender diversity and financial performance. As governance 
variables (e.g. gender diversity) tend to be endogenous (Adams et al., 2010), different 
samples and methodologies may lead to incomparable results. Furthermore, some 
aspects have to be addressed properly e.g. tokenism problem, financial performance 
measures, and female representative measures. This implies that it is necessary to use 
advanced econometrics techniques in addressing the endogeneity problem and to 
carefully consider the appropriate proxies for female directors and firm performance.  
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between female directors and 
firm performance by addressing the above concerns. There are four contributions of this 
study to current literature on gender diversity in the boardroom. Firstly, the study will 
examine not only the presence of females on the boards, but also the composition of 
female non-executive and executive directors. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) indicate that 
the rates of females who are hired as CEO and chairman have remained stagnant at 
around 5 per cent since the introduction of the female quota for Norwegian listed firms 
in 2006. Gregory-Smith et al. (2013) show that most of the female directors who were 
appointed by FTSE350 companies between 1996 and 2010 are as non-executive 
directors rather than as executive directors. Both studies imply that there is a tendency 
to appoint females as non-executive directors in order to comply with the regulation or 
stakeholder pressure rather than the business case reasons. 
Most previous studies on female directors tend to use the fraction of females on the 
board in aggregate without distinguishing whether they are non-executives or 
executives. Although these positions are equivalent in law, there are often significant 
differences in the roles and duties of these two positions in practice. Generally, the non-
executives roles focus with monitoring roles. Using the fraction of females on the board 
as a measure might be incorrect because non-executive female directors are less likely 
than executive directors to be involved in the day-to-day business of the firm.  
The analysis in this study is similar to Liu et al. (2013), in which they separate director 
roles into those of female executive directors and female independent directors. They 
report that the effects of female executive directors on firm performance are stronger 
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than those female independent directors. Therefore, this study will try to examine 
whether separating the non-executive and executive functions can give a clearer 
outcome on female directors – firm performance relationship.   
Secondly, this study will try to examine the relation between firm performance and 
female directors with respect to the level of firm governance. Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
argue that the inconsistency in the relationship between gender diversity and firm 
performance is because of the over-monitoring problem. Hiring female directors will 
not improve firm value when the firms have a strong governance level, and vice versa. 
Thus this study will use a different approach in proxying firm the governance level, 
which is through CEO power and firm size. The study suggests that powerful CEOs and 
small firms are associated with weak governance. 
As the boards are responsible for strategic, operational, and financial decisions, the 
board leadership plays an important role on board effectiveness. Bertrand and Schoar 
(2003) show that certain characteristics (such as ownership, age, and education) of top 
executive directors (CEO or financial directors) will affect firm policies. Previous 
studies (Adams et al., 2005; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2011) indicate that a 
greater influence in firm strategic decisions may or may not be detrimental to firm value. 
Nevertheless, having powerful CEOs may affect the effectiveness of governance within 
the firms. Monitoring may not be effective because the CEOs tend to be entrenched. 
The involvement of the CEOs in selecting directors is one of the reasons (Westphal and 
Zajac, 1995; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). 
Similarly, small firms are also associated with weak governance because they lack 
accountability and transparency, when compared to large firms (Atiase, 1985; Slovin et 
al., 1992). In the case of UK listed firms, there is a significant difference in the standard 
of disclosure and governance rules. For instance, the governance standards for AIM 
listed firms are not as strict as those for FTSE100 or FTSE250 firms (Mallin and Ow-
Yong, 2008).  
Thirdly, female directors tend to experience the tokenism problems in the boardroom 
(Torchia et al., 2011). As the boards tend to be dominated by males, appointing one or 
two female directors is less likely to increase board effectiveness. Female directors, who 
are deemed to be a minority party, can be marginalised when their presence on the 
board is a modest proportion of the board members. Konrad et al. (2008) argue that 
there should be at least three female directors in order to optimize their contribution, 
which is known as the critical mass. Torchia et al. (2011) empirically support the 
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critical mass of female directors in terms of strategic tasks and firm innovation. 
Similarly, Joecks et al. (2013) show that a nearly balanced composition between male 
and female directors can contribute positively on firm performance for German listed 
firms. Therefore, this study will try to analyse whether the tokenism and the critical 
mass problems occur in the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance 
for UK listed firms. 
Fourthly, this study will focus on all UK industrialized listed firms (big and small 
capitalization firms). Previous studies have mostly been conducted in the US and the 
Scandinavian countries, in which appointing female directors has mostly been mandated 
by law. Furthermore, previous studies have tended to focus on the firms with big 
capitalization, for instance Fortune 500, S&P500, and FTSE350. This study will use all 
available non-financial listed firms listed in the FTSE350 and AIM indices.  
The UK market is slightly different from other markets in terms of governance 
standards. The UK market regulators tend to impose stricter governance and disclosure 
standards for large capitalization firms than for small capitalization firms (AIM index). 
Therefore, this study can give an early indication as to whether gender diversity on the 
boards, particularly for small capitalization firms, can bring positive benefits on firm 
performance. 
 
4.2 Gender Bias and Quota Policy  
Gender bias (inequality) in labour market (work place) has been a topical issue for 
recent years. Two aspects that have drawn significant attention are related to worker 
payment equality and the chance of being hired and promoted. The OECD reports that 
the gender pay gap among OECD countries is around 16 per cent in 2010, compared to 
20 per cent in 2000. The gender pay gap in Japan and Korea are the highest while 
Mexico and Hungary are the lowest.   
As one of developed countries, the UK is still experiencing a similar gender inequality 
issue. The Office of National Statistics (ONS) show that there is a 9.4 per cent gender 
pay gap in the UK labour market in 2014, although this figure dropped significantly 
from 17.4 per cent in 1997. Moreover, the ONS data show that the gender pay gap for 
senior positions (i.e. manager, director) is worse than the average of overall level 
position. The gap remains significantly high at 15.9 per cent in 2014 (Jenkins and 
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Agnew, 2015). In other words, the gender inequality in high level positions may be 
more problematic than low level positions.  
Ideally, the chance of female candidates being appointed as directors will be the same as 
the chance of male directors as the firm employees and markets are relatively composed 
in balance between female and male. The OECD reports that female labour contributes 
65 per cent of labour force in OECD countries, but the composition may be lower than 
50 per cent in some developing countries (OECD, 2012). Similarly, the survey from 
American consumers indicates that almost 75 per cent of the primary shoppers in the 
household are females (Catalyst, 2014) 
Until recent laws and recommendations on gender diversity on the boards, the chances 
of female candidates being hired or promoted to higher level (or board level) positions 
have been relatively low. Farrel and Hersch (2005) indicate that the average percentage 
(number) of female on the boards is less than 13 per cent for Fortune 1000 firms in 1999. 
In the UK, gender diversity on the boards is lower than  in the US, which is less than 10 
per cent for FTSE350 firms between 1996 and 2010 (Gregory-Smith, 2013). Yet, this 
figure may be distorted as female directors are appointed as non-executive directors 
rather than executive directors – who are mostly responsible for the running of firms. 
The latest data shows that the average of female director in financial services around the 
world, which is deemed as the most prudent sector, is only 20 per cent (Jenkins and 
Agnew, 2015). The gender bias on corporate boards is a global problem.  
The Norwegian government initially and controversially passed the law on a female 
director quota in 2003. The law states that all Norwegian listed firms must be composed 
at least 40 per cent of female directors by July 2005 or they will be forced to dissolve. 
This regulation effectively encourages Norwegian listed firms in appointing female 
directors. On average, the fraction of female director in Norwegian listed firms is 40 per 
cent by 2007, compared to less than 10 per cent in 2002 (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). At 
the moment, the boards of directors of Norwegian firms are the most gender-balanced 
boards in the world (Jenkins and Agnew, 2015). 
Following the success of the Norwegian government in increasing the presence of 
females in the boardroom, most EU countries will apply the same action. The French 
government requires that firms, that have 500 employees and more than 50 million 
euros in sales, to have 20 per cent female directors in 2014 and 40 per cent by 2017 
(Nekhili and Gatfaoui, 2013). The Italian government imposes 33 per cent of female 
directors or the facing a 1 million euro fine (Chapple and Humphrey, 2014). Similarly, 
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female directors must hold 30 per cent of board seats in German big corporations from 
2016 (Dauer, 2014).  
Several countries outside the EU have followed a similar action. Japan, one of the worst 
gender diverse amongst developed countries, targets 30 per cent female representative 
for senior positions by 2020. Malaysia and Brazil set 30 per cent and 40 per cent 
threshold respectively for the presence of female on the boards (J., 2015). 
The UK government uses a slightly different approach to encourage UK listed firms to 
hire more female directors. Unlike its EU counterparts, The UK government issues 
recommendations rather than passing mandatory laws (regulations) on gender diversity 
for board level positions. The call for diversity on the UK listed boards of directors was 
introduced in the Higgs Report (2002), but the progress of diversity, specifically gender 
diversity, on the boards is too slow, which increases only 4 per cent during the period 
2004 to 2010, from 8.6 per cent to 12.5 per cent.  
The Davies Report (2012) explicitly recommends a 25 per cent representation of 
females on the boards for FTSE100 firms by 2015. The recommendation is lower than 
the required average of female director in other EU countries and the recommendation 
aims toward big capitalization firms rather than all listed firms. Nevertheless, the latest 
figures indicate that female directorships in FTSE index firms have increased from 12 
per cent in 2011 to 25 per cent in 2014 (Stern, 2014). In other words, the government 
intervention successfully makes female candidates get more access to the UK listed 
firms boardroom.  
The policy on gender diversity in the boardroom is not the first government intervention 
on corporate governance particularly in the UK. Following to some of UK big corporate 
scandals, the Cadbury Report (1992) recommended to separate the CEO and chairman 
roles in order to reduce the power of CEO on the board and to increase internal 
monitoring through independent directors. Dahya et al. (2002) report that the release of 
the Cadbury Report (1992) brings a positive consequence on the firm governance 
mechanism, particularly with respect to CEO turnover. 
Therefore, more importantly, it is necessary to examine whether the increase of female 
presence on the boards can bring positive outcomes on firm performance. According to 
the Davies Report (2012), the increase of diversity on the boards brings a larger pool of 
talents in terms of expertise, experience, and connection, which leads to better 
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governance and firm performance. Unfortunately, the recent studies show that the 
effects of female directors on firm performance lack of consistency.  
 
4.3 Literature Review 
This section will discuss the theories that are involved in relation to the presence of 
females in the boardroom. All related empirical evidence will be presented afterwards. 
 
4.3.1  Theories of Gender Diversity on the Boards 
The presence and the effects of females on the boards can be explained from a number 
of theoretical perspectives and may cover interdisciplinary studies, such as 
organizational, management, psychology, sociology, and finance (Terjesen et al., 2009).  
Carter et al. (2003, 2010) use five theories in their papers: the business case approach, 
the agency theory, the resource dependence theory, the human capital theory, and the 
social psychology approach. 
The business case approach is introduced by Robinson and Dechant (1997), who argue 
that board diversity can enhance firm business growth through several channels. (1) A 
diverse board can bring positive outcomes on firm market penetration, particularly for 
firms that want to expand their market. As the market becomes more diverse in terms of 
race and ethnicity, so aligning board diversity with market demographic characteristics 
will enhance the understanding of the current and potential market. (2) Board diversity 
will improve creativity and innovation. Different races, ages, and gender are associated 
with different attitudes, cognitive, and beliefs which can stimulate creativity and 
innovation in the boardroom. (3) Board diversity will improve the decision-making 
process, which will lead to better problem-solving. Different experiences and 
perspectives can provide a wide range of alternative solutions to certain problems for 
the firm or board. (4) Board diversity will enhance effective leadership. Homogeneous 
boards tend to have a myopic perspective, while a diverse board can improve the board 
members’ understanding on the complexities and uncertainties of the firm environment. 
(5) Board diversity promotes global relationships. A nationally successful board does 
not necessarily lead to a globally successful board, but diversity on the board will 
improve the board cultural awareness and knowledge in global competition. 
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The agency theory is introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976), who argue that 
managers tend to act in their own best interests rather than the shareholders’ interests. 
As a result, directors, as a middle party between managers and shareholders, are 
appointed with their main roles to do monitor and control so that managers’ actions are 
aligned with shareholders’ best interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003).  
There are two ways to link diversity on the boards and the agency problems. Firstly, 
board independence is a pivotal factor to ensure that board oversight duties are effective 
(Weisbach, 1988). Carter et al. (2003) argue that board diversity is equivalent to board 
independence because diverse boards do not have the traditional background that insider 
directors have. Diverse board members can be deemed as activist board members. Thus, 
the more diverse boards will reduce agency problems in firms. Secondly, Ahern and 
Dittmar (2012) refer to Bebchuk and Fried (2005), in which consider that when CEOs 
are powerful, they tend to make decisions that maximize management’s private benefits 
rather than shareholders’ interests. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) argue that appointing 
female directors can reduce CEOs’ influence on the boards and this eventually reduces 
the agency costs.  
The resource dependence theory is introduced by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), in which 
they argue that the board role is primarily to find access to resources and to secure them 
so that shareholders’ interests can be enhanced. This theory implies that board duties 
involve not only monitoring and controlling but also advising. The boards’ roles include 
addressing external dependencies, for example providing with knowledge and expertise.  
Hillman et al. (2000) suggest that diverse boards will provide unique resources and 
information that may benefit in decision-making. Within a diverse board, there exist 
diverse perspectives and non-traditional alternatives to certain problems. Hillman et al. 
(2007) argue that diversity on a board shows the firms’ commitment to minorities and 
females, which can add legitimacy to the firms. It gives a signal that such firms promote 
equal opportunities for current and potential employees. Previous studies (Peterson and 
Philpot, 2007; Adams and Ferreira, 2009) also report that female directors are more 
likely to be appointed to certain committees than male directors which implies that 
female directors may add specialized expertise or skills to the committees, for instance 
auditing expertise.  
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The stakeholder theory is that the board principal duty is to maintain good relationships 
with the stakeholders. The proponents of the stakeholder theory argue that corporations 
should reflect their external environment, for instance a society that is composed of 
different genders, races, and ethnicity. As a result, gender diversity on the board might 
be a rational consequence or even an obligatory implication for some countries. 
However, Rose (2007) argues that imposing such a law may not be appropriate for 
listed firms, as listed firms are different from democratic institutions. Regulating board 
composition may undermine the nature of business for firms, as they have different 
strategic goals and have certain plans and strategies for achieving those goals.  
The human capital theory is related to directors characteristics (such as education, 
experience, and skills), which benefit firms. Singh et al. (2008) report that female 
directors tend to have an MBA degree and international experience in FTSE100 firms. 
Sealy et al. (2007) report that female directors tend to be younger and have fewer 
multiple directorships than male directors. They also tend to have a title with their name, 
for instance academic titles (Prof, Dr), civic or political titles (Dame, Baroness), or 
aristocratic titles (Lady, Honourable). In general, female qualifications are relatively the 
same as male qualifications, but females tend to be less experienced than men in terms 
of business experience (Terjesen et al., 2009). Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) argue that 
the lack of female networks and experience in executive positions is the main reason 
why females are less attractive than their male counterparts to become directors in large 
UK listed firms. 
Having discussed the theories involved in gender diversity on the boards, the 
contributions of female directors on board effectiveness and firm performance may not 
be straightforward. The business case approach, the agency theory, and the resource 
dependence theory suggest that female directors will bring positive impacts, whereas the 
stakeholder theory and the human capital theory tend to have contradictory views. The 
next sections will discuss the impacts of firm performance on board effectiveness and 
overall firm performance. 
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4.3.2 The Impacts of Female Directors on Board Effectiveness 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that female directors improve firm governance 
mechanism in four ways. (1) Director attendance. The presence of female directors has 
a positive influence on the attendance of male directors. (2) Committees assignments. 
Female directors are more likely involved in monitoring committees such as nominating 
and audit. (3) CEO turnover. The presence of female directors makes the relation 
between CEO turnover and stock performance more sensitive. (4) Director pay. The 
presence of female directors is positively associated with equity-based compensation.  
Jurkus et al. (2011) examine the relationship between female directors and the agency 
cost for Fortune 500 companies. Female directors could reduce the agency cost, which 
is proxied by free cash flow and dividend payout ratio, particularly in firms with a low 
level of competitiveness. The effect of gender diversity on the boards is not significant 
when firm external governance mechanism is strong.  
Abbot et al. (2012) report that female directors tend not to be associated with financial 
restatement events. Similarly, Srinidhi et al. (2011) report that the presence of female 
directors can improve firms’ earning quality. Gul et al. (2011) indicate that gender 
diversity on the boards is positively associated with stock price informativeness by 
increasing public disclosures and incentivising private collection for large and small 
firms respectively. Thus, the presence of female directors improves the board 
overseeing and monitoring particularly in connection with the firm financial reporting 
quality. 
Huang and Kisgen (2013) indicate that female executive directors are less likely to 
conduct acquisitions or to use debt as source of financing. Even though female 
executive directors tend to be less aggressive in acquisition activities and more risk 
averse in choosing financing sources than their male counterparts, female directors’ 
decisions are more favoured by shareholders. 
Levi et al. (2013) found a negative association between the fraction of female directors 
and the number of acquisition bids and the size of the bid premium, by using almost 
20,000 firm-year observations between 1997 and 2009. The increase in female directors 
by 10 per cent would significantly decrease the number of acquisition and bid premium 
by 7.6 per cent and 15.4 per cent. They also noted that female directors are not as 
overconfident as male directors.  
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Nielsen and Huse (2010) argue that the presence of females on the boards can influence 
the decision-making culture and the board working structure, through a high level of 
development activities and open debate, and a low level of conflict among board 
members. Overall, they conclude that female directors bring a good atmosphere in the 
boardroom.  
Prior studies have indicated that the presence of female directors is positively associated 
with (1) better governance practices (e.g. high CEO turnover sensitivity and attendance 
at meetings); (2) accountability and transparency in financial reporting; (3) improved 
decision-making in investment and financing; and (4) a good atmosphere in the 
boardroom.  
 
4.3.3 The Impacts of Female Directors on Firm Performance 
 Erhardt et al. (2003) and Carter et al. (2003) report a positive association between 
female directors and firm performance in the US. Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2007) 
indicate that the presence of females on the boards have positive impacts on Tobin’s Q 
in Spain. Similarly, Luckerath-Rovers (2013) shows that female directors can improve 
return on equity (ROE) for Dutch listed firms. However, it should be noted that these 
studies (Erhardt et al., 2003; Carter et al., 2003; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2007) 
used sample periods during which the quotas had not yet been introduced yet, while 
Luckerath-Rovers (2013) did not address properly the endogeneity problems. 
More comprehensive studies were conducted by Liu et al. (2013) and Strom et al. (2014) 
in developing countries, in which the issue of gender diversity on the boards is not as 
predominant as in developed countries. After addressing the endogeneity problem, both 
studies show that female directors can influence firm performance in China (Liu et al., 
2013) and 73 other developing countries (Strom et al., 2014). 
However, a few studies find difficulty to indicate a positive and direct relationship 
between female directors and firm performance. Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Jurkus 
et al. (2011) fail to indicate a direct and positive relationship between female directors 
and firm performance after addressing the endogeneity problem. Similarly, Carter et al. 
(2010) report an inconsistency when attempting to link female directors with firm return 
on asset (ROA) and Tobin’s Q.    
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A similar problem occurs in the non-US based studies. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) 
examine the effect of this regulation in Norway, where the quotas were initially 
introduced. They show that the market reacted negatively after imposing the law and it 
had a negative influence on Tobin’s Q as firms had to conduct board restructuring.  
Smith et al. (2006) and Rose (2007) found that the effect of female directors on firm 
performance was ambiguous for Danish firms. Certain characteristics of board members 
were the main reason why board diversity did not increase firm value, for instance 
female qualifications and insider female directors who are elected by staff. 
Galbreath (2011) examines the role of gender diversity on firm sustainability for 
Australian listed firms. The results indicate that female directors would bring positive 
impacts on firm economic growth (e.g. firm value, ROA, ROE), and social 
responsiveness (e.g. human rights, ethics, health and safety), whereas they would hardly 
influence firm environment-related policy (e.g. energy efficiency, recycled waste). 
In the UK, Ryan and Haslam (2005) and Haslam et al. (2010) report that there is no 
association between the presence of female directors and firm performance for 
FTSE100 firms. In a recent study, Gregory-Smith et al. (2013) found no evidence that 
the presence of females on the boards will be associated with outperformed firm 
performance for FTSE350 firms during the period 1996 to 2010. 
As a consequence of the mixed empirical evidence, some studies conduct further 
examinations by adding certain conditions or states that can make female directors have 
positive impacts on firm performance. For instance, Adams and Ferreira (2009) and 
Jurkus et al. (2011) use the internal and external governance of firms as moderating 
variables respectively. Female directors may cause an over-monitoring problem when 
firms have strong governance. 
Dezso and Ross (2012) report that gender diversity may bring benefits on firm 
performance when a firm’s based strategy is innovation. Firms which are heavily 
engaged in innovation-related tasks will gain the most from gender diversity benefits. 
Chapple and Humphrey (2014) report there are positive returns in certain industries, for 
instance basic materials and consumer goods industries.    
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The tokenism problem is another factor that may influence the relation between female 
directors and firm performance. It occurs when firms appoint only one female director, 
which means her contributions on firm performance is marginalized.  Firms with at least 
three female directors will outperform firms with one or two female directors (Torchia 
et al., 2011; Joecks et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2013).  
Several previous studies (Simpson et al., 2010; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013) identified 
several problems that may cause mixed results in estimating the relation between female 
directors and firm performance. Firstly, time. The effects of female directors on firm 
performance should be for the long-term rather than the short-term.  
Secondly, causality. This problem is also known as the endogeneity problem, which 
mostly occurs in governance studies. For instance, it can be said that qualified directors 
may bring positive impacts on firm performance, but it is also likely that well-
performed firms attract qualified directors. Generally, it results difficulty in 
understanding the relation between governance variables and firm value (Adams et al., 
2009). There is a tendency for the relation between female directors and firm 
performance to be affected by previous firm performance rather than the explanatory 
power of female directors.   
Thirdly, critical mass. This view argues that there is a certain threshold between one 
female director and a certain number at which female directors can bring positive 
contributions on firm performance.  
Fourthly, most studies on this topic indicate that there were positive associations 
conducted before 2003 in which government has not intervened in the gender 
composition on the boards. Before 2003, the same year in which Norway passed its 
legislation on female director quotas, firms had more flexibility to appoint female 
directors according to firm’s strategy and long-term goals. As a result, firms can 
optimize the presence of females on the board which is transmitted to the firm’s 
‘bottom-line’.  
Fifthly, Liu et al. (2013) and Strom et al. (2013) are exceptional studies because they 
show a positive relation by using advanced econometric techniques and the observation 
period is after 2003. However, as mentioned earlier, these studies were conducted in 
developing countries: Liu et al. (2013) in China and Strom et al. (2013) in 73 other 
developing countries. The issue of gender diversity on the boards in developing 
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countries is not as predominant in developed countries. Government intervention in the 
composition of the board in developed countries could be the reason why it is difficult 
to find a positive and direct relationship between female directors and firm performance 
in the US and the EU countries.    
 
4.4  Hypothesis Development 
There are four objectives in the study: (1) examining the effect of female directors on 
firm performance, (2) examining whether the different roles of female directors 
(executive director vs non-executive director) will have a different effect on firm 
performance, (3) examining whether having one female director has a similar effect 
with having more than one female director, and (4) examining the effect of female 
directors on firm performance with respect to firm certain governance (firm) 
characteristics (i.e. CEO power and firm size). This section will try to develop the 
hypotheses of each objective.  
 
4.4.1 Gender Diversity and Firm Performance 
There is a lack of consistency that gender diversity on the board has a direct and 
positive impact on the firm’s ‘bottom-line’. Previous section showed that many theories 
are involved around gender diversity on the board. Some theories suggested that it is 
possible that appointing female directors may be a result of external factors (e.g. 
government, shareholder pressure) rather than the business case reasons (e.g. firm 
market and firm employee composition). The benefits of appointing female directors 
tend to be manifested in board effectiveness (e.g. board monitoring and controlling roles) 
rather than in overall firm financial performance because gender diversity on the boards 
involves multi-level and complex processes (Terjesen et al., 2009).  
Empirically, prior studies inconsistently report the contribution of female directors on 
firm performance. Several studies have found a positive association (Carter et al., 2003; 
Erhardt et al., 2003; Carter et al., 2003; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2007; Luckerath-
Rovers, 2013). There are two reasons why these studies successfully a report positive 
association. Firstly, all of empirical analyses in those studies are relatively not so 
advanced which makes it difficult to decide whether the result is correct or implies a 
specification and endogeneity issue.  Secondly, most of them are conducted in the early 
2000s, in which quota rules on female directors have not been introduced yet. Firms in 
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the 1990s and the early 2000s have more flexibility in composing their boards than in 
the middle or late 2000s.  
While most of those studies focused on firms in developed countries, Liu et al. (2013) 
investigate gender diversity in Chinese listed firms and Strom et al. (2014) use firms 
from 73 developing countries. Both studies may involve less governed firms and less 
regulated markets than in developed countries, particularly with respect to gender 
diversity on the boards. These studies report that female directors significantly affect 
firm performance in the developing markets.  
By contrast, others (Smith et al., 2006; Rose et al., 2006; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Ahern and Dittmar, 2012) do not find evidence that females can directly influence firm 
performance. Adams and Ferreira (2009) report a negative association between female 
directors and firm performance in the US. The positive association cannot be found in 
the Scandinavian countries, in which gender diversity has been mandated by law (Smith 
et al., 2006; Rose et al., 2006; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012).  
Consistently, the UK-based studies tend to indicate that there is no positive association 
between gender diversity on the boards and firm performance. Haslam et al. (2010) and 
Gregory-Smith et al. (2013) report that there is no positive association between the 
presence of female directors and firm performance for FTSE100 and FTSE350 firms 
respectively. 
In terms of financial measures, there are various performance measures that have been 
used in previous studies. Most of them used firm profitability ratios to proxy firm 
performance, such as ROA (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), ROA and profit margin (Liu et 
al., 2013), and ROA and ROE (Strom et al., 2014). Consequently, this study uses two of 
profitability ratios, which are ROA and profit margin. 1   
Given the UK market regulator has explicitly recommended gender diversity on the 
boards and recent studies on measuring the impacts of female directors on firm 
performance, therefore the first hypothesis is: 
H1: Gender diversity will have a negative impact (or no association) on firm 
performance, which is proxied by firm ROA and profit margin 
 
 
                                            
1 This study tested other financial measures namely Tobin’s Q, ROE, EBITDA-to-Revenue ratios but the 
results are unsatisfactory in terms of the sign, the significance, and the availability. 
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4.4.2   Female Executive Director Vs Female Non-Executive Director 
Although the roles of executive and non-executive directors are equivalent in law, these 
positions have different roles in practice. Monks and Minow (2004) argue that firm 
directors have the same duties in the legal framework regardless of their roles 
(executive directors or non-executive directors), which are the duty of loyalty, which is 
to act on behalf shareholders’ best interest, and the duty of care, which is to conduct a 
proper due diligence in strategic decision-making.  
Nordberg (2007) expands the roles of directors into four aspects: setting direction (e.g. 
M&A, HR and marketing strategy, share buybacks, disposal, capital formation), 
marshalling resources (e.g. remuneration, senior managerial appointment, budgets), 
controlling and  reporting (e.g. credit analysis, investor relation, audit, ethics, social 
responsibility), and evaluating and enhancing (e.g. risk management, risk strategy). 
Moreover, the author argues that non-executive directors’ responsibilities are related to 
evaluating performance, marshalling resources, and controlling, while executive 
directors are predominantly responsible in setting up the firm strategic direction.   
The UK governance code explains that the roles of non-executive directors are mainly 
related to monitoring and controlling the executives, firm financial reporting integrity, 
and remuneration of the executives. On the other hand, executive directors tend to be 
involved on day-to-day firms operating and business (FRC, 2010). It suggests executive 
directors tend to be more influential on firm performance than non-executive directors. 
Liu et al. (2013) indicate that female executive director is more influential on firm 
performance than female independent director.  Therefore, the second hypothesis in the 
study is:  
H2: Female executive directors have more important role than female non-executive 
director on firm performance. 
 
4.4.3 Tokenism and Critical Mass 
Recent findings have indicated that gender bias still occurs in appointing female 
directors. Large UK listed companies tend to appoint female directors for non-executive 
roles rather than for executive roles. Gregory-Smith et al. (2013) show the likelihood of 
hiring female non-executive directors is high when the incumbent female non-executive 
directors left their position. This makes the presence of female on the boards may be 
prone to the tokenism problems.  
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Tokenism is introduced by Kanter (1977) in which individuals who come from a 
minority group will encounter obstacles (i.e. not trusted or often doubted) to make a 
significant contribution within an organization. In other words, under-represented 
females on the boards can be marginalised and, eventually, limit their contributions. 
One female in the male-dominated board is less likely to make a significant influence on 
firm performance.  
Elstad and Ladegar (2012) summarize the consequences of the tokenism problems. 
Visibility is a condition when female directors are always being watched by male 
directors. Female directors tend to avoid conflict and they become passive in the 
boardroom. Polarization is a condition when male directors feel threatened and 
uncomfortable by the presence of female directors, which can cause the reluctance of 
male directors to share information and female directors are cut from social 
communication inside (or outside) the boardroom. Assimilation is a condition when 
male directors will have a stereotypical thinking on gender, which is suitable for female 
directors. Consequently, female directors’ ability will be underestimated and their 
arguments will become trivia in board decision-making.  
There is a certain threshold (number) so the minority (female group) can be more 
influential on the boards, which is known as the critical mass.  Kristie (2011) in Liu et al. 
(2013) mentions “one female on the board is a token, two is a presence, and three is a 
voice”. Torchia et al. (2011) find that firms with three or more female directors can 
improve firm level of innovation for Norwegian firms. Joecks et al. (2013) report that 
having three or more female on the boards will increase ROE for German listed firms.  
Consistently, the more of absolute number of female directors, the more significant of 
their contributions on ROA and profit margin in China (Liu et al., 2013).  
Therefore, the third hypothesis is:  
H3: Firms with three or more female directors will have better performance than firms 
with less than three female directors in the UK 
 
 
 
113 
 
 
 
4.4.4 Firm Governance Level 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) indicate that female directors will improve firm governance 
levels, for instance CEO turnover – firm performance sensitivity, meeting attendance, 
participation in board committees and director remuneration. But, they fail to indicate 
that female directors have a direct impact on firm performance. They suggest that 
female directors and firm performance relation is subject to firm governance level. 
Firms with strong governance will encounter the over-monitoring problem, which make 
female director contribution is less significant on firm performance. 
Jurkus et al. (2011) use firm industry competitiveness level as a proxy of firm external 
governance level. When firms are in the competitive market, management tends to 
behave efficiently to minimize costs.  In other words, this type of firms has a strong 
external governance mechanism. As a result, they do not find evidence that female 
directors have a significant influence to reduce the agency cost when firms are 
externally well-governed.  
The examples of hiring female directors lead to a better monitoring mechanism can be 
seen from the quality of firm financial report. Abbot et al. (2012) and Srinidhi et al. 
(2011) indicate that female directors reduce the likelihood of financial restatement and 
earnings management.  
There are two important inferences from those previous studies. Firstly, female 
directors are highly associated with a high level of monitoring. Secondly, a high level of 
monitoring (over-monitoring) can have a negative impact on firm performance.  
The study will try to examine the same aspect but using a different approach. The study 
will measure firm governance level via the CEO power and firm size. Firms with 
powerful CEOs tend to have lower firm value (Bebchuk et al., 2011) and lack of 
transparency to bondholders (Liu and Jiraporn, 2010). Moreover, powerful CEOs more 
likely in the selection of directors (Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Shivdasani and Yermack, 
1999) and they tend to be entrenched (Denis et al., 1997; Goyal and Park, 2002). Given 
these previous studies, it can be implied that powerful CEOs are highly associated with 
weak governance. 
 
114 
 
 
 
Ferreira (2005) argue that the sources of CEOs power are from the founder status, the 
ownership level, and the CEO title (chairman and CEO). This study will define 
powerful CEOs when the CEOs are the founder, the family member, or the substantial 
shareholder. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is: 
H4: The positive association between female directors and firm performance is 
stronger for firms with powerful CEOs 
Similarly, small firms are associated with weak governance, for example poor 
transparency and accountability (Zeghal, 1984; Atiase, 1985; Slovin et al., 1992). In 
addition, the UK regulator imposes different standards for small-young listed firms 
(AIM firms) and large listed (FTSE350) firms in terms of disclosure rules and 
governance structure. Firms that registered in AIM index are not obliged to follow all 
the UK Governance Codes (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2008). In terms of female quota on 
the board, the target firms are large listed firms rather than small listed firms (Davies 
Report, 2012).  
Therefore, fifth hypotheses are:  
H5: The positive association between female directors and firm performance is 
stronger for smaller firms 
 
4.5 Research Methodology 
This section will be divided into three parts: sample and data, regression model and 
variables, and instrumental variables. 
 
4.5.1 Sample and Data 
This study will be using all non-financial listed firms in the UK for the nine-year period 
between 2004 and 2012. This study will use multiple sources to obtain investigated 
variables. The data on firm governance characteristics are mostly obtained from the 
FAME database such as: name, date of birth, nationality, gender, date of appointment, 
and date of resignation, and block holders. The positions (e.g. CEO, chairman, financial 
directors) and functions (e.g. executive and non-executive) are obtained from the 
Thomson-one Banker and the Bloomberg databases, which are hand-collected. Proxies 
for firm performance are from the Fame and the Bloomberg databases. 
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As this study is about gender diversity on the boards, it is necessary to distinguish 
correctly between female and male directors. Most of the gender details have been 
provided by the FAME database, but some are missing. This problem mostly occurs 
when directors are not from the UK. In this case, this study will try to retrieve those 
missing values by looking at directors’ profile in the firm financial reports and firm 
disclosure on the director appointment or resignation from the Bloomberg database.  
 
4.5.2 Regression Models and Variables 
The general form of regression models are as follows: 
 
Firm Perfomanceit = α + βFemale_Measuresit  + λBoard_Characteristicsit  + 
  γFirm_Characteristicsit  +  ζk  + θt + eit  (4.1) 
 
Where i indexes firms and t is a yearly time index. The ζk and θt variables represent firm 
industry and year respectively. This study will use two dependent variables which are 
return on assets (ROA) and profit margin2. Both measures have been widely used in the 
previous related studies for instance ROA in Erhardt et al. (2003), Adams and Ferreira 
(2009), and Strom et al. (2014), while profit margin in Smith et al. (2006) and Liu et al. 
(2013). 
As the analysis between female directors and firm performance may suffer from the 
endogeneity problems, this study will employ four different models. Following previous 
studies (Adams et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2013), those models are OLS model, fixed effect 
model, 2SLS model (IV model), and the Arellano-Bond model. For the IV models, this 
study will use two instrumental variables, which are the fraction of female director in 
the same industry and the fraction of male director with a connection to female director. 
The reasoning and detail of those variables will be discussed in the next section. The IV 
model (1st stage regression) will be: 
 
Female_Directorsit = α+ δ1male_connectionit + δ2female_industryit + 
λBoard_Characteristicsit   
 + γFirm_Characteristicsit  + θt + eit (4.2) 
 
                                            
2 This study tested other financial measures namely Tobin’s Q, ROE, EBITDA-to-Revenue ratios but the 
results are unsatisfactory in terms of the sign, the significance, and the availability. 
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Wooldridge (2010) recommends a two-step procedure to address the endogeneity 
problem. The first step is to regress a suspected endogenous variable, which is female 
director, with all possible predetermined variables (Equation 4.2). The second step is to 
use the predicted values of endogenous variable from the first regression (Equation 4.2) 
as explanatory variable in the model of interest (Equation 4.1).  
 
The final model is the Arellano-Bond model. This model is known as a dynamic model 
because the model includes the lagged of firm performance as an explanatory variable.  
The equation 4.1 will be transformed: 
 
Firm Perfomanceit = α + β1Firm Perfomanceit-1 +β2Female_Measuresit + 
β3Board_Characteristicsit + β4Firm_Characteristicsit  
 + θt + ei (4.3) 
 
The specification of the Arellano-Bond Model is very important when addressing the 
endogeneity issue. This study will employ the same approach with Adams and Ferreira 
(2009), in which they use two lagged period and all further lagged period of firm 
performance and all one period lags of independent variables as the instrumental 
variables.  
The independent variables can be divided into three categories: female director 
measures, board characteristics, and firm characteristics. There are two board 
characteristics that will be included in the regression models, namely board size and 
fraction of non-executive director. The firm characteristics are firm size, firm age, block 
holder, and debt ratio. The full definitions of dependent and independent variables can 
be seen in Table 4.1. 
Besides all the dependent and independent variables, the study will examine the role of 
CEO power in influencing the relation between firm performance and female directors. 
Following to Adams et al. (2005), this study will define CEO power according to CEO 
origin. Owner-CEOs equal to one when the CEOs are either a founder, a substantial 
shareholder (> 3 per cent stake), or a member of family, it equals zero if else. Moreover, 
it is necessary to assess the relationship between firm performance and female directors 
when the CEOs are outsider.  As owner-CEOs equals to zero does not necessarily mean 
that the CEOs are outsiders, this study will create another dummy outsider-CEOs, 
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which equals one if the CEOs are from outside the firm and do not affiliate nor have ties 
with the certain shareholders, it equals zero if else.    
 
Table 4.1 Variable Descriptions 
Variables Descriptions 
Dependent Variables  
ROA Ratio between net-income and book value of total assets at the end of year 
Profit margin Net profit divided by total turnover (sales) 
  
Gender Diversity  
Fract_female Ratio between female directors and total directors  
Fract_female_exec Ratio between female  executive directors and total directors  
Fract_female_ned Ratio between female  non-executive directors and total directors  
D_female1 D_female1 =1 if firms have 1 female director; = 0 if else 
D_female2 D_female2 =1 if firms have 2 female directors; = 0 if else 
D_female3 D_female 3=1 if firms have 3 or more  female directors;    = 0 if else 
  
Board Characteristics  
Board size Total directors 
Fract_ned The number of non-executive director divided by board size 
  
Firm Characteristics  
Firm size Logarithm of total assets 
Firm age The difference between year - t with firm establishment year 
Block holder The percentage of firm ownership that held by the largest shareholder 
Debt ratio Total debt divided by total assets 
Total employee Logarithm of firm total employees 
  
Instrumental Variables  
Fem_exp The fraction of male director to total directors who have a connection to 
female director  
ICB_one Fraction of female in the same one-digit ICB code industry 
ICB_two Fraction of female in the same two-digit ICB code industry 
ICB_three Fraction of female in the same three-digit ICB code industry 
ICB_four Fraction of female in the same four-digit ICB code industry 
 
 
4.5.3 Instrumental Variables 
It is very likely that the relation between female directors and firm performance is 
conflated by causality problems, namely the endogeneity problem, whether the presence 
of females on the boards positively influences firm performance or well-performed 
firms tend to hire female directors. Adams et al. (2010) argue that there are two reasons 
why governance studies are prone to the endogeneity problem. Firstly, it is likely the 
economic actors will create a certain governance structure in order to deal with firm 
problems that they encounter. Secondly, the solutions of governance problems are 
multifaceted and complex.  
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The consequences of this problem are so critical because it can give biased estimations. 
The concern of gender diversity studies has been discussed by Simpson et al. (2010), in 
which they argue that different statistical techniques and methodologies have resulted in 
mixed relationships between female directors and firm performance.  
As part of the IV models, this study will follow previous studies in selecting the 
instrumental variables which are the male director connection to female director   
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Levi et al., 2013) and the fraction of female directors in the 
same industry (Liu et al., 2013). This study will use both instrumental variables in order 
to obtain robust results. The rationales and details of these variables are as follows.  
Firstly, the male director connection to female director. This variable is defined as the 
fraction of male directors who ever work with female directors on other boards divided 
by total directors. Male directors who frequently work with female directors will affect 
the notion on female directors’ quality and improve females’ connection. It is expected 
a positive relationship between male director connection and the likelihood of hiring 
female directors.  
Secondly, the fraction of female directors in the same industry. Hillman et al. (2007) 
indicates that the gender diversity on the boards is likely to be the same among firms 
that are in the same industry. Brammer et al. (2007) find that females tend to be hired in 
consumer-oriented sectors (e.g. retail, utilities, media, and banking). This variable is 
also expected to have a positive association with the presence of females on the boards. 
 
4.6 Empirical Results 
This section will be divided into six sub-sections, which are sample selection, 
descriptive analysis, instrumental variable analysis, regression analysis, the effects 
powerful CEOs and firm size on female directors – firm performance relationship, and 
research discussion. 
 
4.6.1 Sample Selection 
In order to be included into this study, several requirements need to be fulfilled. (1) The 
firms must be non-financial firms. Firms with Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) 
equals to 8 will be excluded from the research observation. As this study cannot track 
firms that change industry classification during the observation period, some firms may 
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be excluded.  (2) Due to the lack of data availability on the board of directors, the firm 
headquarter must be in the UK. Firms that have registered number started with ‘#’, 
which refers to foreign owned, will be excluded because the details of the board of 
directors cannot be retrieved from the FAME database. The initial sample size is 1803 
firms and 10610 firm-years observations, but due to missing observations, the 
estimation number will often be lower.  
 
4.6.2 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 4.2 indicates the development of female directors in the UK non-financial listed 
firms. There is a tendency that more listed firms appoint female directors. There are 
73.8 per cent of total firms that do not have a female director in 2004, but that figure 
reduces to 59 per cent in 2012. The fraction of female directors who sit on the board has 
increased gradually, from 5.0 per cent to 8.8 per cent during the period 2004 to 2012.  
Even though more female directors are appointed, the proportion females who are hired 
as executive directors tends to be stagnant. The fraction of non-executive female 
directors has increased more than twice between 2004 and 2012, while the fraction of 
executive directors remains at around 2.5 per cent. Yet, less than 4 per cent of total 
firms are appointing females as the CEOs. These results are relatively similar to 
previous studies (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Gregory-Smith et al., 2013), in which the 
increase of female participation on the boards is more likely through the non-executive 
roles rather than the executive roles. In other words, there is still a gender bias problem 
in the appointment of executive directors.   
Furthermore, among those firms that have females on the board, most of them only have 
one female director. About 20.6 per cent to 27.5 per cent of the firms have one female 
director during the observation period. Although the number of firms with one director 
is significantly larger than firms with two or three female directors, the pace of firms 
that are hiring two or more female directors is higher than firms with one female 
director. The number of firms with two or more female directors has doubled between 
2004 and 2012. The recent regulations on gender diversity on the boards might be a 
possible explanation of this finding.  
As most of firms tend to appoint one female director, the tokenism problems might 
occur. In this case, female directors, which is the minority party, can be easily 
marginalised when their number in the boardroom is modest, e.g. only one female 
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director. As a result, the contribution of one or two female directors will not bring 
positive consequences on firm performance. Further discussion of the tokenism 
problems will be in the regression analysis.  
Table 4.3 shows the mean, median, standard deviation, and 25th and 75th percentiles of 
the research variables that will be possibly used in the regression analyses. The 
variables can be categorised as CEO characteristics, board characteristics, firm 
performance, firm characteristics, and instrumental variables.  
There is a significant difference in available observations in relation to firm profit 
margin. While most of the board characteristics, CEO characteristics, firm 
characteristics have more than 10,000 observations, firm profit margin observation only 
has 9474 observations. This discrepancy may be as a result of using two databases, 
which are the Fame database (UK-based) and the Bloomberg database (US-based). The 
Bloomberg database may not provide financial information of delisted and acquired 
firms. 
Table 4.3 indicates that there are about 34 per cent of CEOs who are owner-CEOs. In 
other words, around one-third of the firms are led by powerful CEOs. The percentage of 
outsider CEOs (less powerful CEOs) is slightly lower than owner CEOs (powerful 
CEOs), which is 31 per cent of total observations.  
The mean of board size in UK listed firms is 6.43 directors, which about half of them 
are non-executive directors. Nevertheless, non-executive directors are not necessarily 
also independent directors. The fraction of independent non-executive director is about 
40 per cent of board size. The mean of firm performance variables (ROA and profit 
margin) are negative, while the median of those variables tend to be positive. 
Furthermore, the mean of firm age is 23.19 years and the average block holder is 22 per 
cent. Total assets have a large standard deviation, which means there is a significant gap 
between large firms and small firms. In order to deal with it, total assets will be 
converted into logarithm value.  
The final section in Table 4.3 is the instrumental variables, which are the fraction of 
females within the same 3 digit-ICB code and the fraction of male directors who work 
with female directors on other boards. The mean of both variables are 7 per cent and 30 
per cent respectively. The detailed of these variables will be discussed in the next 
section.  
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Table 4.4 show the correlation between firm performance measures, female 
representative measures and other control variables. This table is important to indicate 
multicolinearity problems in the regression analysis. The multicolinearity is likely to 
occur when the absolute value of coefficient correlation is close to 0.7 or higher or a 
variance inflation factor (VIF) is greater than ten. This study uses two proxies to 
measure firm size which are firm total assets and firm total employees. Both variables 
are highly correlated to board size. Large firms tend to have a large board as well. As a 
consequence, this study will use total employees as a proxy of firm size rather than total 
assets in the regression analysis.  
Fraction of female director (fract_female) is also highly correlated to fraction of female 
NED and fraction of female executive director, which is around 0.67 – 0.68. However, 
that two pair of variables (fraction of female and female NED; fraction of female and 
female executive) will not be used in the same model. 
Table 4.4 indicates the relation between female non-executive directors and the number 
of female directors (with 1, 2, or 3 female directors) is stronger than the relation 
between female executive directors and the number of female. Most listed firms tend to 
appoint female directors as non-executive directors rather than as executive directors.  
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Table 4.2 The Percentage of Female Director in the UK listed Firms between 2004 and 2012. Directors are total individuals (directors) in the sample. Fraction of female is total 
female directors divided by total directors. Female NED is total female non-executive directors divided by total directors. Female exec is total female executive directors divided by 
total directors. No female director is the fraction of firms with no female director. One female director is the fraction of firms with one female director. Two female directors is the 
fraction of firms with two female directors. Three or more female director is the fraction of firms with three or more female directors. Female CEO is the fraction of firms with 
female CEO. Female Chair is the fraction of firm with chairwoman. 
 
Year Firms 
Number 
of 
Directors 
Fraction of 
Female 
Fraction of 
NED Female 
Fraction of 
Executive 
Female 
Firms with 
no Female 
Director 
Firms with 1 
Female 
Director 
Firms with 2 
Female 
Directors 
Firms with 3 
or more 
Female 
Directors 
Female 
CEO 
Female 
Chair 
2004 1181 7628 0.050 0.026 0.024 0.738 0.206 0.049 0.007 0.025 0.007 
2005 1366 8787 0.056 0.030 0.026 0.717 0.221 0.051 0.011 0.031 0.007 
2006 1401 8882 0.058 0.032 0.026 0.707 0.234 0.050 0.009 0.037 0.009 
2007 1373 8765 0.059 0.032 0.027 0.706 0.230 0.047 0.017 0.039 0.012 
2008 1241 7922 0.060 0.034 0.026 0.695 0.243 0.044 0.017 0.038 0.013 
2009 1119 7104 0.063 0.038 0.025 0.685 0.248 0.051 0.016 0.036 0.013 
2010 1053 6809 0.067 0.043 0.024 0.666 0.256 0.061 0.017 0.036 0.015 
2011 998 6500 0.074 0.050 0.024 0.643 0.254 0.079 0.024 0.035 0.018 
2012 948 6222 0.088 0.063 0.025 0.590 0.275 0.105 0.030 0.033 0.019 
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Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics. owner_code equals to 1 if the CEO is a substantial shareholder (>3 per 
cent), or a member of family, or a founder, owner_code equals to 0 if else. Outsider_code equals to 1 if 
the CEO is not the owner and CEO joins the firm less than 1 year, it equals to 0 if else. Board_size is total 
directors. prop_ned is the fraction of non-executive director. prop_ined is the fraction of independent non-
executive director. roaf2 is net profit divided by total assets (ROA). prof_margin2 is net profit divided by 
total sales (profit margin). Assetf2 is total firm assets. Employf2 is total firm employee. firm_age is the 
difference between end date of calendar year-t and firm establishment date. block is percentage owned by 
top block holder. Debt_ratio2 is total debt divided by total assets. ICB_three is the fraction of female 
director within the same 3-digit industry code. Fem_exp is the fraction of male director who ever works 
with female director on other boards. roaf2, prof_margin2, assetf2, employef2 and debt_ratio2 are 
winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent.  
 
Variable N Mean StdDev Q1 Median Q3 
CEO characteristics 
     
 owner_code 10680 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Outsider_code 10656 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
      Board Characteristics 
      board_size 10680 6.43 2.28 5.00 6.00 8.00 
prop_ned 10680 0.51 0.16 0.40 0.50 0.63 
prop_ined 10680 0.40 0.19 0.29 0.40 0.55 
       Firm Performance 
      roaf2 10217 -0.08 0.37 -0.10 0.03 0.09 
prof_margin2 9473 -2.10 10.95 -0.10 0.03 0.08 
 
      Firm Characteristics 
      assetf2 ('000) 10249       890,411        3,433,844        10,132        42,200        218,414  
employf2 10049          4,533            14,035              53            255           1,714  
firm_age 10680 23.19 28.23 5.58 10.98 26.23 
block 10467 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.27 
debt_ratio2 10246 0.51 0.34 0.28 0.48 0.67 
       Instrumental Variables 
      icb_three 10656 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.09 
fem_exp 10680 0.30 0.26 0.00 0.25 0.50 
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Some interesting findings in Table 4.4 are the correlation among board characteristics, 
firm characteristics, and the number of females on the boards. Firms with large boards 
tend to have a positive correlation with female directors. This relationship is stronger 
for firms that have more than two or more female directors than firms with one female 
directors. Moreover, the bigger and the older of the firms, the more females are 
involved on the board of directors, except for female executive directors. Conversely, 
the percentage of ownership that is held by block holders tends to have a negative 
correlation with the number of female directors, particularly for female non-executive 
directors.   
The instrumental variables also have positive correlations with the fraction of female 
directors as previously expected. There is an early sign that firms tend to follow other 
firms in the same ICB code in terms of the level of female participation on the boards. 
There is a tendency that firms with higher digit ICB has a closer association with female 
representative measures. Likewise, the fraction of male directors who works with 
female directors on other board has a positive correlation with the number of female 
directors. Those relationships are substantially higher for firms with female non-
executive directors than firms with female executive directors. 
Table 4.5 compares the firm characteristics between firms that have at least one female 
director and firms with no female director across firm-years. Most of firm 
characteristics that hire at least one female director are different from firms with no 
female director. Firms with female directors tend to be bigger, more profitable, more 
efficient, and well established than firms with no female director. The block holder for 
firms with female director holds less ownership than firms with no female director.  
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Table 4.4 Correlation Analysis. Roaf2 is return on assets. Prof_margin2 is profit margin. dwomen equals to 1 if firm has at least one female director, dwomen equals to 0 if else. 
Fract_female is fraction of female director. Female_exec is fraction of female executive director. Female_ned is fraction of female non-executive director. d_female1 equals 1 if firm 
has one female director, d_female1 equals to 0 if else. d_female2 equals 1 if firm has two female directors, d_female2 equals to 0 if else. d_female3 equals 1 if firm has three female 
directors, d_female3 equals to 0 if else. owner_code equals to 1 if the CEO is a substantial shareholder (>3 per cent), or a member of family, or a founder, owner_code equals to 0 if 
other. Outsider_code equals to 1 if the CEO is not the owner and CEO joins the firm less than 1 year, it equals to 0 if else. block is percentage owned by top block holder. Board_size 
is total directors. prop_ned is the fraction of non-executive director. Debt_ratio2 is total debts divided by total assets. Ln_Asset2 is natural logarithm of firm total assets. Ln_employf 
is natural logarithm of firm total employees. Ln_firm_age is natural logarithm of (1 + firm_age). ICB_one is the fraction of female director within the same 1-digit industry code.  
ICB_two is the fraction of female director within the same 2-digit industry code. ICB_three is the fraction of female director within the same 3-digit industry code. ICB_four is the 
fraction of female director within the same 4-digit industry code. Fem_exp is the fraction of male director who ever works with female director on other boards. roaf2, prof_margin2, 
assetf, employeef2, firm_age2, block2, debt_ratio2 are winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent.  
 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
roaf2 (1) 1.00
prof_margin2 (2) 0.35 1.00
dwomen (3) 0.13 0.07 1.00
fract_female (4) 0.10 0.06 0.87 1.00
female_exec (5) 0.03 0.03 0.54 0.68 1.00
female_ned (6) 0.10 0.05 0.65 0.67 0.02 1.00
d_female1 (7) 0.09 0.05 0.82 0.54 0.34 0.39 1.00
d_female2 (8) 0.07 0.04 0.37 0.52 0.30 0.41 -0.15 1.00
d_female3 (9) 0.05 0.03 0.19 0.37 0.25 0.27 -0.08 -0.04 1.00
owner_code (10) -0.08 -0.02 -0.09 -0.05 0.03 -0.10 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 1.00
outsider_CEO (11) -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.47 1.00
ln_bsize (12) 0.24 0.10 0.33 0.15 0.00 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.20 -0.25 0.06 1.00
prop_ned (13) 0.12 0.04 0.12 0.04 -0.04 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.06 -0.28 0.15 0.35 1.00
debt_ratio2 (14) -0.19 0.13 0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.09 0.07 0.08 0.06 1.00
block (15) -0.06 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.09 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.12 -0.04 -0.15 -0.08 0.03 1.00
ln_firm_age (16) 0.23 0.16 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.05 -0.29 0.05 0.17 0.08 0.11 -0.09 1.00
ln_asset2 (17) 0.43 0.17 0.31 0.18 -0.04 0.27 0.16 0.21 0.19 -0.34 0.09 0.68 0.42 0.12 -0.21 0.28 1.00
ln_employf (18) 0.39 0.24 0.30 0.18 -0.03 0.27 0.16 0.20 0.17 -0.33 0.08 0.61 0.36 0.24 -0.19 0.35 0.88 1.00
icb_one (19) 0.03 0.04 0.23 0.23 0.10 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.12 -0.02 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.14 1.00
icb_two (20) 0.04 0.05 0.25 0.26 0.12 0.21 0.14 0.15 0.14 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.93 1.00
icb_three (21) 0.05 0.04 0.28 0.29 0.14 0.25 0.14 0.18 0.20 -0.02 -0.02 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.01 0.06 0.16 0.17 0.79 0.85 1.00
icb_four (22) 0.06 0.05 0.32 0.34 0.17 0.28 0.16 0.19 0.23 -0.02 -0.01 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.17 0.19 0.67 0.72 0.85 1.00
fem_exp (23) 0.18 0.08 0.25 0.18 0.01 0.21 0.15 0.16 0.11 -0.26 0.14 0.32 0.32 0.12 -0.19 0.12 0.54 0.51 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.17 1.00
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Table 4.5 The Comparisons between Firms with and without Female Director. ROA is net profit 
divided by total assets. profit margin is net profit divided by total sales. Board size is total directors. 
Fraction of NED is the fraction of non-executive director. Total employee is total firm employees. Block 
holder is percentage owned by top block holder. Firm age is the difference between end date of calendar 
year-t and firm establishment date. Debt ratio is total debt divided by total assets. *** indicates 
significance at 1 per cent level 
Firms 
Characteristics 
Firms with female director   Firms without female director 
Difference 
N Mean   N Mean 
ROA 3233 -0.01 
 
6984 -0.11 0.10*** 
Profit Margin 3093 -1.01 
 
6380 -2.63 1.62*** 
Board Size 3337 7.59 
 
7343 5.89 1.70*** 
Fraction of NED 3337 0.54 
 
7343 0.49 0.05*** 
Total Employee 3199 12501.50 
 
6850 2361.40 10140.10*** 
Block holder 3280 0.20 
 
7187 0.22 0.02*** 
Firm Age 3337 26.85 
 
7343 21.54 5.31*** 
Debt Ratio 3236 0.56   7010 0.81 0.25*** 
 
 
4.6.3  Instrumental Variable Analysis 
Previous studies (Smith et al., 2006; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and Dittmar, 
2012; Liu et al., 2013) show that there is an endogeneity problem when assessing the 
contribution of female directors over firm performance. One of the similarities among 
those studies is the use of instrumental variable in addressing the problem. This study 
employs two instrumental variables which are the fraction of female directors in the 
same ICB-code (Liu et al., 2013) and the fraction of male directors who work with 
female directors on other board (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). 
The industry in which the firms mainly operate their business may be a reason for hiring 
female directors. The Davies Report (2012) indicates that the composition of females 
and males is relatively the same for the UK total population. Not having female 
representative on the board will make firm less competitive. Brammer et al. (2007) finds 
that female directors tend to be hired in consumer-oriented sectors because they have 
unique and specific knowledge, skills, and attitude that are valuable in those sectors. 
Hillman et al. (2007) find that firms industry and size have important roles in explaining 
the presence of females on the boards.  
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of female directors for UK listed firms according       
2-digit ICB code. Firms will likely hire female directors when firms are consumer based, 
such as: retail, media, personal and household goods, and healthcare. The participation 
of females on the boards is also relatively high for utility and telecommunication sectors. 
Conversely, the number of female directors is low for firms in automobiles and parts, 
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chemicals, basic resources, oil and gas sectors. This instrumental variable is expected to 
have a positive association with the fraction of female director in the regression analysis. 
 
Figure 4.1 The Mean of Fraction of Female Director based on the Industry 
 
 
The other instrumental variable is the fraction of male directors that work with female 
directors on other boards. Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) argue that the lack of 
experience and business connection is the main reasons why not many female are hired 
as directors. As the boards of directors are still male dominated positions, it is likely that 
male directors serve on other boards. Males who ever work with female directors are 
likely to increase females’ business connections, which will increase the likelihood of 
females to be appointed as directors. This variable is also expected to have a positive 
association with the fraction of female directors.  
These instrumental variables will be used in the two-stage least square regression 
analysis. The Previous studies (Smith et al., 2006; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and 
Dittmar, 2012; Liu et al., 2013; Strom et al., 2013) indicate that it is necessary that the 
instrumental variables are related to the endogenous variable (fraction of female 
directors) but uncorrelated with the dependent variable (firm performance). The 
instrumental variables are required to be statistically significant in the first stage 
regression.  
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Assessing the significance of instrumental variables in the first stage is relatively 
straightforward, which is by looking at the t-value or p-value of the estimations of the 
instrumental variables. However, assessing whether the variables are the right 
instrumental variables to address the endogeneity problem, in terms of weak or strong 
instrument, under- (over-) identification instrument, or correlated with the disturbance 
(error) process, is a bit complex.  
As this study is using the STATA software in the regression analysis, there are several 
essential tests that should be taken account.  Firstly, to check whether the instrumental 
variable is a weak variable in the first stage regression. When the F-test value is less 
than ten, the instrumental variable can be deemed as a weak instrumental variable. The 
more formal test is the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, in which the F-test value is 
compared with several threshold values. Secondly, to check whether the instrument of 
endogenous variable is correlated with the error term in the second stage regression. The 
Sargan*R-square test can be used to assess this. Thirdly, to conduct endogeneity tests 
for the suspected endogenous variables in the second stage regression. If the p-value is 
not close to the significant 5 per cent or 10 per cent level, the instrument can satisfy the 
required specification.  
The regression results indicate that the instrumental variables seem to be valid because 
they are statistically significant in the first stage regression. The variables also tend not 
to be weak instrument variables as the F-test value is more than 10. Furthermore, most 
importantly, the endogeneity problem can be addressed as the p-value for Sargan 
statistics larger than 10 per cent. The full details of the STATA output for 2SLS model, 
particularly for Model 4 in Table 4.6, can be seen in Appendix B.  
 
4.6.4 The Regression Analysis 
The main objective of this study is to examine the impact of female directors on firm 
performance, which is proxied by firm ROA and profit margin. The regression analyses 
are split into four parts. Firstly, this study will investigate the influence of appointing 
female directors by using the fraction of female directors as a proxy of female director. 
Secondly, this study will investigate whether distinguishing the role of director into 
executive and non-executive have the same contribution on firm performance. Thirdly, 
this study will investigate whether firms that hiring more than one female director can 
be more outperformed than firms that only hiring one female director. Lastly, this study 
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will investigate whether a certain governance level (weak governance vs strong 
governance) may influence the relation between female directors and firm performance. 
 
4.6.4.1 Analysis of female directors on firm performance 
A recent article in the Guardian newspaper indicates that firms with at least one female 
executive director tend to perform better than firms that are dominated by male 
executive directors for listed firms in the UK, the US, and India. Firms with no female 
executive director missed £430 billion of investment returns in 2014 (Farrel, 2015). So, 
does the presence of females in the boardroom improve firm performance? 
Table 4.6 shows the estimations of focused variable (fract_women) for various 
estimations. Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 show consistent results with the arguments 
in the article. These findings also occur in previous studies (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Liu et al., 2013), in which female directors tend to bring positive effects on firm 
performance.  
However, these results not reliable and robust as the positive estimations are the results 
of the endogeneity problems, particularly reverse causality. This means that well-
performed firms tend to hire female directors rather than female directors bring positive 
impacts on firm performance (Adams et al., 2010). In other words, there is a possibility 
that the article’s finding is biased and misleading.  
Consequently, there are three implications for the regression analysis in this chapter. 
Firstly, the estimations in OLS model and fixed effect model (Model 1, Model 2, and 
Model 3) could lead to misleading interpretations. The readers should take extra 
awareness in interpreting the estimations between female directors and firm 
performance. Secondly, nevertheless, all estimations will be presented in each section 
(the female non-executive vs female executive director analysis, the tokenism problem 
analysis, the governance level analysis). There is possibility that every regression 
analysis suffers from the endogeneity problems in this chapter.  By showing all 
estimations, the study shows concrete evidence of the urgency to address properly the 
endogeneity problem rather than relying on previous studies results, for instance in 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Liu et al. (2013).  
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To address the endogeneity problems, Model 4 and Model 5 employ 2SLS regressions. 
The results of the first stage regressions indicate that the instrumental variables are 
highly correlated with the endogenous variable (fract_women). The signs of both IVs 
are positive, which means the more of male director who has a connection with female 
directors the more likely firms hire female directors. Moreover, firms will follow the 
composition of males and females on the boards with other firms within the same 
industry. 
Both Model 4 and Model 5 use the same instrumental variable, which are fem_exp and 
icb_two. Generally, the more specific of industry classification, the larger of F-test 
value in first stage regression, which may be also associated with a higher P-value for 
the Sargan test and the endogeneity test in the second stage regression. Both 
instrumental variables are relatively strong, which the F-value of first regression is more 
than ten. The Sargan statistic test and the endogeneity test are not significant at level 10 
per cent. However, strong instrumental variables may affect the significance of fraction 
of female director. Consequently, the estimations of female director are no longer 
statistically significant although the coefficients are still positive.  
In Model 6, this study uses the Arellano-Bond two-step approach in order to address the 
endogeneity problems. The lag of one period of ROA is added in the regression as this 
model is a dynamic model. As a consequence, the number of observation decreases. 
Two important statistics in creating the model are the Arellano-Bond for AR(2) and the 
Hansen test of over-identification restriction. At the first attempt, the study uses one-
period lag of fraction women director, but the Hansen test still report significant at 5.7 
per cent. Consequently, the Arellano-Bond model is re-specified by using two-period 
lag of fraction women director. The endogeneity problem is fully addressed with the P-
value of the Hansen test is more than 10 per cent level.  
Moreover, Table 4.6 indicates that most independent variables have a significant impact 
on firm ROA in the OLS regression (Model 1). The fraction of non-executive directors 
significantly influences ROA but board size tends to be insignificant. The higher 
fraction of non-executive directors does not necessarily lead to better firm performance.  
The significance and the sign of board characteristics are not entirely consistent. For 
instance, the board size coefficients are positive in Model 1, Model 3, and Model 5, 
while they are negative in Model 4 and Model 6. This inconsistency also occurs for 
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fraction of non-executive directors. The coefficient sign also changes in the Arellano-
Bond regression (Model 6) even though the estimation is not statistically significant. 
Almost all firm characteristics experience changes either in coefficient sign or 
significance in the Arellano-Bond regression (Model 6). Block holder and debt ratio 
tend to have a consistent sign for every model. In terms of control variables in the 
Arellano-Bond model, the changes in estimation signs were also experienced in 
previous studies (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Liu et al., 2013). The specification of the 
Arellano-Bond model may be main reason of this occurrence.  
This study uses similar independent variables and approach in every model in Table 4.7, 
but ROA is replaced by profit margin. Table 4.7 shows that the number of observation 
is less than 9000, which means there is a significant difference between Table 4.6 and 
Table 4.7 in terms of total observations. As a result, there is a chance that the relations 
between independent variables and profit margin are not as strong as the relationship 
between independent variables and ROA.  
Fraction of female directors consistently indicates a positive sign for every model in 
Table 4.7, but most of the estimations are not statistically significant. The estimation of 
female directors is statistically significant in OLS model (Model 1), but this estimation 
is prone to the endogeneity problem. The inclusion of fixed effects in Model 2 and 
Model 3 changes its significance although the sign remains positive. Both instrumental 
variables are statistically significant, but fraction of females (fract_women) is not 
statistically significant. Furthermore, Model 6 indicates that fraction of female remains 
statistically insignificant but it has a positive estimation.  
The findings in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 show that there is a tendency that female 
directors can positively influence firm performance. But, the estimations often lack of 
significance depending on the specification. Yet, there is a possibility that the effects 
may be negative in Model 6 Table 4.6. This finding supports the first hypothesis, in 
which there might be no association between female directors and firm performance. 
This finding is deemed robust as the endogeneity problem has been addressed properly 
in both analyses.  
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Table 4.6 The Regression Estimations: ROA and Fraction of Female Directors. Firm performance is 
regressed with female director measure and control variables. roaf2 is net profit divided by total assets 
(ROA). fract_women is fraction of female director. ln_bsize is natural logarithm total directors. prop_ned 
is the fraction of non-executive director. ln_employf is natural logarithm of firm total employees. block is 
percentage owned by top block holder. Ln_firm_age is natural logarithm of (firm age+1). Debt_ratio2 is 
total debt divided by total assets. Lag_roaf2 is one period lag of ROA. ICB_two is the fraction of female 
director within the same 2-digit industry code. Fem_exp is the fraction of male director who ever works 
with female director on other boards. Model 1 employs OLS estimation. Model 2 and Model 3 employ 
panel with fixed effects. Model 4 and Model 5 employ 2SLS with IV.  Model 6 employs Arellano-Bond 
method. roaf2 and debt_ratio2 are winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent. The robust t-statistics of each 
coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 
per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ols fe1 fe2 iv_fe1 iv_fe2 ar_bond 
VARIABLES roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 
       
fract_women 0.064** 0.147*** 0.136*** 0.385 0.005 -0.059 
 (2.075) (3.051) (2.856) (0.583) (0.018) (-0.372) 
ln_bsize 0.014 -0.002 0.001 -0.006 0.003 -0.061 
 (1.044) (-0.138) (0.056) (-0.302) (0.182) (-0.835) 
prop_ned -0.048* -0.066** -0.074** -0.066** -0.073** 0.036 
 (-1.939) (-2.202) (-2.539) (-2.194) (-2.453) (0.243) 
ln_employf 0.065*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.028*** -0.044* 
 (26.514) (5.512) (5.236) (5.614) (5.299) (-1.831) 
block 0.116*** 0.008 0.002 0.011 0.001 0.211 
 (5.099) (0.241) (0.052) (0.336) (0.022) (1.633) 
ln_firm_age 0.035*** 0.011 -0.009 0.014 -0.007 0.070 
 (11.448) (0.720) (-0.826) (0.740) (-0.570) (1.505) 
debt_ratio2 -0.372*** -0.441*** -0.444*** -0.443*** -0.448*** -0.508** 
 (-17.361) (-31.675) (-32.022) (-30.800) (-31.760) (-2.422) 
Lag_roaf2      0.170*** 
      (3.622) 
Fem_exp    0.013** 0.016***  
    (2.30) (2.70)  
Icb_two    0.577*** 0.948***  
    (6.13) (15.42)  
Constant -0.680*** -0.041 0.038    
 (-10.429) (-0.701) (0.894)    
Year Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry Yes No No No No No 
Observations 9,884 9,903 9,903 9,771 9,771 4,998 
R-squared 0.276 0.121 0.117 0.119 0.118  
ll -2471 1576 1555 1484 1475 . 
Number of firm_id  1,787 1,787 1,669 1,669 1,254 
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Table 4.7 The Regression Estimations: Profit Margin and Fraction of Female Directors. Firm 
performance is regressed with female director measure and control variables. prof_margin2 is net profit 
divided by total sales. fract_women is fraction of female director. ln_bsize is natural logarithm total 
directors. prop_ned is the fraction of non-executive director. ln_emplyf is natural logarithm of firm total 
employees. Block is percentage owned by top block holder. Ln_firm_age is natural logarithm of (firm 
age+1). Debt_ratio2 is total debt divided by total assets. Lag_prof_margin2 is one period lag of profit 
margin. ICB_three is the fraction of female director within the same 3-digit industry code. Fem_exp is the 
fraction of male director who ever works with female director on other boards. Model 1 employs OLS 
estimation. Model 2 and Model 3 employ panel with fixed effects. Model 4 and Model 5 employ 2SLS 
with IV.  Model 6 employs Arellano-Bond method. prof_margin2 and debt_ratio2 are winsorized at 1 per 
cent and 99 per cent. The robust t-statistics of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
mean statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance 
respectively 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ols fe1 fe2 iv_fe1 iv_fe2 ar_bond 
VARIABLES prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 
       
fract_women 1.881** 1.102 0.686 12.672 6.690 0.150 
 (2.198) (0.667) (0.422) (0.823) (0.752) (0.090) 
ln_bsize -0.870* -0.039 0.043 -0.246 -0.043 0.683 
 (-1.957) (-0.068) (0.073) (-0.380) (-0.072) (0.522) 
prop_ned -1.127 -0.517 -0.973 -0.446 -1.071 2.083 
 (-1.401) (-0.486) (-0.937) (-0.416) (-1.021) (0.834) 
ln_employf 1.051*** 0.930*** 0.917*** 0.948*** 0.926*** -0.548 
 (12.279) (4.540) (4.491) (4.585) (4.526) (-1.175) 
block 2.396*** 0.286 0.183 0.468 0.239 -3.801 
 (3.387) (0.243) (0.155) (0.388) (0.203) (-1.129) 
ln_firm_age 0.613*** 1.916*** 1.297*** 2.151*** 1.156*** -0.980 
 (6.944) (3.386) (3.384) (3.327) (2.658) (-1.402) 
debt_ratio2 1.588*** 0.149 0.203 0.170 0.240 3.618** 
 (3.211) (0.307) (0.420) (0.349) (0.493) (2.066) 
Lag_prof_margin2      0.363*** 
      (4.533) 
Fem_exp    0.016*** 0.018***  
    (2.54) (2.92)  
ICB_three    0.625*** 0.992***  
    (8.85) (15.38)  
Constant -10.665*** -12.269*** -10.890***    
 (-6.390) (-6.361) (-6.580)    
Year Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry Yes No No No No No 
Observations 8,969 8,969 8,969 8,842 8,842 5,611 
R-squared 0.096 0.008 0.006 0.001 0.004  
Ll -33637 -29756 -29762 -29428 -29412 . 
Number of 
firm_id 
 1,662 1,662 1,535 1,535 1,319 
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4.6.4.2 Analysis of Female Executive Director and Female Non-Executive 
Directors 
The next analysis is to distinguish the role of female directors into two parts, which are 
the executive role and the non-executive role. Basically, executive directors (e.g. CEO, 
operation director, marketing director, finance director) are more involved in running 
the firm business in daily basis, while non-executive directors are more involved in the 
monitoring roles. This implies that executive directors are more influential on firm 
performance than non-executive directors. Correspondingly, firms that appoint female 
directors as executive directors or non-executive directors may have different 
consequences on firm performance with respect to their roles. 
Similar to previous section, this section will present all estimations from different 
estimations, namely OLS, fixed effect, 2SLS, and GMM estimations. Table 4.8 
indicates that female executive directors tend to be more influential than female non-
executive directors in Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3. But, this significance 
relationship between female executive directors and ROA seems not to be robust 
because it loses its explaining power in Model 4, Model 5 and Model 6. 
Unlike the fraction of female director regression analyses (Table 4.6 and Table 4.7), 
male director connection (fem_exp) estimations are not significant and they have 
negative coefficients. The inclusion of instrumental variables (Model 4 and Model 5) 
changes substantially the sign and the significance of female executive director 
coefficients, while female non-executive coefficients remain positive and statistically 
insignificant. In Model 6, both estimations are positive but none is statistically 
significant. Similar to previous section, it is difficult to interpret female directors’ 
contributions based on the director function due to the lack of significance of focused 
variables after addressing the endogeneity problems.  
Table 4.9 confirms the previous results, even though the dependent variable is profit 
margin. Firstly, female executive director coefficient is only statistically significant in 
OLS model. There is no evidence it has the same result after addressing the endogeneity 
problem. Secondly, there is a tendency that female non-executive directors have a 
positive influence on profit margin, except in OLS (Model 1) and the Arellano-Bond 
model (Model 6). The estimations of female non-executive directors are close to 10 per 
cent significance level in Model 4 and Model 5. 
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According to Table 4.8 and Table 4.9, there are two important possibilities that can be 
implied. Firstly, female executive directors may not be as competitive as their male 
counterparts. Wolfer (2006) and Kolev (2012) find that female CEOs tend to be 
underperformed than their male counterpart due to simply either female executive 
directors are less experience or less well-connected than male executive directors 
(Burke, 1997; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004), or female directors are deemed less risky 
and less confidence than male directors in terms of financing and investment decisions 
(Huang and Kisgen, 2013; Levi et al., 2013) which may lead to poor firm performance. 
The other possible explanation is the tokenism problems (Elstad and Ladegar 2012).  
Secondly, even though the estimations of female non-executive directors are positive 
and stable, the estimations are not statistically significant. The study argues that female 
non-executive directors are less likely to be involved in firm business and operation in 
daily basis. Consequently, their contributions are less significant on firm performance.  
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Table 4.8 Female Executive Directors and Female Non-Executive Directors on ROA. Firm 
performance is regressed with female director measures and control variables. fract_women_exec is 
fraction of female executive director. fract_women_ned is fraction of female non-executive director. 
roaf2 is net profit divided by total assets (ROA). ln_bsize is natural logarithm total directors. prop_ned is 
the fraction of non-executive director. ln_emplyf is natural logarithm of firm total employees. block is 
percentage owned by top block holder Ln_firm_age is natural logarithm of (firm age+1). Debt_ratio2 is 
total debt divided by total assets. Lag_roaf2 is one period lag of ROA. ICB_two is the fraction of female 
director within the same 2-digit industry code. Fem_exp is the fraction of male director who ever works 
with female director on other boards. Model 1 employs OLS estimation. Model 2 and Model 3 employ 
panel with fixed effects. Model 4 and Model 5 employ 2SLS with IV.  Model 6 employs Arellano-Bond 
method. roaf2 and debt_ratio2 are winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent. The robust t-statistics of each 
coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 
per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ols_a fe1_a fe2_a ivfe1_a ivfe2_a ar_bond_a 
VARIABLES roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 
       
fract_women_exec 0.076*** 0.096*** 0.093*** -1.018 -1.222 0.033 
 (3.711) (2.878) (2.787) (-0.998) (-1.325) (0.418) 
fract_women_ned -0.017 0.032 0.027 1.420 0.483 0.040 
 (-0.819) (0.974) (0.832) (1.342) (1.177) (0.555) 
ln_bsize 0.014 -0.002 0.001 -0.028 0.005 -0.083 
 (1.058) (-0.118) (0.065) (-0.888) (0.248) (-1.079) 
prop_ned -0.048* -0.063** -0.071** -0.143** -0.132** 0.136 
 (-1.932) (-2.122) (-2.415) (-2.043) (-2.403) (0.953) 
ln_employf 0.066*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.025*** -0.038 
 (26.836) (5.524) (5.245) (3.499) (3.918) (-1.544) 
block 0.111*** 0.008 0.002 0.041 0.005 0.195* 
 (4.871) (0.235) (0.058) (0.869) (0.125) (1.646) 
ln_firm_age 0.035*** 0.010 -0.007 0.021 -0.013 0.060 
 (11.467) (0.640) (-0.698) (0.929) (-0.910) (1.447) 
debt_ratio2 -0.372*** -0.442*** -0.445*** -0.436*** -0.446*** -0.392** 
 (-17.314) (-31.702) (-32.071) (-24.647) (-28.350) (-2.317) 
Lag_roaf2      0.161*** 
      (3.290) 
Fem_exp    -0.000 0.002  
    (-0.03) (0.26)  
ICB_two    0.585*** 1.161***  
    (4.20) (12.77)  
Constant -0.682*** -0.035 0.034    
 (-10.446) (-0.609) (0.797)    
Year Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry Yes No No No No No 
Observations 9,884 9,903 9,903 9,771 9,771 4,998 
R-squared 0.276 0.121 0.117 -0.196 -0.071  
Ll -2467 1575 1556 -10.88 527.2 . 
Number of firm_id  1,787 1,787 1,669 1,669 1,254 
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Table 4.9 Female Executive Directors and Female Non-Executive Directors on Profit Margin. Firm 
performance is regressed with female director measures and control variables. fract_women_exec is 
fraction of female executive director. fract_women_ned is fraction of female non-executive director. 
prof_margin2 is net profit divided by total sales (profit margin). ln_bsize is natural logarithm total 
directors. prop_ned is the fraction of non-executive director. ln_emplyf is natural logarithm of firm total 
employees. block is percentage owned by top block holder. Ln_firm_age is natural logarithm of (firm 
age+1). Debt_ratio2 is total debt divided by total assets. Lag_prof_margin2 is one period lag of profit 
margin. ICB_two is the fraction of female director within the same 2-digit industry code. ICB_three is the 
fraction of female director within the same 3-digit industry code.  Fem_exp is the fraction of male 
director who ever works with female director on other boards. Model 1 employs OLS estimation. Model 2 
and Model 3 employ panel with fixed effects. Model 4 and Model 5 employ 2SLS with IV.  Model 6 
employs Arellano-Bond method. prof_margin2 and debt_ratio2 are winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per 
cent. The robust t-statistics of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** mean statistically 
different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ols_a fe1_a fe2_a ivfe1_a ivfe2_a ar_bond_a 
VARIABLES prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 
       
fract_women_exec 2.371*** -0.452 -0.557 -33.349 -36.111 -0.187 
 (4.024) (-0.398) (-0.491) (-0.952) (-1.171) (-0.301) 
fract_women_ned -0.392 1.179 0.957 39.478 20.038 -0.963 
 (-0.641) (1.032) (0.848) (1.331) (1.451) (-0.998) 
ln_bsize -0.873** -0.053 0.031 -0.924 -0.188 0.383 
 (-1.961) (-0.090) (0.053) (-0.981) (-0.281) (0.334) 
prop_ned -1.116 -0.588 -1.042 -3.523 -3.514 2.746 
 (-1.389) (-0.551) (-1.000) (-1.231) (-1.606) (1.525) 
ln_employf 1.074*** 0.925*** 0.913*** 0.761*** 0.768*** -0.452 
 (12.614) (4.516) (4.470) (2.736) (3.052) (-1.177) 
block 2.244*** 0.297 0.191 1.008 0.267 -2.972 
 (3.155) (0.252) (0.163) (0.699) (0.208) (-1.081) 
ln_firm_age 0.616*** 1.914*** 1.287*** 2.366*** 0.997** -0.934 
 (6.958) (3.384) (3.361) (3.186) (2.025) (-1.597) 
debt_ratio2 1.618*** 0.152 0.208 0.359 0.397 2.408 
 (3.265) (0.313) (0.430) (0.626) (0.734) (1.588) 
Lag_prof_margin2      0.385*** 
      (4.717) 
Fem_exp    0.003 0.001  
    (0.39) (0.68)  
ICB_two     1.219***  
     (13.04)  
ICB_three    0.665***   
    (6.48)   
Constant -10.686*** -12.158*** -10.774***    
 (-6.407) (-6.306) (-6.490)    
Year Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry Yes No No No No No 
Observations 8,969 8,969 8,969 8,842 8,842 5,611 
R-squared 0.096 0.008 0.006 -0.261 -0.166  
ll -33634 -29756 -29762 -30459 -30112 . 
Number of firm_id  1,662 1,662 1,535 1,535 1,319 
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4.6.4.3 Analysis of Critical Mass 
This section examines whether firms with more than one female director tend to have 
better performance than firms with one female director. The idea is from the tokenism 
principle, which suggests that female directors, as a minority party, cannot give a 
positive contribution because female directors will be marginalised and isolated. Liu et 
al. (2013) indicates that the tokenism problem on the boards can be avoided when there 
are at least three female directors. This analysis employs the same approach and 
specification with previous regression analyses.  
Table 4.10 indicates that firms with one female director tend to outperform firms with 
two or more female directors in Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3. However, these results 
are likely affected by the endogeneity problem. The instrumental variables are added in 
Model 4, Model 5, and Model 6. As the number of the suspected endogenous variables 
must be the same or less than the number of the instrumental variables in the IV 
regression, d_women1, d_women2, and d_women3 cannot be conducted all jointly.  
Model 4 indicates that both d_women1 and d_women2 are insignificant, but the signs of 
d_women1 and d_women2 are not the same. The estimation of d_women1 is negative 
while the estimation of d_women2 is positive, which means that two female directors 
may bring a greater contribution to ROA. Model 5 indicates that the estimations 
d_women2 and d_women3 are positive and insignificant, which suggests no difference 
for firms with two female directors or more than three female directors.  
Model 6 is probably the best model to compare between firms with one female director 
and firms with three or more female directors. The estimation of d_women3 
significantly influences ROA, but the d_women1 has an insignificant and negative 
influence on ROA. 
By employing the Arellano-Bond, Model 7 shows that d_women1, d_women2, and 
d_women3 are statistically significant with the same positive signs. But the significance 
of d_women2 and d_women3 is stronger than d_women1. Thus, there is evidence that 
employing more than one female director could give a positive contribution on firm 
performance.  
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Table 4.11 shows that d_women1 tends to have positive impacts on profit margin in 
Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 although the estimations are not statistically significant. 
But after addressing the endogeneity problem (Model 4, Model 5, and Model 6), firms 
with more than one female on the boards tend to outperform firms with one female on 
the boards. Model 4 shows that d_women2 affect positively to profit margin, while 
d_women1 affect negatively to profit margin. Similarly with model 6, d_women1 tends 
to underperform to d_women3. These results are slightly worse than the results in Table 
4.10 because none of the focused variables is statistically significant particularly after 
addressing the endogeneity problem. But, Table 4.11 supports the findings in Table 4.10 
in terms of the estimation signs. 
Overall, even though there is a little evidence, particularly in Table 4.11, to support that 
more females could reduce the tokenism problem, both Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 can 
marginally show that the absolute number of females on the board can increase firm 
performance.  This finding suggests the importance of balance composition between 
female and male on the board rather than only the presence of female director. 
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Table 4.10 Critical Mass Analysis with ROA. Firm performance is regressed with female director 
measures and control variables. d_women1 equals to 1 if firm with one female director, d_women1  
equals 0 if else. d_women2 equals to 1 if firm with two female directors, d_women2 equals 0 if else. 
d_women3 equals to 1 if firm with three or more female directors, d_women3 equals 0 if else. roaf2 is net 
profit divided by total assets (ROA). ln_bsize is natural logarithm total directors. prop_ned is the fraction 
of non-executive director. ln_emplyf is natural logarithm of firm total employees. block is percentage 
owned by top block holder. Ln_firm_age is natural logarithm of (firm age+1). Debt_ratio2 is total debt 
divided by total assets. Lag_roaf2 is one period lag of ROA. ICB_three is the fraction of female director 
within the same 3-digit industry code. ICB_four is the fraction of female director within the same 4-digit 
industry code. Fem_exp is the fraction of male director who ever works with female director on other 
boards. Model 1 employs OLS estimation. Model 2 and Model 3 employ panel with fixed effects. Model 
4, Model 5, and Model 6 employ 2SLS with IV.  Model 7 employs Arellano-Bond method. roaf2 and 
debt_ratio2 are winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent. The robust t-statistics of each coefficient is 
shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 
1 per cent level of significance respectively 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 ols_b fe1_b fe2_b ivfe1_b ivfe2_b ivfe3_b ar_bond_b 
VARIABLES roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 
        
d_women1 0.021*** 0.020** 0.018* -0.117  -0.153 0.040* 
 (3.061) (1.981) (1.779) (-0.622)  (-0.868) (1.718) 
d_women2 -0.010 0.010 0.009 0.903 1.829  0.056** 
 (-0.961) (0.588) (0.549) (1.103) (0.520)  (2.224) 
d_women3 -0.045*** 0.025 0.021  0.159 0.455* 0.069** 
 (-2.864) (0.854) (0.735)  (0.282) (1.731) (2.154) 
ln_bsize 0.015 -0.004 -0.001 -0.035 -0.115 0.005 -0.143** 
 (1.066) (-0.263) (-0.062) (-0.698) (-0.589) (0.155) (-1.977) 
prop_ned -0.051** -0.064** -0.072** -0.130* -0.171 -0.067** -0.049 
 (-2.072) (-2.162) (-2.469) (-1.901) (-0.755) (-1.964) (-0.351) 
ln_employf 0.066*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.020* 0.015 0.029*** -0.043* 
 (26.622) (5.530) (5.246) (1.920) (0.456) (4.859) (-1.758) 
block 0.118*** 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.019 0.007 0.087 
 (5.198) (0.209) (0.033) (0.172) (0.326) (0.205) (0.726) 
ln_firm_age 0.035*** 0.010 -0.007 0.017 0.042 0.003 0.067* 
 (11.399) (0.648) (-0.705) (0.704) (0.644) (0.183) (1.832) 
debt_ratio2 -0.373*** -0.441*** -0.445*** -0.448*** -0.446*** -0.446*** -0.281** 
 (-17.420) (-31.672) (-32.038) (-24.430) (-17.755) (-29.769) (-2.110) 
Lag_roaf2       0.206*** 
       (4.579) 
Fem_exp    -0.156 -0.019* 0.136***  
    (-0.78) (-1.87) (4.19)  
ICB_three     1.233** 1.004***  
     (10.23) (2.73)  
ICB_four    0.298**    
    (2.03)    
Constant -0.687*** -0.010 0.040     
 (-10.548) (-0.198) (0.932)     
        
Year Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes No No No No No No 
Observations 9,884 9,903 9,903 9,771 9,771 9,771 6,272 
R-squared 0.277 0.120 0.117 -0.432 -1.667 0.041  
ll -2466 1572 1552 -893.1 -3930 1069 . 
Number of firm_id  1,787 1,787 1,669 1,669 1,669 1,457 
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Table 4.11 Critical Mass Analysis with Profit Margin. Firm performance is regressed with female 
director measures and control variables. d_women1 equals to 1 if firm with one female director, 
d_women1  equals 0 if else. d_women2 equals to 1 if firm with two female directors, d_women2  equals 0 
if else. d_women3 equals to 1 if firm with three or more female directors, d_women3 equals 0 if else. 
prof_margin2 is net profit divided by total sales (profit margin). ln_bsize is natural logarithm total 
directors. prop_ned is the fraction of non-executive director. ln_emplyf is natural logarithm of firm total 
employees. block is percentage owned by top block holder. Ln_firm_age is natural logarithm of (firm 
age+1). Debt_ratio2 is total debt divided by total assets. Lag_prof_margin2 is one period lag of profit 
margin. ICB_three is the fraction of female director within the same 3-digit industry code.  ICB_four is 
the fraction of female director within the same 4-digit industry code. Fem_exp is the fraction of male 
director who ever works with female director on other boards. Model 1 employs OLS estimation. Model 2 
and Model 3 employ panel with fixed effects. Model 4, Model 5, and Model 6 employ 2SLS with IV.  
Model 7 employs Arellano-Bond method. roaf2 and debt_ratio2 are winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per 
cent. The robust t-statistics of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** mean statistically 
different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 ols_b fe1_b fe2_b ivfe1_b ivfe2_b ivfe3_b ar_bond_b 
VARIABLES prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 
        
d_women1 0.355 0.125 0.044 -4.336  -3.623 0.172 
 (1.573) (0.369) (0.133) (-0.817)  (-0.701) (0.357) 
d_women2 0.182 -0.178 -0.285 15.375 80.343  0.013 
 (0.778) (-0.314) (-0.509) (0.682) (0.318)  (0.039) 
d_women3 -0.683** -0.123 -0.303  -1.235 11.032 0.199 
 (-2.102) (-0.127) (-0.316)  (-0.033) (1.448) (0.353) 
ln_bsize -0.875* -0.021 0.080 -0.465 -5.779 0.026 -0.550 
 (-1.922) (-0.035) (0.135) (-0.282) (-0.344) (0.026) (-0.367) 
prop_ned -1.193 -0.509 -0.946 -1.742 -5.408 -0.356 1.981 
 (-1.481) (-0.478) (-0.910) (-0.899) (-0.324) (-0.308) (1.313) 
ln_employf 1.061*** 0.932*** 0.918*** 0.676* 0.012 0.905***  
 (12.345) (4.547) (4.496) (1.769) (0.004) (3.961)  
Block 2.448*** 0.272 0.173 0.204 1.102 0.244 -1.880 
 (3.460) (0.231) (0.147) (0.152) (0.320) (0.197) (-0.854) 
ln_firm_age 0.614*** 1.900*** 1.325*** 1.728** 2.686 1.746** -0.509 
 (6.951) (3.357) (3.452) (2.371) (1.067) (2.545) (-0.790) 
debt_ratio2 1.568*** 0.150 0.198 -0.041 -0.407 0.105 2.106 
 (3.174) (0.309) (0.410) (-0.070) (-0.191) (0.207) (1.273) 
Lag_prof_margin2       0.346*** 
       (4.476) 
Fem_exp    -0.012 -0.028** 0.159***  
    (-0.56) (-2.37) (4.54)  
ICB_three    0.334** 1.362*** 0.935**  
    (2.07) (10.16) (2.34)  
Constant -10.651*** -12.244*** -11.001***     
 (-6.340) (-6.354) (-6.601)     
        
Year Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes No No No No No No 
Observations 8,969 8,969 8,969 8,842 8,842 8,842 5,627 
R-squared 0.096 0.008 0.006 -0.233 -4.078 -0.043  
Ll -33637 -29756 -29762 -30357 -36616 -29619 . 
Number of 
firm_id 
 1,662 1,662 1,535 1,535 1,535 1,323 
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4.6.5 The Effects of Female Directors on Firm Performance with Respect to Firm 
Governance Level 
Previous studies (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Jurkus et al. 2011) indicate that the relation 
between female directors and firm performance relies on the level of firm governance. 
Female directors significantly influence firm performance for firms with weak 
governance. In other words, it is likely that the relation between female directors and 
firm performance is not straightforward.  
Given the previous studies, this section is going to examine the consistency of those 
results with respect to certain firm characteristics. This analysis will be divided into two 
parts: CEO power and firm size.  
 
4.6.5.1  CEO Power  
Firm CEOs are one of the crucial figures in corporate governance study because their 
strategic decisions will affect the stakeholders. Ideally, the decision-making process is 
based on the consensus among board members (executive and non-executive directors). 
However, Adams et al. (2004) argue that powerful CEOs will have a greater influence 
on strategic decision-making process by extending Finkelstein (1992) model. 
Given a strong influence of powerful CEOs on firm strategic decisions, the 
consequences on firm value are relatively mixed. Adams et al. (2004) find that firms 
with powerful CEOs tend to have a volatile firm performance, but they do not find that 
those firms have worse performance than any other firms. Fahlenbrach (2009) report 
that founder-CEOs may act differently in investment decisions, but those firms tend to 
have better performance in terms of firm valuation and stock performance.  
On the other hand, Bebchuk et al. (2011) find that powerful CEOs, which are proxied 
by CEOs compensation relative to total top executive compensation, have a negative 
association to firm value. Powerful CEOs are also associated with a poor credit rating 
and a high yield spread because the bondholders deem firms with powerful CEOs are 
associated with the lack of transparency which may affect the effectiveness of 
monitoring of their investment (Liu and Jiraporn, 2010).  
Monitoring is a key element in corporate governance study. The effectiveness of 
monitoring on powerful CEOs has been discussed in previous studies (Westphal and 
Zajac, 1995; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). Westphal and Zajac (1995) report that 
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powerful CEOs would select directors with similar demographics (e.g. age, education 
level, inside status) which leads to biased CEOs performance evaluation, generous CEO 
compensation, and  CEOs entrenchment.  Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) also report 
that firms are most likely to appoint grey and insider directors rather than independent 
directors when CEOs are the member of nomination committee. Independent directors 
are more effective than inside or grey directors in monitoring, but their effectiveness 
may depend on CEO power (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998) 
One of effective monitoring indicators is the sensitivity relation between CEO turnover 
and firm performance. Weak governance is associated the lack of sensitivity 
relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance, and vice versa. The lack of 
sensitivity can be caused either poor internal monitoring on CEOs performance or 
CEOs are too powerful to dismiss. Goyal and Park (2002) find that combining both 
CEO and the chairman positions on one individual will weaken monitoring function of 
the boards. Denis et al. (1997) report that CEOs who have a significant stake (between 5 
to 25 per cent) will cause insensitivity on CEO turnover and firm performance 
relationship. In other words, certain CEO characteristics can insulate managers from 
monitoring mechanisms.  
Given that arguments and previous studies, the greater CEOs power, the weaker 
corporate governance practice in that firms.  This section will focus on the origin of 
CEOs (inside or outside CEOs). Inside CEOs are more entrenched than outside CEOs, 
particularly when CEOs are either the founder, the member of family, or with a 
substantial stake. Firms with powerful CEOs are associated with poor (weak) 
governance, which may be affecting the relation between female directors and firm 
performance.  
Table 4.12 shows that more than one-third of total observations are led by powerful 
CEOs. Using similar approaches to previous sections, all models show that the 
estimations of the focused variable, fraction of females (fract_women), has positive 
coefficients but none of them is statistically significant. After employing the 
instrumental variable (Model 4 and Model 5), the estimations are relatively the same in 
terms of the significance and the sign. Model 6 confirms the consistency of previous 
results. 
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In addition, Table 4.13 shows the same analysis but it uses firm profit margin as the 
dependent variable. The results of the estimations fraction of female are relatively the 
same. All of the female fraction (fract_women) estimations are not statistically 
significant, but the presence of female may bring a positive consequence on firm profit 
margin except for OLS estimations. Overall, Table 4.12 and Table 4.13 have similar 
results, in which the fraction of female director is positively correlated with firm 
performance when the firms have a weak governance mechanism despite the lack of 
significance.  
Table 4.14 presents the results of regression if the CEOs are outsiders, which means the 
CEOs join the firm less than one year and they are not the founder, the family, nor the 
substantial shareholder. The outsider CEOs are deemed less powerful CEOs that are 
associated with strong governance.  
Firms with a strong governance environment may suffer from the over-monitoring 
problem when firms appoint more female directors. Table 4.14 indicates that there is a 
positive association between female directors and ROA in Model 1, Model 2, and 
Model 3. But, this positive association changes when instrumental variables are 
included. Even though it is not statistically significant, the focused variables are 
negative in Model 4 and Model 5. But, Model 6 shows a positive and insignificant 
estimation of fract_women. 
Table 4.15 shows that four estimations of female directors (fract_women) change their 
signs to negative when using profit margin as the dependent variable in Model 2, Model 
3, Model 4, and Model 5. Although none of them is statistically significant, female 
directors’ influence to firm profit margin tends to be negative.  
Overall, due to lack significance of the focused variable estimations, this study suggests 
that there is no sufficient evidence that powerful CEOs may influence the relation 
between female directors and firm performance. Some estimations, particularly for 
firms with powerful CEOs, report stable and consistent signs with the hypothesis but 
they are not statistically significant.   
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Table 4.12 Female Directors and ROA for Owner CEOs. Firm performance is regressed with female 
director measure and control variables. Owner CEO refers to firm with CEO who is the substantial 
shareholder (>3 per cent), or the member of family, or the founder. fract_women is fraction of female 
director. roaf2 is net profit divided by total assets (ROA). ln_bsize is natural logarithm total directors. 
prop_ned is the fraction of non-executive director. ln_emplyf is natural logarithm of firm total employees. 
block is percentage owned by top block holder. Ln_firm_age is natural logarithm of (firm age+1). 
Debt_ratio2 is total debt divided by total assets. Lag_roaf2 is one period lag of ROA. ICB_three is the 
fraction of female director within the same 3-digit industry code. ICB_four is the fraction of female 
director within the same 4-digit industry code. Fem_exp is the fraction of male director who ever works 
with female director on other boards. Model 1 employs OLS estimation. Model 2 and Model 3 employ 
panel with fixed effects. Model 4 and Model 5 employ 2SLS with IV. Model 6 employs Arellano-Bond 
method. roaf2 and debt_ratio2 are winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent. The robust t-statistics of each 
coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 
per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ols_a fe1_a fe2_a ivfe1_a ivfe2_a ar_bond_a 
VARIABLES roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 
       
fract_women 0.075 0.161 0.131 1.181 0.718 0.311 
 (1.230) (1.477) (1.213) (1.360) (1.104) (1.076) 
ln_bsize 0.071*** 0.068* 0.068* 0.044 0.052 -0.136 
 (2.741) (1.953) (1.941) (1.096) (1.350) (-1.203) 
prop_ned 0.018 0.010 -0.004 0.017 -0.001 0.174 
 (0.431) (0.150) (-0.058) (0.269) (-0.017) (0.979) 
ln_employf 0.079*** 0.015 0.014 0.021* 0.017 0.021 
 (16.598) (1.523) (1.365) (1.861) (1.579) (0.606) 
block 0.122*** -0.032 -0.035 -0.009 -0.025 0.294 
 (2.928) (-0.494) (-0.545) (-0.124) (-0.367) (1.248) 
ln_firm_age 0.043*** 0.048 0.019 0.071* 0.011 0.105 
 (5.754) (1.485) (0.981) (1.817) (0.552) (1.113) 
debt_ratio2 -0.437*** -0.538*** -0.544*** -0.535*** -0.542*** -0.762** 
 (-12.006) (-21.467) (-21.810) (-20.802) (-21.539) (-2.271) 
Lag_roaf2      0.169** 
      (2.454) 
Fem_exp    0.044*** 0.047***  
    (3.87) (4.10)  
ICB_three    0.594*** 0.691***  
    (5.07) (7.25)  
Constant -0.897*** -0.189* -0.086    
 (-6.862) (-1.667) (-1.131)    
Year Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry Yes No No No No No 
Observations 3,317 3,324 3,324 3,208 3,208 2,015 
R-squared 0.285 0.171 0.166 0.143 0.157  
ll -1186 332.7 323.0 212.0 239.1 . 
Number of firm_id  803 803 693 693 609 
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Table 4.13 Female Directors and Profit Margin for Owner CEOs. Firm performance is regressed with 
female director measure and control variables. Owner CEO refers to firm with CEO who is the substantial 
shareholder (>3 per cent), or the member of family, or the founder.  fract_women is fraction of female 
director. prof_margin2 is net profit divided by total sales (profit margin). ln_bsize is natural logarithm 
total directors. prop_ned is the fraction of non-executive director. ln_emplyf is natural logarithm of firm 
total employees. block is percentage owned by top block holder. Ln_firm_age is natural logarithm of 
(firm age+1). Debt_ratio2 is total debt divided by total assets. Lag_prof_margin2 is one period lag of 
profit margin. ICB_four is the fraction of female director within the same 4-digit industry code. Fem_exp 
is the fraction of male director who ever works with female director on other boards. Model 1 employs 
OLS estimation. Model 2 and Model 3 employ panel with fixed effects. Model 4 and Model 5 employ 
2SLS with IV.  Model 6 employs Arellano-Bond method. prof_margin2 and debt_ratio2 are winsorized at 
1 per cent and 99 per cent. The robust t-statistics of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** mean statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance 
respectively 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ols_a fe1_a fe2_a ivfe1_a ivfe2_a ar_bond_a 
VARIABLES prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 
       
fract_women -1.097 1.747 1.528 13.987 11.417 1.060 
 (-0.633) (0.467) (0.415) (0.659) (0.681) (0.240) 
ln_bsize -0.599 -1.551 -1.527 -1.727 -1.696 -3.786 
 (-0.785) (-1.282) (-1.263) (-1.386) (-1.367) (-1.150) 
prop_ned 0.269 -3.097 -3.230 -2.959 -3.183 0.620 
 (0.198) (-1.353) (-1.417) (-1.287) (-1.395) (0.090) 
ln_employf 1.339*** 0.654* 0.692* 0.717* 0.733* 0.077 
 (8.352) (1.723) (1.837) (1.819) (1.915) (0.051) 
block 2.672** -0.025 0.130 0.324 0.387 -2.222 
 (2.449) (-0.011) (0.058) (0.141) (0.171) (-0.388) 
ln_firm_age 0.844*** 2.309* 1.564** 2.756* 1.490** -0.393 
 (4.348) (1.924) (2.168) (1.939) (2.035) (-0.317) 
debt_ratio2 1.362** -2.724*** -2.681*** -2.804*** -2.739*** -1.418 
 (1.964) (-3.122) (-3.104) (-3.179) (-3.151) (-0.932) 
Lag_prof_margin2      0.229** 
      (2.187) 
Fem_exp    0.046*** 0.049***  
    (3.69) (3.93)  
ICB_four    0.596*** 0.710***  
    (7.41) (9.61)  
Constant -31.622* -5.461 -4.128    
 (-1.709) (-1.292) (-1.478)    
Year Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry Yes No No No No No 
Observations 2,925 2,925 2,925 2,806 2,806 1,720 
R-squared 0.108 0.013 0.010 0.008 0.007  
ll -11079 -9829 -9833 -9494 -9496 . 
Number of firm_id  736 736 617 617 533 
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Table 4.14 Female Directors and ROA for Outsider CEOs. Firm performance is regressed with female 
director measures and control variables. Outsider CEO refers to firm with CEO who joins the firms not 
more than 1 year and he or she is not the substantial shareholder (>3 per cent), the member of family, nor 
the founder. fract_women is fraction of female director. roaf2 is net profit divided by total assets (ROA). 
ln_bsize is natural logarithm total directors. prop_ned is the fraction of non-executive director. ln_emplyf 
is natural logarithm of firm total employees. block is percentage owned by top block holder. Ln_firm_age 
is natural logarithm of (firm age+1). Debt_ratio2 is total debt divided by total assets. Lag_roaf2 is one 
period lag of ROA. ICB_two is the fraction of female director within the same 2-digit industry code. 
ICB_four is the fraction of female director within the same 4-digit industry code. Fem_exp is the fraction 
of male director who ever works with female director on other boards. Model 1 employs OLS estimation. 
Model 2 and Model 3 employ panel with fixed effects. Model 4 and Model 5 employ 2SLS with IV.  
Model 6 employs Arellano-Bond method. roaf2 and debt_ratio2 are winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per 
cent. The robust t-statistics of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** mean statistically 
different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ols_a fe1_a fe2_a ivfe1_a ivfe2_a ar_bond_a 
VARIABLES roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 
       
fract_women 0.110** 0.060 0.039 -0.615 -0.292 0.176 
 (2.008) (0.733) (0.481) (-1.375) (-0.731) (1.269) 
ln_bsize -0.037 -0.038 -0.031 -0.025 -0.026 -0.178 
 (-1.533) (-1.258) (-1.029) (-0.816) (-0.852) (-1.586) 
prop_ned -0.046 -0.161*** -0.163*** -0.176*** -0.164*** -0.327 
 (-0.956) (-2.857) (-2.946) (-3.047) (-2.945) (-1.620) 
ln_employf 0.067*** -0.003 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 -0.016 
 (15.270) (-0.259) (-0.443) (0.004) (-0.310) (-0.475) 
block 0.110** -0.053 -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 0.141 
 (2.406) (-0.857) (-0.995) (-0.984) (-0.999) (0.853) 
ln_firm_age 0.044*** 0.069** 0.039* 0.055* 0.047** -0.008 
 (8.588) (2.345) (1.908) (1.793) (2.059) (-0.166) 
debt_ratio2 -0.354*** -0.461*** -0.462*** -0.458*** -0.463*** 0.069 
 (-9.520) (-17.537) (-17.666) (-17.214) (-17.639) (0.673) 
Lag_roaf2      0.196** 
      (2.439) 
Fem_exp    0.008 0.013  
    (0.71) (1.24)  
ICB_two     1.214***  
     (9.77)  
ICB_four    0.762***   
    (9.05)   
Constant -0.280*** 0.119 0.228***    
 (-5.077) (1.062) (2.666)    
       
Year Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry Yes No No No No No 
Observations 3,098 3,100 3,100 2,974 2,974 1,962 
R-squared 0.294 0.127 0.122 0.102 0.115  
ll -628.4 831.3 821.2 693.0 715.4 . 
Number of firm_id  757 757 632 632 570 
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Table 4.15 Female Directors and Profit Margin on for Outsider CEOs. Firm performance is regressed 
with female director measure and control variables. Outsider CEO refers to firm with CEO who joins the 
firms not more than 1 year and he or she is not the substantial shareholder (>3 per cent), the member of 
family, nor a founder. fract_women is fraction of female director. prof_margin2 is net profit divided by 
total sales (profit margin). ln_bsize is natural logarithm total directors. prop_ned is the fraction of non-
executive director. ln_emplyf is natural logarithm of firm total employees. block is percentage owned by 
top block holder. Ln_firm_age is natural logarithm of (firm age+1). Debt_ratio2 is total debt divided by 
total assets. Lag_prof_margin2 is one period lag of profit margin. ICB_two is the fraction of female 
director within the same 2-digit industry code. Fem_exp is the fraction of male director who ever works 
with female director on other boards. Model 1 employs OLS estimation. Model 2 and Model 3 employ 
panel with fixed effects. Model 4 and Model 5 employ 2SLS with IV.  Model 6 employs Arellano-Bond 
method. prof_margin2 and debt_ratio2 are winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent. The robust t-statistics 
of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 per 
cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ols_a fe1_a fe2_a ivfe1_a ivfe2_a ar_bond_a 
VARIABLES prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 
       
fract_women 0.925 -2.150 -2.644 -6.023 -12.064 1.060 
 (0.607) (-0.878) (-1.100) (-0.263) (-1.043) (0.240) 
ln_bsize 0.328 -0.500 -0.558 -0.450 -0.480 -3.786 
 (0.365) (-0.542) (-0.609) (-0.467) (-0.519) (-1.150) 
prop_ned -1.628 -0.016 -0.233 -0.124 -0.247 0.620 
 (-1.103) (-0.009) (-0.134) (-0.065) (-0.141) (0.090) 
ln_employf 0.913*** 1.027*** 1.057*** 1.033*** 1.073*** 0.077 
 (5.549) (2.913) (3.017) (2.923) (3.051) (0.051) 
block -0.497 -1.507 -1.484 -1.603 -1.620 -2.222 
 (-0.348) (-0.754) (-0.746) (-0.774) (-0.810) (-0.388) 
ln_firm_age 0.702*** -0.093 -0.236 -0.158 0.060 -0.393 
 (4.084) (-0.101) (-0.362) (-0.159) (0.081) (-0.317) 
debt_ratio2 1.803 0.770 0.838 0.783 0.816 -1.418 
 (1.606) (0.975) (1.068) (0.990) (1.037) (-0.932) 
Lag_prof_margin2      0.229** 
      (2.187) 
Fem_exp    0.012 0.016  
    (1.02) (1.40)  
ICB_two    0.938*** 1.234***  
    (4.80) (9.55)  
Constant -15.599*** -8.072** -6.862**    
 (-3.637) (-2.178) (-2.383)    
       
Year Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry Yes No No No No No 
Observations 2,820 2,820 2,820 2,702 2,702 1,720 
R-squared 0.090 0.009 0.006 0.007 -0.001  
ll -10499 -8705 -8709 -8400 -8412 . 
Number of firm_id  695 695 577 577 533 
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4.6.5.2 Firm Size 
Firm size has been scrutinised in finance studies, which include topics in asset pricing 
models (Fama and French, 1993), financing decisions or capital structure (Berger and 
Udell, 1995), and merger and acquisition (Moeller et al., 2004; Offenberg, 2009). Fama 
and French (1993) has extended Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by adding firm 
size because small firms tend to outperform large firms which may be a result of market 
inefficiency. Berger and Udell (1995) report that small firms tend to be more 
dependable to principal owner, commercial banks, and trade creditors as financing 
sources. Moeller et al. (2004) show that the market tends to react negatively to 
acquisition announcements that are conducted by large firms due to management hubris. 
Moreover, Offenberg (2009) indicates that the likelihood of CEOs dismissal in large 
firms is high when they make a series of poor acquisitions. Thus, firm size has an 
important role in finance studies. 
Board diversity is one of the corporate governance branches. One way to approach the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm size is through the asymmetric 
information problem. Zeghal (1984) argue that the information about certain firms is the 
function of firm size. In terms of the scale of production and business activities, large 
firms tend to produce more significant amount resources of financial and non-financial 
information than small firms. Moreover, large firms are more likely scrutinised by 
external parties (e.g. analysts, regulators) in terms of disclosure and governance aspects.   
One example is related to official announcement by listed firms. Atiase (1985) reports 
that the effect of earning announcement is subject to firm size. Small firms will 
experience a substantial market reaction while large firms receive little market reaction. 
Slovin et al. (1992) also find that the reaction of renewal bank loan will generate more 
positive stock returns for small firms, while only normal stock returns to large firms. As 
a prudent institution, renewal bank loan will help small firms in building their 
reputation to outside investors particularly from potential moral hazard.  
In the UK, the market regulators impose different standards in terms of disclosure and 
governance practice according to firm size. For instance, the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) introduced the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in 1995 for smaller and 
fast-growing firms. Firms that registered in AIM index are not obliged to follow all the 
UK governance codes (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2008). The AIM firms are in a less-
regulated environment than the large firms (i.e. FTSE100 and FTSE250).  Dahya et al. 
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(2002) report that there is a significant difference between large firms and small firms in 
terms of compliance with the Cadbury Report (1992). Similarly, the recommendation to 
appoint more female directors is aimed to large listed firms. 
Furthermore, good governance practices are highly associated with monitoring activities. 
As one of the fundamental functions of directors, the intensity and scope of monitoring 
depends firm complexity (Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2007). Firms that operate and 
have geographically dispersed market should bring more outside directors to provide 
valuable expertise, skills, and experience. Unlike inside directors, outside directors tend 
to be more independent than inside directors as inside directors may have ties to CEOs 
or private benefits.  
Even though several studies (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Bhagat and Black, 2002) 
do not find a positive correlation between board independence and firm value, board 
independence still significantly influences most of firm strategic decisions, for instance 
CEO dismissal decision (Weisbach, 1988), M&A decision (Landier, 2012), and 
executive compensation decision (Chhaochharia and Grienstein, 2009). More 
importantly, independent directors will reduce the likelihood of fraud incidents (Beasley, 
1996; Beasley et al., 2000). More outside directors will be associated with a better 
monitoring mechanism. 
A recent report also indicates that small firms may have a different governance practice 
from large firms among Russell 3000 companies (Ernst & Young, 2013). Small firms 
tend to have less board committees meeting, staggered boards, less independent 
directors, and less female directors. In other words, small firms tend to have weak 
governance practices. 
The aim of this section is to examine whether a certain governance level can affect the 
relation between female directors and firm performance. In this case, the analyses will 
be using firm size as the proxy of governance. As this study uses all listed firms in the 
LSE, which includes FTSE100, FTSE250, and AIM index, this study divides the 
observations into two sub-samples according to firm size. This study suggests that small 
firms tend to be associated with weak governance, and vice versa. The analysis will use 
firms with total employees that lower than the 25th quartile and higher than the 75th 
quartile for small firms and large firms respectively.  
Table 4.16 presents the estimations between female directors and ROA for small firms. 
Almost all coefficients of female director are positive and statistically significant. The 
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endogeneity problem in Model 4 and Model 5 can fully be addressed. Consistently, the 
Arellano-Bond model shows that female directors can positively and significantly affect 
ROA at level 5 per cent.   
Table 4.17 also shows relatively the same results in terms of the sign of female director 
estimations when using profit margin as the dependent variable. Female directors 
significantly affect profit margin in OLS model, but this relationship vanishes after 
addressing the endogeneity problem. The relation between female directors and profit 
margin is weaker than the relation between female directors and ROA.  
The next regression will be using large firms only. The effects of female directors on 
large firms are substantially different from the effects on the small firms. Table 4.18 
shows that most of the estimations of female director are negative. The effects are 
statistically significant at level 10 per cent after addressing the endogeneity problem 
(Model 4). The Arellano-Bond model supports the negative relationship between female 
directors and ROA for large firms although it lacks of significance.  
Table 4.19 consistently indicates that female directors do not positively affect firm 
performance. The estimations of female directors are negative although they are not 
statistically significant. In other words, the contributions of female directors in the large 
firms are less significant than in the small firms. 
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Table 4.16 Female Director and ROA for Small Firms. Firm performance is regressed with female 
director measure and control variables. Small firms refer to firms with total employees lower than 25th 
quartile. roaf2 is net profit divided by total assets (ROA).  fract_women is fraction of female director. 
ln_bsize is natural logarithm total directors. prop_ned is the fraction of non-executive director. ln_emplyf 
is natural logarithm of firm total employees. block is percentage owned by top block holder. Ln_firm_age 
is natural logarithm of (firm age+1). Debt_ratio2 is total debt divided by total assets. Lag_roaf2 is one 
period lag of ROA. ICB_two is the fraction of female director within the same 2-digit industry code. 
ICB_four is the fraction of female director within the same 4-digit industry code. Fem_exp is the fraction 
of male director who ever works with female director on other boards. Model 1 employs OLS estimation. 
Model 2 and Model 3 employ panel with fixed effects. Model 4 and Model 5 employ 2SLS with IV.  
Model 6 employs Arellano-Bond method. roaf2 and debt_ratio2 are winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per 
cent. The robust t-statistics of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** mean statistically 
different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ols_a fe1_a fe2_a ivfe1_a ivfe2_a ar_bond_a 
VARIABLES roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 
       
fract_women 0.216** 0.460*** 0.434*** 5.590 3.056** 0.751** 
 (2.086) (2.852) (2.704) (1.483) (2.438) (2.136) 
ln_bsize 0.121*** 0.034 0.028 -0.080 -0.025 -0.228* 
 (3.364) (0.707) (0.587) (-0.781) (-0.438) (-1.652) 
prop_ned 0.027 -0.144* -0.155* -0.130 -0.157* -0.006 
 (0.424) (-1.703) (-1.840) (-1.220) (-1.729) (-0.026) 
block 0.193*** 0.001 -0.009 0.027 0.000 0.409* 
 (3.060) (0.012) (-0.091) (0.213) (0.002) (1.871) 
ln_firm_age 0.100*** 0.077 0.060** 0.157* 0.024 0.181** 
 (8.481) (1.482) (2.218) (1.771) (0.723) (2.082) 
debt_ratio2 -0.482*** -0.548*** -0.557*** -0.451*** -0.506*** -0.721*** 
 (-13.832) (-16.435) (-16.851) (-5.442) (-11.764) (-3.184) 
Lag_roaf2      0.145*** 
      (2.911) 
Fem_exp    0.015 0.017  
    (1.10) (1.26)  
ICB_two    0.397   
    (2.02)**   
ICB_four     0.565***  
     (5.73)  
Constant -1.071*** -0.314** -0.233**    
 (-8.525) (-1.975) (-2.280)    
       
Year Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry Yes No No No No No 
Observations 2,423 2,433 2,433 2,266 2,266 1,409 
R-squared 0.214 0.157 0.150 -0.318 0.026  
ll -1592 -593.0 -603.5 -1139 -796.6 . 
Number of firm_id  658 658 498 498 449 
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Table 4.17 Female Directors and Profit Margin for Small Firms. Firm performance is regressed with 
female director measure and control variables. Small firms refer to firms with total employees lower than 
25th quartile.  prof_margin2 is net profit divided by total sales (profit margin).  fract_women is fraction of 
female directors. ln_bsize is natural logarithm total directors. prop_ned is the fraction of non-executive 
director. ln_emplyf is natural logarithm of firm total employees. block is percentage owned by top block 
holder. Ln_firm_age is natural logarithm of (firm age+1). Debt_ratio2 is total debt divided by total assets. 
Lag_prof_margin2 is one period lag of profit margin. ICB_two is the fraction of female director within 
the same 2-digit industry code. ICB_three is the fraction of female director within the same 3-digit 
industry code. Fem_exp is the fraction of male director who ever works with female director on other 
boards. Model 1 employs OLS estimation. Model 2 and Model 3 employ panel with fixed effects. Model 
4 and Model 5 employ 2SLS with IV.  Model 6 employs Arellano-Bond method. prof_margin2 and 
debt_ratio2 are winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent. The robust t-statistics of each coefficient is 
shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 
1 per cent level of significance respectively 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ols_a fe1_a fe2_a ivfe1_a ivfe2_a ar_bond_a 
VARIABLES prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 
       
fract_women 8.954** 1.107 1.096 28.512 112.989 10.624 
 (2.397) (0.139) (0.139) (0.319) (1.270) (1.141) 
ln_bsize 1.168 0.795 0.768 0.114 -1.676 -4.802 
 (0.691) (0.335) (0.325) (0.035) (-0.525) (-1.319) 
prop_ned 0.977 0.569 0.285 1.115 2.315 3.925 
 (0.362) (0.133) (0.067) (0.240) (0.477) (0.631) 
block 5.720** 0.691 0.601 0.625 0.612 -14.332 
 (2.119) (0.137) (0.119) (0.124) (0.113) (-1.043) 
ln_firm_age 2.522*** 6.849** 5.626*** 7.643** 5.013*** -3.315 
 (5.072) (2.502) (3.942) (2.033) (3.116) (-1.015) 
debt_ratio2 2.668*** -0.862 -0.765 -0.512 0.862 6.755* 
 (2.721) (-0.565) (-0.507) (-0.269) (0.416) (1.737) 
Lag_prof_margin2      0.303*** 
      (3.246) 
Fem_exp    0.029* 0.029*  
    (1.82) (1.83)  
ICB_two       
       
ICB_three    0.455*** 0.555***  
    (2.70) (2.94)  
Constant -21.536*** -23.551*** -21.418***    
 (-3.137) (-3.668) (-3.975)    
       
Year Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry Yes No No No No No 
Observations 1,771 1,771 1,771 1,637 1,637 960 
R-squared 0.083 0.019 0.013 0.010 -0.146  
ll -7794 -6975 -6981 -6520 -6639 . 
Number of firm_id  512 512 378 378 321 
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Table 4.18 Female Directors and ROA for Large Firms. Firm performance is regressed with female 
director measure and control variables.  Large firms refer to firms with total employees higher than 75th 
quartile. roaf2 is net profit divided by total assets (ROA). fract_women is fraction of female directors. 
ln_bsize is natural logarithm total directors. prop_ned is the fraction of non-executive director. ln_emplyf 
is natural logarithm of firm total employees. block is percentage owned by top block holder. Ln_firm_age 
is natural logarithm of (firm age+1). Debt_ratio2 is total debt divided by total assets. Lag_roaf2 is one 
period lag of ROA. ICB_two is the fraction of female director within the same 2-digit industry code. 
ICB_three is the fraction of female director within the same 3-digit industry code. Fem_exp is the fraction 
of male director who ever works with female director on other boards. Model 1 employs OLS estimation. 
Model 2 and Model 3 employ panel with fixed effects. Model 4 and Model 5 employ 2SLS with IV.  
Model 6 employs Arellano-Bond method. roaf2 and debt_ratio2 are winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per 
cent. The robust t-statistics of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** mean statistically 
different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ols_a fe1_a fe2_a ivfe1_a ivfe2_a ar_bond_a 
VARIABLES roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 roaf2 
       
fract_women 0.070** -0.045 -0.056 -0.528* -0.251 -0.045 
 (2.310) (-1.064) (-1.379) (-1.664) (-1.617) (-0.729) 
ln_bsize 0.193*** -0.012 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.050 
 (9.336) (-0.672) (-0.208) (-0.224) (-0.052) (-1.166) 
prop_ned 0.166*** 0.013 -0.007 0.029 0.011 -0.071 
 (4.152) (0.345) (-0.218) (0.736) (0.289) (-0.673) 
block 0.022 -0.082** -0.090** -0.089** -0.091** 0.102 
 (0.672) (-2.233) (-2.437) (-2.336) (-2.453) (0.763) 
ln_firm_age 0.004 0.007 -0.022* 0.004 -0.012 0.001 
 (1.306) (0.427) (-1.863) (0.219) (-0.842) (0.021) 
debt_ratio2 -0.189*** -0.292*** -0.291*** -0.291*** -0.298*** -0.119 
 (-4.318) (-14.710) (-14.762) (-13.650) (-14.853) (-1.090) 
Lag_roaf2      0.165* 
      (1.879) 
Fem_exp    -0.023** -0.027**  
    (-1.98) (-2.34)  
ICB_two     1.39***  
     (12.64)  
ICB_three    0.737***   
    (6.17)   
Constant  -0.337*** 0.231*** 0.329***    
 (-6.733) (3.317) (6.012)    
       
Year Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry Yes No No No No No 
Observations 2,691 2,693 2,693 2,586 2,586 1,810 
R-squared 0.192 0.113 0.098 0.061 0.091  
ll 753.9 2601 2579 2372 2415 . 
Number of firm_id  535 535 429 429 414 
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Table 4.19 Female Directors and Profit Margins for Large Firms. Firm performance is regressed with 
female director measure and control variables. Large firms refer to firms with total employees higher than 
75th quartile.  prof_margin2 is net profit divided by total sales (profit margin). fract_women is fraction of 
female directors. ln_bsize is natural logarithm total directors. prop_ned is the fraction of non-executive 
director. ln_emplyf is natural logarithm of firm total employees. block is percentage owned by top block 
holder. Ln_firm_age is natural logarithm of (firm age+1).  Debt_ratio2 is total debt divided by total assets. 
Lag_prof_margin2 is one period lag of profit margin. ICB_two is the fraction of female director within 
the same 2-digit industry code. Fem_exp is the fraction of male director who ever works with female 
director on other boards. Model 1 employs OLS estimation. Model 2 and Model 3 employ panel with 
fixed effects. Model 4 and Model 5 employ 2SLS with IV.  Model 6 employs Arellano-Bond method. 
prof_margin2 and debt_ratio2 are winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent. The robust t-statistics of each 
coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 
per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ols_a fe1_a fe2_a ivfe1_a ivfe2_a ar_bond_a 
VARIABLES prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 prof_margin2 
       
fract_women -0.420 -0.198 -0.192 -10.120 -1.520 -0.370 
 (-0.773) (-0.206) (-0.207) (-1.044) (-0.444) (-0.783) 
ln_bsize 1.488*** -0.140 -0.157 -0.007 -0.148 0.209 
 (3.280) (-0.329) (-0.370) (-0.016) (-0.348) (0.205) 
prop_ned 1.328* 0.136 0.059 0.522 0.211 -0.081 
 (1.904) (0.162) (0.077) (0.557) (0.247) (-0.062) 
block -0.130 -1.202 -1.275 -1.324 -1.285 -0.544 
 (-0.399) (-1.417) (-1.508) (-1.513) (-1.521) (-0.237) 
ln_firm_age 0.124** 0.082 0.101 0.004 0.169 -0.107 
 (2.474) (0.231) (0.378) (0.010) (0.536) (-0.565) 
debt_ratio2 0.836 1.214** 1.203** 1.415** 1.217** 0.109 
 (1.636) (2.396) (2.405) (2.557) (2.430) (0.228) 
Lag_prof_margin2      0.177 
      (0.784) 
Fem_exp    -0.017 -0.021*  
    (-1.46) (-1.83)  
ICB_two    0.807*** 1.410***  
    (4.49) (12.68)  
Constant -5.047*** -0.725 -0.690    
 (-3.214) (-0.448) (-0.544)    
       
Year Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry Yes No No No No No 
Observations 2,542 2,542 2,542 2,459 2,459 1,720 
R-squared 0.060 0.007 0.004 -0.044 0.003  
ll -6541 -5431 -5435 -5356 -5299 . 
Number of firm_id  480 480 397 397 380 
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4.6.6  Research Discussion 
This study has discussed whether appointing female directors can bring positive impacts 
on firm performance. Previous studies (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Jurkus et al., 2011; 
Liu et al., 2013) have shown that examining female directors and firm performance 
relationship is prone to the endogeneity problems. Therefore, several approaches have 
been employed to address it namely 2SLS regression and the dynamic Arellano-Bond 
model. 
The empirical evidence shows that some of the estimations of female directors are not 
statistically significance particularly after addressing the endogeneity. There are several 
possibilities to explain this occurrence. Firstly, it may be a result of strict approaches in 
addressing the endogeneity problem namely two instrumental variables in 2SLS models 
and certain specification in GMM models. Certain specifications in 2SLS model (i.e. 
using one instrumental variable) or GMM model (i.e. ivstyle and gmmstyle 
specifications) may result statistically significant estimations but the models may suffer 
from the endogeneity problem. The presented estimations are the estimations which the 
endogeneity problems are fully addressed.  
Secondly, there is a difference when using ROA and profit margin as dependent 
variables, which is the number of missing variables. There are more missing 
observations when using profit margin. As a result, most estimations for profit margin 
are not significant (or weaker than ROA’s estimations). Regardless of the insignificance, 
the estimations for profit margin generally support the estimations for ROA in terms 
estimation signs. 
The empirical results showed a little evidence that the fraction of female director can 
positively and directly influence firm performance. But, this positive relationship lacks 
significance. Some previous studies have reported difficulty to find a direct and positive 
association between female directors and firm performance, such as Smith et al. (2006) 
Adams and Ferreira (2009), Jurkus et al., (2011), Ahern and Dittmar (2012), while 
others (Liu et al., 2013; Strom et al., 2014) that are conducted in the developing 
countries report a significant and positive relation.  
One of the possible reasons is due to imposing female director quotas which requires 
firms are forced to appoint more female directors. The imposition of gender diversity is 
applied in the developed markets (countries), whereas most of the stock market 
regulators in developing countries (e.g. China, India) do not restrict gender diversity on 
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the boards. In other words, firms in developing countries have more flexibility to 
compose the optimal board structure and board diversity according to the business case 
perspective rather than a certain pressure.  
Moreover, in the UK case, the LSE is slightly more unique in terms of governance 
standards. Large listed firms experience more strict rules in their governance structure 
than small listed firms. The recommendation of gender diversity on the boards is aimed 
to FTSE100 firms rather than to all listed firms. Large firms encounter more external 
pressure in terms of board diversity. Consequently, the study fails to show that female 
directors can give a positive and direct impact on firm performance for UK listed firms.  
The next analysis is to investigate whether the presence of female on the boards is the 
same with respect to their director roles because, generally, executive directors are more 
involved in firm business activities on daily basis while non-executive directors are 
more responsible to monitoring roles. The regression analyses reports that the 
estimations of female executive directors tend to be statistically insignificant after 
addressing the endogeneity problem.  
This study argues that female executive directors are less competitive than their male 
counterparts (Wolfer, 2006; Kolev, 2012) due to the lack of experience and connection 
(Burke, 1997; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004), or female executive directors are more 
risk averse and less confident than male directors in terms of financing and investment 
decisions (Huang and Kisgen, 2013; Levi et al., 2013). Similarly, there is no evidence 
that female non-executive directors can influence firm performance because non-
executive directors are less influential than executive directors in firm daily business 
and activity.  
This study has also tried to analyse whether the absolute number of female directors has 
different impacts on firm performance. As females are usually deemed as a minority 
group on the boards, hiring one (or two) female director will not bring a significant 
impact on firm performance because their presence will be marginalized by the 
dominant group (male directors). Konrad et al. (2008) argue that the minimum number 
of females on the boards is three so their voices and ideas can be considered in the 
boardroom.  Liu et al. (2013) also show that boards with three or more female directors 
are more influential on firm performance. The regression analyses marginally support 
that appointing more than one female director is better than hiring only one female 
director with respect to firm performance.    
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Adams and Ferreira (2009) report that the relationship between firm performance and 
female directors is moderated by the level of firm governance. Firms with weak 
governance tend to experience the most benefits of hiring female directors. This study 
also has investigated this relationship by using a different approach, which is to proxy 
the firm governance level with CEO power and firm size  
The study reports that CEO power does not statistically influence the relation between 
female directors and firm performance. But, there might a possibility that firms with 
powerful CEOs gain most of benefits of appointing female directors as the estimations 
tend to be positive and stable.  
The final analysis is to test whether firm size can influence the relation between female 
directors and firm performance. This study suggests that small firms tend to be 
associated with weak governance. The findings indicate that female directors 
significantly affect ROA for small firms.  
Given that results, there are two possible reasons to explain it. Firstly, the over-
monitoring problem. According Carter el (2003) board diversity may be equivalent to 
board independence, which its main role is related to monitoring duties. Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) show that hiring female directors will improve firm governance 
mechanism but they argue hiring female directors for well-governed firms will decrease 
firm value. Tough monitoring will improve firm performance when the firms suffer 
from weak governance. In addition, Jurkus et al. (2010) show that gender diversity on 
the boards for firms with a strong external governance mechanism, which refers to 
competitive market, will be less valuable.  
Secondly, the recommendation by the UK regulators to appoint more female directors 
could be the plausible reason why female directors’ contribution in large firms is less 
significant than in small firms. Wintoki (2007) report that there is no evidence the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) improves firm value in the US. Similarly, Ahern 
and Dittmar (2012) report the quotas for female director does not lead to a higher firm 
value in Norway. In the UK, the recommendation of gender diversity on the boards is 
mainly aimed to FTSE100 firms. As a result, large firms tend to appoint female 
directors to meet those regulations (quotas) rather than for strategic reasons.  On the 
other hand, small firms have the flexibility to compose their board of directors in the 
absence of such regulation.  
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 4.7.  Conclusion 
The lack of consistency on the relationship between female directors and firm 
performance is the main motivation of this study. It is reported that the relationship 
between female directors and firm performance is not straightforward. Several certain 
conditions have to be added to improve the explanation power of female director, such 
as: the separation between female executive director and non-executive director (Liu et 
al. 2013), the absolute number of females on the boards (Torchia et al., 2011; Liu et al., 
2013; Joecks et al., 2013), and certain governance aspects (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Jurkus et al., 2011). Given that findings, this study does not only examine the influence 
of female directors on firm performance, but also tries to employ different approaches in 
the analyses with respect to different director functions,  critical mass, and firm 
governance level.  
This study has reported four important findings. Firstly, it is less likely that female 
directors have a direct influence on firm performance in the UK listed firms. Even 
though the estimations of female directors on ROA and profit margin are positive, but 
they are not statistically significant. Secondly, there is no evidence that distinguishing 
executive directors and non-executive directors can help explaining the relation between 
female directors and firm performance. Thirdly, firms with more than one female 
director tend to outperform firms with only one female director. Fourthly, the relation 
between female directors and firm performance is not significant for large firms because 
these firms are associated with strong governance. Moreover, they are prone to external 
pressures in terms of establishing the optimal board structure.  
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CHAPTER 5 
BOARD DIVERSITY AND FIRM SURVIVAL 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The discussions of board diversity have developed from investigating only a single 
diversity dimension to multiple diversity dimensions. Haynes and Hillman (2010) report 
that board capital breadth (occupation, function, interlock) and board capital depth 
(industry occupation and industry interlocks) can influence firm strategic changes. 
Anderson et al. (2011) show how occupational heterogeneity and social heterogeneity 
can improve firm value. Diversity on the boards also can improve the dissemination of 
information to the stakeholders and reduce the cost of capital (Upadhyay, 2014; 
Upadhyay and Zeng, 2014). The study will use the same approach as these previous 
studies by comprising six key diversity dimensions: gender, nationality, age, expertise, 
tenure, and education.  
As an integral part of the board of directors, non-executive directors have crucial and 
complex roles. On the one hand, they are the party that can promote board independence 
in the boardroom (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). This is why the Cadbury 
Report (1992) recommended more independent non-executive directors for UK listed 
firms. On the other hand, they should also bring and provide special skills, valuable 
insights, and key contacts in relation to issues encountered by the firms. Arguably, these 
sets of talents cannot be fulfilled by appointing homogeneous non-executive directors. 
Yet, the Higgs Report (2002) indicated that the non-executive directors of large UK 
listed firms tend to be homogeneous in terms of gender, ethnicity, age, etc. Therefore, 
this study will focus on the diversity of non-executive directors. 
Given the demanding and complexity of non-executive directors’ roles, 
overemphasising on the independence of non-executive directors will affect their 
effectiveness. Johnson et al. (2013) argue that the appointment of directors should be 
beyond independent such as directors’ demography, human capital, and social capital. 
Similarly, the call for diversity on the boards of directors in the UK was introduced in 
the Davies Report (2012). 
The effectiveness of non-executive directors, in terms of independence and competence, 
can be seen in financially distressed firms, regarding whether they can turn around the 
firms or avoid further decline (e.g. bankruptcy, liquidation). This study suggests that the 
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link between the effectiveness of non-executive directors and firm survival can be 
approached via the agency theory and the resource dependence theory.  
From the agency theory stand-point, creditors will be more involved in financially 
distressed firms than in healthy firms, because the creditors will be facing a great 
uncertainty regarding the firm’s ability to meet its obligations. Nini et al. (2012) 
indicate that the creditors will intervene in management decisions when firms 
experience financial distress, particularly in investment and financial activities. 
Management has to satisfy not only shareholders’ interests but also the creditors’ 
interests. The agency problem may exacerbate the firm financial position. For instance, 
shareholders prefer high risk projects, as they can gain the benefits when such projects 
go well while bondholders bear the cost when the projects go badly; or shareholders 
could reject projects with positive net present value (NPV) as the benefits would go to 
the creditors (Chou et al., 2010). Proper monitoring is therefore necessary in order to 
manage decisions so as to avoid further decline. 
From the resource dependence theory stand-point, during the period of distress, 
management will focus on the restructuring activities to turn around firm financial 
position such as assets restructuring, employee layoff, top management change, debt 
restructuring, and dividend change (Ofek, 1993; Hillier, 2007). Ooghe and Pricjcker 
(2008) suggest that bankruptcy is mainly caused by management errors (failure). Banks 
(2004) argues that directors role are likely more visible during a crisis. The quality of 
management can be reflected by whether or not those management actions or responses 
successfully turn the firm around during the period of distress. Thus, the boards must 
have a substantial pool of talents, skills, and experiences in order to conduct a 
restructuring. 
Most previous financial distress (bankruptcy) studies tend to put more emphasis on the 
agency theory perspectives, such as board leadership structure or board independence. 
Daily and Dalton (1994) find that leadership structure (CEO duality) and board 
composition (fraction independent directors) have a significant effect on the probability 
of bankruptcy. Simpson and Gleason (1999) report that CEO duality is an important 
aspect in explaining the likelihood of financial distress in the US banking sector.  
Robinson et al. (2012) and Chancharat et al. (2012) focus on the role outside directors 
for firms that file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the US and young firms in Australia 
respectively.  Fich and Slevak (2008) report that firms with smaller and/or more 
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independent boards are more effective in avoiding bankruptcy during the period of 
distress.  
Several prior studies (Wilson and Altanlar, 2009; Wilson et al. 2014) use different 
aspects of the boards in examining firm survival. Wilson and Altanlar (2009) show that 
gender diversity on the boards can increase the likelihood of firm survival for UK 
limited companies. Consistently, Wilson et al. (2014) report that the founding directors’ 
experience, networking, and occupational background can improve the survival of 
newly established firms in the UK. 
This study makes four contributions with respect to diversity, bankruptcy, and 
governance studies. Firstly, the study will extend previous studies on board diversity in 
terms of proxying diversity. Most of the earlier studies on diversity focus on one 
diversity dimension, for instance director gender (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and 
Dittmar, 2012), director nationality (Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003; Choi et al., 2012), 
director expertise (Goldman et al., 2009; White et al., 2014), and director education 
(Kim and Lim, 2010). The study will comprise six diversity elements, namely directors’ 
age, tenure, gender, education, nationality, and occupational background (expertise).  
Secondly, the study will examine board diversity on firm survival, which has not been 
extensively discussed. Previous studies on board diversity are mostly related to firm 
value (Anderson et al., 2011), firm information opacity (Upadhyay and Zeng, 2014), 
firm cost of capital, (Upadhyay, 2014) and corporate social performance (Hafsi and 
Turgut, 2013). The study will therefore extend previous studies (Wilson and Altanlar, 
2009; Wilson et al., 2014), which used private UK firms, as this study will use listed 
UK firms.   
Thirdly, in terms of financial distress and bankruptcy studies, this study will use a 
different aspect of governance to explain firm survival. Extant literature on bankruptcy 
of firms (Daily and Dalton, 1994; Simpson and Gleason, 1999; Fich and Slevak, 2008; 
Robinson et al., 2012; Chancharat et al., 2012; Plat and Plat, 2012) have focused on the 
board composition (independence), board structure, and leadership structure to predict 
the bankruptcy.   
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Fourthly, the study will highlight another important feature of non-executive directors, 
which is the diversity of non-executive directors, as the academics and the policymakers 
tend to focus on the independence of non-executive directors to proxy the board 
effectiveness (Roberts et al., 2005; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010).  
 
5.2 Literature Review 
This section will be divided into three parts: non-executive directors, empirical evidence 
on board diversity, and corporate governance and financial distress. 
 
5.2.1 Non-Executive Directors 
From a legal point of view, the Companies Act (2006) states that:  
“There is no legal distinction between executive and non-executive directors. As a 
consequence, in the UK unitary board structure, non-executive directors have the 
same legal duties, responsibilities and potential liabilities as their executive 
counterparts” (Companies Act 2006, cited in the Institute of Directors website, 
2015).  
According to Monk and Minow (2004), both executive and non-executive directors 
have the same duties which are the duty of loyalty (acting in the best shareholders’ 
interests) and the duty of care (conducting due diligence in the decision-making 
process). But, non-executive directors are not obliged to report to the CEOs and they are 
not involved in daily firms business, which makes them more effective at monitoring 
roles.   
The Higgs Report (2003) mentions the main roles of non-executive directors: (1) to 
challenge and to contribute to firm strategic decisions; (2) to measure and to monitor 
management performance; (3) to ensure the accountability of the firm financial 
reporting system; (4) too set up appropriate management remuneration.   
From an academic point of view, these roles involve two theories, namely the agency 
theory and the resource dependence theory. The agency theory is a response of 
separation between management and ownership. The agents (executive directors) tend 
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to be opportunistic and take advantage of asymmetric information (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Hillman and Dalziel (2003) argue that one key to minimize or avoid the agency 
problem is to hiring independent directors because they are perceived as the party that 
can ensure executive directors act in the shareholders’ best interests.  
The other view is the resource dependence theory which was introduced Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978, cited in Nordberg, 2011). The boards must be composed of a wide pool 
of talents in terms of expertise, experience, knowledge, reputation, and skills. In order 
to achieve this, the firms should embrace diversity with respect to different 
characteristics, demographics, and social background. Previous studies (Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003) have indicated that the directors’ 
characteristics will shape their behaviour and decision-making which eventually affect 
board effectiveness and firm performance. According to this view, non-executive 
directors provide advice, legitimacy, and networking among the stakeholders (Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003).  
Consequently, the UK regulators released the Higgs Report (2002) and the Davies 
Report (2012) to promote diversity in the UK boardroom particularly for listed firms. 
The Higgs Report indicates that most non-executive directors are white British males. 
Most of them are close to retirement age and previously worked in listed firms. The 
Higgs Report recommends that firms should appoint individuals from a wider 
background. The Davies Report (2012) tried to improve the diversity on the boards by 
explicitly recommending a 25 per cent representation of females on the boards for 
FTSE100 firms by 2015.  
Given the complexity of non-executive directors’ roles and recent recommendations, 
firms should not rely on only one aspect in appointing non-executive directors, which is 
the independence of non-executive directors. The non-executive director roles require 
significant experience, specialist knowledge, connections and personal qualities. These 
directors should also be able to represent firms before the government and the regulators 
(Nordberg, 2011).  
Zattoni and Cuomo (2010) report that there is a tendency for practitioners and the 
regulators to be too focused on board independence in the governance practice. 
Overemphasising the independence of non-executive directors rather than balancing 
both features (independence and competence) would affect firm performance and 
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sustainability. Johnson et al. (2013) summarize different aspects of corporate 
governance, namely board demographics, human capital, and social capital, can 
influence the firm outcomes. Therefore, this study will try to examine the effects of 
board independence and board diversity on firm survival. 
 
5.2.2 Empirical Evidence on Board Diversity 
This section discusses previous diversity studies that used more than one diversity 
dimension in the analysis.  Haynes and Hillman (2010) examine the effect of board 
capital on the firm strategic change. They proxy board capital with board capital breadth 
(e.g. occupation, function, interlock) and board capital depth (e.g. industry occupation 
and interlocks). The analysis indicates that heterogeneous boards significantly change 
firm strategic position with respect to past strategic objectives or industry norms. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between heterogeneous board capital and strategic change 
is subject to CEO power because powerful CEOs may easily overrule strategic changes.  
Anderson et al. (2011) combine six diversity dimensions under two main categories: 
occupational heterogeneity (e.g. education, experience, profession) and social 
heterogeneity (e.g. gender, ethnicity, age).  Using Russell 1000 firms, there is a direct 
and positive relationship between board heterogeneity and Tobin’s Q. The influence of 
board heterogeneity will be greater for firms with complex businesses. In addition, 
occupational heterogeneity has a more significant role in firm value than social 
heterogeneity does.  
Upadhyay and Zeng (2014) examine the impact of social diversity (e.g. female director, 
ethnic minority, and white male director) on corporate opacity (e.g. information quality, 
information accuracy, information uncertainty, and information asymmetric among 
investors). Their results report that board diversity can improve the quality of 
information that is released by managers to firm stakeholders. Diversity on the boards 
can promote transparency and accountability in terms of information dissemination.  
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With the same approach and methodology, Upadhyay (2014) expands the previous 
analysis by examining the relationship between the board social concentration and firm 
cost of capital. Boards with a greater diversity can reduce firm cost of capital because 
those firms are more transparent. Investors believe firms that promote diversity on the 
boards have a good reputation and embrace innovation within the industry.  
Hafsi and Turgut (2013) compare the effects of board structure and board diversity (e.g. 
gender, ethnicity, age, tenure, and experience) on corporate social performance (CSP) 
for S&P500 companies. Board diversity is more important than board structure in 
explaining CSP. They argue that the main purpose of board structure is not firm 
performance, but to deal with the agency problems. On the other hand, board diversity 
could provide key resources in firm strategic decisions which directly influence firm 
performance.   
The previous empirical evidence shows that board diversity is positively associated with 
various aspects of a firm, such as: firm performance, cost of capital, and quality of 
financial disclosures, but none of them examines firm survival (bankruptcy). Therefore, 
this study will examine the impact of board diversity, particularly the diversity of non-
executive directors, on firm survival during the period of distress. 
 
5.2.3 Financial Distress (Bankruptcy) 
Firms can raise funds internally or externally. Internal funds are profits that are retained 
rather than distributed to shareholders (e.g. dividends), while external funds can be 
either from equity financing (e.g. rights issues) or debt financing (e.g. bank loans, 
bonds). Financial distress refers to difficulty in meeting debt payments or other 
obligations as the result of cash flow shortages and the violation of debt covenants. It 
can be classified into as the stock-based distress and the flow-based insolvency 
(operating cash flow shortage). According to Altman (1983), the stock-based distress 
can be defined as the condition when the firm total liabilities are higher than its total 
assets. According to Ross et al. (2009), the flow-based distress can occur when the firm 
cash flow cannot meet its routine obligations. 
Purnanandam (2008) defines financial distress as a low-cash flow state which incurs 
losses without being insolvent which can be indicated by three indicators. Firstly, it 
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refers to a condition when the firms lose suppliers, customers, and key employees. They 
also lose a significant market share during industry down turns. Secondly, it refers to 
debt covenant violations that can lead to financial penalties, accelerated debt repayment, 
and operational inflexibility. Thirdly, it refers to firms’ inability to invest in positive 
NPV projects due to costly external financing.  
Platt and Platt (2009) summarize five indicators of the financially distressed firms. 
Firstly, there are layoffs, restructuring, or missed or delayed dividend payments. 
Secondly, such firms have a low interest coverage ratio. Thirdly, their cash flow is lower 
than the current maturities of their long-term debts. Fourthly, there is a substantial 
change in their equity price. Lastly, these firms have a negative net income before 
special items.  
Andrade and Kaplan (1998) found that high-leveraged firms are more likely to 
experience financial distress. Even though the companies have a high positive operating 
margin, they will suffer from financial distress when the debt level is high. Financially 
distressed firms may also experience economic distress at the same time due to 
customer-driven factors, competitors driven factors, and manager-driven factors (Opler 
and Titman, 1994). Kahl (2002) argues that firms that experience financial and 
economic distress at the same time will be liquidated by creditors. 
According to Emery and Finnerty (1997), there are four types of states of financial 
distress: insolvent, failed, in default, and bankrupt. An insolvent firm means that the firm 
is unable to pay its debts.  A failed firm is slightly more complicated than the others. It 
refers to the firm that ceases its operation due to: (1) following assignment and 
bankruptcy; (2) execution, foreclosure, or attachment by creditors; (3) leaving unpaid 
obligations, or being involved in court actions i.e. receivership, reorganization, or 
arrangement; and (4) voluntarily compromising with creditors. A default firm means 
that the firm violates one of the terms in its bond indenture or loan agreement. A default 
firm can commit either a technical default or a payment default. In this case, a payment 
default is more serious than a technical default. A bankrupt firm mean that a firm files a 
petition for relief from its creditors, which indicates that the firm has not paid its due 
debts or not able to pay its debts within the foreseeable future.  
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In the UK, firms that cannot meet obligations to their creditors are likely to encounter 
liquidation (insolvency), or go into administration, or receivership. In the case of 
liquidation, creditors can liquidate the firm assets. An official receiver will be appointed 
to distribute the assets to all (secured and unsecured) debt holders and shareholders after 
settling the debt holders’ claims. Going into administration is more complicated than 
liquidation. When debt holders cannot reach the settlement cash by liquidating firm’s 
assets, debt holders and shareholders must reach a specific settlement, which is called a 
Company Voluntary Agreement (CVA), to avoid liquidation. During the administration, 
various claimants will receive new financial claims in exchange for their current claims. 
For instance, debt holders will get a certain stake in the firm. CVAs must be agreed at 
least by 75 per cent of the claimants (Hillier et al., 2008). 
 
5.2.4 Corporate Governance and Financial Distress 
The relation between corporate governance and financial distress can be approached via 
the agency theory and the resource dependence theory (Daily and Dalton, 1994). From 
the agency theory point of view, there are two potential problems that may occur during 
the period of distress. Firstly, the boards have to conduct a greater diligence over audits, 
control, and risk, because management tend to undertake unwise or fraudulent actions to 
avoid further decline or to gain self-interest benefits, particularly over the firm cash 
management, securities dealing, and accounting reporting policy (Banks, 2004). 
Secondly, the agency relationship in financially distressed firms is more complex than in 
healthy firms. When the firm financial condition deteriorates, the director fiduciary 
duties, which are the duty of care and the duty of loyalty, may shift from shareholders to 
creditors. The shareholders are less influential over the board of directors. When the 
firms are in the vicinity of solvency, the main objective of the boards is creditor value 
maximisation. 
Moreover, the conflict of interest in financially distressed firms is likely to occur 
because debt holders are more involved (Nini et al., 2012). The shareholders will choose 
projects that maximize firm value, but reduce the value of the debts. The shareholders 
can press management to pay dividends in order to secure a large proportion of the 
remaining assets. Financially distressed firms may experience over-investment 
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problems (assets substitution), under-investment problems (debt overhang), and short-
sighted investment problems (Hillier et al., 2008).  
According to the resource dependence theory, the directors of financially distressed 
firms must conduct restructuring activities to turnaround the firms. The directors in 
financially distressed firms are likely to find their duties more difficult than in healthy 
firms due to adversity. For instance, they are likely to lose a significant market share, 
suppliers, and key employees during the period of distress. They also will find difficulty 
to invest in positive NPV projects due to costly external financing (Purnanandam, 2008). 
The boards can take several steps to overcome the problem, such as issuing new 
securities, negotiating with banks (creditors), converting debt into equity, employee 
layoff, top management changes, debt restructuring, and dividend changes (Ofek, 1993; 
Jostarndt and Sautner, 2008; Ross et al., 2009). Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) argue that 
not all of those strategies are useful to overcome financial distress. The effectiveness of 
restructuring depends on the quality of the board in selecting appropriate strategies and 
its quick responses to overcome the crisis.  
Consistently, Ooghe and Pricjcker (2008) state that bankruptcy is mainly a result of 
management errors (failure). The quality of the boards can be reflected whether or not 
the board actions or responses successfully turn the firm around during the period of 
distress. Directors’ quality, in terms of skills, experience, and knowledge, may be the 
key to this. Farrar (2008) refers to these restructuring activities as the acid test of 
management (boards) skills and competence. Diversity in knowledge, expertise, and 
experience should address the need for effective advice in the boardroom. 
Empirically, most bankruptcy studies are approached via the agency theory.  Daily and 
Dalton (1994) find that CEO duality and fraction of independent directors have a 
significant effect on the bankruptcy probability. Simpson and Gleason (1999) report that 
CEO duality is an important aspect in explaining the likelihood of financial distress for 
banking firms in the US.  Fich and Slevak (2008) report that firms with smaller and 
more independent boards are more effective to avoid bankruptcy. Chancharat et al. 
(2012) report that there is a positive relationship between board independence and new 
IPO firms in Australia. Plat and Plat (2012) show that board size and board 
independence still have an important role in explaining firm bankruptcy. 
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Several studies (Wilson and Altanlar, 2009; Wilson et al., 2014) have examined other 
aspects of corporate governance, in particular board diversity. These studies are 
underpinned by the resource dependence theory. Wilson and Altanlar (2009) report that 
the presence of females on the boards can avoid insolvency. Similarly, Wilson et al. 
(2014) show that certain characteristics of the founding directors, namely directors’ 
gender, experience, and directors connections (multi-directorships) can influence the 
survival of newly-established firms. 
This study will focus on the diversity of non-executive directors rather than using all 
board members. Even though non-executive directors duties predominantly are 
associated with monitoring roles (the agency theory), they also make contributions to 
firm business and firm performance in general (the resource dependence theory), 
particularly in the UK where listed firms adopt the single-tier board system.  
From both theories points of view, appointing more outside directors (non-executive 
directors) tends to improve firm survival during the period of distress. Directors 
(independent directors) do not only bring more independence on the boards, but also 
they bring invaluable resources such as experience and skills to overcome the crisis.  
The final empirical chapter of this thesis will focus on non-executive directors in 
financially distressed firms only. By doing so, the study tries to combine two theories, 
the agency theory and the resource dependence theory, in the analysis. They are proxied 
by board independence and board diversity respectively.  
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5.3 Research Methodology 
This section will be divided into four parts: sample selection, board diversity 
dimensions, diversity measures, and regression model and control variables. 
 
5.3.1. Sample Selection 
The study will follow Fich and Slevak’s (2008) approach in assessing the effects of 
board diversity on firm survival. The study only focuses on the non-financial UK listed 
firms that experience financial distress between 2004 and 2012.  
In order to select the appropriate firms, the study employs several rules in the firm 
selection. Firstly, the study uses two measures to select financially distressed firms, 
which are firm debt ratio (total debts to total assets) and qui score. Debt ratio is to 
capture the stock-based insolvency. Firms with debt ratio larger than one are categorised 
as financially distressed firms.  
Qui score is a rating which is provided by the FAME database which shows the firms 
creditworthiness. Qui score is calculated by including various information such as firm 
financial report, directors history, shareholders data, country court judgements, and 
holding and subsidiary structure. In other words, qui score is a valid and reliable 
indicator to measure a firm’s credit risk. Qui score is classified into five bands, which 
are the high risk band (00-20), the unstable band (21-40), the normal band (41-60), the 
stable band (61-80), and the secure band (81-100). This study classifies financially 
distressed firms when the qui ratio is less than 40.  
Secondly, as the study uses only listed firms, ideally firms will be delisting from the 
stock market before they go to administration or they are liquidated. As a result, this 
study will exclude observations when the failure year precedes the delisting year.  
In order to distinguish survived or failed firms, the study defines default (failed) firms 
when the firms are dissolved or in liquidation not more than 5 years after the delisting 
year (Shumway, 2001). Firms that go default 6 years after delisting year are deemed as 
survived firms.  
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Figure 5.1 Sample Selection Process 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the process of selecting financially distressed firms and 
categorising failed firms. The observation period for each firm is during the period of 
distress (restructuring). In year 0, firms enter the period of distress. As firms are 
experiencing financial distress, the shareholders (creditors or management) will conduct 
a restructuring to turnaround the condition between year 0 and year t. As the result of 
restructuring process, firms can either experience further performance decline, which 
refers to delisting from the stock market, become a default, or become healthy firms 
again. The status of financially distressed firms (i.e. survived firms or failed firms) in 
year t will be assessed up to five years after they go delisting. 
 
5.3.2 Board Diversity Dimensions 
There are six diversity dimensions that will be comprised in one index: gender, 
nationality, occupation, education, age, and tenure.  
 
5.3.2.1 Gender diversity 
The empirical studies of the impacts of gender diversity on the boards can be viewed 
from two angles, which are governance (board effectiveness) and financial performance. 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) indicate that the presence of females on the boards will 
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improve monitoring effectiveness on directors. Abbot et al. (2012) and Srinidhi et al. 
(2011) indicate that females on the boards can improve firms financial report quality. 
Thus, the presence of females on the boards will improve board effectiveness on 
monitoring roles. 
However, the impact of gender diversity on firm performance is relatively mixed. On 
the one hand, several studies have found a positive association (Erhardt et al., 2003; 
Carter et al., 2003; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2007; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013; Liu et 
al., 2013; Strom et al., 2014). On the other hand, some studies have failed to indicate the 
same results (Smith et al., 2006; Rose, 2007; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and 
Dittmar, 2012). 
Rather than examining the impact of gender diversity on firm performance, the study 
will examine it to firm survival during the period of distress. Wilson and Altanlar (2009) 
indicate that the presence of females on the boards can reduce insolvency risks for the 
UK private firms. 
 
5.3.2.2 Nationality Diversity 
As the UK is one of the financial centres, nationality diversity on the boards is 
inevitable. The London Stock Exchange (LSE) reports that there are 700 international 
companies out 3100 listed companies, which represent more than 70 countries (LSE, 
2015). Consequently, the increase of labour mobility, particularly for top management 
level, is very likely to occur among UK listed firms.  
Veen and Elbertsen (2008) report that the UK boards are more diverse in terms of 
directors’ nationality than their counterparts in Germany and Netherlands. In the 
financial sector, Greve et al. (2009) indicate that the UK is the second, after Swiss, most 
diverse top executive among 13 European countries in terms of international experience. 
Estelyiova and Nisar (2012) report that 13 per cent UK listed firms appointed foreign 
directors between 2001 and 2011.  
Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) examine the role of foreign directors on firm value in 
Norway and Sweden. Choi et al. (2012) investigate the impacts of foreign directors 
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presence in Korean listed firms. Both studies report that hiring foreign directors can 
increase Tobin’s Q.  
Hambrick et al. (1998) explain that the implications of nationality diversity among 
decision makers. Bringing individuals from a different nationality to the group of 
decision makers will bring different values, cognitive (knowledge), and demeanour 
(physical behaviour). In other words, nationality is also a proxy of individual’s 
orientation, outlook, perception, and behaviour.  
 
5.3.2.3 Occupation (Expertise) Diversity 
According to the resource dependence theory, the board of directors should be 
comprised from different background in order to satisfy the firm’s needs on the 
resources with respect to external environment uncertainty (Hillman et al., 2000). They 
classify the background of outside directors into three parts. (1) Business experts, who 
have a significant knowledge about the firms’ related industry and they previously work 
in large corporation. Firms appoint business experts when the market has a high level of 
competition. (2) Support specialists, who can give special advices in particular issues, 
such as capital market, law, public relations. (3) Community influential, who are usually 
perceived as symbolic directors, but they have a significant power in the community, 
such as politicians, academics, former MPs.  
In terms of firm strategic decisions, previous studies indicate that different directors’ 
background will influence the decision-making in the boardroom. Jensen and Zajac 
(2004) report that the proportion of directors with financial expertise influences firm 
diversification level and acquisition activities. Guner et al. (2008) show that the boards 
that are dominated by financial expertise (i.e. commercial bankers, investment bankers) 
will tend to use bond issuance as a source of debt financing. 
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The directors’ background not only has a significant implication on firm strategic 
decisions but also on firm governance and firm overall performance (firm value). 
Krishnan et al. (2011) find that directors with a legal expertise will improve the quality 
of firm financial reporting. Goldman et al. (2009) indicate that appointing politicians as 
directors may benefit the firms in the US, particularly when the politicians are members 
of the winning party. White et al. (2014) show the market reacts positively when firms 
appoint academics, particularly professors in science, medicine, or engineering.  
 
5.3.2.4 Educational Diversity 
The analysis of directors education can be approached from several angles, such as the 
education major (e.g. accounting, law, engineering), the level of education (e.g. 
bachelor, MBA, post-graduate), and the university reputation (e.g. Ivy league, Russell 
Group). There are consequences when firms are hiring directors with respect to a certain 
education background. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) report that fund managers who are 
graduated from reputable universities tend to be more risk-taking in investment 
decisions. Vafeas (2009) find that market will react more positively when firms decide 
to hiring finance controller with an accounting degree rather than with an MBA degree.  
The study will focus on directors’ level education namely a bachelor’s degree, a 
master’s degree, or a doctoral (PhD) degree. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) indicate that 
CEOs with an MBA degree tend to be more aggressive, e.g. higher debt level, higher 
capital expenditure and lower dividend payout ratio and they outperform CEOs without 
an MBA degree. Datta and Iskandar-Datta (2014) show CFOs with an MBA degree 
(generalist CFOs) will likely be paid higher than CFO without an MBA degree 
(specialist CFOs). Kim and Lim (2010) find that the diversification of education level 
can improve firm valuation for South Korean firms.  
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5.3.2.5 Age Diversity 
Directors age can be deemed as a reflection directors’ cognitive abilities, experience and 
risk averse level. Waelchli and Zeller (2013) argue that the cognitive abilities of older 
directors will deteriorate which make them less effective in doing their duties. Bertrand 
and Schoar (2003) report that older CEOs are associated with lower capital expenditure 
and lower financial leverage. Older manager tend to avoid complexity such as decisions 
to go public (Yang et al., 2011).  Platt and Platt (2012) shows that bankrupt firms tend 
to have younger directors, which suggesting that older directors have a valuable 
experience in financially distressed firms. Anderson et al. (2011) argue that older 
directors tend to bring an experiential wisdom, while younger directors tend to bring 
more energy.  
 
5.3.2.6 Tenure (Experience) Diversity 
Vafeas (2003) develops two hypotheses in terms of director tenure. (1) Expertise 
hypothesis. Director tenure indicates the director familiarity with firm business and 
operational environment. Directors with long tenure are more competent and experience 
than directors with short tenure. (2) Management friendly hypothesis. Directors with 
long tenure are less effective in doing monitoring because they more likely befriend 
with the managers.  
 
5.3.3 Diversity Measures and Diversity Index 
The study will follow Hillman et al. (2000) in proxying director expertise. The study 
categorises expertise into four parts: business experts (e.g. general management, 
entrepreneur, sector related experts), support specialist (e.g. sales, marketing, lawyer), 
community influential (e.g. academics, former ministers, former MP), and finance 
specialist (i.e. accountant, banker). The finance specialist is originally part of business 
experts, but the study splits it with other expertise to anticipate over-crowding finance 
specialist on the boards of financially distressed firms.  
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The study will categorise non-executive directors’ nationality diversity into 10 types, 
which depends on the most frequent directors nationality are appointed in the firm 
observations. Non-executive directors’ education will be divided in to three categories, 
which are directors with a Bachelor’s degree only, a Master’s degree, and PhD degree 
and beyond. Directors age will be classified into seven categories: 20-30, 30-40, 40-50, 
50-60, 60-70, 70-80 and greater than 80 years old (Kim and Lim, 2010). Director tenure 
will be divided into four categories: 0-3, 3-6, 6-9 and beyond 9 years. 
The focused variable is board diversity which covers gender, nationality, education, 
expertise, age and tenure. To measure board diversity, the study follows previous 
studies (Kim and Lim, 2010; Upadhyay, 2014; Upadhyay and Zeng, 2014), in which 
they used the Herfindahl index. Each of diversity dimensions will be calculated as 
follows: 
 
 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 1 − (
∑(𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡)
2
∑(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡)
2 )
𝑖,𝑡
 5.1 
 
Where (
∑(𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡)
2
∑(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡)
2 ) is the sum of the squared proportions of non-executive 
directors with j diversity dimension (i.e. female director, British citizen). Firms with 
larger index mean that the firms are more diverse. It is expected that there are six 
indexes.  
Rather than examining each diversity dimension, the study will calculate the aggregate 
effect of diversity by creating a score to proxy all diversity dimensions. Following to 
Anderson et al. (2011), the diversity scores are created with these procedures: (1) 
calculate each diversity index with Equation 5.1; (2) calculate the first quartile, median, 
and third quartile of all observations for each of diversity dimension; (3) determine the 
scores, between 1 and 4, for each diversity dimension. The scores of each diversity 
dimension depend on diversity index falls with respect to the values of first quartile, 
median, and third quartile. If the index diversity falls in the bottom quartile (first 
quartile), then the score is one. If the index diversity falls between first quartile and 
median (second quartile) then the score is two, and so on. (4) The total diversity score 
will be the sum of six diversity dimensions. The aggregate scores are ranging between 6 
and 24.  
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5.3.4 Regression Model and Control Variables 
The study uses the Cox proportional hazard model to examine the relation between 
financially distressed firms and board diversity3. The hazard model is widely used in the 
bankruptcy models because it can control both the occurrence and the timing of events. 
Most of the bankruptcy models (static models) only analyse the probability of 
bankruptcy models at one time point, while the hazard models allow bankruptcy 
probability to vary with time (Shumway, 2001).  
The Cox proportional hazard regression model can be expressed as: 
 
 ℎ𝑖(𝑡|𝑧(𝑡)) = ℎ0(𝑡) exp{ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑧𝑗
𝑖(𝑡)𝑝𝑗=𝑖 } 5.2 
 
Where hi(t|x(t)) is the time-varying hazard-function for firm i at time t, or it can be 
deemed as the hazard rate. h0(t) is the baseline hazard, which represents the effect of 
time. 𝑧𝑗
𝑖(𝑡) indicates the the value of jth covariate at time t for the ith firm. βj is the 
corresponding coefficient for vector 𝑧𝑗
𝑖. 
The estimations of Equation 5.2 can be presented in two ways which are the coefficient 
estimates and the hazard estimates. The coefficient estimations (β) can be positive and 
negative but they usually do not have a direct economic interpretation. Consequently, 
the coefficient estimations must be converted to hazard ratio, which equals to eβ where β 
is the coefficient estimations from Equation 5.2 and e is natural exponential. The value 
of hazard ratio is always positive. Hazard ratio equals one is deemed as a benchmark 
point because the independent variable has no effect on firm survival at that value. 
Moreover, hazard ratio more than one means a greater likelihood of failure, vice versa. 
Thus, hazard ratios minus one (eβ-1) indicate the percentage change in failure 
probability given an increase one unit of independent variable.   
The dependent variable is time which shows the number of years from the year when 
firms enter the period of distress to the year when they are liquidated (dissolved) or the 
last year observed for active firms. In this case, firms that do not experience the 
liquidation will be censored in the hazard estimation method. The failed firms will be 
decided according to firms’ status in the FAME database and the ICC database. In 
                                            
3 This approach follows Shumway (2001), Fich and Slevak (2008), Chancharat et al. (2012), Wilson et al. 
(2014). 
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addition, the study will compare the results to the Bloomberg database regarding M&A 
information. Firms that experience M&A during period of distress are not categorise as 
failed firms, such as distressed-acquired firms.   
The study adds several control variables that have been previously used in bankruptcy 
studies. (1) CEO characteristics. Most of previous studies (Daily and Dalton, 1994; 
Simpson and Gleason, 1999; Chancharat et al. 2012) have been focusing the power 
level of CEOs. The study will include CEO power in the regression which indicates 
whether the CEOs are the founder, substantial shareholder, member of family or with 
dual-CEO roles. The study also includes CEO age and CEO tenure to the model.  
(2) CEO turnover and board turnover. Emery and Finnerty (1997) argue that financial 
distress could be a result of poor performance of the management, e.g. lack of 
experience and expertise. Previous studies (Gilson, 1989; Denis and Kruse, 2000; 
Jostarndt and Sautner, 2008) show that managers will be removed after firms enter 
financial distress in order to turnaround the firms. Therefore, the studies will include 
CEO turnover and board turnover as the control variables.  
(3) Board structure. Daily and Dalton (1994) argue that board will encounter a greater 
challenge in financially distressed firms than healthy firms. The more outside directors, 
firms will have more valued resources and information to overcome the crisis. Perry and 
Shivdasani (2005) found that firms with a majority of outside directors can conduct 
effective restructuring to improve firms operating income during the decline period. 
However, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) did not find evidence that the number of 
independent directors could improve the firm financial performance. Those findings 
indicate that the optimal board size and composition will lead to effective monitoring 
and supervising, which is more needed in financially distressed firms than in healthy 
firms. Therefore, board size and board independence will be added to the model.  
(4) Ownership. The ownership structure tends to change for financially distressed firms. 
Parker et al. (2002) find that firms with low levels of block holders and insider 
ownership tend to experience bankruptcy. Gilson (1990) finds that the concentration 
level of block holders and creditors’ ownership increases significantly. Therefore, the 
study will include the stake that held by top block holders. 
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(5) Firm characteristics. The study will add firm ROA and stock return to proxy firm 
profitability, firm total employees to proxy firm size, and firm age. The definition of all 
variables that will be used can be seen in Table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1 the Research Variables 
Variables Definition Variable Code 
Diversity Measures 
Total scores The sum of six diversity dimensions scores, which are age, 
tenure, education, gender, nationality, and expertise  
score_total 
Occupational scores The sum of expertise, education, and tenure scores score_occu 
Social scores The sum of gender, age, and nationality scores Score_social 
CEO Characteristics 
Power CEO The value is one if CEOs are the substantial shareholder, the 
family member, the founder, or hold dual-CEO roles. The 
value is zero if else 
power_ceo 
CEO tenure The number of year CEOs hold their position ceo_tenure 
CEO age The CEO age in year ceo_age 
Boards Composition and Size 
Fraction Independent 
Directors  
The number of non-executive director divided by board size. 
Independent directors are directors who do not have tie with 
firms businesses. 
prop_ined 
Board Size Total directors in the boardroom board_size 
Ownership Structure 
Size of block holders Proportion of common voting share that held by block 
holders 
block 
Management Turnovers 
CEO turnover The value is one if the CEO is replaced before the election of 
CEO. The value is zero if else 
ceo_turnover1 
Board Turnover Fraction of directors that is removed from the board (per cent) board_turnover 
Firm Characteristics 
Total Employee Logarithm of firm total employees ln_employ 
Stock Return The firm stock return (per cent) stock_return2 
ROA The ratio between firm net profit and firm total assets (per 
cent) 
roaf2 
Firm age The difference between firm established year and firm year 
observation (years) in logarithm function 
lg_firm_age 
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5.4. Empirical Results 
The empirical results will be divided into four sections: failed firms, non-executive in 
financially distressed (failed) firms, regression analysis, and research discussion.  
5.4.1 Failed Firms 
Table 5.2 shows the full list of failed firms from two databases. Categorising failed and 
non-failed firms are based firm status. Firms can be deemed as failure when one of two 
databases states dissolved, in default, in liquidation, in administration, petition to wind 
up, in receivership, operating under voluntary arrangement or pre-dissolution. In 
addition to the FAME and the ICC databases, the study compares it with the Bloomberg 
database, in which firms can be classified into acquired, delisted, suspended or active. 
The Bloomberg database shows that 29 firms can be classified as distressed-acquired 
firms. As a result, those firms are classified as survived firms. 
Table 5.2 The Insolvency Classification. This table reports the insolvency classification in the UK. The 
sources are from the FAME and the ICC databases.  
Firm Status N 
Fame Status 
 
Active (dormant) 38 
Active (dormant), in default 1 
Active (receivership) 3 
Active, in administration 23 
Active, in default 5 
Active, petition to wind-up 1 
Active, with vol. arrangement 11 
Dissolved 229 
In liquidation 94 
Unknown 2 
Total 407 
  ICC Status 
 
Active 3 
Closed (Converted) 3 
Dissolved 246 
In Administration 15 
In Liquidation 81 
In Receivership 1 
Non-Trading 39 
Operating under Voluntary Arrangement 7 
Practitioner has ceased to act - resumed trading 6 
Pre-dissolution 3 
Unknown 2 
Winding Up Petition 1 
Total 407 
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Table 5.3 indicates the number of failed firms and financially distressed firms according 
to sector classification.  Most of the research samples are in industrial goods and 
services. The highest failure rate is for automobiles and parts firms (100 per cent), while 
the lowest failure rate are for oil and gas firms (15.8 per cent). Other Sectors that have a 
higher failure rate than the average are construction and materials, personal and 
household goods, healthcare, media, travel and leisure, and utilities. Table 5.3 also 
shows that some financial-based (real estate and financial services) firms are still 
included and they, as a consequence, must be removed. 
Table 5.3 Financially Distressed Firms and Failed Firms based on the Industry. The classification is 
based on Industry Classification Index (ICB) from the Bloomberg database. Failed Firms are based on the 
results from the FAME and the ICC classifications excluding firms that are acquired. Financially 
distressed firms are defined when debt ratio > 1 or Qui ratio < 40.  
Sector Name 
Failed Firms 
Financially  
Distressed Firms Failure Rate 
Oil and Gas 3 19 0.158 
Chemicals 2 5 0.400 
Basic Resources 15 45 0.333 
Construction and Materials 7 11 0.636 
Industrial Goods and Services 74 165 0.448 
Automobiles and Parts 3 3 1.000 
Food and Beverages 6 21 0.286 
Personal and Household Goods 24 36 0.667 
Health Care 30 60 0.500 
Retail 38 75 0.507 
Media 31 90 0.344 
Travel and Leisure 28 63 0.444 
Telecommunications 8 32 0.250 
Utilities 3 7 0.429 
Real Estate 4 10 0.400 
Financial Services 19 54 0.352 
Technology 38 107 0.355 
Unknown 5 11 0.455 
  338 814 0.415 
 
Table 5.4 shows the number of delisting firms and dissolved firms according to year 
occurrences. As the study uses only listed firms, normally delisting year equal to or  less 
than failure year because the stock exchange regulators require certain and strict 
disclosure standards to protect shareholders and investors interest. As a result, any firms 
that have smaller failure year than delisting year will be excluded. 
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One interesting result is more firms delisting from LSE in 2008 and 2009 which may be 
a result of the financial crisis. The highest number of failed firms is occurred in 2010 
and 2011, which infers that those firms are most likely delisting from the stock market 
between 2008 and 2009.  
Table 5.4 Delisting and Failed Firms between 2005 and 2015. Delisting firm refers to firm that goes 
delisting from the stock market. Failed firms refer to the FAME and the ISS classification in Table 5.2. 
Year Delisting Firms Failed Firms 
2005 21 1 
2006 26 7 
2007 33 10 
2008 67 16 
2009 78 39 
2010 38 60 
2011 28 62 
2012 19 52 
2013 10 62 
2014 2 28 
2015 16 1 
Total 338 338 
 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the tendency of failed firms after delisting from the stock market. 
Gap year is defined as failure year minus delisting year. Most of delisting firms will 
become failed firms three years after delisting from the stock market. The study follows 
Shumway (2001), in which firms are still considered dissolved (liquated) after 5 years 
of delisting year as the data only provides the directorship while the firms are still listed 
in the stock market.  Firms that go failure five year after the delisting year (or gap year 
more than 5) are categorised as survived firms.  
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Figure 5.2 The Difference between Delisting Year and Failure Year. This study focuses on firms with 
the difference between 0 and 5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4.2 The Diversity of Non-Executive Directors in Financially Distressed Firms 
 
Table 5.5 shows six dimensions of diversity on the boards. As previously anticipated, 
financially distressed firms will likely appoint directors with financial expertise (39 per 
cent), while only 6 per cent of directors who have social influence (e.g. academics, 
former MPs). Most directors (74 per cent) have a bachelor’s degree, while only 15 per 
cent and 11 per cent of non-executive directors that have a master’s degree (e.g. MSc, 
MBA) and beyond master’s degree (e.g. PhD, Professor) respectively.  
Gender diversity on the boards for financially distressed firms is substantially low. Only 
6 per cent of total directors that are females. This figure is well below the 
recommendations of the UK or European regulators which are about 25-40 per cent. 
Most of directors are from the United Kingdom (74 per cent), while the American, Irish, 
Australian directors are in the second, third, and fourth respectively. Moreover, firms 
tend to appoint non-executive directors whose their age is between 50 and 70 years old. 
Finally, financially distressed firms tend to appoint new non-executive directors. The 
majority of directors’ tenure is between 0 and 3 years. Firms are likely to conduct a 
restructuring by removing incumbent non-executive directors. Overall, there is an early 
indication that the boards of financially distressed firms lack of diversity.  
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Table 5.5 Non-Executive Characteristics in the Research Sample between 2004 and 2012 
Diversity Sum Percentage 
Expertise 
  Finance 1181 0.39 
Management 992 0.33 
Expert  654 0.22 
Community 165 0.06 
   Education 
  Undergraduate 2213 0.74 
Master 463 0.15 
Beyond Master 316 0.11 
   Gender 
  Woman 171 0.06 
Man 2821 0.94 
   Nationality 
  United Kingdom 2222 0.74 
United States of America 250 0.08 
Australia 75 0.03 
Ireland 75 0.03 
France 40 0.01 
Canada 38 0.01 
Germany 37 0.01 
South Africa 22 0.01 
India 20 0.01 
Netherlands 20 0.01 
Other 191 0.06 
   Age 
  Age 20-30 16 0.01 
Age 30-40 208 0.07 
Age 40-50 760 0.25 
Age 50-60 1096 0.36 
Age 60-70 818 0.27 
Age 70-80 101 0.03 
More than 80 16 0.01 
   Tenure 
  Tenure 0-3  2545 0.84 
Tenure 3-6 278 0.09 
Tenure 6-9 121 0.04 
More than 9 71 0.02 
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The Herfindahl index is calculated for every diversity dimension. Firms with a greater 
index are equivalent to a greater diversity. Table 5.6 confirms that most of financially 
distressed firms lack of diversity on the boards. Gender diversity has the lowest mean 
among any other dimensions, while director age and director profession have the 
highest mean.  
The study creates the same scoring system to proxy the entire diversity dimension. The 
values of 1st quartile (Q1), median and 3rd quartile (Q3) of the index will be used a 
foundation of the scoring system. For instance, JJB sports plc in 2011 has age index = 
0.64, index tenure = 0, index profession = 0.64, index education = 0.32, index woman = 
0, and index nation = 0. Based on the values of Q1, median, and Q3 for each dimension, 
the scores of age = 4, tenure = 1, profession = 4, education = 3, woman = 1, and nation 
= 1. The score total of JJB sports in 2011 is 14. The score of diversity is between 6 
(least diverse) and 24 (most diverse). This score will be used in the regression analysis. 
 
Table 5.6 Descriptive statistics of the Herfindahl Concentration Index. Ind_age is age index. 
Ind_tenure is tenure index. Ind_prof is profession (expertise) index. Ind_educ is education index. 
Index_woman is gender index. Ind_nation is nationality index.  
The index = 1 − (
∑(𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗)
2
∑(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 )2
)
𝑖,𝑡
 
 
Index Observation Mean Q1 Median Q3 
ind_age 1205 0.34 0.00 0.44 0.50 
ind_tenure 1205 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.50 
ind_prof 1205 0.34 0.00 0.44 0.50 
ind_educ 1205 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.44 
ind_woman 1205 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ind_nation 1205 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.38 
 
Table 5.7 provides the available data, means, standard deviations, first quartile, medians, 
and third quartile of dependent variable (year_distress), the focused variables (diversity 
score) and control variables (board characteristics, CEO characteristics, firm 
characteristics) after excluding incomplete observations. The available data for 
regression analysis yields 875 observations, which is lower than its potential 1205 
observations in Table 5.6. The missing observations seem to be a common problem in 
analysing financially distressed (bankrupt) firms as the quality of market information 
and financial disclosure deteriorate when firms get closer to the failure year. 
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The average (median) of score total, which proxies board diversity, is 12.99 (13.00). 
The study divides the score total into two parts:  score occupational (occupation, tenure, 
education) and score social (gender, age, nationality). The mean (median) of score 
social is substantially lower than the mean (median) of score occupational.  
During the restructuring years, 16 per cent of the firms will remove the CEOs and about 
17 per cent of directors (executive or non-executive) will be removed from their 
position. The average director on the boards is 5.72, with non-executive directors and 
independent non-executive directors are 52 per cent and 33 per cent respectively. CEOs 
are on average 50.62 years old and have served as CEOs for 4.12 years. More than one-
third of the CEOs are powerful CEOs.   
As expected, financially distressed firms tend to have a negative performance. The 
average (median) firm employ 3206 (124) people, which means the firms sample 
consist large and small firms. The average (median) stakes that are held by top block 
holders is 24 per cent (19 per cent).  
The comparison statistics and the mean t-test between failed firms and non-failed firms 
in the final year of firm observation are reported in Table 5.8. Most of the variables of 
the failed firms and non-failed firms are statistically different, except CEO turnover, 
board turnover, CEO age, block holder, and firm age. Failed firms are associated with 
less diverse boards. The boards of failed firms are smaller and less independent than the 
boards of non-failed firms. Larger and more profitable firms will less likely go failure.  
Table 5.9 reports the correlation matrix. Board size tends to have a high correlation with 
diversity measures, namely score total (0.67), score occupational (0.59), and score 
social (0.59). Board size and firm size (ln_employ) are highly correlated. As a result, 
board size should be excluded from the regression analysis to avoid a linearity problem.  
Similarly, fraction of non-executive directors (prop_ned) and total scores is highly 
correlated, which leads also to removal non-executive directors from the regression 
models. There is a positive association between diversity measures and board 
independence. Table 5.9 also indicates that there is a negative correlation between board 
diversity measures and CEO power, which suggests firms with powerful CEOs are 
associated with less diverse boards. Larger, older, and more profitable firms are 
associated with diverse boards.  
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Table 5.7 Descriptive Statistics. year_distress is number of year from the beginning year of financial 
distress to the final year of financial distress or to the last year observed.  Score_total is total score of 
diversity that is composed from the Herfindahl index of age, education, expertise, nationality, gender, and 
tenure. Score_occu is total score of occupation diversity that is composed from the Herfindahl index of 
education, expertise, and tenure. Score_social is total score of social diversity that is composed from the 
Herfindahl index of gender, nationality, and age. Ceo_turnover1 equals to 1, if the CEO is dismissed in 
the period of distress, it equals to 0 if else. Board_turnover is the fraction of director that is dismissed in 
the period of distress. Board_size is total directors. Prop_ned is the fraction of non-executive director. 
Prop_ined is the fraction of independent non-executive director. ceo_tenure is the difference between end 
date of calendar year-t and CEO date appointment. ceo_age is the difference between end date of calendar 
year-t and CEO date of birth. Power_ceo equals to 1 if the CEO is a founder, a substantial shareholder 
(>3 per cent), or a member of family. roaf2 is net profit divided by total assets (ROA). Stock return is 
measured by a 12-month stock return at the end of the calendar year. Employ is firm total employees. 
block is stake is owned by top block holder. Firm_age is the difference between end date of calendar 
year-t and firm date establishment. roaf2 and stock_return2 are winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent. 
Variables N Mean StdDev Q1 Median Q3 
year_distress 875 1.99 1.44 1.00 1.00 3.00 
score_total 875 12.99 4.82 10.00 13.00 17.00 
score_occu 875 7.08 2.96 5.00 8.00 10.00 
score_social 875 5.91 2.44 3.00 5.00 8.00 
ceo_turnover1 875 0.16 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 
board_turnover 875 0.17 0.20 0.00 0.13 0.29 
board_size 875 5.72 2.37 4.00 5.00 7.00 
prop_ned 875 0.52 0.17 0.40 0.50 0.67 
prop_ined 875 0.33 0.22 0.20 0.33 0.50 
ceo_tenure 875 4.12 3.89 1.50 3.00 5.33 
ceo_age 875 50.62 8.09 45.05 50.13 56.32 
power_ceo 875 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 
roaf2 875 -0.50 0.99 -0.56 -0.15 0.02 
stock_return2 875 -0.06 0.90 -0.61 -0.26 0.14 
employf 875 3206 10703 30 124 789 
block 875 0.24 0.18 0.12 0.19 0.30 
firm_age 875 16.13 22.43 4.18 8.33 16.25 
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Table 5.8 The Descriptive Statistics difference between Failure and Non-Failed Firms year_distress is number of year from the beginning year of financial distress to the final 
year of financial distress or to the last year observed.  Score_total is total score of diversity that is composed from the Herfindahl index of age, education, expertise, nationality, 
gender, and tenure. Score_occu is total score of occupational diversity that is composed from the Herfindahl index of education, expertise, and tenure. Score_social is total score of 
social diversity that is composed from the Herfindahl index of gender, nationality, and age. Ceo_turnover1 equals to 1, if the CEO is dismissed in the period of distress, it equals to 0 
if else. Board_turnover is the fraction of director that is dismissed in the period of distress. Board_size is total directors. Prop_ned is the fraction of non-executive director. Prop_ined 
is the fraction of independent non-executive director. ceo_tenure is the difference between end date of calendar year-t and CEO date appointment. ceo_age is the difference between 
end date of calendar year-t and CEO date of birth. Power_ceo equals to 1 if the CEO is a founder, a substantial shareholder (>3 per cent), or a member of family. Roaf2 is firm return 
on assets. Stock return is measured by a 12-month stock return at the end of the calendar year. Employf is firm total employees. block is top block holder’s stake. Firm_age is the 
difference between end date of calendar year-t and firm date establishment. roaf2 and stock_return2 is winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent. *, **, and *** mean statistically 
different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively 
Variable Failure 
No Yes 
N Mean StdDev Q1 Median Q3 N Mean StdDev Q1 Median Q3 
year_distress 277 2.01*** 1.64 1.00 1.00 2.00 203 1.56 1.11 1.00 1.00 2.00 
score_total 277 13.51*** 4.77 10.00 14.00 17.00 203 10.89 4.29 6.00 11.00 15.00 
score_occu 277 7.26*** 2.87 5.00 8.00 10.00 203 5.96 2.83 3.00 5.00 8.00 
score_social 277 6.25*** 2.48 5.00 6.00 8.00 203 4.94 2.08 3.00 5.00 6.00 
ceo_turnover1 277 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 203 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 
board_turnover 277 0.14 0.17 0.00 0.06 0.23 203 0.16 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.29 
board_size 277 5.91*** 2.36 4.00 6.00 7.00 203 4.50 1.63 3.00 4.00 6.00 
prop_ned 277 0.54* 0.17 0.40 0.50 0.67 203 0.50 0.19 0.33 0.50 0.60 
prop_ined 277 0.37*** 0.21 0.25 0.33 0.50 203 0.28 0.22 0.00 0.25 0.40 
ceo_tenure 277 4.84** 3.91 2.04 3.99 6.25 203 3.94 3.87 1.45 2.58 5.17 
ceo_age 277 50.99 7.62 45.73 50.87 55.73 203 51.00 9.01 44.78 50.40 57.85 
power_ceo 277 0.34** 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 203 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
roaf2 277 -0.39*** 0.85 -0.43 -0.09 0.04 203 -0.64 1.00 -0.75 -0.32 -0.05 
stock_return2 277 0.11*** 0.95 -0.49 -0.03 0.37 203 -0.38 0.60 -0.75 -0.48 -0.19 
employf 277 2912*** 8950 35 184 1043 203 524 2313 21 58 191 
block 277 0.26 0.20 0.13 0.21 0.30 203 0.25 0.18 0.13 0.19 0.33 
firm_age 277 17.51 23.17 5.36 9.88 17.07 203 14.62 21.58 3.74 7.24 13.77 
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5.4.3 Regression Analysis 
The regression analysis will be divided into three parts: regression analysis for all 
observations, regression analysis for large vs small firms, and regression analysis for 
firms with powerful CEOs vs non-powerful CEOs. 
 
5.4.3.1 Regression Analysis for All Observations 
The estimations of the Cox proportional hazard model are reported in Table 5.10. There 
are 875 observations with 480 firms, of which 203 firms experience failure. This sample 
is larger than previous studies (Fich and Slevak, 2008; Chancharat et al., 2012). Panel A 
presents the coefficients and Z-statistics, while Panel B presents the hazard ratios and Z-
statistics. In Panel A, the focused variables, namely score total, score occupational, and 
score social, are negatively and statistically significant at 1 per cent level in influencing 
the likelihood of failed firms. In Panel B, the hazard ratios indicate that an increase one 
point in the diversity score decreases the likelihood of failure between 6 per cent and 13 
per cent. Social diversity will bring a greater benefit than occupational diversity to 
financially distressed firms. 
The board independence (prop_ined), which was a focused variable in previous 
bankruptcy studies, is not statistically significant. It has a positive coefficient in Model 
1, but it changes to a negative. This evidence suggests that a wide pool of talents of non-
executive directors, which is proxied by their diversity, is more important than their 
independence for restructuring processes in financially distressed firms.   
Besides the diversity measures, stock return (stock_return2) and firm size (ln_employ) 
significantly influence the likelihood of failed firms. The more profitable and bigger of 
financially distressed firms, the less likely they experience the failure. The results are 
consistent with previous studies (Shumway, 2001; Fich and Slevak, 2008; Chancharat et 
al., 2012). 
None of CEO characteristics has significant estimations in the models. CEO tenure 
(ceo_tenure) coefficients seem to have the strongest explanation power. Its coefficients 
and hazard ratios indicate that CEO with long tenure can reduce the probability of 
failure. On the other hand, CEO power (power_ceo) and CEO age (ceo_age) can 
increase the likelihood of failure. Firms that are led by powerful CEOs (e.g. the founder, 
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substantial shareholder, member of family) will increase the likelihood of failure by 
more than 20 per cent.     
Similarly, none of CEO turnover and board turnover estimations can significantly 
influence the probability of failed firms. But, the negative estimations indicate firms 
that remove the CEOs or board members can decrease the likelihood of failure. A new 
CEO and the dismissal of board member by 1 per cent can decrease the probability of 
failure by up to 15.6 per cent (Model 5) and 40 per cent (Model 4) respectively. 
In order to check the robustness of diversity estimations, it is necessary to run several 
models with respect to certain firm conditions. In this case, the regressions will involve 
firm size and CEO power to proxy firm complexity and potential agency problem 
(governance level) respectively.  
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Table 5.9 Correlation Matrix. Score_total is total score of diversity that is composed from the Herfindahl index of age, education, expertise, nationality, gender, and tenure. 
Score_occu is total score of occupation diversity that is composed from the Herfindahl index of education, expertise, and tenure. Score_social is total score of social diversity that is 
composed from the Herfindahl index of gender, nationality, and age. Ceo_turnover1 equals to 1, if the CEO is dismissed in the period of distress, it equals to 0 if else. 
Board_turnover is the fraction of director that is dismissed in the period of distress. Board_size is total directors. Prop_ned is the fraction of non-executive director. Prop_ined is the 
fraction of independent non-executive director. ceo_tenure is the difference between end date of calendar year-t and CEO date appointment. ceo_age is the difference between end 
date of calendar year-t and CEO date of birth. Power_ceo equals to 1 if the CEO is a founder, a substantial shareholder (>3 per cent), or a member of family, or hold dual-CEO roles. 
Roaf2 is net profit divided by total assets (ROA). Stock return is measured by a 12-month stock return at the end of the calendar year. Employ is firm total employees. block is top 
block holder’s stake. Firm_age is the difference between end date of calendar year-t and firm date establishment. Roaf2 and stock_return2 is winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent. 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
score_total (1) 1.00 
               score_occu (2) 0.91 1.00 
              score_social (3) 0.87 0.59 1.00 
             ceo_turnover (4) 0.03 0.01 0.05 1.00 
            board_turnover (5) -0.09 -0.10 -0.06 0.53 1.00 
           power_ceo (6) -0.30 -0.28 -0.25 -0.13 -0.11 1.00 
          ceo_tenure (7) -0.06 -0.03 -0.09 -0.21 -0.27 0.28 1.00 
         ceo_age (8) 0.07 0.08 0.04 -0.06 -0.12 0.02 0.27 1.00 
        board_size (9) 0.67 0.59 0.59 -0.03 -0.14 -0.22 -0.02 0.02 1.00 
       prop_ned (10) 0.59 0.55 0.49 0.10 0.05 -0.24 -0.12 0.00 0.20 1.00 
      prop_ined (11) 0.47 0.46 0.38 0.02 -0.04 -0.25 -0.04 0.01 0.32 0.50 1.00 
     roaf2 (12) 0.25 0.26 0.18 -0.14 -0.18 -0.17 0.04 0.03 0.25 0.14 0.19 1.00 
    stock_return2 (13) 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.09 -0.06 -0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.14 1.00 
   ln_employ (14) 0.48 0.45 0.40 0.00 -0.03 -0.29 -0.05 0.00 0.58 0.28 0.45 0.41 0.06 1.00 
  block (15) 0.01 -0.04 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.07 0.06 0.01 -0.05 -0.14 0.04 -0.11 1.00 
 lg_firm_age (16) 0.19 0.24 0.09 0.01 -0.03 -0.18 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.07 0.21 -0.07 1.00 
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Table 5.10 The Estimations of the Cox Proportional Hazard Model of the Entire Sample. Panel A 
reports the estimated coefficients. Panel B reports the hazard ratio. The dependent variable is 
year_distress, number of year from the beginning year of financial distress to the final year of financial 
distress or to the last year observed. Ceo_turnover1 equals to 1, if the CEO is dismissed in the period of 
distress, it equals to 0 if else. Board_turnover is the fraction of director that is dismissed in the period of 
distress. Prop_ined is the fraction of independent non-executive director. ceo_tenure is the difference 
between end date of calendar year-t and CEO date appointment. ceo_age is the difference between end 
date of calendar year-t and CEO date of birth. Power_ceo equals to 1 if the CEO is a founder, a 
substantial shareholder (>3 per cent), or a member of family, or hold dual-CEO roles, it equals 0 if else. 
Roaf2 is net profit divided by total assets (ROA). Stock_return2 is measured by a 12-month stock return 
at the end of the calendar year. ln_employ is natural logarithm firm total employees. block is the stake 
that is owned by top block holder. Firm_age is the natural logarithm of (firm age+1). Score_total is total 
score of diversity that is composed from the Herfindahl index of age, education, expertise, nationality, 
gender, and tenure. Score_occu is total score of occupation diversity that is composed from the 
Herfindahl index of education, expertise, and tenure. Score_social is total score of social diversity that is 
composed from the Herfindahl index of gender, nationality, and age. Roaf2 and stock_return2 is 
winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent. *, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 per 
cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. Z-statistics are provided in parentheses.  
 Panel A (Coefficient)  Panel B (Hazard Ratio) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
ceo_turnover1 -0.130 -0.170 -0.127  0.878 0.844 0.880 
 (-0.531) (-0.693) (-0.519)  (-0.531) (-0.693) (-0.519) 
board_turnover -0.502 -0.423 -0.500  0.605 0.655 0.606 
 (-1.164) (-0.981) (-1.150)  (-1.164) (-0.981) (-1.150) 
power_ceo 0.196 0.223 0.206  1.216 1.250 1.229 
 (1.238) (1.422) (1.299)  (1.238) (1.422) (1.299) 
ceo_age 0.007 0.006 0.007  1.007 1.006 1.007 
 (0.795) (0.685) (0.773)  (0.795) (0.685) (0.773) 
ceo_tenure -0.030 -0.029 -0.033  0.970 0.972 0.968 
 (-1.361) (-1.276) (-1.442)  (-1.361) (-1.276) (-1.442) 
prop_ined 0.128 -0.015 0.016  1.137 0.986 1.016 
 (0.347) (-0.039) (0.045)  (0.347) (-0.039) (0.045) 
roaf2 0.067 0.065 0.059  1.070 1.067 1.061 
 (0.910) (0.880) (0.802)  (0.910) (0.880) (0.802) 
stock_return2 -0.722*** -0.714*** -0.731***  0.486*** 0.490*** 0.481*** 
 (-4.726) (-4.670) (-4.790)  (-4.726) (-4.670) (-4.790) 
ln_employ -0.101** -0.115*** -0.105***  0.904** 0.892*** 0.900*** 
 (-2.492) (-2.861) (-2.592)  (-2.492) (-2.861) (-2.592) 
block 0.414 0.312 0.498  1.513 1.367 1.645 
 (1.067) (0.809) (1.271)  (1.067) (0.809) (1.271) 
lg_firm_age 0.112 0.118 0.095  1.119 1.125 1.099 
 (1.401) (1.488) (1.159)  (1.401) (1.488) (1.159) 
score_total -0.070***    0.933***   
 (-3.769)    (-3.769)   
score_occu  -0.080***    0.923***  
  (-2.740)    (-2.740)  
score_social   -0.142***    0.867*** 
   (-3.841)    (-3.841) 
        
Observations 875 875 875  875 875 875 
ll -1120 -1124 -1120  -1120 -1124 -1120 
No. Subjects 480 480 480  480 480 480 
No. Failure 203 203 203  203 203 203 
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5.4.3.2 Regression Analysis for Small and Large firms 
Anderson et al. (2011) report that the relation between board diversity and firm 
performance may be subject to firm complexity. Firms with more complex business 
activities tend to gain most of the benefits of board diversity. Firms with a greater 
complexity requires more set of talents, skills, and experience in the boardroom.    
It is useful to conduct a similar approach to Anderson et al. (2011) in examining the 
consistency of previous results. This study will use a simple measure to proxy firm 
complexity, which is firm size. The analyses will be divided into two parts: small firms 
(total employees < 1st quartile) and large firms (total employees > 3rd quartile). Table 
5.11 presents the relation between firm survival and all control variables when 
controlling firm size.  
Diverse non-executive directors can generally increase the likelihood of firm survival. 
But, the significance of occupational diversity (score_occu) and social diversity 
(score_social) in influencing firm survival depends on firm size. Appointing non-
executive directors with high level of occupational diversity are not necessarily 
effective in preventing failure for small firms. When firms with less complexity 
experience financial distress, they should focus on fixing it by conducting a financial 
restructuring, e.g. employee layoff, assets restructuring. Those small firms should hiring 
non-executive directors with financial expertise who have a significant experience to 
turnaround firm financial condition, instead of hiring academics or former MPs. 
On the other hand, the social diversity of non-executive directors is less likely to make 
significant contributions in large firms (complex firms). Besides the complexity aspect, 
small firms and big firms are different in many aspects. Larger firms tend to be more 
scrutinised than smaller firms particularly in the UK. For instance, most of the UK 
governance codes, e. g. the Cadbury Report (1992), the Higgs Report (2002), the Davies 
Report (2012), are aimed to large listed firms rather than the entire UK listed firms. The 
Davies Report (2012) recommends a 25 per cent representation of females on the boards 
for FTSE100 firms by 2015. Gregory–Smith et al. (2013) shows that FTSE250 firms 
(large firms) tend to hire female directors as non-executive directors, specifically when 
the incumbent female directors left non-executive position.  
In other words, hiring non-executive directors with different social background (i.e. 
gender) for large firms is not entirely a business perspective reason. As large firms are 
prone to a certain pressure in appointing directors from various social backgrounds, the 
195 
 
 
 
effectiveness of social diversity in large firms may be less significant than in small 
firms.   
Still in the large firm sub-sample regressions (Panel B), several control variables have 
different signs and significance from the full sample regressions (Table 5.11). Firstly, 
board independence, the estimations of board independence (prop_ined) are relatively 
more significant than previous results, specifically Model 6. The significance of board 
independence is higher than diversity measure (score_social) for the first time in the 
study, which suggests the need of a better monitoring mechanism for large firms.  
Secondly, the rate of board turnover (board_turnover) can significantly decrease the 
chance of firm failure at 10 per cent level. Thirdly, firm age (lg_firm_age) has positive 
and significant estimated coefficients, which means older firms will likely go failure. 
Fourthly, CEO removal (ceo_turnover1) will increase the likelihood of firm failure. 
Lastly, powerful CEOs (power_ceo) can increase firm survival. These results show that 
the relationship between control variables and firm survival could be subject to firm size 
(firm complexity). 
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Table 5.11 The Estimations of Failure Hazard Rate between Small Firms (Panel A) and Large 
Firms (Panel B). Panel A reports the estimated hazard rates for firms with total employees lower than 1st 
quartile. Panel B reports the estimated hazard rates for firms with total employees higher than 3rd quartile. 
The dependent variable is year_distress, number of year from the beginning year of financial distress to 
the final year of financial distress or to the last year observed. Ceo_turnover1 equals to 1, if the CEO is 
dismissed in the period of distress, it equals to 0 if else. Board_turnover is the fraction of director that is 
dismissed in the period of distress. Prop_ined is the fraction of independent non-executive director. 
ceo_tenure is the difference between end date of calendar year-t and CEO date appointment. ceo_age is 
the difference between end date of calendar year-t and CEO date of birth. Power_ceo equals to 1 if the 
CEO is a founder, a substantial shareholder (>3 per cent), or a member of family or hold dual-CEO roles, 
it equals 0 if else. Roaf2 is firm ROA. Stock_return2 is measured by a 12-month stock return at the end of 
the calendar year. block is the stake is owned by top block holder. Lg_firm_age is the natural logarithm of 
(firm age + 1). Score_total is total score of diversity that is composed from the Herfindahl index of age, 
education, expertise, nationality, gender, and tenure. Score_occu is total score of occupation diversity that 
is composed from the Herfindahl index of education, expertise, and tenure. Score_social is total score of 
social diversity that is composed from the Herfindahl index of gender, nationality, and age. Roaf2 and 
stock_return2 is winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent. *, **, and *** mean statistically different from 
zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. z-statistics are provided in 
parentheses.  
 Panel A (Small Firms)  Panel B (Large Firms) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
ceo_turnover1 0.900 0.859 0.990  3.029 2.868 2.768 
 (-0.241) (-0.345) (-0.024)  (0.975) (0.897) (0.926) 
board_turnover 0.458 0.501 0.452  0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
 (-1.154) (-1.014) (-1.167)  (-2.262) (-2.196) (-2.307) 
power_ceo 1.067 1.109 1.059  0.815 0.961 0.891 
 (0.234) (0.377) (0.207)  (-0.259) (-0.054) (-0.146) 
ceo_age 1.016 1.014 1.018  1.012 1.007 1.022 
 (1.152) (1.022) (1.260)  (0.317) (0.168) (0.571) 
ceo_tenure 0.932 0.942 0.925  0.996 1.014 0.956 
 (-1.280) (-1.111) (-1.393)  (-0.053) (0.188) (-0.673) 
prop_ined 1.353 1.179 1.350  0.278 0.484 0.071* 
 (0.519) (0.281) (0.527)  (-0.806) (-0.430) (-1.914) 
roaf2 0.997 0.987 1.003  0.299 0.254* 0.355 
 (-0.027) (-0.148) (0.035)  (-1.621) (-1.804) (-1.421) 
stock_return2 0.440*** 0.437*** 0.433***  0.224*** 0.223*** 0.212*** 
 (-2.809) (-2.821) (-2.830)  (-2.678) (-2.602) (-2.804) 
block 1.601 1.500 1.692  18.094* 14.708 13.105 
 (0.696) (0.603) (0.764)  (1.665) (1.632) (1.470) 
lg_firm_age 1.126 1.125 1.118  2.087*** 2.064*** 2.105*** 
 (0.761) (0.768) (0.694)  (2.822) (2.855) (2.796) 
score_total 0.945*    0.858**   
 (-1.742)    (-2.127)   
score_occu  0.955    0.753**  
  (-0.895)    (-2.212)  
score_social   0.862**    0.832 
   (-2.211)    (-1.536) 
        
Observations 216 216 216  225 225 225 
ll -275.8 -277.0 -274.6  -71.67 -71.47 -72.89 
No. Subjects 137 137 137  106 106 106 
No. Failure 66 66 66  22 22 22 
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5.4.3.3 Regression Analysis for Firms with Powerful CEOs and Non-Powerful 
CEOs 
The agency theory implies that the agents, including CEOs, tend not to act in the best 
shareholders’ interests. CEOs with too much power are associated with low 
effectiveness in monitoring.  Westphal and Zajac (1995) report that powerful CEOs 
would select directors with similar demographics (e.g. age, education level, inside or 
outside status) which lead to biased CEOs performance evaluation, generous CEO 
compensation, and  CEOs entrenchment. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) report that 
firms are most likely to appoint grey and insider directors rather than independent 
directors when CEOs are the member of nomination committee. CEO power can be a 
proxy of potential agency problem in the firms. 
Moreover, CEO power has an important role in the previous bankruptcy studies. CEO 
duality significantly and positively influences the probability of bankruptcy (Daily and 
Dalton, 1994; Simpson and Gleason 1999). Fich and Slevak (2008) show that founder 
CEOs will increase the probability of bankruptcy for financially distressed firms.  
Consistently, the estimations indicate that powerful CEOs can reduce firm survival 
(Table 5.10). The correlation matrix (Table 5.9) indicates that there is a tendency that 
powerful CEOs want to limit the independence and diversity of non-executive directors. 
Therefore, it is important to examine whether CEO power can affect the relationship 
between firm survival and the diversity of non-executive directors.  
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Table 5.12 The Estimations of Failure Hazard Rate between Less Powerful CEOs (Panel A) Vs 
Powerful CEOs (Panel B). Panel A reports the estimated hazard rates for firms less powerful CEO. 
Panel B reports the estimated hazard rates for firms less powerful CEO. Powerful CEO refer to CEO who 
is a founder, a substantial shareholder (>3 per cent), or a member of family or hold dual-CEO roles. The 
dependent variable is year_distress, number of year from the beginning year of financial distress to the 
final year of financial distress or to the last year observed. Ceo_turnover1 equals to 1, if the CEO is 
dismissed in the period of distress, it equals to 0 if else. Board_turnover is the fraction of director that is 
dismissed in the period of distress. Prop_ined is the fraction of independent non-executive director. 
ceo_tenure is the difference between end date of calendar year-t and CEO date appointment. ceo_age is 
the difference between end date of calendar year-t and CEO date of birth. Roaf2 is net profit divided by 
total assets (ROA). Stock_return2 is measured by a 12-month stock return at the end of the calendar year. 
ln_employ is natural logarithm firm total employees. block is the stake is owned by top block holder. 
Lg_firm_age is the natural logarithm of (firm_age+1). Score_total is total score of diversity that is 
composed from the Herfindahl index of age, education, expertise, nationality, gender, and tenure. 
Score_occu is total score of occupation diversity that is composed from the Herfindahl index of education, 
expertise, and tenure. Score_social is total score of social diversity that is composed from the Herfindahl 
index of gender, nationality, and age. Roaf2 and stock_return2 is winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent. 
*, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of 
significance respectively. z-statistics are provided in parentheses. 
 Panel A (Less Powerful CEOs)  Panel B (Powerful CEOs) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
ceo_turnover1 0.870 0.821 0.918  0.858 0.850 0.822 
 (-0.443) (-0.631) (-0.272)  (-0.355) (-0.377) (-0.458) 
board_turnover 0.356* 0.400 0.347*  1.137 1.193 1.158 
 (-1.775) (-1.576) (-1.796)  (0.195) (0.267) (0.222) 
ceo_age 0.999 1.000 1.001  1.016 1.014 1.014 
 (-0.048) (0.024) (0.087)  (1.222) (1.090) (1.118) 
ceo_tenure 0.947 0.947 0.947  0.974 0.978 0.969 
 (-1.355) (-1.369) (-1.359)  (-0.936) (-0.769) (-1.068) 
prop_ined 1.139 0.949 0.938  1.384 1.190 1.367 
 (0.268) (-0.107) (-0.139)  (0.555) (0.299) (0.532) 
roaf2 0.993 0.999 0.978  1.161 1.153 1.160 
 (-0.065) (-0.013) (-0.216)  (1.351) (1.297) (1.346) 
stock_return2 0.460*** 0.452*** 0.456***  0.521*** 0.533*** 0.513*** 
 (-3.587) (-3.609) (-3.641)  (-2.950) (-2.892) (-3.001) 
ln_employ 0.875** 0.862*** 0.871***  0.971 0.957 0.969 
 (-2.554) (-2.900) (-2.631)  (-0.434) (-0.645) (-0.474) 
block 1.486 1.344 1.546  1.709 1.456 2.061 
 (0.774) (0.582) (0.848)  (0.847) (0.599) (1.111) 
lg_firm_age 1.144 1.162 1.121  1.147 1.136 1.150 
 (1.244) (1.429) (1.035)  (1.083) (1.016) (1.076) 
score_total 0.921***    0.940**   
 (-3.369)    (-2.115)   
score_occu  0.917**    0.927  
  (-2.266)    (-1.644)  
score_social   0.845***    0.880** 
   (-3.509)    (-2.128) 
        
Observations 584 584 584  291 291 291 
ll -555.1 -558.4 -554.3  -421.9 -422.8 -421.8 
No. Subjects 304 304 304  195 195 195 
No. Failure 112 112 112  91 91 91 
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Table 5.12 reports the regression when splitting the sample according to CEO power. 
The study defines powerful CEOs when the power is based on the ownership or 
organizational power. Powerful CEOs are the founder, the substantial shareholder, the 
family member or hold CEO and chairman positions.   
Overall, Table 5.12 reports that the estimations of diversity measures for firms with less 
powerful CEOs are relatively similar to previous estimations, in terms of estimation 
signs and significance. However, the significance of diversity measures is weaker for 
firms with powerful CEOs, particularly occupational diversity (score_occu). This might 
be due to powerful CEOs try to limit the diversity of non-executive directors by hiring 
candidates who have a similar background. For instance, appointing non-executive 
directors with the same education background or CEOs can keep long-tenured non-
executive directors to avoid a strict oversight by appointing new non-executive directors.  
Regardless the slight insignificance of occupational diversity (score_occu), there is a 
strong evidence that the diversity (competence) feature is more important than 
independence feature for non-executive directors particularly in firms with a high level 
of potential agency problems.  
 
5.4.4 Research Discussion 
The study has examined the relation between board diversity and firm outcomes during 
the period of distress. The contributions of this study can be seen from several angles. (1) 
Corporate governance studies. Most of previous studies have put more emphasis on the 
independence of non-executive directors. The study has shown that another important 
feature of non-executives directors which is diversity (competence). (2) Diversity 
studies. Previous studies indicated that board diversity can enhance board effectiveness 
and improve firm performance. The study has shown that board diversity can increase 
firm survival during the period of distress. (3) Bankruptcy studies. Prior studies have 
been dominated by the agency theory which mainly focused on board independence and 
board leadership structure. The study has shown that board diversity, another aspect of 
governance, has a significant influence the bankruptcy. 
The study focuses on non-executive directors who have two important roles: monitoring 
and advising roles. The study suggests that monitoring roles are related to the 
independence of non-executive directors while advising roles are related to the 
competence of non-executive directors. Directors’ competence is proxied by a score that 
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is composed from non-executive directors’ age, tenure, gender, occupation background, 
education, and nationality. More diverse boards will represent a wider pool of talents, in 
terms of experience, skills and connections, which will affect board effectiveness and 
firm outcomes. 
In order to examine both features (independence and diversity), the study uses the UK 
financially distressed listed firms rather than all UK listed firms, as financially 
distressed firms are more likely to conduct restructuring activities to turnaround the 
business. Given this condition, the effectiveness of non-executive directors can be seen 
on firm survival. From the agency theory, the agency problem in financially distressed 
firms is likely to occur due to creditor involvement, which suggests the necessity of a 
proper monitoring by non-executive directors. On the other hand, from the resource 
dependence theory, non-executive should provide high quality advices in restructuring 
decision-making which are highly related to their experiences, skills, and connections.  
The examination was started by identifying financially distressed firms and failed firms. 
The descriptive analysis shows that most firms went failure 1 or 2 years after they 
delisting from the stock market and most of them occur when the financial crisis hit the 
UK in 2008 and 2009. Using the same approach as Shumway (2001), the study deems 
firms that went failure 5 years after the delisting year will be classified as failed firms.  
In terms of diversity dimensions, there is a tendency that non-executive directors are not 
as diverse as expected. For instance only less than 7 per cent of non-executive directors 
are females, which is much lower than the Davies Report (2012) recommendation. Most 
of them are British nationality, directors with short tenure and undergraduate educated. 
Candidates with financial expertise are more likely to be appointed as non-executive 
directors in financially distressed firms. 
The regression analyses have shown that diversity in non-executive directors constantly 
improve firm survival during restructuring period. The significance and the signs of 
total diversity score estimations (score_total) are robust after controlling firm size (firm 
complexity) and CEO power (the agency problem). An increase one point in total score 
can decrease the likelihood of failure between 6 per cent for firms with powerful CEOs 
and almost 14 per cent for firms with a high complexity business. This finding supports 
previous studies (Wilson and Altanlar, 2009; Wilson et al. 2014), in which the diversity 
in the boardroom can improve firm survival. 
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The study splits the diversity scores into two parts: occupation diversity (occupation 
background, tenure, education) and social diversity (gender, age, nationality). The 
relation between both diversity scores and firm survival depends on firm size and CEO 
power. Occupational diversity is less important in smaller firms and firms with powerful 
CEOs, while social diversity is less important in large firms.  
The estimations of occupation diversity and social diversity are relatively very close in 
Panel A Table 5.11 (small firms) and Panel B Table 5.12 (Powerful CEOs) in terms of 
the significance and the sign. The matrix correlation (Table 5.9) also indicates that firm 
size has a negative correlation with CEO power, which means large firms tend to be led 
by less powerful CEOs. The insignificance of occupation diversity for small firms and 
for firms with powerful CEOs can be explained in two ways. Firstly, as smaller firms 
are less complex than larger firms, the boards should put more attention to the financial 
aspect of the firms by appointing directors with special expertise, namely financial 
expertise, rather than hiring individual with community expertise (e.g. academics, 
former MPs) which is mainly aimed to provide a public legitimacy. Secondly, as small 
firms are associated with powerful CEOs, CEOs have power to limit the diversity on the 
board by appointing non-executive directors who have the same occupational 
background with CEOs e.g. experience and education (Westphal and Zajac, 1995). 
Regarding the insignificance of social diversity estimations for large firms (Panel B 
Table 5.11), the study argues that large firms are more scrutinised by external parties in 
the UK. Most of UK governance codes are aimed to large firms. For instance, 
recommendation on minimum of females on the board is towards to FTSE100 rather 
than all listed firms. Large firms encounter a certain pressure which may be not related 
to the business case perspectives to appoint directors from different social background. 
Thus, the effectiveness of social diversity is relatively less effective for those firms.  
Overall, the characteristics of non-executive directors, in terms their independence or 
diversity, have a vital contribution for firm survival. But, the estimations of the diversity 
scores tend to outperform the board independence except in regressions in the sub-
sample of large firms.  This evidence suggests that board independence is not the only 
important feature of non-executive director. Roberts et al. (2005) argue that putting 
more emphasis on board independence will decrease the board effectiveness as they 
may not have sufficient experience about the industry and the business. Firms have to 
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balance between the independence and competence in appointing non-executive 
directors during the restructuring period.  
  
5.5 Conclusion 
The primary objective of this study is to examine the effects of non-executive directors’ 
diversity on firm survival. Using six diversity dimensions (gender, age, tenure, 
education, occupational background, nationality), the study found that most financially 
distressed UK listed firms tend to appoint non-executive directors with homogeneous 
background.  
Overall, the study provides evidence that firms that embrace occupational diversity and 
social diversity will improve the likelihood of firm survival during the period of distress.  
However, the study also shows that not all diversity dimensions could bring positive 
consequences as they may be subject to firm complexity and CEO power. Large firms 
will gain most benefits of occupational diversity, while firms that are led by powerful 
CEOs are more likely to survive when the boards are socially diverse.  
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CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The board of directors has been continuously examined by practitioners and academics. 
In the UK, there are many governance guidelines and recommendations to improve the 
effectiveness of the boards. This trend started with the Cadbury Report (1992), which 
recommended separating the roles of CEO and chairman, appointing more independent 
directors, and establishing nomination, audit, and remuneration committees. The Higgs 
Report (2002) focused on the roles of non-executive directors, which are deemed the 
pivotal party on the boards in aligning management interests with shareholders’ 
interests. The Davies Report (2012) tried to improve female participation on the boards.  
In addition, the UK listed firms do not have to follow all the codes because the UK 
governance codes adopt a ‘comply and explain’ approach. Given these regulations and 
arguments, it is necessary to investigate some of the key aspects of the UK governance 
codes. 
There are two ways to link each of the empirical chapters in this thesis. Firstly, both the 
board chairman and board diversity have continuously been a target of the UK 
governance guidelines, namely the Cadbury Report (1992) and the Combined Code 
(1998) for the board chairman and the Higgs Report (2002) and the Davies Report 
(2012) for board diversity. This implies that these two aspects of the board are essential 
for the prosperity and sustainability of UK listed firms.  
However, there has been a lack of proper investigation into these aspects in the UK. For 
instance, only focusing on chairman duality, or only using UK large listed firms, or 
ignoring certain problems in the analysis, such as: endogeneity problems or tokenism 
problems (Dahya et al., 2002; Florou, 2005; Ryan and Haslam, 2005; Haslam et al., 
2010).  
Secondly, the discussions of the empirical chapters in this thesis followed the 
development of the UK governance guidelines. There is a tendency that the UK 
governance recommendations have evolved. The Cadbury Report (1992), the Greenbury 
Report (1995), and the Hampel Report (1998) all tried to improve board oversight, 
which is underpinned by the agency theory. The Higgs Report (2002) tried to shift 
previous codes by calling for more diversity in the UK board room because the report 
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found that UK boards of directors tend to be homogeneous. After the financial crisis in 
2008, the Turner Review (2009) and the Walker Review (2009) recommended a balance 
between board independence and competence in the UK financial sector. Finally, the 
Davies Report (2012) only focuses on gender diversity in the UK boardroom, which is 
underpinned by the resource dependence theory.  
Given the development of the UK governance codes, the empirical chapters in this 
thesis have tried to capture the same approach. The first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) 
was predominantly approached by the agency theory, while the second and the third 
empirical chapters (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) are primarily underpinned by the resource 
dependence theory. 
The main objective of this thesis was to investigate whether the key aspects of UK 
governance codes may have positive consequences on the board effectiveness, firm 
performance and firm outcomes.  In order to achieve this objective, the thesis focused 
on the following questions. Firstly, do chairman characteristics influence CEO turnover 
events? Secondly, does the presence of female directors influence firm performance? 
Thirdly, does board diversity, namely gender, nationality, age, education diversity, 
influence firm survival during the period of distress? 
This chapter will summarize the key findings of this thesis. The rest of the chapter is 
therefore organized as follows. Section 6.2 will summarize and discuss the key results 
of the empirical chapters. Section 6.3 will discuss the limitations of this thesis and 
several aspects that can be investigated in the future. Section 6.4 will present the 
conclusions and contributions of the thesis.  
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6.2  Key Findings on the Empirical Chapters 
This section will be divided into three sub-sections based on the empirical chapters. 
 
6.2.1 Chairman Characteristics and CEO turnover 
Chapter 3 has examined the impacts of the chairman characteristics on CEO turnovers. 
Since most of the UK listed firms have separated the CEO-chairman roles, this chapter 
argues that the characteristics of the board chairman can influence decisions on 
removing poor performing CEOs, which is one of the fundamental duties of the 
chairman.  
By employing a large panel data set and logit regression analysis of the UK listed firms 
between 2004 and 2012, Chapter 3 has shown that certain chairman characteristics may 
influence CEO turnovers. Firstly, chairmen title. This study hypothesised that the non-
executive chairmen are more effective to remove poor performing CEOs than the 
executive chairmen because the non-executive chairmen tend to focus in monitoring 
roles. The regression analysis found no evidence that the non-executive chairmen 
significantly influence the sensitivity of firm performance and CEO turnovers. However, 
further analysis showed that the effectiveness of the non-executive chairmen depends on 
the board composition and board size.  
Secondly, chairmen independence. Similar to previous result, there was no clear 
evidence that the independent chairmen can influence CEO turnover. Nonetheless, the 
impacts of the independent chairman can be significant when the boards are 
(independent) non-executive dominated and small. This analysis is consistent with 
McNulty et al. (2011), in which the chairman can increase his or her influence by 
creating a certain board structure and composition. 
Thirdly, chairman age. The analysis showed that younger chairmen are more influential 
than the older chairmen in CEO turnover events. Even though the older chairmen may 
have more experience than the younger chairmen, their cognitive abilities tend to 
deteriorate, which leads to less effectiveness in assessing CEO performance. The older 
chairmen can increase board size or board independence to accommodate such 
cognitive problems. 
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Fourthly, chairman tenure. There was no evidence that the chairmen tenure can 
influence the sensitivity of CEO turnover and firm performance. This result is robust 
after controlling for board size and board independence.  
Finally, chairman involvement in the CEO selection. The interaction analysis did not 
provide sufficient evidence that the chairman involvement can increase CEO turnovers. 
Overall, there are two important implications from the empirical analysis. (1) The 
effectiveness of chairman roles is highly associated with board size and board 
composition. This means that the chairman cannot remove poor performing CEOs by 
his or her own assessment. (2) The roles of the chairman may have been shifting from 
the passive roles (e.g. only monitoring roles) to the active chairmanship.  
 
6.2.2 Female Directors and Firm Performance 
Chapter 4 discussed the effects of female directors on firm performance. Previous 
studies indicated that female directors tend to have positive consequences on board 
effectiveness (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Jurkus et al., 2011), but that the effects do not 
necessarily lead to better firm performance (Smith et al., 2006; Rose, 2007; Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). This study has tried to address several 
concerns that might influence the relationship between female directors and firm 
performance, namely the endogeneity problem, the tokenism problem, female 
representative measures, and certain characteristics of the firm.  
Chapter 4 used non-financial UK listed firms between 2004 and 2012. To address the 
endogeneity issue, several types of regression were employed, including OLS, fixed-
effect, 2SLS, and GMM regressions. Two instrumental variables were used in 2SLS 
regressions, namely the fraction of male directors who have a connection to female 
directors and the fraction of female director within firms in the same industry.  Firm 
performance was measured firm ROA and profit margin. 
The first analysis examined the impacts of female directors on firm performance. There 
was a little evidence that female directors can significantly influence firm performance. 
Most of the estimations reported positive signs, but they lacked significance. 
The second analysis investigated whether female non-executive directors and female 
executive directors have the same influence on firm performance. Female executive 
directors tend to have insignificant and negative estimations. This analysis argued that 
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(1) female executive directors are not as competitive as their male counterparts (Wolfer, 
2006; Kolev, 2012); (2) female executive directors are deemed less risky and less 
confident in terms of financing and investment decisions (Huang and Kisgen, 2013; 
Levi et al., 2013). Similarly, the analysis found no strong evidence that female non-
executive directors may influence firm performance. 
The third analysis examined whether there is a certain threshold at which female 
directors have more influence on firm performance. After addressing the endogeneity 
problem, there was evidence that three or more female directors have a greater influence 
than one or two female directors on firm performance. Thus, it was concluded that it is 
important to keep a gender balance on the boards rather than only considering the need 
for the presence of female directors (by only appointing one female director). 
The fourth analysis examined whether CEO power and firm size might influence the 
relation between female directors and firm performance. No evidence was found that 
CEO power can significantly influence the relation between female directors and firm 
performance. However, there is a possibility that firms with powerful CEOs may gain 
most benefits by appointing female directors, as the estimations tended to be positive 
and stable. Next, the estimations showed that female directors are more influential in 
small firms rather than in large firms. This chapter argued that large firms appoint 
female directors not entirely because of the business perspective reason e.g. external 
pressure. 
Overall, this chapter has shown that female directors can have a positive influence on 
firm performance. The results were robust after properly addressing the endogeneity 
problems by employing different estimations. However, several aspects should be 
considered when appointing female directors namely the tokenism problems and certain 
external pressures.  
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6.2.3 Board Diversity and Firm Survival 
Chapter 5 has discussed the impact of board diversity on firm survival. Practitioners and 
academics tend to put more emphasis on the independence feature of non-executive 
directors rather than balancing both the competence and independence features of non-
executive directors. In terms of the financial distress, most studies show that the 
independence of non-executive directors is pivotal to firm survival. In addition, board 
diversity has a significant impact on firm value, cost of capital, and the quality of 
disclosure. Therefore, Chapter 5 aimed to investigate the effects of non-executive 
diversity on firm survival. 
This study has only focused on financially distressed firms rather than all listed firms 
because it is the financially distressed firms that may encounter agency problems and 
conduct restructuring activities. The involvement of non-executive directors is 
important to firm survival with respect to these directors’ independence and competence. 
The study has used debt ratio and qui-score to proxy financially distressed firms and six 
diversity dimensions to proxy board diversity. In terms of the estimations, the study 
employed the Cox proportional hazard model.  
There were three important findings in this final empirical chapter (Chapter 5). (1) The 
diversity of non-executive directors can reduce the likelihood of failure, while the 
independence of non-executive director tends to be not significant in almost all 
estimations. This finding is robust after controlling for firm size and CEO power.  
(2) Social diversity (e.g. age, gender, and nationality) does not necessarily lead to firm 
survival particularly for large firms. This study argued that large firms are prone to 
government intervention in creating their board structures. In other words, board 
diversity in those firms is a result of an external intervention rather than a business 
necessity. Nonetheless, social diversity seems to have a significant influence for firms 
with powerful CEOs, which are the proxy of weak governance. (3) Occupation diversity 
(e.g. education, expertise, and experience) effects on firm survival may depend on CEO 
power. Powerful CEOs tend to appoint non-executive directors who have relatively 
similar backgrounds to themselves. 
Overall, this final empirical chapter showed that there is another important feature in 
appointing non-executive directors besides their independence. Firms should appoint 
and maintain the heterogeneity of non-executive directors in order to provide a wider 
pool of talents (i.e. expertise, experience, connections) during the period of distress. 
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6.3  Research Limitations and Future Research  
Every empirical chapter has its limitations and these can be addressed in future studies. 
The first empirical chapter of this thesis has shown that several chairman characteristics 
have important impacts in explaining CEO turnover, but their significance may depend 
on board size and board composition. Even though this study has discussed five 
chairman characteristics, there are many chairman characteristics that can be 
investigated in the later studies, such as the chairman previous experience (for instance 
former CEOs, former executive director, etc.), the chairman current roles (involvement 
in board committees, multiple directorships, etc.). These aspects are likely to affect 
board effectiveness. 
Moreover, the future study can control the fraction of directors (or non-executive 
directors) of which the chairmen are involved in their appointment. It would also be 
interesting to control for several important parties that have an influence on CEO 
turnover such as the recruitment (nomination) committee and institutional shareholders 
with respect to the relation between chairman characteristics and CEO turnover 
sensitivity.  
Overall, these findings could open opportunities to further quantitative research on the 
roles of chairman in other firm strategic decisions or firm performance because the roles 
of chairman have evolved from a passive chairmanship to an active chairmanship. 
The second empirical chapter reported that female directors can significantly influence 
firm performance. This study did not control for female directors’ characteristics (e.g. 
age, education, and expertise). The next study could extend the present study by 
controlling for those characteristics. Moreover, this study has distinguished between 
director function in two ways, namely executive directors and non-executive directors. 
Further studies could be done by examining in more detail, for instance female CEOs or 
female finance directors.  
The third empirical chapter showed that six diversity dimensions can improve firm 
survival in the period of distress. In terms of the study of diversity, the next study could 
add more proxies such as ethnicity and level of director busyness (multiple 
directorships). It is also important to examine the effect of this diversity in other aspects 
of governance and board effectiveness. In terms of governance studies, there should be 
more investigations on other features of non-executive directors besides their 
independence feature. Finally, in terms of bankruptcy studies, it will be interesting to 
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see whether board diversity has a certain influence in the selection of strategic decisions 
during a restructuring period, for instance employee layoff, delays in dividend payments, 
or assets sell-off. 
 
 
6.4  Summary 
This thesis has examined several aspects of the UK governance codes on the level of 
board effectiveness, firm performance, and firm outcomes. Several chairman 
characteristics have important impacts in disciplining poor performing CEOs, but those 
relationships may depend on the board composition and board size. Similarly, female 
directors may bring positive benefits on firm performance, but certain aspects should be 
considered in appointing female directors. Finally, the heterogeneity of non-executive 
directors improves firm survival during the period of distress. 
This thesis contributes to governance studies in several ways. Firstly, it has opened up 
an opportunity for further quantitative examinations on the chairman roles. Previous 
studies have predominantly focused on CEOs and non-executive directors. Moreover, 
studies that discussed the roles of chairman were primarily conducted qualitatively.  
Secondly, this thesis contributes to the fast growing literature on board diversity. This 
study showed that the diversity on the boards can bring positive consequences on firm 
performance and firm survival. Thirdly, this thesis, particularly Chapter 5, contributes to 
bankruptcy (financial distress) studies by linking corporate governance and financial 
distress via the agency theory and the resource dependence theory. Previous related 
studies are largely approached it via the agency theory.  
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Appendix A. The Estimation Results and the Graphs of Interaction Effects 
A.1. Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Function for Small Board                        
(Board Size < 5).  CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial performance 
measures and control variables. functionXroa is interaction variable between chair_func and roaf2. 
functionXret is interaction variable between chair_func and ret_bloom2. functionXpm is interaction 
variable between chair_func and prof_margin2.   functionXqui is interaction variable between chair_func 
and quif.   Year and industry (2-digit ICB code) are controlled for all models. *, **, and *** mean 
statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. 
Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 funct_roa funct_ret funct_pm funct_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
chair_func -0.710 -0.961** -0.673 0.121 
 (0.441) (0.432) (0.418) (1.042) 
outsider_code -0.073 -0.464 -0.237 -0.194 
 (0.356) (0.369) (0.399) (0.367) 
ceo_tenure -0.002 -0.014 -0.015 -0.005 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.038) 
prop_ined -0.315 -0.046 -1.220 -0.015 
 (0.902) (0.920) (1.111) (0.896) 
women_ned 0.300 0.533 1.155 0.582 
 (0.775) (0.798) (0.797) (0.710) 
ln_employf 0.025 -0.112 -0.174 -0.061 
 (0.110) (0.118) (0.126) (0.129) 
block -1.704 -1.756 -2.202* -1.854 
 (1.045) (1.145) (1.330) (1.131) 
firm_age -0.013 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
chair_age -0.043** -0.055** -0.047** -0.051** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) 
chair_tenure 0.026 0.033 0.034 0.031 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.030) (0.026) 
independent_origin 0.099 -0.069 0.061 -0.134 
 (0.382) (0.389) (0.434) (0.382) 
involve 0.055 -0.145 -0.109 -0.061 
 (0.383) (0.385) (0.444) (0.399) 
roaf2 -0.517    
 (0.405)    
functionXroa -0.443    
 (0.449)    
ret_bloom2  -0.006*   
  (0.003)   
functionXret  -0.005   
  (0.004)   
prof_margin2   0.027**  
   (0.011)  
functionXpm   -0.046***  
   (0.016)  
quif    -0.005 
    (0.011) 
functionXqui    -0.011 
    (0.014) 
Constant 0.484 2.064 0.984 2.101 
 (1.461) (1.503) (1.858) (1.609) 
     
Observations 952 861 802 913 
ll -199.0 -183.4 -161.4 -192.7 
r2_p 0.100 0.147 0.111 0.108 
236 
 
 
 
A.2. Interaction Effect between Chairman Function and Firm Performance for 
Small Board (Board Size < 5) 
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A.3. Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Function for Large Board (Board Size > 
8). CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial performance measures and control 
variables. functionXroa is interaction variable between chair_func and roaf2. functionXret is interaction 
variable between chair_func and ret_bloom2. functionXpm is interaction variable between chair_func and 
prof_margin2.   functionXqui is interaction variable between chair_func and quif. Year and industry (2-
digit ICB code) are controlled for all models.   *, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 
per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. Robust standard errors are provided 
in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 funct_roa funct_ret funct_pm funct_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
chair_func -0.585** -0.689** -0.595** 0.924 
 (0.279) (0.302) (0.274) (1.640) 
outsider_code -0.076 -0.106 0.021 -0.047 
 (0.253) (0.267) (0.251) (0.265) 
ceo_tenure -0.012 -0.015 -0.022 -0.015 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) 
prop_ined 0.224 0.432 0.088 0.539 
 (0.964) (1.032) (0.985) (0.946) 
women_ned -1.528 -1.565 -1.627 -1.468 
 (1.056) (1.066) (1.093) (1.052) 
ln_employf 0.031 -0.007 -0.028 -0.044 
 (0.063) (0.067) (0.068) (0.065) 
block -0.358 -0.368 -0.396 -0.399 
 (0.854) (0.941) (0.852) (0.914) 
firm_age 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
chair_age -0.027* -0.034** -0.022 -0.029** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
chair_tenure -0.009 -0.008 -0.012 -0.015 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
independent_origin 0.086 0.094 0.143 0.048 
 (0.275) (0.287) (0.273) (0.271) 
involve -0.479* -0.476* -0.522* -0.418 
 (0.279) (0.288) (0.281) (0.283) 
roaf2 -2.586***    
 (0.743)    
functionXroa 1.870**    
 (0.853)    
ret_bloom2  -0.011***   
  (0.004)   
functionXret  0.000   
  (0.004)   
prof_margin2   -0.048*  
   (0.028)  
functionXpm   0.052  
   (0.036)  
quif    0.013 
    (0.018) 
functionXqui    -0.018 
    (0.019) 
Constant -0.197 0.422 0.083 -0.664 
 (1.113) (1.174) (1.082) (1.923) 
     
Observations 1,712 1,568 1,641 1,599 
ll -326.8 -296.2 -320.2 -316.5 
r2_p 0.0736 0.0958 0.0667 0.0551 
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A.4. Interaction Effect between Chairman Function and Firm Performance for 
Large Board (Board Size > 8) 
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A.5. Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Function for Insider-Dominated Board 
(prop_ined ≤ 0.5). CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial performance 
measures and control variables. functionXroa is interaction variable between chair_func and roaf2. 
functionXret is interaction variable between chair_func and ret_bloom2. functionXpm is interaction 
variable between chair_func and prof_margin2.   functionXqui is interaction variable between chair_func 
and quif. Year and industry (2-digit ICB code) are controlled for all models.    *, **, and *** mean 
statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. 
Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 funct_roa funct_ret funct_pm funct_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
chair_func -0.275** -0.353*** -0.228* -0.661 
 (0.131) (0.136) (0.136) (0.500) 
outsider_code 0.287** 0.207* 0.325** 0.274** 
 (0.117) (0.123) (0.127) (0.120) 
ceo_tenure 0.003 0.005 -0.008 0.000 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
board_size 0.033 0.041 0.050 0.040 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
women_ned 0.128 0.350 0.401 0.066 
 (0.427) (0.423) (0.446) (0.454) 
ln_employf -0.036 -0.110*** -0.140*** -0.082** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.038) 
block -0.556 -0.277 -0.295 -0.518 
 (0.403) (0.426) (0.423) (0.419) 
firm_age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
chair_age -0.015** -0.016** -0.015* -0.015** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
chair_tenure -0.042** -0.044** -0.041** -0.044** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
independent_origin 0.184 0.145 0.077 0.123 
 (0.115) (0.119) (0.123) (0.116) 
involve 0.005 -0.002 -0.014 -0.011 
 (0.135) (0.141) (0.146) (0.138) 
roaf2 -0.939***    
 (0.175)    
functionXroa 0.109    
 (0.200)    
ret_bloom2  -0.006***   
  (0.001)   
functionXret  -0.001   
  (0.002)   
prof_margin2   -0.004  
   (0.006)  
functionXpm   -0.003  
   (0.008)  
quif    -0.017*** 
    (0.005) 
functionXqui    0.004 
    (0.006) 
Constant -2.252*** -1.704*** -1.712*** -0.408 
 (0.551) (0.560) (0.584) (0.645) 
     
Observations 6,249 5,807 5,666 6,032 
ll -1343 -1238 -1201 -1298 
r2_p 0.0550 0.0638 0.0395 0.0462 
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A.6. Interaction Effect between Chairman Function and Firm Performance for 
Insider-Dominated Board (prop_ined ≤ 0.5)  
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A.7. Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Function for Outsider-Dominated 
Board (prop_ined > 0.5). CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial 
performance measures and control variables. functionXroa is interaction variable between chair_func and 
roaf2. functionXret is interaction variable between chair_func and ret_bloom2. functionXpm is 
interaction variable between chair_func and prof_margin2.   functionXqui is interaction variable between 
chair_func and quif. Year and industry (2-digit ICB code) are controlled for all models.     *, **, and *** 
mean statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance 
respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 funct_roa funct_ret funct_pm funct_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
chair_func -0.008 -0.160 -0.374 2.909 
 (0.341) (0.363) (0.349) (2.333) 
outsider_code 0.188 0.050 0.124 0.264 
 (0.198) (0.212) (0.215) (0.202) 
ceo_tenure 0.006 -0.011 -0.014 0.002 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) 
board_size 0.083* 0.064 0.098** 0.076 
 (0.046) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) 
women_ned -0.135 -0.375 -0.172 0.019 
 (0.858) (0.915) (0.878) (0.876) 
ln_employf -0.058 -0.076 -0.083 -0.077 
 (0.050) (0.052) (0.055) (0.050) 
block 0.172 -0.841 -0.431 0.111 
 (0.672) (0.792) (0.814) (0.690) 
firm_age 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
chair_age -0.032** -0.036** -0.031** -0.027** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) 
chair_tenure -0.049 -0.028 -0.036 -0.036 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.041) (0.040) 
independent_origin -0.197 -0.313 -0.200 -0.179 
 (0.233) (0.239) (0.251) (0.239) 
involve -0.204 -0.316 -0.426 -0.191 
 (0.261) (0.272) (0.285) (0.265) 
roaf2 -0.767    
 (0.577)    
functionXroa -0.146    
 (0.624)    
ret_bloom2  -0.005   
  (0.004)   
functionXret  -0.004   
  (0.004)   
prof_margin2   0.034  
   (0.026)  
functionXpm   -0.051*  
   (0.027)  
quif    0.008 
    (0.027) 
functionXqui    -0.035 
    (0.028) 
Constant -1.338 -0.234 -0.857 -2.123 
 (0.889) (0.931) (1.003) (2.338) 
     
Observations 2,253 2,056 2,078 2,200 
ll -467.1 -415.5 -409.7 -449.4 
r2_p 0.0548 0.0803 0.0605 0.0636 
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A.8. Interaction Effect between Chairman Function and Firm Performance for 
Outsider-Dominated Board (prop_ined > 0.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction ROA and Chairman Function (Outsider Dominated Board)
Interaction Stock Return and Chairman Function (Outsider Dominated Board)
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A.9. Interaction between Firm Performance and Independent Chairman for All Observations. CEO 
turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial performance measures and control variables. 
indXroa is interaction variable between independent_origin and roaf2. indXret is interaction variable 
between independent_origin and ret_bloom2. indXpm is interaction variable between independent_origin 
and prof_margin2.   indXqui is interaction variable between independent_origin and quif. Year and 
industry (2-digit ICB code) are controlled for all models. *, **, and *** mean statistically different from 
zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. Robust standard errors are 
provided in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ind_roa ind_ret ind_pm ind_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
independent_origin 0.128 0.160 0.065 -0.390 
 (0.112) (0.120) (0.117) (0.433) 
outsider_code 0.269*** 0.178* 0.287*** 0.282*** 
 (0.100) (0.105) (0.107) (0.102) 
ceo_tenure 0.003 -0.002 -0.013 -0.000 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
prop_ined -0.233 -0.088 -0.549 -0.275 
 (0.318) (0.327) (0.343) (0.318) 
board_size 0.047* 0.050* 0.070*** 0.049* 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
women_ned 0.027 0.220 0.291 0.004 
 (0.391) (0.390) (0.409) (0.413) 
ln_employf -0.030 -0.085*** -0.097*** -0.062** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.030) 
block -0.419 -0.402 -0.313 -0.395 
 (0.345) (0.374) (0.371) (0.355) 
firm_age -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
chair_age -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
chair_tenure -0.045*** -0.040** -0.041** -0.042** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
chair_func -0.247** -0.269** -0.193 -0.249** 
 (0.114) (0.117) (0.121) (0.114) 
involve -0.048 -0.101 -0.128 -0.059 
 (0.119) (0.124) (0.127) (0.121) 
roaf2 -0.820***    
 (0.123)    
indXroa -0.058    
 (0.173)    
ret_bloom2  -0.008***   
  (0.001)   
indXret  0.002*   
  (0.001)   
prof_margin2   -0.004  
   (0.005)  
indXpm   -0.006  
   (0.006)  
quif    -0.019*** 
    (0.004) 
indXqui    0.006 
    (0.005) 
Constant -1.986*** -1.502*** -1.564*** -0.139 
 (0.460) (0.464) (0.489) (0.537) 
     
Observations 8,507 7,916 7,749 8,237 
ll -1821 -1667 -1622 -1759 
r2_p 0.0497 0.0622 0.0385 0.0446 
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A.10. Interaction Effect between Independent Chairman and Firm Performance 
for all observation 
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A11. Interaction between Firm Performance and Independent Chairman for Small Board (Board 
Size < 5). CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial performance measures and 
control variables. indXroa is interaction variable between independent_origin and roaf2. indXret is 
interaction variable between independent_origin and ret_bloom2. indXpm is interaction variable between 
independent_origin and prof_margin2. indXqui is interaction variable between independent_origin and 
quif. Year and industry (2-digit ICB code) are controlled for all models.  *, **, and *** mean statistically 
different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. Robust 
standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ind_roa ind_ret ind_pm ind_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
independent_origin -0.305 -0.172 -0.208 -0.259 
 (0.415) (0.442) (0.461) (1.140) 
outsider_code -0.034 -0.451 -0.162 -0.199 
 (0.354) (0.371) (0.395) (0.368) 
ceo_tenure -0.003 -0.013 -0.016 -0.007 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.038) 
prop_ined -0.336 -0.098 -1.093 -0.037 
 (0.905) (0.936) (1.113) (0.911) 
women_ned 0.418 0.560 1.203 0.630 
 (0.775) (0.879) (0.798) (0.692) 
ln_employf 0.044 -0.118 -0.151 -0.069 
 (0.111) (0.120) (0.129) (0.127) 
block -1.652 -1.543 -2.207 -1.793 
 (1.128) (1.135) (1.361) (1.120) 
firm_age -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
chair_age -0.044** -0.056** -0.045** -0.049** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) 
chair_tenure 0.021 0.032 0.030 0.035 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.031) (0.026) 
chair_func -0.629 -0.715* -0.497 -0.664* 
 (0.396) (0.370) (0.411) (0.367) 
involve -0.059 -0.120 -0.172 -0.086 
 (0.399) (0.383) (0.452) (0.402) 
roaf2 -0.418    
 (0.305)    
indXroa -1.150**    
 (0.463)    
ret_bloom2  -0.007***   
  (0.003)   
indXret  -0.002   
  (0.004)   
prof_margin2   0.033**  
   (0.015)  
indXpm   -0.053***  
   (0.020)  
quif    -0.011 
    (0.011) 
indXqui    0.002 
    (0.015) 
Constant 0.629 1.997 0.586 2.423 
 (1.468) (1.500) (1.904) (1.588) 
     
Observations 952 861 802 913 
ll -196.8 -184.1 -161.3 -193.0 
r2_p 0.111 0.144 0.113 0.107 
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A.12. Interaction Effect between Independent Chairman and Firm Performance 
for Small Board (Board Size < 5)  
Interaction Profit Margin and Independent Chairman (Small Board)
Interaction Qui Score and Independent Chairman (Small Board)
Interaction ROA and Independent Chairman (Small Board)
Interaction Stock Return and Independent Chairman (Small Board)
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A.13. Interaction between Firm Performance and Independent Chairman for Large Board (Board 
Size > 8). CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial performance measures and 
control variables. indXroa is interaction variable between independent_origin and roaf2. indXret is 
interaction variable between independent_origin and ret_bloom2. indXpm is interaction variable between 
independent_origin and prof_margin2.   indXqui is interaction variable between independent_origin and 
quif. Year and industry (2-digit ICB code) are controlled for all models.  *, **, and *** mean statistically 
different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. Robust 
standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ind_roa ind_ret ind_pm ind_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
independent_origin 0.055 0.044 0.167 0.312 
 (0.275) (0.298) (0.275) (1.415) 
outsider_code -0.076 -0.098 0.014 -0.049 
 (0.250) (0.267) (0.251) (0.266) 
ceo_tenure -0.007 -0.014 -0.020 -0.014 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
prop_ined 0.436 0.435 0.101 0.503 
 (0.955) (1.024) (0.980) (0.934) 
women_ned -1.445 -1.564 -1.572 -1.516 
 (1.037) (1.069) (1.091) (1.050) 
ln_employf 0.026 -0.006 -0.029 -0.043 
 (0.063) (0.067) (0.067) (0.065) 
block -0.443 -0.349 -0.431 -0.377 
 (0.874) (0.942) (0.856) (0.888) 
firm_age 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
chair_age -0.026* -0.034** -0.023 -0.029** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
chair_tenure -0.013 -0.009 -0.013 -0.016 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
chair_func -0.650** -0.694** -0.644** -0.630** 
 (0.273) (0.290) (0.268) (0.268) 
involve -0.409 -0.461 -0.501* -0.416 
 (0.270) (0.288) (0.280) (0.283) 
roaf2 -1.500**    
 (0.643)    
indXroa 0.671    
 (0.747)    
ret_bloom2  -0.009**   
  (0.004)   
indXret  -0.003   
  (0.004)   
prof_margin2   -0.035*  
   (0.019)  
indXpm   0.103  
   (0.094)  
quif    0.000 
    (0.014) 
indXqui    -0.003 
    (0.017) 
Constant -0.280 0.417 0.158 0.394 
 (1.126) (1.174) (1.070) (1.487) 
     
Observations 1,712 1,568 1,641 1,599 
ll -328.7 -295.9 -320.4 -316.9 
r2_p 0.0681 0.0967 0.0660 0.0540 
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A.14. Interaction Effect between Independent Chairman and Firm Performance 
for Large Board (Board size > 8) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction Profit Margin and Independent Chairman (Large Board)
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A.15. Interaction between Firm Performance and Independent Chairman for Insider-Dominated 
Board (prop_ined ≤ 0.5). CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial 
performance measures and control variables. indXroa is interaction variable between independent_origin 
and roaf2. indXret is interaction variable between independent_origin and ret_bloom2. indXpm is 
interaction variable between independent_origin and prof_margin2. indXqui is interaction variable 
between independent_origin and quif. Year and industry (2-digit ICB code) are controlled for all models.   
*, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of 
significance respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ind_roa ind_ret ind_pm ind_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
independent_origin 0.195 0.286** 0.078 -0.972* 
 (0.123) (0.129) (0.126) (0.505) 
outsider_code 0.287** 0.206* 0.328*** 0.278** 
 (0.117) (0.123) (0.127) (0.120) 
ceo_tenure 0.004 0.004 -0.008 0.000 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
board_size 0.033 0.042 0.050 0.042 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
women_ned 0.125 0.361 0.400 0.081 
 (0.426) (0.420) (0.447) (0.455) 
ln_employf -0.037 -0.107*** -0.140*** -0.086** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.037) 
block -0.564 -0.260 -0.290 -0.535 
 (0.403) (0.427) (0.422) (0.419) 
firm_age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
chair_age -0.015** -0.016** -0.015* -0.015** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
chair_tenure -0.043** -0.042** -0.041** -0.043** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
chair_func -0.303** -0.322** -0.216* -0.323*** 
 (0.122) (0.125) (0.131) (0.122) 
involve 0.006 -0.017 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.135) (0.142) (0.146) (0.138) 
roaf2 -0.880***    
 (0.132)    
indXroa 0.043    
 (0.191)    
ret_bloom2  -0.008***   
  (0.001)   
indXret  0.004**   
  (0.002)   
prof_margin2   -0.006  
   (0.005)  
indXpm   0.000  
   (0.007)  
quif    -0.020*** 
    (0.004) 
indXqui    0.014** 
    (0.006) 
Constant -2.242*** -1.821*** -1.724*** -0.193 
 (0.556) (0.558) (0.585) (0.613) 
     
Observations 6,249 5,807 5,666 6,032 
ll -1343 -1235 -1201 -1296 
r2_p 0.0549 0.0660 0.0394 0.0476 
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A.16. Interaction Effect between Independent Chairman and Firm Performance 
for Insider-Dominated Board (prop_ined ≤ 0.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction Profit Margin and Independent Chairman (Insider Dominated Board)
Interaction Qui Score and Independent Chairman (Insider Dominated Board)
Interaction ROA and Independent Chairman (Insider Dominated Board)
Interaction Stock Return and Independent Chairman (Insider Dominated Board)
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A.17. Interaction between Firm Performance and Independent Chairman for Outsider-Dominated 
Board (prop_ined > 0.5). CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial 
performance measures and control variables. indXroa is interaction variable between independent_origin 
and roaf2. indXret is interaction variable between independent_origin and ret_bloom2. indXpm is 
interaction variable between independent_origin and prof_margin2.   indXqui is interaction variable 
between independent_origin and quif. Year and industry (2-digit ICB code) are controlled for all models.   
*, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of 
significance respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ind_roa ind_ret ind_pm ind_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
independent_origin -0.229 -0.370 -0.266 1.226 
 (0.235) (0.243) (0.252) (1.218) 
outsider_code 0.184 0.058 0.108 0.265 
 (0.199) (0.211) (0.215) (0.202) 
ceo_tenure 0.006 -0.013 -0.016 0.002 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032) 
board_size 0.080* 0.058 0.092* 0.071 
 (0.046) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) 
women_ned -0.159 -0.387 -0.182 -0.003 
 (0.858) (0.914) (0.877) (0.878) 
ln_employf -0.059 -0.073 -0.080 -0.071 
 (0.050) (0.053) (0.055) (0.049) 
block 0.131 -0.836 -0.420 0.169 
 (0.673) (0.797) (0.807) (0.668) 
firm_age 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
chair_age -0.033** -0.037** -0.030** -0.027** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) 
chair_tenure -0.049 -0.024 -0.036 -0.034 
 (0.039) (0.037) (0.041) (0.040) 
chair_func -0.006 -0.026 -0.331 0.081 
 (0.343) (0.349) (0.348) (0.352) 
involve -0.198 -0.326 -0.437 -0.196 
 (0.260) (0.273) (0.286) (0.265) 
roaf2 -0.503    
 (0.422)    
indXroa -0.524    
 (0.500)    
ret_bloom2  -0.007**   
  (0.003)   
indXret  -0.002   
  (0.003)   
prof_margin2   0.038  
   (0.025)  
indXpm   -0.059**  
   (0.025)  
quif    -0.012 
    (0.014) 
indXqui    -0.017 
    (0.015) 
Constant -1.221 -0.211 -0.815 -0.552 
 (0.881) (0.946) (0.994) (1.258) 
     
Observations 2,253 2,056 2,078 2,200 
ll -466.7 -415.9 -408.5 -449.9 
r2_p 0.0556 0.0794 0.0631 0.0624 
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A.18. Interaction Effect between Independent Chairman and Firm Performance 
for Outsider Board Dominated (prop_ined > 0.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction Profit Margin and Independent Chairman (Outsider Dominated Board)
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A.19. Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Age for All Observation. CEO turnover 
is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial performance measures and control variables. ageXroa 
is interaction variable between chair_age and roaf2. ageXret is interaction variable between chair_age and 
ret_bloom2. ageXpm is interaction variable between chair_age and prof_margin2.   ageXqui is interaction 
variable between chair_age and quif. Year and industry (2-digit ICB code) are controlled for all models.   
*, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of 
significance respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 age_roa age_ret age_pm age_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
chair_age -0.019*** -0.025*** -0.018*** 0.031 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.026) 
outsider_code 0.268*** 0.182* 0.291*** 0.283*** 
 (0.100) (0.105) (0.108) (0.102) 
ceo_tenure 0.003 -0.002 -0.012 -0.001 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
prop_ined -0.231 -0.115 -0.556 -0.257 
 (0.318) (0.328) (0.343) (0.318) 
board_size 0.048* 0.050* 0.071*** 0.047* 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
women_ned 0.029 0.211 0.287 -0.009 
 (0.392) (0.389) (0.409) (0.411) 
ln_employf -0.031 -0.084*** -0.097*** -0.063** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.030) 
block -0.418 -0.419 -0.305 -0.415 
 (0.345) (0.374) (0.370) (0.356) 
firm_age -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
independent_origin 0.140 0.088 0.085 0.101 
 (0.107) (0.111) (0.114) (0.107) 
chair_tenure -0.045*** -0.040** -0.041** -0.042** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
chair_func -0.248** -0.264** -0.188 -0.254** 
 (0.114) (0.117) (0.121) (0.114) 
involve -0.048 -0.094 -0.127 -0.052 
 (0.119) (0.123) (0.127) (0.121) 
roaf2 -0.841    
 (0.641)    
ageXroa -0.000    
 (0.011)    
ret_bloom2  -0.000   
  (0.005)   
ageXret  -0.000   
  (0.000)   
prof_margin2   -0.009  
   (0.018)  
ageXpm   0.000  
   (0.000)  
quif    0.020 
    (0.020) 
ageXqui    -0.001* 
    (0.000) 
Constant -2.001*** -1.184** -1.591*** -3.193** 
 (0.482) (0.485) (0.497) (1.574) 
     
Observations 8,507 7,916 7,749 8,237 
ll -1821 -1667 -1622 -1758 
r2_p 0.0496 0.0619 0.0383 0.0451 
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A.20. Interaction Effect between Firm Performance and Chairman Age for All 
Observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction Profit Margin and Chairman Age (All Observations)
Interaction Qui Score and Chairman Age (All Observations)
Interaction ROA and Chairman Age (All Observations)
Interaction Stock Return and Chairman Age (All Observations)
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A.21. Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Age for Small Board (Board Size < 5). 
CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial performance measures and control 
variables. ageXroa is interaction variable between chair_age and roaf2. ageXret is interaction variable 
between chair_age and ret_bloom2. ageXpm is interaction variable between chair_age and prof_margin2. 
ageXqui is interaction variable between chair_age and quif. Year and industry (2-digit ICB code) are 
controlled for all models.   *, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, 
and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 age_roa age_ret age_pm age_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
chair_age -0.034 -0.060** -0.049** -0.100* 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.022) (0.060) 
outsider_code -0.004 -0.463 -0.111 -0.155 
 (0.351) (0.375) (0.421) (0.362) 
ceo_tenure 0.000 -0.013 -0.017 -0.003 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.042) (0.038) 
prop_ined -0.093 -0.098 -1.211 -0.075 
 (0.745) (0.751) (0.862) (0.737) 
women_ned 0.361 0.537 1.046 0.616 
 (0.753) (0.843) (0.813) (0.688) 
ln_employf 0.028 -0.114 -0.153 -0.075 
 (0.110) (0.119) (0.124) (0.124) 
block -1.904* -1.538 -2.015 -2.089* 
 (1.105) (1.121) (1.309) (1.194) 
firm_age -0.015 -0.011 -0.010 -0.012 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
chair_tenure 0.023 0.035 0.035 0.032 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.025) 
chair_func -0.499 -0.703* -0.357 -0.622* 
 (0.378) (0.368) (0.416) (0.361) 
involve 0.113 -0.111 -0.119 -0.026 
 (0.379) (0.385) (0.457) (0.398) 
roaf2 -1.731    
 (1.501)    
ageXroa 0.015    
 (0.026)    
ret_bloom2  -0.004   
  (0.015)   
ageXret  -0.000   
  (0.000)   
prof_margin2   0.015  
   (0.058)  
ageXpm   -0.000  
   (0.001)  
quif    -0.052 
    (0.047) 
ageXqui    0.001 
    (0.001) 
Constant -0.222 2.100 0.594 5.206 
 (1.611) (1.663) (1.869) (3.628) 
     
Observations 956 862 805 917 
ll -201.2 -184.3 -164.2 -195.3 
r2_p 0.103 0.143 0.0971 0.108 
 
 
 
 
256 
 
 
 
A.22. Interaction Effect between Chairman Age and Firm Performance for Small 
Board (Board size < 5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction Profit Margin and Chairman Age (Small Board)
Interaction Qui Score and Chairman Age (Small Board)
Interaction ROA and Chairman Age (Small Board)
Interaction Stock Return and Chairman Age (Small Board)
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A.23. Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Age for Large Board (Board Size > 8). 
CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial performance measures and control 
variables. ageXroa is interaction variable between chair_age and roaf2. ageXret is interaction variable 
between chair_age and ret_bloom2. ageXpm is interaction variable between chair_age and prof_margin2.   
ageXqui is interaction variable between chair_age and quif. Year and industry (2-digit ICB code) are 
controlled for all models.   *, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, 
and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 age_roa age_ret age_pm age_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
chair_age -0.028** -0.038*** -0.023 0.138 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.105) 
outsider_code -0.063 -0.092 0.025 -0.033 
 (0.249) (0.264) (0.248) (0.264) 
ceo_tenure -0.009 -0.018 -0.020 -0.015 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
prop_ined 0.422 0.457 0.248 0.557 
 (0.904) (0.957) (0.929) (0.881) 
women_ned -1.431 -1.554 -1.489 -1.380 
 (1.041) (1.081) (1.093) (1.061) 
ln_employf 0.029 0.001 -0.036 -0.043 
 (0.062) (0.065) (0.066) (0.064) 
block -0.414 -0.305 -0.426 -0.372 
 (0.903) (0.949) (0.852) (0.930) 
firm_age 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
chair_tenure -0.014 -0.009 -0.016 -0.014 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
chair_func -0.658** -0.681** -0.617** -0.626** 
 (0.269) (0.286) (0.262) (0.267) 
involve -0.403 -0.503* -0.463* -0.411 
 (0.270) (0.288) (0.277) (0.278) 
roaf2 4.285    
 (3.327)    
ageXroa -0.089*    
 (0.054)    
ret_bloom2  0.017   
  (0.016)   
ageXret  -0.000*   
  (0.000)   
prof_margin2   -0.038  
   (0.122)  
ageXpm   0.000  
   (0.002)  
quif    0.120 
    (0.080) 
ageXqui    -0.002 
    (0.001) 
Constant -0.155 0.586 0.162 -9.776 
 (1.094) (1.146) (1.054) (6.939) 
     
Observations 1,712 1,568 1,641 1,599 
ll -327.8 -294.9 -321.4 -315.8 
r2_p 0.0705 0.0998 0.0631 0.0574 
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A.24. Interaction Effect between Chairman Age and Firm Performance for Large 
Board (Board Size > 8) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction Profit Margin and Chairman Age (Large Board)
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Interaction ROA and Chairman Age (Large Board)
Interaction Stock Return and Chairman Age (Large Board)
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A25. Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Age for Insider-Dominated  Board 
(prop_ined ≤ 0.5). CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial performance 
measures and control variables. ageXroa is interaction variable between chair_age and roaf2. ageXret is 
interaction variable between chair_age and ret_bloom2. ageXpm is interaction variable between 
chair_age and prof_margin2. ageXqui is interaction variable between chair_age and quif. Year and 
industry (2-digit ICB code) are controlled for all models.  *, **, and *** mean statistically different from 
zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. Robust standard errors are 
provided in parentheses.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 age_roa age_ret age_pm age_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
chair_age -0.012 -0.019** -0.013* 0.030 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.029) 
outsider_code 0.286** 0.205* 0.319** 0.281** 
 (0.117) (0.122) (0.126) (0.120) 
ceo_tenure 0.004 0.004 -0.008 0.001 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
board_size 0.033 0.042 0.050 0.037 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
women_ned 0.191 0.394 0.424 0.102 
 (0.426) (0.418) (0.444) (0.448) 
ln_employf -0.041 -0.114*** -0.141*** -0.088** 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.040) (0.037) 
block -0.592 -0.275 -0.302 -0.586 
 (0.402) (0.423) (0.422) (0.419) 
firm_age -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
chair_tenure -0.045** -0.044** -0.042** -0.045** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
chair_func -0.264** -0.298** -0.199 -0.300** 
 (0.120) (0.124) (0.129) (0.120) 
involve 0.015 -0.003 -0.011 0.005 
 (0.135) (0.140) (0.146) (0.137) 
roaf2 -1.166    
 (0.712)    
ageXroa 0.005    
 (0.012)    
ret_bloom2  -0.002   
  (0.005)   
ageXret  -0.000   
  (0.000)   
prof_margin2   -0.020  
   (0.019)  
ageXpm   0.000  
   (0.000)  
quif    0.019 
    (0.022) 
ageXqui    -0.001 
    (0.000) 
Constant -2.355*** -1.517*** -1.812*** -3.195* 
 (0.583) (0.581) (0.592) (1.745) 
     
Observations 6,265 5,814 5,680 6,048 
ll -1347 -1239 -1202 -1301 
r2_p 0.0547 0.0634 0.0390 0.0464 
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A.26. Interaction Effect between Chairman Age and Firm Performance for 
Insider-Dominated Board (Prop_ined ≤ 0.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction Profit Margin and Chairman Age (Insider Dominated Board)
Interaction Qui Score and Chairman Age (Insider Dominated Board)
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A.27. Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Age for Outsider-Dominated Board 
(Prop_ined > 0.5). CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial performance 
measures and control variables. ageXroa is interaction variable between chair_age and roaf2. ageXret is 
interaction variable between chair_age and ret_bloom2. ageXpm is interaction variable between 
chair_age and prof_margin2.   ageXqui is interaction variable between chair_age and quif. Year and 
industry (2-digit ICB code) are controlled for all models.    *, **, and *** mean statistically different 
from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. Robust standard 
errors are provided in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 age_roa age_ret age_pm age_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
chair_age -0.038*** -0.047*** -0.035** 0.070 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.064) 
outsider_code 0.180 0.029 0.132 0.237 
 (0.196) (0.209) (0.211) (0.200) 
ceo_tenure 0.007 -0.015 -0.015 -0.001 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032) 
board_size 0.091** 0.070 0.108** 0.081* 
 (0.044) (0.048) (0.046) (0.046) 
women_ned -0.196 -0.478 -0.190 -0.054 
 (0.857) (0.914) (0.883) (0.884) 
ln_employf -0.058 -0.065 -0.079 -0.073 
 (0.050) (0.053) (0.055) (0.049) 
block 0.108 -0.888 -0.404 0.071 
 (0.681) (0.797) (0.804) (0.695) 
firm_age 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
chair_tenure -0.047 -0.019 -0.033 -0.027 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.043) (0.041) 
chair_func -0.083 -0.132 -0.358 0.009 
 (0.315) (0.331) (0.324) (0.326) 
involve -0.198 -0.359 -0.451 -0.214 
 (0.259) (0.271) (0.286) (0.265) 
roaf2 0.799    
 (1.582)    
ageXroa -0.027    
 (0.025)    
ret_bloom2  0.006   
  (0.011)   
ageXret  -0.000   
  (0.000)   
prof_margin2   0.031  
   (0.043)  
ageXpm   -0.001  
   (0.001)  
quif    0.051 
    (0.050) 
ageXqui    -0.001 
    (0.001) 
Constant -1.108 0.078 -0.914 -5.486 
 (0.898) (0.968) (1.010) (3.952) 
     
Observations 2,256 2,056 2,079 2,202 
ll -467.7 -416.2 -410.7 -450.3 
r2_p 0.0540 0.0786 0.0581 0.0619 
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 A.28. Interaction Effect between Chairman Age and Firm Performance for 
Outsider-Dominated Board (Prop_ined > 0.5) 
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A.29. Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Tenure for All Observations. CEO 
turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial performance measures and control variables. 
tenureXroa is interaction variable between chair_tenure and roaf2. tenureXret is interaction variable 
between chair_tenure and ret_bloom2. tenureXpm is interaction variable between chair_tenure and 
prof_margin2.   tenureXqui is interaction variable between chair_tenure and quif. roaf2, ret_bloom2, 
prof_margin2 are winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent. Year and industry (2-digit ICB code) are 
controlled for all models.   *, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, 
and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 tenure_roa tenure_ret tenure_pm tenure_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
chair_tenure -0.046*** -0.047** -0.040** 0.013 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.064) 
outsider_code 0.268*** 0.176* 0.290*** 0.279*** 
 (0.100) (0.105) (0.108) (0.102) 
ceo_tenure 0.002 -0.003 -0.012 -0.001 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
prop_ined -0.240 -0.116 -0.561 -0.268 
 (0.320) (0.328) (0.343) (0.317) 
board_size 0.049* 0.050* 0.071*** 0.048* 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
women_ned 0.029 0.220 0.281 0.002 
 (0.391) (0.395) (0.409) (0.413) 
ln_employf -0.031 -0.085*** -0.097*** -0.061** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.030) 
block -0.416 -0.416 -0.310 -0.388 
 (0.344) (0.374) (0.371) (0.354) 
firm_age -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
independent_origin 0.139 0.089 0.088 0.102 
 (0.107) (0.111) (0.114) (0.107) 
chair_age -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
chair_func -0.246** -0.268** -0.191 -0.247** 
 (0.114) (0.116) (0.121) (0.115) 
involve -0.051 -0.102 -0.123 -0.059 
 (0.119) (0.124) (0.127) (0.121) 
roaf2 -0.801***    
 (0.140)    
tenureXroa -0.014    
 (0.029)    
ret_bloom2  -0.006***   
  (0.001)   
tenureXret  -0.000*   
  (0.000)   
prof_margin2   -0.011**  
   (0.005)  
tenureXpm   0.001  
   (0.001)  
quif    -0.014*** 
    (0.004) 
tenureXqui    -0.001 
    (0.001) 
Constant -1.995*** -1.388*** -1.592*** -0.542 
 (0.457) (0.466) (0.490) (0.554) 
     
Observations 8,507 7,916 7,749 8,237 
ll -1821 -1667 -1622 -1759 
r2_p 0.0497 0.0622 0.0385 0.0445 
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A.30. Interaction Effect between Firm Performance and Chairman Tenure for All 
Observations 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction Profit Margin and Chairman Tenure (All Observations)
Interaction Qui Score and Chairman Tenure (All Observations)
Interaction ROA and Chairman Tenure (All Observations)
Interaction Stock Return and Chairman Tenure (All Observations)
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A.31. Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Tenure for Small Board (Board Size < 
5). CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial performance measures and control 
variables. tenureXroa is interaction variable between chair_tenure and roaf2. tenureXret is interaction 
variable between chair_tenure and ret_bloom2. tenureXpm is interaction variable between chair_tenure 
and prof_margin2.   tenureXqui is interaction variable between chair_tenure and quif. Year and industry 
(2-digit ICB code) are controlled for all models.   *, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 
10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. Robust standard errors are 
provided in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 tenure_roa tenure_ret tenure_pm tenure_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
chair_tenure 0.028 0.034 0.036 0.254* 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.029) (0.150) 
outsider_code -0.068 -0.465 -0.102 -0.205 
 (0.359) (0.375) (0.409) (0.370) 
ceo_tenure -0.001 -0.009 -0.016 -0.014 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.041) 
prop_ined -0.379 -0.011 -1.374 0.039 
 (0.901) (0.940) (1.090) (0.895) 
women_ned 0.302 0.463 1.018 0.722 
 (0.788) (0.838) (0.818) (0.714) 
ln_employf 0.028 -0.115 -0.161 -0.048 
 (0.111) (0.119) (0.125) (0.126) 
block -1.612 -1.534 -2.043 -1.753 
 (1.043) (1.109) (1.300) (1.122) 
firm_age -0.014 -0.012 -0.010 -0.009 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
independent_origin 0.125 -0.057 0.107 -0.163 
 (0.392) (0.393) (0.434) (0.387) 
chair_age -0.043** -0.056** -0.048** -0.050** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) 
chair_func -0.547 -0.740** -0.396 -0.627 
 (0.392) (0.371) (0.415) (0.383) 
involve 0.068 -0.082 -0.104 -0.122 
 (0.381) (0.382) (0.455) (0.404) 
roaf2 -0.911**    
 (0.434)    
tenureXroa 0.025    
 (0.082)    
ret_bloom2  -0.010***   
  (0.003)   
tenureXret  0.000   
  (0.000)   
prof_margin2   -0.006  
   (0.013)  
tenureXpm   0.001  
   (0.002)  
quif    -0.001 
    (0.013) 
tenureXqui    -0.002 
    (0.002) 
Constant 0.325 1.885 0.658 1.468 
 (1.469) (1.512) (1.886) (1.832) 
     
Observations 952 861 802 913 
ll -199.4 -184.0 -163.9 -192.1 
r2_p 0.0986 0.144 0.0980 0.111 
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A.32. Interaction Effect between Chairman Tenure and Firm Performance for 
Small Board (Boar Size < 5) 
Interaction Profit Margin and Chairman Tenure (Small Board)
Interaction Qui Score and Chairman Tenure (Small Board)
Interaction ROA and Chairman Tenure (Small Board)
Interaction Stock Return and Chairman Tenure (Small Board)
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A.33. Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Tenure for Large Board (Board Size > 
8). CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial performance measures and control 
variables. tenureXroa is interaction variable between chair_tenure and roaf2. tenureXret is interaction 
variable between chair_tenure and ret_bloom2. tenureXpm is interaction variable between chair_tenure 
and prof_margin2.   tenureXqui is interaction variable between chair_tenure and quif. Year and industry 
(2-digit ICB code) are controlled for all models.   *, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 
10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. Robust standard errors are 
provided in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 tenure_roa tenure_ret tenure_pm tenure_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
chair_tenure -0.012 -0.011 -0.015 -0.302 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.200) 
outsider_code -0.084 -0.104 0.009 -0.043 
 (0.251) (0.266) (0.252) (0.265) 
ceo_tenure -0.006 -0.018 -0.020 -0.013 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
prop_ined 0.306 0.347 0.131 0.535 
 (0.960) (1.024) (0.981) (0.947) 
women_ned -1.410 -1.551 -1.524 -1.489 
 (1.042) (1.067) (1.077) (1.040) 
ln_employf 0.038 -0.003 -0.030 -0.041 
 (0.062) (0.066) (0.067) (0.065) 
block -0.310 -0.318 -0.416 -0.460 
 (0.865) (0.944) (0.852) (0.908) 
firm_age 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
independent_origin 0.061 0.110 0.127 0.030 
 (0.274) (0.283) (0.272) (0.273) 
chair_age -0.027* -0.036** -0.024* -0.031** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
chair_func -0.627** -0.693** -0.644** -0.639** 
 (0.271) (0.286) (0.267) (0.266) 
involve -0.396 -0.500* -0.467* -0.411 
 (0.271) (0.291) (0.277) (0.288) 
roaf2 -0.710    
 (0.494)    
tenureXroa -0.184**    
 (0.092)    
ret_bloom2  -0.009***   
  (0.003)   
tenureXret  -0.001   
  (0.000)   
prof_margin2   -0.023  
   (0.034)  
tenureXpm   -0.000  
   (0.006)  
quif    -0.013 
    (0.012) 
tenureXqui    0.003 
    (0.002) 
Constant -0.255 0.635 0.205 1.656 
 (1.120) (1.173) (1.074) (1.547) 
     
Observations 1,712 1,568 1,641 1,599 
ll -327.6 -295.2 -321.3 -315.9 
r2_p 0.0711 0.0987 0.0634 0.0570 
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A.34. Interaction Effect between Chairman Tenure and Firm Performance for 
Large Board (Board Size > 8).  
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction Profit Margin and Chairman Tenure (Large Board)
Interaction Qui Score and Chairman Tenure (Large Board)
Interaction ROA and Chairman Tenure (Large Board)
Interaction Stock Return and Chairman Tenure (Large Board)
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A.35. Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Tenure for Insider-Dominated Board 
(Prop_ined ≤ 0.5). CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial performance 
measures and control variables. tenureXroa is interaction variable between chair_tenure and roaf2. 
tenureXret_bloom2 is interaction variable between chair_tenure and ret_bloom2. tenureXpm is 
interaction variable between chair_tenure and prof_margin2.   tenureXqui is interaction variable between 
chair_tenure and quif. Year and industry (2-digit ICB code) are controlled for all models.   *, **, and *** 
mean statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance 
respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 tenure_roa tenure_ret tenure_pm tenure_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
roaf2 -0.838***    
 (0.152)    
chair_tenure -0.043** -0.049** -0.039** 0.046 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.067) 
tenureXroa -0.008    
 (0.033)    
outsider_code 0.287** 0.204* 0.326*** 0.270** 
 (0.117) (0.123) (0.127) (0.121) 
ceo_tenure 0.004 0.004 -0.007 -0.000 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
board_size 0.033 0.042 0.050 0.039 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
women_ned 0.123 0.353 0.390 0.077 
 (0.426) (0.429) (0.446) (0.453) 
ln_employf -0.036 -0.110*** -0.140*** -0.083** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.038) 
block -0.563 -0.271 -0.293 -0.527 
 (0.403) (0.427) (0.423) (0.418) 
firm_age -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
independent_origin 0.184 0.149 0.082 0.120 
 (0.115) (0.119) (0.123) (0.116) 
chair_age -0.015** -0.016** -0.015* -0.015** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
chair_func -0.301** -0.324*** -0.220* -0.320*** 
 (0.122) (0.125) (0.131) (0.122) 
involve 0.004 -0.015 -0.007 -0.013 
 (0.135) (0.141) (0.145) (0.138) 
ret_bloom2  -0.006***   
  (0.001)   
tenureXret  -0.000   
  (0.000)   
prof_margin2   -0.011*  
   (0.006)  
tenureXpm   0.002  
   (0.001)  
quif    -0.010** 
    (0.005) 
tenureXqui    -0.001 
    (0.001) 
Constant -2.227*** -1.683*** -1.747*** -0.908 
 (0.551) (0.560) (0.585) (0.635) 
     
Observations 6,249 5,807 5,666 6,032 
ll -1343 -1237 -1200 -1298 
r2_p 0.0549 0.0646 0.0399 0.0466 
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A.36. Interaction Effect between Chairman Tenure and Firm Performance for 
Insider-Dominated Board (prop_ined ≤ 0.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction Profit Margin and Chairman Tenure (Insider Dominated Board)
Interaction Qui Score and Chairman Tenure (Insider Dominated Board)
Interaction ROA and Chairman Tenure (Insider Dominated Board)
Interaction Stock Return and Chairman Tenure (Insider Dominated Board)
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A.37. Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Tenure for Outsider-Dominated 
Board (Prop_ined > 0.5). CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial 
performance measures and control variables. tenureXroa is interaction variable between chair_tenure and 
roaf2. tenureXret is interaction variable between chair_tenure and ret_bloom2. tenureXpm is interaction 
variable between chair_tenure and prof_margin2.   tenureXqui is interaction variable between 
chair_tenure and quif. Year and industry (2-digit ICB code) are controlled for all models.   *, **, and *** 
mean statistically different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance 
respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 tenure_roa tenure_ret tenure_pm tenure_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
roaf2 -0.895**    
 (0.379)    
chair_tenure -0.049 -0.031 -0.035 -0.172 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.042) (0.194) 
tenureXroa 0.001    
 (0.058)    
outsider_code 0.191 0.053 0.152 0.264 
 (0.198) (0.210) (0.216) (0.204) 
ceo_tenure 0.006 -0.015 -0.016 0.003 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032) 
board_size 0.083* 0.058 0.102** 0.074 
 (0.046) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) 
women_ned -0.135 -0.403 -0.147 0.074 
 (0.859) (0.917) (0.884) (0.877) 
ln_employf -0.058 -0.071 -0.083 -0.073 
 (0.050) (0.053) (0.055) (0.049) 
block 0.186 -0.823 -0.308 0.143 
 (0.663) (0.783) (0.796) (0.658) 
firm_age 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
independent_origin -0.197 -0.325 -0.189 -0.191 
 (0.233) (0.236) (0.253) (0.237) 
chair_age -0.032** -0.037** -0.029** -0.026** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) 
chair_func 0.009 -0.041 -0.270 0.096 
 (0.346) (0.351) (0.356) (0.355) 
involve -0.208 -0.336 -0.453 -0.190 
 (0.260) (0.272) (0.288) (0.267) 
ret_bloom2  -0.007***   
  (0.002)   
tenureXret  -0.000   
  (0.000)   
prof_margin2   -0.011  
   (0.011)  
tenureXpm   -0.000  
   (0.002)  
quif    -0.029*** 
    (0.009) 
tenureXqui    0.002 
    (0.002) 
Constant -1.365 -0.151 -1.063 0.769 
 (0.864) (0.952) (0.996) (1.159) 
     
Observations 2,253 2,056 2,078 2,200 
ll -467.1 -415.8 -410.8 -450.4 
r2_p 0.0548 0.0797 0.0579 0.0614 
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A.38. Interaction Effect between Chairman Tenure and Firm Performance for 
Outsider-Dominated Board (Prop_ined > 0.5) 
Interaction Profit Margin and Chairman Tenure (Outsider Dominated Board)
Interaction Qui Score and Chairman Tenure (Outsider Dominated Board)
Interaction ROA and Chairman Tenure (Outsider Dominated Board)
Interaction Stock Return and Chairman Tenure (Outsider Dominated Board)
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A.39. Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Involvement for All Observations. 
CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial performance measures and control 
variables. involveXroa is interaction variable between involve and roaf2. involveXret is interaction 
variable between involve and ret_bloom2. involveXpm is interaction variable between involve and 
prof_margin2.   involveXqui is interaction variable between involve and quif. Year and industry (2-digit 
ICB code) are controlled for all models.   *, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 per 
cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in 
parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 invol_roa invol_ret invol_pm invol_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
involve -0.110 -0.051 -0.119 0.298 
 (0.126) (0.137) (0.130) (0.448) 
outsider_code 0.268*** 0.178* 0.291*** 0.282*** 
 (0.100) (0.105) (0.108) (0.102) 
ceo_tenure 0.001 -0.001 -0.012 -0.002 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
prop_ined -0.248 -0.104 -0.555 -0.264 
 (0.318) (0.329) (0.343) (0.318) 
board_size 0.049** 0.049* 0.071*** 0.049* 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
women_ned 0.028 0.221 0.286 0.003 
 (0.389) (0.390) (0.409) (0.412) 
ln_employf -0.031 -0.085*** -0.097*** -0.062** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.030) 
block -0.412 -0.422 -0.305 -0.387 
 (0.344) (0.374) (0.370) (0.355) 
firm_age -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
independent_origin 0.142 0.084 0.086 0.103 
 (0.107) (0.111) (0.114) (0.107) 
chair_age -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
chair_func -0.246** -0.269** -0.189 -0.244** 
 (0.114) (0.116) (0.121) (0.115) 
chair_tenure -0.043** -0.042** -0.041** -0.041** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
roaf2 -0.757***    
 (0.117)    
involveXroa -0.246    
 (0.180)    
ret_bloom2  -0.007***   
  (0.001)   
involveXret  0.001   
  (0.001)   
prof_margin2   -0.008*  
   (0.004)  
involveXpm   0.002  
   (0.006)  
quif    -0.015*** 
    (0.004) 
involveXqui    -0.005 
    (0.006) 
Constant -2.000*** -1.455*** -1.589*** -0.508 
 (0.457) (0.465) (0.490) (0.547) 
     
Observations 8,507 7,916 7,749 8,237 
ll -1820 -1668 -1622 -1759 
r2_p 0.0501 0.0616 0.0383 0.0444 
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A.40. Interaction Effect between Firm Performance and Chairman Involvement 
for All Observation 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction Profit Margin and Chairman Involvement (All Observations)
Interaction Qui Score and Chairman Involvement (All Observations)
Interaction ROA and Chairman Involvement (All Observations)
Interaction Stock Return and Chairman Involvement (All Observations)
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A.41. Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Involvement for Small Board (Board 
Size 5). CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial performance measures and 
control variables. involveXroa is interaction variable between involve and roaf2. involveXret is 
interaction variable between involve and ret_bloom2. involveXpm is interaction variable between involve 
and prof_margin2.   involveXqui is interaction variable between involve and quif. Year and industry (2-
digit ICB code) are controlled for all models.    *, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 
per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. Robust standard errors are provided 
in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 invol_roa invol_ret invol_pm invol_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
involve 0.121 0.175 -0.183 -0.744 
 (0.436) (0.437) (0.471) (1.065) 
outsider_code -0.065 -0.440 -0.085 -0.196 
 (0.361) (0.369) (0.416) (0.368) 
ceo_tenure -0.001 -0.007 -0.018 -0.003 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.039) 
prop_ined -0.365 0.022 -1.339 -0.036 
 (0.900) (0.927) (1.083) (0.897) 
women_ned 0.314 0.433 1.062 0.566 
 (0.774) (0.812) (0.807) (0.699) 
ln_employf 0.030 -0.114 -0.158 -0.070 
 (0.112) (0.121) (0.125) (0.125) 
block -1.577 -1.610 -2.053 -1.795 
 (1.056) (1.129) (1.301) (1.129) 
firm_age -0.014 -0.013 -0.009 -0.011 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
independent_origin 0.123 -0.052 0.075 -0.117 
 (0.388) (0.389) (0.433) (0.385) 
chair_age -0.043** -0.056** -0.049** -0.050** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) 
chair_func -0.534 -0.696* -0.382 -0.685* 
 (0.382) (0.370) (0.414) (0.364) 
chair_tenure 0.026 0.028 0.038 0.029 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.030) (0.027) 
roaf2 -0.864***    
 (0.307)    
involveXroa 0.125    
 (0.456)    
ret_bloom2  -0.010***   
  (0.003)   
involveXret  0.005   
  (0.004)   
prof_margin2   0.001  
   (0.012)  
involveXpm   -0.010  
   (0.019)  
quif    -0.014 
    (0.011) 
involveXqui    0.009 
    (0.015) 
Constant 0.270 1.763 0.612 2.707* 
 (1.467) (1.526) (1.890) (1.621) 
     
Observations 952 861 802 913 
ll -199.4 -183.5 -163.8 -192.8 
r2_p 0.0985 0.147 0.0986 0.107 
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A.42. Interaction Effect between Chairman Involvement and Firm Performance 
for Small Board (Board Size < 5) 
 
 
 
Interaction Profit Margin and Chairman Involvement (Small Board)
Interaction Qui Score and Chairman Involvement (Small Board)
Interaction ROA and Chairman Involvement (Small Board)
Interaction Stock Return and Chairman Involvement (Small Board)
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A.43. Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Involvement for Large Board (Board 
Size > 8). CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial performance measures and 
control variables. involveXroa is interaction variable between involve and roaf2. involveXret is 
interaction variable between involve and ret_bloom2. involveXpm is interaction variable between involve 
and prof_margin2.   involveXqui is interaction variable between involve and quif. Year and industry (2-
digit ICB code) are controlled for all models.   *, **, and *** mean statistically different from zero at 10 
per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. Robust standard errors are provided 
in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 invol_roa invol_ret invol_pm invol_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
roaf2 -0.437    
 (0.556)    
involve -0.515* -0.488 -0.521* -2.264 
 (0.275) (0.308) (0.281) (1.656) 
involveXroa -1.691**    
 (0.825)    
outsider_code -0.057 -0.105 0.014 -0.044 
 (0.250) (0.266) (0.251) (0.265) 
ceo_tenure -0.016 -0.015 -0.022 -0.012 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) 
prop_ined 0.390 0.434 0.103 0.498 
 (0.959) (1.023) (0.984) (0.951) 
women_ned -1.456 -1.575 -1.622 -1.531 
 (1.047) (1.074) (1.090) (1.044) 
ln_employf 0.027 -0.006 -0.029 -0.047 
 (0.062) (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) 
block -0.394 -0.366 -0.404 -0.433 
 (0.865) (0.943) (0.852) (0.903) 
firm_age 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
independent_origin 0.062 0.096 0.143 0.041 
 (0.275) (0.287) (0.273) (0.273) 
chair_age -0.028** -0.034** -0.022 -0.030** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
chair_func -0.595** -0.694** -0.614** -0.638** 
 (0.275) (0.290) (0.272) (0.266) 
chair_tenure -0.006 -0.007 -0.013 -0.018 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
ret_bloom2  -0.010***   
  (0.003)   
involveXret  -0.001   
  (0.004)   
prof_margin2   -0.003  
   (0.019)  
involveXpm   -0.042  
   (0.032)  
quif    -0.008 
    (0.010) 
involveXqui    0.022 
    (0.019) 
Constant -0.135 0.438 0.118 1.123 
 (1.112) (1.171) (1.086) (1.312) 
     
Observations 1,712 1,568 1,641 1,599 
ll -326.4 -296.2 -320.5 -316.3 
r2_p 0.0745 0.0958 0.0659 0.0558 
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A.44. Interaction Effect between Chairman Involvement and Firm Performance 
for Large Board (Board size > 8) 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction Profit Margin and Chairman Involvement (Large Board)
Interaction Qui Score and Chairman Involvement (Large Board)
Interaction ROA and Chairman Involvement (Large Board)
Interaction Stock Return and Chairman Involvement (Large Board)
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A.45. Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Involvement for Insider-Dominated 
Board (prop_ined ≤ 0.5). CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial 
performance measures and control variables. involveXroa is interaction variable between involve and 
roaf2. involveXret is interaction variable between involve and ret_bloom2. involveXpm is interaction 
variable between involve and prof_margin2.   involveXqui is interaction variable between involve and 
quif. Year and industry (2-digit ICB code) are controlled for all models.  *, **, and *** mean statistically 
different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. Robust 
standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 invol_roa invol_ret invol_pm invol_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
involve -0.037 0.043 0.015 0.405 
 (0.145) (0.158) (0.149) (0.503) 
outsider_code 0.288** 0.205* 0.327*** 0.277** 
 (0.117) (0.123) (0.127) (0.120) 
ceo_tenure 0.003 0.005 -0.007 -0.001 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
board_size 0.033 0.040 0.050 0.040 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
women_ned 0.121 0.350 0.394 0.073 
 (0.424) (0.422) (0.446) (0.453) 
ln_employf -0.037 -0.109*** -0.140*** -0.084** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.037) 
block -0.560 -0.282 -0.288 -0.522 
 (0.402) (0.427) (0.422) (0.419) 
firm_age -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
independent_origin 0.184 0.145 0.081 0.124 
 (0.115) (0.119) (0.123) (0.117) 
chair_age -0.015** -0.016** -0.015* -0.015** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
chair_func -0.303** -0.326*** -0.218* -0.319*** 
 (0.122) (0.125) (0.131) (0.122) 
chair_tenure -0.041** -0.045** -0.042** -0.043** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
roaf2 -0.814***    
 (0.126)    
involveXroa -0.146    
 (0.199)    
ret_bloom2  -0.007***   
  (0.001)   
involveXret  0.001   
  (0.002)   
prof_margin2   -0.008*  
   (0.005)  
involveXpm   0.006  
   (0.007)  
quif    -0.012*** 
    (0.004) 
involveXqui    -0.005 
    (0.006) 
Constant -2.228*** -1.736*** -1.751*** -0.788 
 (0.551) (0.559) (0.586) (0.641) 
     
Observations 6,249 5,807 5,666 6,032 
ll -1343 -1238 -1200 -1298 
r2_p 0.0551 0.0639 0.0397 0.0463 
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 A.46. Interaction Effect between Chairman Involvement and Firm Performance 
for Insider-Dominated Board(prop_ined ≤ 0.5) 
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A.47. Interaction between Firm Performance and Chairman Involvement for Outsider-Dominated 
Board (prop_ined > 0.5). CEO turnover is regressed with chairman characteristics, financial 
performance measures and control variables. involveXroa is interaction variable between involve and 
roaf2. involveXret is interaction variable between involve and ret_bloom2. involveXpm is interaction 
variable between involve and prof_margin2.   involveXqui is interaction variable between involve and 
quif. Year and industry (2-digit ICB code) are controlled for all models. *, **, and *** mean statistically 
different from zero at 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent level of significance respectively. Robust 
standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 invol_roa invol_ret invol_pm invol_qui 
VARIABLES force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover force_turnover 
     
involve -0.267 -0.293 -0.478 -0.112 
 (0.263) (0.291) (0.291) (1.051) 
outsider_code 0.189 0.054 0.151 0.270 
 (0.198) (0.212) (0.215) (0.203) 
ceo_tenure 0.002 -0.012 -0.017 0.002 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032) 
board_size 0.085* 0.059 0.102** 0.073 
 (0.046) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) 
women_ned -0.119 -0.373 -0.148 0.011 
 (0.858) (0.915) (0.883) (0.875) 
ln_employf -0.061 -0.072 -0.083 -0.070 
 (0.050) (0.053) (0.055) (0.049) 
block 0.187 -0.797 -0.302 0.191 
 (0.663) (0.788) (0.790) (0.661) 
firm_age 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
independent_origin -0.190 -0.330 -0.188 -0.186 
 (0.234) (0.237) (0.253) (0.237) 
chair_age -0.031** -0.036** -0.029* -0.026** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) 
chair_func 0.022 -0.035 -0.266 0.097 
 (0.350) (0.353) (0.357) (0.358) 
chair_tenure -0.047 -0.025 -0.034 -0.032 
 (0.040) (0.037) (0.042) (0.041) 
roaf2 -0.587*    
 (0.327)    
involveXroa -0.518    
 (0.457)    
ret_bloom2  -0.009***   
  (0.002)   
involveXret  0.001   
  (0.003)   
prof_margin2   -0.008  
   (0.010)  
involveXpm   -0.007  
   (0.013)  
quif    -0.024*** 
    (0.007) 
involveXqui    -0.001 
    (0.013) 
Constant -1.363 -0.270 -1.070 0.332 
 (0.869) (0.949) (0.994) (1.036) 
     
Observations 2,253 2,056 2,078 2,200 
ll -466.6 -416.0 -410.7 -450.7 
r2_p 0.0558 0.0791 0.0581 0.0607 
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 A.48. Interaction Effect between Chairman Involvement and Firm Performance 
for Outsider-Dominated Board (Prop_ined > 0.5
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Appendix B. The Stata Output of 2SLS Model 
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